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Empire  and  Armament 

The   Evolution   of   American  Imperialism 
and  the  Problem  of  National  Defence 


By 
Jennings  C.  Wise 

Late  Professor  Political  Science  and  International  Law 
Virginia  Military  Institute 


G.  P.  Putnam's  Sons 

New  York  and  London 

Gbe    "fcnicfterbocfcer    press 

1915 


Copyright,  1915 

BY 

JENNINGS    C.  WISE 


"Cbc  Ifcnfcfccrbocfeer  iprcss,  IRcw  U?orfe 


Go 

MAJOR-GENERAL  LEONARD  WOOD 


PREFACE 

IF  I  were  asked  to  state  what  I  believed  to  be  the 
most  practical  method  of  procedure  for  Ameri- 
can pacifists,  I  should  unhesitatingly  answer,  the 
honest  writing  of  history  for  the  rising  generation. 
It  may  be  patriotism  to  present  the  history  of 
one's  country  in  the  best  possible  light,  but,  in  the 
United  States,  we  have  gone  beyond  patriotism 
by  actually  misrepresenting  the  facts  to  our  own 
advantage.  It  is  just  that  kind  of  mistaken 
patriotism  which  tends  to  convince  the  American 
people  that  they  have  always  been  peculiarly  just 
and  pacific,  and  that  fosters  among  them  the 
growth  and  continuance  of  a  spirit  of  intolerance 
and  aggression.  The  American  people  should 
learn  from  history  that  the  United  States  has  not 
been  a  white  dove  among  political  hawks,  if  only 
that  they  may  profit  by  the  errors  that  have  been 
made  in  the  past.  If  they  were  fully  aware  how 
much  they  have  provoked  other  nations,  and  how 
little  they  have  really  contributed  to  the  cause  of 
international  peace,  concerning  which  they  talk 
so  much,  and  in  which,  by  reason  of  their  inde- 
fensive  condition,  their  interest  lies,  they  would 
regard  international  questions  with  a  spirit  more 
conducive  to  that  peace  they  profess  to  cherish. 


vi  Preface 

The  pacifists  should  impress  upon  Americans 
the  fact  that  foreign  nations  do  not  always  accept 
them  at  their  own  estimate,  but  naturally  look 
to  the  facts  of  history  which  are  capable  of  a 
construction  adverse  to  the  claim  that  the  Ameri- 
cans as  a  nation  are  of  a  peaceable,  exclusive,  un- 
aggressive nature.  We  may  with  some  assurance 
point  to  the  attitude  of  our  Government  in  the 
present  diplomatic  controversy  with  Germany  as 
evidence  of  the  pacific  nature  of  our  people,  but 
there  are  those  who  attribute  that  attitude  more 
to  a  natural  unwillingness  to  jeopardize  interests 
than  to  a,  real  love  of  peace.  Certain  it  is,  when 
his  rights  are  involved,  the  average  American  is 
not  yet  "too  proud  to  fight." 

In  this  study  of  the  evolution  of  American  im- 
perialism, it  has  been  sought  to  disclose  the  po- 
litical doctrines  which  gradually,  step  by  step,  led 
to  an  aggressive  national  expansion,  and  to  show 
that  between  imperialism,  with  all  its  dangers, 
and  militarism  there  exists  no  essential  connection. 
It  has  been  attempted,  without  cynicism,  to  stress 
the  fact  that  the  American  people  have  deluded 
themselves  into  believing  that,  because  they  were 
not  militaristic,  they  were  not  aggressive  or  mili- 
tant in  their  dealings  as  a  nation  with  the  world. 
This  it  was  attempted  to  do  by  dwelling  concur- 
rently upon  an  ever-readiness  on  their  part  to 
resort  to  force  to  attain  their  political  ends,  not- 
withstanding a  persistent  antipathy  for  militarism 
and  militaristic  policies;  that  inherent  antagonism 


Preface 


vu 


which  has  been  persistently  but  erroneously  cited 
as  proof  of  their  pacific  nature.  The  truth  is, 
popular  history,  in  its  utter  falsity  as  written  for 
Americans,  has  actually  succeeded  in  convincing 
them  that  they  are  the  most  exclusive,  amicable, 
and  just  people  in  the  world,  when  as  a  matter  of 
fact  they  have  "spoiled  for  a  fight"  on  every  occa- 
sion when  it  seemed  advantageous  for  them  to 
provoke  one,  and  have  officially  meddled  in  the 
affairs  of  every  country  with  which  they  have 
come  in  contact. 

Special  attention  has  been  devoted  to  Jefferson's 
inconsistencies,  not  for  lack  of  appreciation  of  his 
greatness,  but  because  his  characteristics  typify 
the  American  people  in  respect  to  their  sentiments 
on  war — self -professed  peacefulness  of  disposition 
coupled  with  an  underlying  spirit  of  keen  ag- 
gressiveness. 

That  the  United  States  has  become  a  great 
empire,  practically  without  fighting  for  its  ex- 
pansion, I  have  attempted  to  show  to  be  due  not 
to  the  fact  that  the  American  people  have  con- 
tributed greatly  to  the  avoidance  of  war,  but  be- 
cause they  have  not  been  sufficiently  opposed  in 
most  cases  to  make  war  necessary. 

The  Monroe  Doctrine  I  have  not  undertaken 
to  establish  as  good  or  bad,  wise  or  unwise;  but 
the  abuses  of  that  doctrine,  together  constituting 
our  present  Monroeism,  which  has  become  more 
of  a  national  fetich  than  a  national  shibboleth, 
I  have  pointed  out  as  sources  of  danger. 


viii  Preface 

American  imperialism  in  all  its  aggressiveness 
I  have  shown  to  have  been  based  on  a  doctrine 
which  has  long  been  held  up  as  a  peaceful  influence, 
a  fact  which  is  thoroughly  in  accord  with  the 
anomaly  of  American  national  character;  for  the 
Monroe  Doctrine,  as  shown  by  the  history  of  its 
pronouncement,  was  nothing  more  nor  less  than 
an  aggressive  measure  adroitly  veiled  in  words  of 
a  pacific  sound. 

It  is  not  in  a  cynical  spirit,  nor  through  lack  of 
patriotism,  that  I  have  endeavoured  to  picture 
Americans  as  others  see  us,  but  in  the  sincere  con- 
viction that  an  appreciation  of  the  defects  of  our 
national  character  may  aid  us  in  overcoming  those 
defects. 

I  may  have  erred  in  the  judgment  I  have  passed, 
I  may  have  been  influenced  too  greatly  by  foreign 
comment  and  criticism,  but  the  fact  remains  that 
abroad  the  impression  of  Americans  is  generally 
an  unfavourable  one  as  to  their  spirit  of  tolerance 
and  respect  for  foreign  rights.  The  reason  is, 
history  is  not  written  in  the  same  way  for  Ameri- 
cans and  for  foreigners.  Errors  exist  in  both 
versions,  it  is  true,  but  if  we  correct  our  own  by 
expunging  the  palpable  evasions  and  distortions 
of  fact,  we  shall  at  least  receive  credit  for  good 
faith,  and  the  frank  confession  of  political  sins 
in  the  past  will  do  much  to  prevent  their  repetition, 
as  well  as  to  convince  the  world  that  we  are  cog- 
nizant of  our  shortcomings  and  sincerely  desirous 
of  overcoming  them. 


Preface  ix 

Surely  it  cannot  be  unpatriotic  to  urge  upon 
Americans : 

"Make  it  thy  business  to  know  thyself,  which 
is  the  most  difficult  lesson  in  the  world." 

J.  C.  W. 

Lexington,  Virginia, 
June,  I,  1915. 


CONTENTS 

PAGE 

Preface       .......         v 

PART  I 

THE  EVOLUTION  OF  AMERICAN  IMPERIALISM 
The  Origin  of  a  National  Prejudice 


CHAPTER 

I. — Historical     .... 

II. — The  Revolutionary  Period   . 
III. — Inadequacy  of  the  Old  Policy 
IV. — The  Hamiltonian  Doctrine  . 

V. — The  Federal  Constitution    . 
VI. — The  Washingtonian  Doctrine 


3 

33 
38 
46 

57 


VII. — Jefferson  and  his  Military  Policy      76 

VIII. — What  Was  the  Jefferson  Doctrine 

of  War?     .....       87 

IX. — The  Clay-Calhoun  Doctrine         .106 

X. — The  Monroe  Doctrine  .         .121 

XI. — The  Jacksonian  Doctrine      .         .135 

XII. — The  Polk  Doctrine  of  Imperialism      156 


xii  Contents 


■AGE 


CHAPTER  PAGE 

XIII. — Jingoism  Rampant  .         .         .178 

XIV. — Imperialism  a  Fact:  Its  Dangers    .     193 

PART  II 

ARMAMENT  AND  THE  PROBLEM  OF  ADEQUATE 
NATIONAL  DEFENCE 

CHAPTER 

XV. — Adequate  Defence  Indispensable 

to  Pacifism         ....     227 

XVI. — Adequate    Defence    Confounded 

with  Militarism  .         .         .     250 

XVII. — The    Evolution    of    the    False 

Philosophy  of  War    .         .         .281 

XVIII. — What  Is  Adequate  National  De- 
fence?         312 

Bibliography 331 

Index 337 


PART  I 

THE  EVOLUTION  OF  AMERICAN  IMPERI- 
ALISM 

The  Origin  of  a  National  Prejudice 


CHAPTER  I 


HISTORICAL 


THE  armies  of  mediaeval  days  were  made  up  of 
the  retainers,  dependents,  and  followers  of 
the  nobility.  The  personnel  for  the  most  part  was 
unskilled,  but  a  sprinkling  of  professional  soldiers, 
men  who  had  acquired  experience  in  war  under 
many  banners  and  in  many  quarters,  were  ever  at 
hand  seeking  the  employment  of  baron  or  king, 
ready  to  shed  their  blood  in  the  cause  of  the  high- 
est bidder.  Many  of  the  celebrated  warriors  of 
feudal  days  whom  we  style  knights  were  nothing 
more  than  itinerant  soldiers  knighted  in  many 
cases  solely  for  their  personal  prowess  and  skill  at 
arms. 

Most  of  the  righting  in  which  the  untrained 
bands  of  the  Middle  Ages  engaged  was  petty  in 
nature,  and  even  when  the  king  summoned  his 
military  chieftains  to  assemble  their  nondescript 
forces  to  make  war  upon  the  so-called  common 
enemy,  the  cause  of  conflict  was  an  individual  and 
selfish  one,  or  at  best  an  unpopular  affair.  The 
plain  soldier  was  primarily  a  plain  civilian;  that 
is  his  welfare  lay  in  peace.     The  military  service 

3 


4  Empire  and  Armament 

he  was  called  upon  to  render  his  lord  became  a 
burden  by  reason  of  its  frequency,  and  his  own 
lack  of  personal  interest  in  the  issue.  But  he 
paid  his  rent  with  his  "sword  and  buckler,"  and 
when  the  landlord  called  for  the  use  of  the  vassal's 
good  right  arm,  with  a  curse  ~.nd  a  groan  the  plough 
was  left  in  the  furrow. 

What  was  a  burden  to  the  common  man  was  an 
opportunity  for  the  roving  professional  soldiery. 
The  interests  of  the  two  were  as  wide  apart  as  the 
sympathy  that  existed  between  them.  Small 
wonder  then  that  the  great  mass  of  the  people  in 
time  acquired  and  then  transmitted  intense  dis- 
trust and  hatred  of  the  "trained  soldier,"  to  whom 
they  attributed  so  many  of  their  ills.  The  feeling 
was  a  most  natural  one.  Not  only  were  the  pro- 
fessional warriors  closely  identified  in  the  minds 
of  the  people  with  the  useless  fighting  in  which  the 
common  man  suffered  most,  but  among  the  trained 
soldiers  there  were  none  of  the  lofty  ideals  we  find 
in  the  armies  of  today.  In  character,  the  profes- 
sional soldier  was  decidedly  inferior  to  the  un- 
skilled man  whom  he  regarded  with  such  contempt. 
And  then  there  was  slight  reward  for  the  plain 
man  who  did  his  duty  on  the  field  of  battle;  the 
fruits  of  victory  went  to  the  nobles  and  their  mili- 
tary experts ;  the  vassals  returned  to  their  neglected 
fields. 

The  success  of  the  king  invariably  meant  gifts 
of  land  or  privileges  to  the  military  caste.  The 
common  people  belonged  to  the  land.     The  more 


Historical  5 

ambitious  the  owner  of  the  land  the  greater  was 
the  military  burden  of  the  people.  It  was  natural, 
then,  that,  among  the  people,  military  service 
was  regarded  with  great  disfavour  in  an  age  when 
want  of  intellectual  occupation  made  war  the 
favourite  pastime  of  the  higher  classes. 

At  this  time,  military  science  was  unknown. 
Individual  prowess  and  bravery  won  battles,  the 
fate  of  a  battle  frequently  depending  on  a  personal 
combat  between  two  knights.  Under  such  cir- 
cumstances, the  science  of  war  could  never  attain 
a  high  degree  of  efficiency,  nor  could  any  general 
or  permanent  military  organization  be  effected 
whereby  to  relieve  the  common  man  of  his  ever- 
present  burden,  or  to  distribute  the  weight  of 
military  service  among  the  masses. 

The  Crusades  did  much  to  develop  the  idea  of 
co-operation  between  small  military  units  united 
for  common  action,  and  it  is  not  too  much  to  say 
that  to  them  may  be  traced  the  origin  of  larger 
and  more  permanent  armed  forces  than  had  been 
hitherto  employed.  But  it  was  not  until  the 
reign  of  Charles  VII.  of  France  that  any  regular 
attempt  at  organizing  a  standing  army  was  made, 
although  at  that  time  the  Turkish  janizaries  had 
been  in  existence  for  almost  a  century.  As  the 
demand  for  trained  soldiers  increased,  the  profes- 
sion of  arms  became  more  popular.  Not  only 
were  there  skilful  officers  now  to  be  had,  as  for- 
merly, for  a  price,  but  "men-at-arms,"  as  well; 
and  these  men  often  banded  together  under  their 


6  Empire  and  Armament 

own  leaders  and  sold  the  services  of  their  organiza- 
tion. The  Swiss  mercenaries  were  in  great  demand 
during  the  Middle  Ages,  their  superior  military 
qualities  often  successfully  deciding  the  issue  of  a 
battle.  The  employment  of  mercenaries  conse- 
quently became  popular,  and  soon  general;  so 
much  so  that  voluntary  patriotic  service  ceased 
altogether  and  also  the  practice  of  calling  upon 
quotas  of  unskilled  fighting  men.  The  mercenary 
was,  therefore,  in  a  sense  the  liberator  of  the  masses 
from  enforced  military  service,  except  in  time  of 
war.  In  their  freedom,  the  people  tasted  the 
sweets  of  peaceful  pursuits  and  grew  all  the  more 
antagonistic  to  compulsory  military  service.  While 
their  distaste  for  personal  military  service  even- 
tually became  traditional,  their  lack  of  respect  for 
the  professional  soldier,  or  the  mercenary,  was 
always  a  present  fact.  Recruited  from  the  very 
dregs  of  society,  and  often  of  foreign  blood,  the 
soldier,  and  consequently  the  profession  of  arms, 
fell  into  disrepute.  Even  the  redeeming  features 
of  knighthood  no  longer  existed,  for  chivalry  was 
sunk  in  a  system  of  organization  which  afforded 
no  opportunity  for  individual  feats  of  arms  and 
examples  of  personal  skill. 

Wide-spread  dissatisfaction  with  the  mercenary 
system  developed,  however,  with  the  increased 
dependence  upon  the  system.  The  great  expense 
of  maintaining  a  mercenary  force,  and  the  proven 
danger  of  intrusting  the  safety  of  the  state  to 
hired   foreigners  of  low  caste,   brought  about  a 


Historical  7 

reaction  which  led  directly  to  a  new  system. 
Gustavus  Adolphus,  Wallenstein,  Louis  XIV.  and 
his  great  marshals,  and  finally  Frederick  the 
Great,  each  contributed  something  to  military 
science  and  much  to  organization.  Together 
they  succeeded  in  reshouldering  the  military  bur- 
den upon  the  people,  although  all  of  them  to  some 
extent  employed  mercenaries  in  their  wars.  In 
theory,  however,  armies  during  the  seventeenth 
century  were  largely  composed  of  volunteers,  and 
the  people  were  more  or  less  free  to  serve  with  the 
colours  or  follow  peaceful  pursuits  as  they  saw  fit. 
Economic  and  social  conditions  were  such,  never- 
theless, that  while  no  man  was  forced  by  the 
state  to  serve  in  the  ranks,  yet,  in  fact,  he  was 
compelled  to  seek  a  livelihood  in  the  army.  It 
was  not  until  1798  that  France,  after  the  exhaus- 
tion of  her  great  levies  in  the  wars  she  waged  from 
1792  to  1797,  enacted  a  law  establishing  compul- 
sory military  service,  an  act  which  compelled  all 
Continental  Europe  to  follow  Napoleon's  example, 
so  that  today  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States 
alone  of  all  the  great  Powers  rely  on  volunteers 
for  their  armies. 

In  England,  the  development  has  been  some- 
what different  from  that  on  the  Continent,  and  in 
England,  we  find  the  source  of  American  ideals. 

The  right  to  bear  arms  was  inherent  in  .the 
English  people ;  in  fact,  under  early  laws,  was  com- 
pulsory. The  feudal  barons  who,  in  their  petty 
struggles  with  each  other,  laid  such  a  heavy  burden 


8  Empire  and  Armament 

upon  their  vassals,  were  in  turn  required  to  support 
their  king  in  war.  The  same  complaint  which  the 
people  made  against  the  barons,  the  barons  made 
against  the  king,  for  they  early  objected  to  being 
led  out  of  the  kingdom,  and  King  John's  insist- 
ence upon  foreign  service  was  the  principal  cause 
of  Runnymede.  The  objection  of  the  English 
people  to  foreign  service  at  the  sole  will  of  the 
king  or  chief  executive  is  reflected  in  every  Ameri- 
can constitutional  document. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  English  people  from  the 
first  displayed  the  keenest  antipathy  towards 
mercenaries.  Indeed,  there  were  practically  none 
employed  in  England  until  the  time  of  the  Stuarts, 
though  a  small  force  of  Italian  and  German — 
"Brabazon" — soldiers  were  hired  by  Henry  VI. 
in  1449,  with  which  to  suppress  Jack  Cade.  To 
their  employment  on  this  occasion  is  commonly 
attributed  the  preservation  of  English  freedom  and 
parliamentary  government. 

Removed  by  the  isolation  of  the  realm  from  the 
maelstrom  of  continuous  inter-state  strife  in 
Central  Europe,  the  people  of  the  British  Isles 
in  their  formative  period  principally  indulged 
their  warlike  tastes  in  intra-state  war.  The  wars 
of  the  Continent  had  a  direct  tendency  to  evolve 
a  greater  measure  of  central  military  power  in 
the  states  involved,  in  order  that  they  might 
contend  the  more  successfully  with  their  neigh- 
bours, and  in  as  much  as  a  centralized  power  was 
essential  to  the  existence  of  their  states,  the  people 


Historical  9 

submitted  more  or  less  willingly  to  the  process  of 
centralization.  But,  in  England,  where  frequent 
encroachments  from  the  outside  did  not  intervene 
to  compel  the  surrender  of  individual  liberties  in 
the  common  defence,  the  democratic  spirit  pre- 
vailed. Indeed,  not  only  were  the  very  causes 
which  led  the  people  of  the  Continent  to  accept 
militarism  almost  entirely  absent,  but  in  England, 
the  people  recognized  the  fact  that  centralized 
military  power  meant  for  them  a  compulsory  sur- 
render, without  compensating  advantages,  of 
control  over  the  state.  Consequently,  they  re- 
tained all  military  power  in  themselves,  relying 
upon  militia  rather  than  upon  a  trained  and  per- 
manent army  at  the  beck  and  call  of  a  ruler  or 
faction. 

The  objection  of  the  English  people  to  the  crea- 
tion of  an  army,  which  might  be  used  to  establish 
military  tribunals  and  to  overawe  the  people,  is 
apparent  in  a  long  range  of  constitutional  de- 
cisions and  statutes  of  the  realm.  There  are  many 
early  statutes  protesting  against  the  Laws  of  the 
Forest,  and  prohibiting  martial  law.  Indeed,  it 
is  difficult  to  discover  when  the  principle  that  the 
military  must  never  be  independent  of  or  superior 
to  the  civil  power  was  first  established.  The 
militia,  the  ancient  defence  of  the  realm,  was  re- 
vived only  seventeen  years  after  the  Norman  con- 
quest; the  Norman  ordeal  of  battle  was  abolished 
in  12 13.  So  zealously  have  the  English  people 
adhered  to  their  early  ideas  that  they  have  re- 


io  Empire  and  Armament 

tained  to  the  present  day  the  constitutional 
provision  requiring  the  annual  re-enactment  by 
Parliament  of  the  laws  for  the  government  of  the 
army  and  navy,  lest  those  laws  become  estab- 
lished by  custom  independent  of,  and  superior  to, 
the  authority  of  the  people. 

In  the  Petition  of  Rights  we  find  the  following 
significant  complaint: 

...  of  late  great  companies  of  soldiers  and  mari- 
ners have  been  dispersed  into  divers  counties  of  the 
realm,  and  the  inhabitants  against  their  wills  have 
been  compelled  to  receive  them  into  their  houses  and 
there  to  suffer  them  to  sojourn,  against  the  laws  and 
customs  of  this  realm.  ...   (31  Car.,  ii.) 

and  again : 

. . .  certain  persons  have  been  appointed  commission- 
ers, with  power  and  authority  to  proceed  .  .  .  accord- 
ing to  .  .  .  martial  law  .  .  .  and  by  such  summary 
course  and  order  as  is  agreeable  to  martial  law,  and  as 
is  used  in  armies  in  time  of  war,  to  proceed  to  the 
trial  and  condemnation  of  such  offenders,  and  then 
to  cause  to  be  executed  and  put  to  death  according 
to  the  law  martial.  By  pretext  whereof  some  of  your 
Majesty's  subjects  have  been  by  some  of  the  said 
commissioners  put  to  death,  when  and  where,  if  by 
the  laws  and  statutes  of  the  land  they  had  deserved 
death,  by  the  same  laws  and  statutes  also  they  might 
and  by  no  other  ought  to  have  been  judged  and  exe- 
cuted. 

.  .  .  and  that  the  foresaid  commissioners,  for  pro- 
ceeding by  martial  law,  may  be  revoked  and  annulled 


Historical  n 

.  .  .  that  your  Majesty  would  be  pleased  to  remove 
the  said  soldiers  and  mariners,  and  that  your  people 
may  not  be  so  burdened  in  time  to  come. 

In  the  Bill  of  Rights  we  also  find  significant 
clauses : 

That  the  subjects  which  are  Protestants  may  have 
arms  for  their  defence  suitable  to  their  conditions, 
and  as  allowed  by  law. 

That  the  raising  or  keeping  a  standing  army,  within 
the  Kingdom  in  time  of  peace,  unless  it  be  with  the 
consent  of  Parliament,  is  against  law.      (a.  d.  1688.) 

Knowing  what  were  the  early  sentiments  and 
convictions  of  the  English  people, — sentiments  and 
convictions  which  have  remained  unaltered  even 
by  three  centuries  of  armed  aggression  and  empire 
building, — it  is  not  difficult  to  understand  the 
views  of  the  colonial  Americans  with  respect  to 
military  service,  for  their  ideals  were  those  of  their 
native  country. 

Throughout  the  early  period  of  settlement  in 
the  American  Colonies,  the  old  English  localized 
militia  system  was  relied  upon  for  purposes  of 
defence  against  the  Indians,  the  French,  the 
Spanish,  the  Dutch,  or  whatever  enemy  might 
threaten.  Permanent  armed  forces  did  not  exist, 
though  all  men  were  liable  to  be  called  into  military 
service  when  needed. 

In  1754,  when  the  French  and  Indian  War 
threatened,  and  the  Lords  of  Trade  suggested  that 


12  Empire  and  Armament 

an  intercolonial  conference  be  held  for  the  purpose 
of  entering  into  "articles  of  union  and  confedera- 
tion with  each  other  for  mutual  defence  of  his 
Majesty's  subjects  and  interests  in  North  America 
in  time  of  peace  as  well  as  war,"  a  permanent 
armed  force  for  the  Colonies  was  first  discussed. 

On  June  19th,  commissioners  from  Massachusetts, 
Connecticut,  Rhode  Island,  Pennsylvania,  New 
York,  New  Hampshire,  and  Maryland  assembled 
at  Albany,  and,  after  arranging  for  the  participa- 
tion of  the  "Five  Nations"  in  the  war  as  allies  of 
the  Colonies,  adopted  with  some  modifications 
the  plan  proposed  by  Benjamin  Franklin  for  inter- 
colonial union.  This  plan  provided,  among  other 
things,  for  the  appointment  by  the  Crown  of  a 
President-general,  who  was  to  nominate  and  com- 
mission military  officers,  and  for  the  enlistment 
and  pay  of  troops  and  the  building  of  forts.  But 
the  plan  was  everywhere  opposed  and  rejected  by 
the  Colonies,  because  they  believed  its  adoption 
would  centralize  colonial  authority  to  such  an 
extent  that  the  king  could  more  readily  usurp  it, 
and  by  the  king  and  the  English  people  on  the 
ground  that  it  made  the  Colonies  too  powerful. 
The  final  action  in  this  first  attempt  at  union 
among  the  Colonies  is  a  striking  example  of  the 
Englishman's  inborn  distrust  of  centralized  power. 
The  very  people  the  plan  was  designed  to  benefit 
were  as  fearful  that  the  military  power  it  involved 
would  be  turned  against  them  as  the  Crown  was 
that  the  development  of  military  strength  in  the 


Historical  13 

Colonies  would  make  the  Colonials  too  inde- 
pendent— neither  was  willing  to  trust  an  army! 
And  here  we  should  pause  to  consider  how  pleased 
the  French  sovereign  would  have  been  had  he 
possessed  a  sturdy  body  of  colonial  subjects  in 
Canada  out  of  whom  to  create  an  army  of  20,000 
men  or  more. 


CHAPTER  II 

THE  REVOLUTIONARY  PERIOD 

ENGLAND'S  policy  throughout  the  colonial 
period  was  to  discourage  every  development 
among  her  American  Colonies  tending  towards 
independence  of  the  mother  country,  but  while 
she  succeeded  in  preventing  the  creation  of  a  force 
of  trained  soldiery,  and  saw  to  it  that  no  navy 
yards  and  arsenals  were  erected  in  the  Colonies, 
which  might  prove  to  be  dangerous  weapons  in  the 
hands  of  her  growing  children,  she  could  not  sup- 
press the  British  spirit  of  independence  which  her 
own  selfish  policy  aroused  in  them.  There  is  no 
need  here  to  trace  the  events  which  led  up  to  the 
American  Revolution.  Suffice  it  to  say  that,  in 
1774,  the  Colonies  began  preparations  for  an 
armed  conflict  with  Great  Britain. 

The  Congress  which  met  in  September  at  Phila- 
delphia adopted  a  military  measure  it  is  true,  a 
measure  providing  for  the  higher  officers  of  the 
force  to  be  raised,  for  the  training  of  the  troops, 
and  the  procuring  of  arms  and  supplies,  but  still 
the  old  plan  of  relying  on  the  militia  was  adhered 
to,   and  no   troops  were  to  be    called  out  until 


The  Revolutionary  Period  15 

actually  needed  for  active  service.  The  Second 
Provincial  Congress  which  met  in  Philadelphia  in 
May,  1775,  was  endowed  with  power  to  raise  and 
support  such  a  military  force  as  it  might  deem 
proper  to  resist  the  execution  of  the  acts  of  Par- 
liament. Under  the  powers  conferred  upon  it  by 
this  Congress,  the  Committee  of  Safety  under- 
took to  organize  militia  companies  and  regiments 
throughout  the  Colonies,  designating  a  third  part 
of  the  force  organized  on  paper  as  "minute  men," 
who  agreed  to  respond  promptly  to  the  call  of  the 
committee  when  needed.  Thus  we  see  that,  in 
spite  of  the  imminency  of  armed  conflict,  the  people 
of  the  Colonies  were  unable  to  abandon  their  old 
military  ideals  and  to  create  in  their  midst  a  reg- 
ularly organized  and  trained  body  of  soldiery. 
The  idea  of  a  "standing  army"  was  still  too  ab- 
horrent to  the  English-born  Colonial  to  be  seri- 
ously entertained  by  him,  and  the  events  of 
Lexington  and  Bunker  H  11  only  confirmed  him  in 
the  belief  that  militia  was  able  to  cope  success- 
fully with  the  best  trained  soldiery.  Accordingly, 
in  June,  1775,  the  Second  Continental  Congress 
resolved  that  the  militia  which  had  assembled 
about  Boston  from  the  various  Colonies  should 
be  employed  in  the  service  of  the  United  Colonies, 
and  with  this  army  commanded  by  George  Wash- 
ington, it  undertook  to  make  war  upon  the  well- 
organized  and  disciplined  British  troops. 

No  sooner,  however,  had  Washington  assumed 
command  of  the  nondescript  mob  of  17,000  mili- 


16  Empire  and  Armament 

tia  at  Cambridge  than  he  undertook  to  impress 
upon  Congress  the  necessity  of  providing  an  army 
which  would  owe  its  allegiance  to  the  United 
Colonies  exclusively.  Obedient  to  Washington's 
will,  Congress,  by  resolution  of  June,  1775,  author- 
ized the  raising  of  ten  companies  of  riflemen  in 
Pennsylvania,  Maryland,  and  Virginia;  but  so 
great  was  the  fear  of  a  standing  army  that  the 
term  of  enlistment  of  the  regular  troops  was  fixed 
at  one  year.  The  force  originally  authorized  was 
soon  augmented,  but,  at  this  time,  nothing  could 
induce  the  extension  of  the  prescribed  term  of 
service  for  the  Continental  troops. 

In  July,  1775,  still  jealous  of  the  growth  of  mili- 
tary power,  instead  of  providing  for  the  mainte- 
nance of  an  adequate  army  subject  only  to  its 
own  authority,  Congress  contented  itself  with 
recommending  to  the  Colonies  that  all  effective 
men  between  sixteen  and  fifty  years  of  age  be 
formed  into  companies  of  militia  with  elective 
officers,  which  militia  could  be  called  out  only 
with  the  consent  of  the  colonial  legislatures  and 
was  not  subject  to  service  beyond  the  borders  of 
the  Colony  to  which  it  belonged.  It  did,  however, 
empower  Washington  to  maintain  around  Boston 
an  army  not  to  exceed  22,000  men;  but  no  pro- 
vision whatever  was  made  as  to  how  he  should 
maintain  them,  and  as  most  of  the  militia  had 
only  enlisted  to  serve  to  December  1st,  a  serious 
problem  presented  itself. 

The  necessity  of  providing  troops  to  take  the 


The  Revolutionary  Period  17 

place  of  those  whose  enlistments  would  expire 
within  the  year,  led  Congress  to  appoint  a  special 
committee  to  confer  with  Washington  and  the 
Colonies  of  Massachusetts,  Connecticut,  Rhode 
Island,  and  New  Hampshire.  In  October,  the 
committee  reported  that  an  army  of  about  20,000 
men  should  be  organized,  and  Congress  called 
upon  the  four  Colonies  consulted  to  furnish  their 
proportionate  quotas  of  this  number  to  serve 
until  January  15th  following.  But  enlistments 
were  very  slow,  so  slow,  in  fact,  that  late  in  Decem- 
ber but  6000  men  had  been  enrolled.  It  is  need- 
less to  add  that  the  discipline  among  the  troops  at 
Washington's  disposal  was  such  as  to  render  them 
totally  ineffective. 

The  Continental  Congress  of  1775  should  not 
be  charged  with  too  much  blame  for  the  inadequate 
measures  it  adopted,  for  the  Colonies  intentionally 
withheld  from  their  representatives  the  power  to 
enforce  effective  measures  for  defence.  Having 
no  authority  to  levy  taxes  or  to  raise  revenue,  the 
Congress  was  after  all  but  an  advisory  body,  with- 
out real  power  to  raise  or  support  a  single  soldier. 
Nor  was  it  intended  that  it  should  exercise  such 
power.  General  Upton  has  fully  set  forth  in  his 
unanswerable  book — The  Military  Policy  of  the 
JJyiited  States — the  evils  in  all  stages  of  our  history 
of  the  American  military  policy.  It  is  designed 
here  only  to  develop  the  nature  of  that  policy  and 
to  examine  into  the  underlying  reasons  for  the 
support  it  has  commanded. 


18  Empire  and  Armament 

During  the  first  part  of  the  year  1776,  the  Con- 
tinental Congress  was  induced  to  augment  the 
regular  army  little  by  little,  always  safeguarding 
against  too  much  regularly  organized  military 
strength.  Many  of  the  benefits  that  might  have 
been  derived  from  the  gradual  extension  of  the 
term  of  enlistment  for  the  regulars  were  lost 
through  the  failure  of  Congress  to  provide  for  the 
extension  of  the  term  of  enlistment  in  the  militia. 
Very  naturally,  men  preferred  short  term  service 
in  the  "home"  militia  to  long  enlistments  in  more 
severely  disciplined  organizations  subject  to  the 
call  of  Congress.  This  preference  rendered  it 
almost  impossible  to  keep  up  the  Continental  army 
at  more  than  half  its  authorized  strength,  a 
strength  which  was  never  allowed,  even  on  paper, 
to  approach  that  of  the  militia. 

The  sentiment  of  the  people  of  the  Colonies  is 
well  expressed  in  the  Virginia  Bill  of  Rights,  drafted 
by  George  Mason,  and  adopted  by  the  Virginia 
Convention  June  15,  1776,  in  which  it  is  declared: 

That  a  well  regulated  militia,  composed  of  the  body 
of  -the  people,  trained  to  arms,  is  the  proper,  natural, 
and  safe  defence  of  a  free  state;  that  standing  armies 
in  time  of  peace  should  be  avoided  as  dangerous  to 
liberty;  and  that  in  all  cases  the  military  should  be 
under  strict  subordination  to,  and  governed  by,  the 
civil  power. 

One  need  only  compare  the  words  in  the  Virginia 
Bill  of  Rights  with  those  in  the  British  Declaration 


The  Revolutionary  Period  19 

of  Rights  to  see  that  no  change  of  sentiment  with 
respect  to  standing  armies  had  come  about  among 
Englishmen  since  William  and  Mary  ascended  the 
throne. 

It  was  not  until  five  days  after  Virginia  declared 
her  independence  of  Great  Britain  that  the  Con- 
tinental Congress  promulgated  the  "Declaration 
of  Independence"  for  the  United  Colonies.  In 
that  declaration,  many  grievances  against  the 
King  were  specified,  among  which  were  the  fol- 
lowing : 

He  has  kept  among  us,  in  times  of  peace,  standing 
armies,  without  the  consent  of  our  legislatures. 
(Clause  15.) 

For  quartering  large  bodies  of  armed  troops  among 
us;  For  protecting  them,  by  a  mock  trial,  from  punish- 
ment for  any  murders  which  they  should  commit  on 
the  inhabitants  of  these  States.     (Clauses  18  and  19.) 

These  grievances  should  also  be  compared  with 
those  set  forth  in  the  British  Petition  of  Rights. 

Having  braced  themselves,  under  Virginia's 
leadership,  to  take  the  irretrievable  step  of  declar- 
ing their  political  independence  of  Great  Britain, 
upon  first  consideration  it  seems  strange  that  the 
Colonies  should  have  continued  a  course  of  inde- 
cision, and  that  they  should  have  failed  to  adopt 
well-digested  measures  for  the  expulsion  of  the 
British  troops  from  American  soil.  In  raising  an 
effective  army  of  such  size  as  to  overwhelm  the 


20  ■  Empire  and  Armament 

few  British  troops  on  this  continent,  the  old  risk 
of  providing  the  king  with  an  instrument  of  coer- 
cion no  longer  existed,  but  what,  upon  cursory 
consideration,  seems  inexplicable,  is,  in  fact, 
readily  accounted  for.  The  truth  is,  the  Colonies 
were  in  1776,' and  for  years  thereafter,  as  jealous 
and  fearful  of  each  other  as  so  many  individual 
states,  highly  conscious  of  their  own  weakness  and 
given  to  exaggerate  the  strength  and  unfriendly 
designs  of  the  others,  are  today  wont  to  be.  To 
understand  the  condition  of  affairs  existing  in 
1776,  one  must  constantly  bear  in  mind  the  fact 
of  the  wide  diversity  of  interests  among  the  Colo- 
nies, and  that  not  only  had  there  been  no  fusion 
of  interests  in  the  heat  of  a  common  cause,  but 
that  on  the  contrary  there  actually  existed  serious 
antagonisms  born  of  the  most  diverse  political 
and  economic  situations.  Consequently,  the  Con- 
tinental Congress  was  not  a  central  executive 
body  with  plenary  power  to  act  for  the  common 
welfare  of  the  Colonies,  but  a  mere  body  of  colonial 
agents  whose  prime  function  was  to  yield  up  as 
little  and  to  secure  as  much  for  their  respective 
principals  as  shrewdness  and  selfish  intrigue  might 
enable  them  to  do.  These  are  unpleasant  facts, 
but  they  are  amply  borne  out  by  the  history  of 
the  Revolutionary  War,  in  which  we  search  in 
vain  for  evidence  of  any  real  willingness  on  the 
part  of  most  of  the  Colonies  to  afford  material 
support  to  the  war  when  the  invading  armies  had 
departed  from  their  own  territory,  or  when  the 


The  Revolutionary  Period  21 

threat  of  bringing  the  war  home  to  them  was  even 
temporarily  averted. 

During  the  Revolution  [wrote  Upton],  the  intense 
feeling  of  opposition  to  a  standing  army  almost 
wrought  the  ruin  of  our  cause.  Since  then,  this 
feeling  has  been  diligently  kept  up  and  has  formulated 
itself  into  the  maxim  that  "A  standing  army  is  dan- 
gerous to  liberty." 

The  maxim  quoted  by  Upton  has  by  no  means 
been  formulated  since  the  Revolutionary  War,  as 
he  seemed  to  believe.  It  was  formulated,  as  we 
have  seen,  in  England  centuries  before  that  war. 
It  was  the  general  adherence  of  Englishmen  to 
the  time-worn  principle  expressed  in  this  maxim 
that  made  Washington's  task  so  onerous,  and 
compelled  him,  at  Harlem  Heights  on  the  24th 
of  September  just  after  the  militia  under  his  com- 
mand had  been  driven  like  a  flock  of  sheep  from 
Long  Island  by  the  British,  to  address  to  the 
President  of  Congress  that  memorable  letter,  in 
which  he  said : 

"To  place  any  dependence  upon  militia  is  as- 
suredly resting  upon  a  broken  staff." 

Referring  to  the  attitude  of  the  people  of  the 
Colonies  towards  regular  troops  in  the  same  letter 
he  wrote: 

The  jealousy  of  a  standing  army,  and  the  evils  to 
be  apprehended  from  one,  are  remote,  and,  in  my 
judgment,  situated  and  circumstanced  as  we  are,  not 
at  all  to  be  dreaded;  but  the  consequence  of  wanting 


22  Empire  and  Armament 

one,  according  to  my  ideas,  formed  from  the  present 
view  of  things,  is  certain  and  inevitable  ruin.  For  if 
I  was  called  upon  to  decide  upon  oath  whether  the 
militia  had  been  most  serviceable  or  hurtful,  upon 
the  whole  I  should  subscribe  to  the  latter. 


Although  Washington  was  never  able  to  enforce 
his  views  upon  his  countrymen,  who  were  willing 
enough  to  rest  the  great  burden  of  defence  upon 
his  shoulders  while  they  ignored  in  great  measure 
his  advice,  circumstances  compelled  them  twice 
during  the  first  two  years  of  the  war  to  admit 
tacitly  the  groundless  nature  of  their  own  fear  of 
military  dictation;  for  on  two  occasions  they 
were  forced  to  invest  him  as  their  military  chief- 
tain with  dictatorial  powers.  On  both  occasions, 
as  dictator,  he  saved  the  Colonies  from  defeat,  and 
on  neither  occasion  did  he  give  evidence  of  a  desire 
to  establish  himself  permanently  as  a  ruler  with 
the  aid  of  the  army  at  his  command.  But,  the 
danger  having  passed,  the  old  distrust  of  the  mil- 
itary soon  revived  and  manifested  itself  as  before. 

Just  at  the  time  when  the  Continental  Congress 
was  becoming  more  and  more  impressed  by  Wash- 
ington with  the  necessity  of  encouraging  the  Colo- 
nies to  assent  to  the  creation  of  a  permanent  and 
centralized  armed  force,  a  new  form  of  govern- 
ment was  adopted.  The  union  of  the  Colonies 
under  the  Articles  of  Confederation,  which  went 
into  effect  in  July,  1778,  was  in  every  way  but  one 
a  distinct  advance  over  the  old  plan  of  co-operation 


The  Revolutionary  Period         23 

through  a  Congress  of  delegates  which  possessed 
no  executive  power.  But  with  respect  to  defen- 
sive power  the  new  government  was  decidedly 
inferior  to  the  Continental  Congress,  which  had 
established  a  small  regular  army,  however  in- 
adequate this  may  have  been.  The  new  govern- 
ment was  not  only  unequipped  with  power  to 
raise  an  army,  but  the  right  to  maintain  an  armed 
force  was  expressly  denied  it,  and  was  reserved  to 
the  constituent  States.  And  to  make  matters 
worse,  the  States  themselves  were  denied  the 
right  of  maintaining,  in  time  of  peace,  ships  of 
war  or  troops  without  the  consent  of  Congress. 
The  Articles,  then,  not  only  divested  the  central 
government  of  all  authority  to  raise  and  maintain 
troops  for  the  common  defence,  but  prohibited  the 
individual  States  from  preparing  in  advance  of 
actual  hostilities  for  their  own  defence.  Nor 
could  any  State  engage  in  war  without  the  ap- 
proval of  at  least  eight  other  States.  But  the 
crowning  folly  of  all  was  the  provision  that  when 
war  was  declared  by  Congress  the  troops  provided 
by  the  States  were  to  be  paid  out  of  the  common 
treasury ! 

Instead  of  resting  the  war  power  in  a  central  govern- 
ment which  alone  could  insure  its  vigorous  exercise, 
Congress  was  reduced  to  a  mere  consultative  body 
or  congress  of  diplomats,  with  authority  to  concert 
only  such  measures  for  common  defence  as  might 
receive  the  sanction  of  nine  of  the  allied  sovereignties 
they  represented. 


24  Empire  and  Armament 

If  any  State  became  lukewarm  or  conceived  that 
its  local  interests  were  neglected,  it  could  promptly 
recall  its  delegates. 

Weak  as  had  been  our  military  policy  under  the 
government  of  the  Continental  Congress,  it  was  to 
become  still  more  imbecile  through  the  inherent  de- 
fects of  the  new  system.  To  the  indecision  and  delays 
of  a  single  Congress  were  now  superadded  the  inde- 
cisions and  delays  of  at  least  nine  more  deliberative 
bodies. 

Shortly  before  the  formation  of  the  new  govern- 
ment Washington  wrote  a  member  of  Congress : 

The  other  point  is  the  jealousy  which  Congress 
unhappily  entertains  of  the  Army  and  which,  if  reports 
are  right,  some  members  labour  to  establish.  You 
may  be  assured  there  is  nothing  more  injurious  or  more 
unfounded.  This  jealousy  stands  upon  the  commonly 
received  opinion,  which  under  proper  limitations  is 
certainly  true,  that  standing  armies  are  dangerous  to 
a  State.  The  prejudices  in  other  countries  have  only 
gone  to  them  in  time  of  peace,  and  these  from  their 
not  having,  in  general  cases,  any  of  the  ties,  the  con- 
cerns, or  interests  of  citizens,  or  any  other  dependence 
than  what  flowed  from  their  military  employ,  in  short, 
from  their  being  mercenaries,  hirelings.  It  is  our 
policy  to  be  prejudiced  against  them  in  time  of  war, 
though  they  are  citizens,  having  all  the  ties  and  inter- 
ests of  citizens,  and,  in  most  cases,  probably  totally 
unconnected  with  the  military  life. 

As  declared  by  Washington,  the  Americans 
made  no  distinction  whatever  between  the  hire- 


The  Revolutionary  Period  25 

lings  of  a  despot  and  an  army  of  citizens  created 
by  the  representatives  of  a  free  people.  They 
could  not  perceive  that  the  character  of  the  indi- 
viduals composing  a  standing  army  might  have  a 
marked  effect  upon  the  tendencies  of  that  army; 
that  the  mere  fact  of  extending  the  term  of  enlist- 
ment sufficiently  to  enable  men  to  be  properly 
disciplined  and  trained  would  not,  of  itself,  destroy 
the  sentiments  of  patriotism  which  induced  citizens 
to  shed  their  blood  in  defence  of  their  country. 
They  were  unwilling  to  credit  themselves,  or  their 
kind,  with  the  same  high  purpose  and  unselfish 
motives  so  strikingly  displayed  by  Washington, 
who,  as  we  have  seen,  did  not  attempt  to  usurp 
the  reins  of  government  or  to  oppress  the  people 
while  entrusted  with  dictatorial  powers.  Their 
evident  lack  of  faith  in  themselves  is  a  sad  com- 
mentary upon  the  early  American  character,  and 
constituted  a  serious  self -accusation. 

It  was  not  until  1780  that  the  people  of  Mas- 
sachusetts adopted  the  State  constitution  which 
in  its  fundamental  principles  remains  unchanged 
to  this  day.  The  Bill  of  Rights  prefixed  to  this 
constitution  contains  the  following  clauses: 

In  time  of  peace,  no  soldier  ought  to  be  quartered 
in  any  house  without  the  consent  of  the  owner;  and 
in  time  of  war  such  quarters  ought  not  to  be  made  but 
by  the  civil  magistrate,  in  a  manner  ordained  by  the 
legislature.     (Clause  xxvii.) 

No  person  can  in  any  case  be  subject  to  law-martial, 
or  to  any  penalties  or  pains,  by  virtue  of  that  law, 


26  Empire  and  Armament 

except  those  employed  in  the  army  or  navy,  and  except 
the  militia  in  actual  service,  but  by  authority  of  the 
legislature.     (Clause  xxviii.) 

The  people  have  a  right  to  keep  and  bear  arms  for 
the  common  defence.  And  as,  in  time  of  peace,  armies 
are  dangerous  to  liberty,  they  ought  not  to  be  main- 
tained without  the  consent  of  the  legislature;  and  the 
military  power  shall  always  be  held  in  an  exact  subor- 
dination to  the  civil  authority,  and  be  governed  by  it. 
(Clause  xvii.) 


The  fact  that  it  was  generally  believed  in  the 
Colonies  at  large  as  in  Massachusetts  that  the 
military  should  ' '  always  be  held  in  an  exact  subor- 
dination to  the  civil  authority,  and  be  governed 
by  it,"  undoubtedly  explains  why  the  consecutive 
governing  bodies  set  up  by  the  Colonies  pursued 
such  an  inadequate  military  policy.  In  other 
words,  in  seeking  to  keep  the  military  within 
close  bounds,  they  so  circumscribed  it  as  to  prevent 
it  from  developing  any  power  whatever.  It  is 
indeed  a  notable  fact  that,  at  the  most  critical 
stage  of  the  war,  and  in  spite  of  the  glaring  defects 
in  the  traditional  military  system,  the  people  of 
Massachusetts,  who  had  with  the  Virginians  taken 
the  lead  in  the  war,  persisted  in  their  prejudices 
against  trained  soldiers.  If  ever  there  were  a 
time  when  those  prejudices  might  have  been  set 
aside,  even  though  temporarily,  it  was  at  the  very 
time  they  were  so  forcefully  and  unequivocally 
expressed  in  the  organic  law  of  the  State,  a  State 


The  Revolutionary  Period  27 

which  had  acted  with  more  deliberation  in  the 
matter  of  its  constitution  than  any  of  its  sisters. 

A  careful  survey  of  contemporaneous  history 
discloses  an  explanation  for  the  inhibition  against 
standing  armies  in  the  Virginia  Bill  of  Rights, 
even  more  satisfactory  than  the  traditional  con- 
victions of  the  people,  taken  by  themselves.  At 
the  very  hour  the  Virginia  convention  of  1776  was 
deliberating  upon  the  expediency  of  declaring  the 
independence  of  the  Colony,  the  soldiery  were 
clamouring  outside  the  convention  hall  for  the 
radical  action  finally  determined  upon.  Thomas 
Nelson,  Jr.,  addressing  a  member  of  the  convention, 
wrote : 

The  military  in  particular,  men  and  officials,  are  out- 
rageous on  the  subject;  and  a  man  of  your  excellent 
discernment  need  not  be  told  how  dangerous  it  would 
be  in  our  present  circumstances  to  dally  with  the  spirit, 
or  disappoint  the  expectations  of  the  bulk  of  the  people. 

The  letter  quoted  was,  in  all  probability,  but  one  of 
many  evidences  of  the  power  of  the  military,  before 
the  convention.  The  very  violence  of  the  military 
demonstrators  alone  would  have  directed  atten- 
tion to  the  danger  of  unrestrained  military  power 
and  would  have  caused  the  spectre  of  military 
tyranny  to  stalk  before  the  convention.  But 
in  Massachusetts,  the  State  constitution  was  not 
framed  by  a  radical  body  of  revolutionists  labour- 
ing under  the  stress  of  excitement  and  the  neces- 
sity of  meeting  the  pressing  demands  of  the  hour. 


28  Empire  and  Armament 

On  the  contrary,  that  constitution  was  framed  by 
a  convention,  regularly  organized  for  the  purpose, 
which  confined  its  activity  to  the  single  function 
of  drawing  up  an  instrument  of  government. 
This  convention  moved  slowly  and  deliberately, 
and  the  inhibition  against  standing  armies  con- 
tained in  the  Bill  of  Rights  owed  nothing  to  present 
fears,  but  everything  to  traditional  prejudice. 

Diverted  from  a  serious  prosecution  of  the 
American  war  by  France,  Spain,  her  East  Indian 
troubles,  and  a  large  section  of  her  own  people  at 
home,  whose  representatives  in  Parliament  cham- 
pioned the  cause  of  the  Colonies  more  efficiently 
than  did  the  American  legislators  themselves, 
England  finally  abandoned  her  attempt  to  coerce 
her  former  subjects.  The  failure  of  England 
proved  the  success  of  the  Americans .  That  success , 
proximately  due  to  extraneous  causes  in  the  nature 
of  British  home  troubles,  and  immediately  due  to 
the  perseverance  of  Washington  and  a  few  other 
patriots  aided  by  the  French,  was  accepted  by  the 
American  people  as  a  vindication  of  their  war 
policy.  But  how  much  it  was  due  to  the  American 
war  policy  and  how  much  to  the  French  may  be 
strikingly  determined  by  an  examination  of  the 
relative  number  of  French  and  American  graves 
at  Yorktown. 

The  sad  military  record  of  the  Americans  in  the 
Revolutionary  War  is  relieved,  however,  by  the 
loyalty  and  patriotic  self-sacrifice  of  the  Conti- 
nental or  regular  troops,  those  troops  who  retained 


The  Revolutionary  Period  29 

throughout  their  career  the  jealous  and  fearful 
regard  of  the  people  they  so  loyally  served,  and 
to  whom  they  so  promptly  surrendered  their  arms 
and  titles  upon  the  termination  of  hostilities. 

The  greatest  service  the  Continental  troops 
rendered  the  country  was  not  that  they  performed 
in  campaign,  but  in  emphasizing  two  great  facts: 

1st:  That  troops  subject  to  the  disposition  of 
the  central  government  are  effective  out  of  all 
proportion  to  their  numbers  as  compared  with 
militia  not  subject  to  central  control. 

2d:  That  regular  troops,  enlisted  for  long  peri- 
ods, carefully  trained  and  disciplined,  are  the 
only  safe  reliance  of  a  state  in  war. 

While  the  foregoing  facts  were  emphasized  by 
the  experiences  of  the  war,  it  must  not  be  thought 
the  American  people  as  a  whole  accepted  them. 
In  vain  did  Washington  declare  that  to  place  any 
dependence  upon  militia  was  to  rest  upon  a  broken 
staff.  They  exalted  him  and  proclaimed  him  as 
the  father  of  their  country,  his  political  views  they 
adopted,  and  they  took  his  advice  upon  many  other 
subjects,  but  when  it  came  to  matters  military, 
not  his  long  and  fruitful  experience,  but  their  own 
outworn  traditional  prejudices  dictated  the  course 
they  elected  to  pursue. 

Regular  troops  alone  [he  wrote]  are  equal  to  the 
exigencies  of  modern  war  as  well  for  defence  as  offence, 
and  when  a  substitute  is  attempted,  it  must  prove 
illusory  and  ruinous. 


30  Empire  and  Armament 

No  militia  will  ever  acquire  the.  habits  necessary  to 
resist  a  regular  force.  The  firmness  requisite  for  the 
real  business  of  fighting  is  only  to  be  attained  by  a 
constant  course  of  discipline  and  service. 

I  have  never  yet  been  a  witness  to  a  single  instance 
that  can  justify  a  different  opinion,  and  it  is  most 
earnestly  to  be  wished  that  the  liberties  of  America 
may  no  longer  be  trusted,  in  a  material  degree,  to  so 
precarious  a  defence. 

The  American  people  based  their  views  upon 
an  ancient  prejudice.  Washington  based  his 
opinions  not  only  upon  his  own  bitter  experience 
with  militia,  extending  over  eight  years,  in  which 
time  nearly  400,000  men  came  under  his  command, 
but  upon  the  history  of  war  in  all  ages.  Surely, 
when  he  penned  the  foregoing  advice  he  must  have 
had  in  mind  the  sagacious  words  of  Bacon  who,  in 
his  essay  entitled  Of  the  True  Greatness  of  King- 
doms and  Estates,  wrote : 

Walled  towns,  stored  arsenals  and  armouries,  goodly 
races  of  horse,  chariots  of  war,  elephants,  ordnance, 
artillery,  and  the  like:  all  this  is  but  a  sheep  in  a  lion's 
skin,  except  the  breed  and  disposition  of  the  people 
be  stout  and  warlike.  Nay,  number  itself,  in  armies, 
importeth  not  much,  where  the  people  is  of  weak 
courage;  for,  as  Virgil  saith,  it  never  troubles  a  wolf 
how  many  the  sheep  be.  The  army  of  the  Persians, 
in  the  plains  of  Arbela,  was  such  a  vast  sea  of  people, 
as  it  did  somewhat  astonish  the  commanders  in  Alex- 
ander's army;  who  came  to  him  therefore,  and  wished 
him  to  set  upon  them  by  night ;  but  he  answered,  he 


The  Revolutionary  Period         31 

would  not  pilfer  the  victory ;  and  the  defeat  was  easy. 
When  Tigranes  the  Armenian,  being  encamped  upon  a 
hill,  with  four  hundred  thousand  men,  discovered  the 
army  of  the  Romans ,  being  not  above  fourteen  thousand, 
marching  towards  him,  he  made  himself  merry  with 
it,  and  said:  "Yonder  men  are  too  many  for  an  em- 
bassage, and  too  few  for  a  fight."  But  before  the 
sun  set,  he  found  them  enow  to  give  him  the  chace, 
with  infinite  slaughter.  Many  are  the  examples  of 
the  great  odds  between  number  and  courage;  so  that 
a  man  may  truly  make  a  judgment,  that  the  principal 
point  of  greatness  in  any  state  is  to  have  a  race  of 
military  men.  Neither  is  money  the  sinews  of  war,  as 
it  is  trivially  said,  where  the  sinews  of  men's  arms, 
in  base  and  effeminate  people,  are  failing.  For 
Solon  said  well  to  Croesus,  when  in  ostentation  he 
shewed  him  his  gold,  "Sir,  if  any  other  come  that 
hath  better  iron  than  you,  he  will  be  master  of  all  this 
gold. ' '  Therefore,  let  any  prince  or  state  think  soberly 
of  his  forces,  except  his  militia  of  natives  be  of  good 
and  valiant  soldiers.  And  let  princes  on  the  other 
side,  that  have  subjects  of  martial  disposition,  know 
their  own  strength,  unless  they  be  otherwise  wanting 
unto  themselves.  As  for  mercenary  forces,  which  is 
the  help  in  this  case,  all  examples  shew,  that  whatso- 
ever estate  or  prince  doth  rest  upon  them,  he  may 
spread  his  feathers  for  a  time,  but  he  will  mew  them 
soon  after. 


Despite  Washington's  advice,  the  moment 
independence  was  established,  the  Continental 
army  was  disbanded  and  certain  States  were 
called  upon  to  furnish  their  quotas  of  a  force  of 


32  Empire  and  Armament 

about  700  men  to  garrison  the  western  frontiers, 
where  several  forts  were  to  be  evacuated  by  the  Brit- 
ish troops.  For  a  number  of  years,  this  regiment 
constituted  the  only  military  force  of  the  United 
States  of  America,  the  population  of  which  was 
3,500,000,  or  half  that  of  Belgium  when  in  1914 
that  brave  little  country  was  able  to  place  in  the 
field  an  army  capable  of  checking  the  superb 
fighting  machine  of  the  war-mad  Kaiser.  But, 
as  events  soon  showed  them,  it  was  beyond  the 
power  of  the  deluded  Americans,  to  create  an  Uto- 
pia. That  the  United  States  existed  for  nearly 
four  years  practically  without  an  armed  force  of 
any  kind,  is  a  unique  fact  in  the  history  of  nations. 


CHAPTER  III 

INADEQUACY  OF  THE  OLD  POLICY 

IT  was  a  hopeful  sign  when,  in  1786,  John  Adams 
of  Massachusetts  declared  national  defence 
to  be  one  of  the  cardinal  duties  of  a  statesman. 
"On  this  head,"  he  wrote,  "I  recollect  nothing 
with  which  to  reproach  myself."  Was  it  a  guilty- 
conscience  that  made  him  thus  disavow  respon- 
sibility for  the  absurd  situation  of  the  infant  re- 
public? Perhaps  not,  but  it  was  certainly  his 
own  personal  experience  of  the  events  following 
close  upon  the  Revolution  that  made  him  add, 
"The  subject  [national  defence]  has  always  been 
near  my  heart.  The  delightful  imaginations  of 
universal  and  perpetual  peace  have  often  amused, 
but  have  never  been  credited  by  me." 

The  developments  which  inspired  such  senti- 
ments on  the  part  of  Adams  are  not  difficult  to 
discover.  Hardly  had  the  new  government  been 
established  when  its  impotence  became  manifest, 
especially  in  Massachusetts.  The  large  public 
debt  in  that  State  had  necessitated  heavy  taxes, 
and  the  attempts  of  creditors  to  recover  debts  due 
them  added  to  popular  discontent. 
3  33 


34  Empire  and  Armament 

A  levelling,  licentious  spirit  [says  Mr.  Curtis],  a 
restless  desire  for  change,  and  a  disposition  to  throw 
down  the  barriers  of  private  rights,  at  length  broke 
forth  in  conventions,  which  first  voted  themselves 
to  be  the  people  and  then  declared  their  proceedings  to 
be  constitutional.  At  these  assemblies  the  doctrine 
was  publicly  broached  that  property  ought  to  be 
common,  because  all  had  aided  in  saving  it  from  con- 
fiscation by  the  power  of  England.  Taxes  were  voted 
to  be  unnecessary  burdens,  the  courts  of  justice  to  be 
intolerable  grievances,  and  the  legal  profession  a 
nuisance.  A  revision  of  the  [State]  constitution  was 
demanded,  in  order  to  abolish  the  Senate,  reform  the 
representation  of  the  people,  and  make  all  civil  officers 
eligible  by  the  people.  .  .  .  Had  the  government  of 
the  State  been  in  the  hands  of  a  person  less  firm  and 
less  careless  of  popularity  than  Bowdoin,  it  would 
have  been  given  up  to  anarchy  and  civil  confusion. 

In  December,  1786,  violence  began  to  develop, 
and  soon  Daniel  Shay  at  the  head  of  2000  armed 
malcontents,  after  forcing  the  Supreme  Court  of 
the  State  to  adjourn,  moved  against  Springfield 
Arsenal,  finding  sympathy  for  his  rebellious  acts 
throughout  New  England.  Governor  Bowdoin 
called  out  4000  militia  and,  with  General  Lincoln 
at  their  head,  succeeded  in  restoring  order;  but 
the  alarming  possibility  that  such  an  uprising 
might  recur  and  bring  about  the  overthrow  of 
constituted  authority  called  attention  to  the 
defects  of  a  central  government  which  was  power- 
less to  aid  a  State  in  so  serious  a  crisis. 


Inadequacy  of  the  Old  Policy       35 

Shay's  Rebellion  is  an  important  landmark  in 
American  history,  for  it  indicates  a  very  radical 
turn  in  the  military  policy  of  the  United  States, 
whose  people  awoke  with  a  start  to  the  fact  that 
what  had  transpired  in  Massachusetts  threatened 
in  other  quarters.  Adams  was  but  a  spokesman 
for  the  general  body  of  property  holders  in  the 
States,  who,  when  they  perceived  that  their  prop- 
erty was  actually  imperilled,'  reflected  his  views 
as  to  the  necessity  of  protection.  From  this  time 
on  they  were  more  willing  to  tolerate,  if  they  did  not 
demand,  protection  in  a  form  which  before  they 
had  so  persistently  feared.  Fortunately  many  of 
our  statesmen  at  this  time,  having  been  officers 
under  Washington,  were  imbued  with  his  ideas 
concerning  national  defence,  and  it  was  not  difficult 
in  view  of  the  popular  change  of  heart  for  them  to 
impress  the  Constitutional  Convention  of  1787 
with  their  views.  It  must  also  be  borne  in  mind 
that  the  members  of  this  Convention  were  in  no 
sense  popular  representatives,  as  is  so  commonly 
claimed.  Theoretically  they  did  represent  the 
people;  but  in  fact  they  represented  the  class  by 
which  they  were  chosen,  or  the  property  class 
which  largely  monopolized  the  elective  franchise  in 
the  States.  There  may  have  been  political  theo- 
rists in  this  Convention,  or  extreme  democrats, 
but  there  were  positively  no  anarchists  or  even 
members  with  strong  socialistic  tendencies.  Fur- 
thermore, those  who  a  few  years  before  might 
have  embraced  disarmament  in  their  program  of 


36  Empire  and  Armament 

pacifism  were  no  longer  enthusiastic  over  that 
principle,  for  they  did  not  deem  it  prudent  to 
experiment  further  with  their  novel  theories  at  a 
time  when  a  veritable  epidemic  of  anarchistic 
tendencies  was  abroad.  Even  from  Jefferson, 
known  to  history  as  an  extreme  democrat,  but  who 
may  properly  be  classed  today  as  a  socialist  of 
pronounced  type,  came  no  serious  plaint  against 
the  obvious  trend  of  thought  towards  an  increase 
of  centralized  power,  and  we  shall  see  that  his 
views  concerning  the  necessity  and  wisdom  of 
adequate  measures  for  defence  constantly  ex- 
panded, though  he  did  in  a  feeble  way  seek  to 
block  the  ratification  of  the  Constitution  on  the 
ground  that  it  contained  no  declaration  of  ancient 
rights  including  an  inhibition  against  a  standing 
army. 

Hamilton  was  an  ardent  advocate  of  Washing- 
ton's military  views,  and  supported  him  in  them 
as  in  all  things.  The  Pinckneys,  Randolph,  and 
others  were  now  positive  in  their  demands,  Ran- 
dolph publicly  declaring  that  the  Confederacy  was 
not  only  utterly  powerless  against  foreign  inva- 
sion but  had  not  even  the  power  to  prevent  war. 
And  Madison,  who  within  ten  years  had  concurred 
in  the  inhibition  contained  in  the  Virginia  Bill  of 
Rights  against  a  standing  army  in  time  of  peace, 
was  now,  if  his  written  expressions  are  to  be  relied 
upon,  of  quite  a  different  conviction.  What  he 
had  regarded  as  unnecessary  and  dangerous  be- 
fore the  Revolution,  he  now  regarded  as  essential. 


Inadequacy  of  the  Old  Policy       37 

Public  men  then,  from  Massachusetts  to  the  Caro- 
linas,  if  they  had  not  experienced  a  change  of 
heart,  were  loud  in  their  advocacy  of  a  new  policy. 
Indeed,  in  their  expressions,  they  were  already 
anticipating  Tocqueville,  who  some  years  later,  in 
his  Democracy  in  America,  wrote : 

Any  law  which,  in  repressing  the  turbulent  spirit 
of  the  army,  should  tend  to  diminish  the  spirit  of  free- 
dom in  the  nation,  and  to  overshadow  the  notion  of 
law  and  right,  would  defeat  its  object ;  it  would  do  much 
more  to  favour,  than  to  defeat,  the  establishment  of 
military  tyranny. 

We  may  interpret  this  passage  to  mean  simply 
this :  a  government  which  did  not  possess  the  power 
to  maintain  domestic  order  and  prevent  foreign 
encroachments  would  promptly  be  overthrown, 
and  arbitrary  power  be  assumed  by  the  strongest 
element  of  the  people  at  the  expense  of  the  weaker 
elements. 

War  [wrote  Tocqueville]  is  nevertheless  an  occur- 
rence to  which  all  nations  are  subject,  democratic 
nations  as  well  as  others.  Whatever  taste  they  may 
have  for  peace,  they  must  hold  themselves  in  readiness 
to  repel  aggression,  or  in  other  words  they  must  have 
an  army. 


CHAPTER  IV 

THE  HAMILTONIAN  DOCTRINE 

WE  have  seen  what  was  the  frame  of  mind,  not 
perhaps  of  the  people,  but  certainly  of  the 
public  men  of  1787.  We  are,  therefore,  better 
prepared  to  understand  the  radical  increase  of  the 
central  power  in  matters  of  national  defence  which 
was  soon  to  be  bestowed  upon  Congress  by  the 
Federal  Constitution.  But  it  is  a  mistake  to 
assume  public  opinion  stopped  at  the  idea  of  mere 
defence — it  went  far  beyond  such  a  conception. 

The  United  States  had  arrived  at  a  stage  at 
which  commercial  development  was  essential  to 
progress,  and  a  doctrine  of  commercial  expansion 
was  rapidly  formulating  itself  in  the  minds  of 
the  American  people.  Even  in  its  early  stages 
that  doctrine  contemplated  a  vigorous  govern- 
ment policy  to  advance  the  world  trade  of  the 
United  States.  The  way  to  accomplish  such  an 
expansion  was,  as  far  as  the  writer  can  discover, 
first  hinted  at  by  Edmund  Randolph  in  a  letter  to 
Madison  in  which  he  enumerated  the  more  glaring 
defects  of  the  Articles  of  Confederation.  "There 
are  many   advantages,"    he    wrote,    "which    the 

38 


The  Hamiltonian  Doctrine  39 

United  States  might  acquire  which  were  not  attain- 
able under  the  Articles  of  Confederation — such  as 
productive  import,  counteraction  of  the  commercial 
regulations  of  other  nations — pushing  of  commerce 
ad  libitum,  etc." 

Can  it  be  doubted  that  Randolph  even  at  this 
early  day  had  in  mind  the  "pushing  of  commerce" 
under  the  fostering  protection  of  American  guns? 
If  so  the  doubt  may  readily  be  dispelled  by  the 
most  casual  examination  of  the  Federalist,  which 
was  so  widely  circulated  during  the  struggle  to 
establish  the  present  Federal  Government,  and 
which  presents  in  great  detail  the  political  theories 
of  the  proposed  system  of  government  as  conceived 
by  three  of  the  profoundest  thinkers  of  the  period, 
Hamilton,  Madison,  and  Jay.  If  the  Federalist 
be  not  sufficient  to  dispel  our  doubts,  being  regarded 
by  us  as  merely  evidence  of  the  personal  convic- 
tions of  Hamilton,  Madison,  and  Jay,  it  is  only 
necessary,  then,  to  consult  the  records  of  the  pro- 
ceedings in  the  Philadelphia  Convention,  and  the 
pamphlets  and  newspapers  of  the  day,  which 
together  will  conclusively  reveal  the  successive 
steps  in  the  building  of  the  framework  of  the  new 
government,  and  disclose  the  contemporary  ideas 
of  the  creators  of  that  government. 

The  results  of  such  an  investigation  will  come 
as  a  surprise  to  most  of  those  Americans  who  point 
to  the  traditional  peace  policy  of  our  government 
with  such  pride  and  assurance,  not  knowing  that 
the  considerations  which  led  to  the  creation  of  our 


4-o  Empire  and  Armament 

standing  army  under  the  Federal  Constitution 
were  identical  with  those  underlying  the  aggressive 
national  policy  of  Bismarck,  which  Wilhelm  II.  has 
only  extended.  Americans  have  long  argued  from 
the  diminutive  size  of  our  army  that  its  creators 
necessarily  contemplated  a  purely  defensive  policy, 
when  as  a  matter  of  fact  the  size  of  the  army  was 
dictated  solely  by  considerations  of  economy,  and 
had  nothing  whatever  to  do  with  the  purpose  for 
which  it  was  contemplated  that  it  would  be 
employed. 

It  is  not  the  writer's  intention  from  now  on  to 
dwell  upon  early  American  views  regarding  the 
desirability  of  a  standing  army  for  the  purpose  of 
maintaining  domestic  tranquillity.  While  that 
object  was  indeed  in  itself  a  compelling  one,  the 
arguments  in  its  support  are  too  obvious  to  require 
elaboration,  and  that  their  force  was  felt  in  1787 
may  be  inferred  from  the  mere  fact  of  the  creation 
of  an  army.  It  is  now  only  intended  to  show  that 
a  desire  for  domestic  tranquillity  was  by  no  means 
the  sole  reason  for  the  revulsion  in  public  opinion 
which  led  to  the  abandonment  of  the  old  militia 
ideal. 

The  authors  of  the  Federalist  [writes  Mr.  Beard] 
carry  over  into  the  field  of  international  politics  the 
concept  of  economic  antagonisms  which  lie  at  the 
basis  of  their  system  of  domestic  politics.  Modern 
wars  spring  primarily  out  of  commercial  rivalry, 
although  the  ambitions  of  princes  have  often  been  a 
source  of  international  strife. 


The  Hamiltonian  Doctrine         41 

Mr.  Beard's  view  is  based  upon  the  argument  of 
Hamilton,  who  wrote: 

Has  commerce  hitherto  done  anything  more  than 
change  the  objects  of  war?  Is  not  the  love  of  wealth 
as  domineering  and  enterprising  a  passion  as  that  of 
power  or  glory?  Have  there  not  been  as  many  wars 
founded  upon  commercial  motives,  since  that  has 
become  the  prevailing  system  of  nations,  as  were  be- 
fore occasioned  by  the  cupidity  of  territory  or  do- 
minion? Has  not  the  spirit  of  commerce,  in  many 
instances,  administered  new  incentives  to  the  appetite, 
both  for  the  one  and  for  the  other? 

For  an  answer  to  the  questions  he  propounds, 
Hamilton  calls  upon  history  in  a  series  of  remark- 
able papers,  which  it  is  the  duty  of  every  disarma- 
mentist  to  read  at  this  time.  He  further  points 
out  that  in  the  world-wide  and  age-long  conflict 
for  commercial  advantages,  the  United  States 
cannot  expect  to  become  a  non-resistant,  an  idle 
spectator.  Even  were  pacific  ideals  to  dominate 
American  policy,  she  could  not  overcome  the 
scruples  of  her  ambitious  rivals.  In  union,  there- 
fore, is  strength,  not  only  against  aggression,  he 
declares,  but  in  support  of  offensive  operations. 
Moreover,  he  points  out,  the  Union  will  be  better 
able  to  settle  disputes  amicably  because  of  the 
greater  show  of  power  which  it  can  make!  "Ac- 
knowledgments, explanations,  and  compensations 
are  often  accepted  as  satisfactory  from  a  strong 
united  nation,  which  would  be  rejected  as  unsatis- 


42  Empire  and  Armament 

factory  if  offered  by  a  State  or  a  Confederacy  of 
little  consideration  or  power." 

The  foregoing  remarks  of  Hamilton  smack 
exceedingly  much  of  the  later  German  doctrine 
of  the  mailed  fist  so  widely  condemned  today. 
Yet  Hamilton  but  gave  expression  to  the  dominant 
American  view  of  his  time,  a  view  which  not  only 
contemplated  that  the  Government  with  a  strong 
army  at  its  back  might  enforce  a  high  degree  of 
respect  for  its  demands  but  that  it  might  exact 
better  terms  for  itself  in  the  settlement  of  disputes. x 
It  should  here  be  noted  that  the  covert  suggestion 
is  made  that  the  desired  ends  might  be  attained  ir- 
respective of  the  validity  or  the  justice  of  the  claims. 

Jay  pointed  out  that  the  safety  of  the  American 
people  depended  not  only  upon  their  forbearing 
to  give  offence,  but  upon  their  ability  to  resent 
foreign  insults  and  encroachments.  "It  is  too 
true,"  he  declared,  "however  disgraceful  it  may 
be  to  human  nature,  that  nations  in  general  will 
make  war  whenever  they  have  a  prospect  of  getting 
anything  by  it."  He  then  argued  that,  in  the 
extension  of  her  foreign  commerce,  the  United 
States  would  necessarily  come  into  contact  with 
France,  England,  Spain,  and  other  countries,  not 
only  in  Europe,  but  in  the  Orient;  and  he  added 

that  we  are  not  to  expect  they  should  regard  our  ad- 
vancement in  union,  in  power  and  consequence  by 

1  By  dominant  American  view  is  not  meant  the  view  of  the 
masses  but  the  view  of  the  majority  in  the  Convention  which 
framed  the  Constitution. 


The  Hamiltonian  Doctrine  43 

land  and  by  sea,  with  an  eye  of  indifference  and  com- 
posure. The  people  of  America  are  aware  that  in- 
ducements to  war  may  arise  out  of  these  circumstances, 
as  well  as  from  others  not  so  obvious  at  present;  and 
whenever  such  inducements  may  find  fit  time  and 
opportunity  for  operation,  pretences  to  colour  and 
justify  them  will  not  be  wanting.  Wisely,  therefore, 
do  they  consider  Union  and  a  good  National  Govern- 
ment as  necessary  to  put  and  keep  them  in  such  a 
situation,  as,  instead  of  inviting  war,  will  tend  to 
repress  and  discourage  it.  That  situation  consists  in 
the  best  possible  state  of  defence,  and  necessarily 
depends  on  the  Government,  the  arms,  and  the  re- 
sources of  the  country. 

It  is  not  difficult  to  detect  in  the  foregoing 
words  of  Jay,  tactfully  as  the  proposition  may  be 
put,  an  argument  in  favour  of  aggressive  power. 
Hamilton,  always  more  blunt  and  straight  to  the 
point  than  Jay  or  Madison,  tears  the  veil  from  the 
face  of  the  idea  in  Jay's  mind  and  boldly  declares 
that  the  selfish  restrictions  of  European  nations 
upon  our  expanding  trade  might  be  removed  by 
the  establishment  of  a  strong  Federal  navy. 

A  few  ships  of  the  line  [he  declared]  sent  opportunely 
to  the  reinforcement  of  either  side,  would  often  be 
sufficient  to  decide  the  fate  of  a  campaign,  on  the 
event  of  which  interests  of  the  greatest  magnitude 
were  suspended.  Our  position  is,  in  this  respect,  a 
very  commanding  one.  And  if,  to  this  consideration, 
we  add  that  of  the  usefulness  of  supplies  from  this 
country,  in  the  prosecution  of  military  operations  in 
the  West  Indies,  it  will  readily  be  perceived,  that  a 


44  Empire  and  Armament 

situation  so  favourable  would  enable  us  to  bargain 
with  great  advantage  for  commercial  privileges.  A 
price  would  be  set,  not  only  upon  our  friendship,  but 
upon  our  neutrality.  By  a  steady  adherence  to  the 
Union,  we  may  hope,  ere  long,  to  become  the  arbiter 
of  Europe  in  America;  and  to  be  able  to  incline  the 
balance  of  European  competitions  in  this  part  of  the 
world,  as  our  interest  may  dictate. 

The  early  American  doctrine  of  commerce  and 
foreign  trade,  as  enunciated  by  Hamilton,  was 
not  only  highly  selfish  but  extremely  unpacific 
in  nature.  In  brief,  and  in  substance,  it  amounted 
to  this :  for  reasons  of  economy  it  were  unwise  for 
the  United  States  to  maintain  an  extensive  naval 
establishment  because  by  skilful  diplomacy  and 
artfully  playing  upon  the  jealousies  of  foreign  na- 
tions, coupled  with  a  timely  employment  of  a 
small  navy,  our  own  selfish  ends  could  be  secured. 
The  very  idea  that  we  were  to  hold  the  balance 
of  naval  power  in  foreign  disputes  of  our  own 
creation,  a  trump  card  in  the  game  of  diplomacy  so 
to  speak,  is  not  suggestive  of  a  truly  pacific  com- 
mercial policy.  What  other  nations  thought  of  our 
reiterated  expressions  of  peaceful  intent  and  pro- 
fessed desire  to  remain  aloof  from  foreign  entangle- 
ments is  not  difficult  to  imagine.  In  the  European 
mind,  the  principle  subsequently  laid  down  in  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  must  have  seemed  inconsistent 
at  least,  but  American  policy  for  Americans  and 
American  policy  for  Europeans  were  two  separate 
and  distinct  things. 


The  Hamiltonian  Doctrine  45 

While  Hamilton  and  Jay  certainly  contemplated 
a  policy  of  intermeddling  with  foreign  commerce 
and  forcing  open  foreign  markets  through  the 
medium  of  a  navy,  they  were  none  the  less  desirous 
of  placing  the  United  States  in  a  position  to  main- 
tain its  neutrality  when  interference  in  foreign 
affairs  offered  no  prospect  of  advantage.  "The 
rights  of  neutrality  will  only  be  respected,"  wrote 
Hamilton,  "when  they  are  defended  by  an  ade- 
quate power.  A  nation  despicable  by  its  weak- 
ness, forfeits  even  the  privilege  of  being  neutral." 


CHAPTER  V 

THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION 

IT  has  been  shown  that  the  feeble  military  policy 
of  the  States  until  the  adoption  of  the  present 
Federal  Constitution  in  1787  was  primarily  due 
to  the  jealousy  of  a  standing  army  on  the  part  of 
the  people  which  manifested  itself  in  the  inade- 
quate powers  they  conferred  upon  'their  govern- 
ment. Under  the  Constitution,  however,  the 
authority  vested  in  Congress  ' '  to  raise  and  support 
armies,"  "to  provide  and  maintain  a  navy,"  "to 
levy  and  collect  taxes,"  and  "to  borrow  money 
on  the  credit  of  the  United  States,"  was  unquali- 
fied and  gave  every  war  power  that  the  most 
despotic  ruler  could  ask. 

Fortunately,  the  debates  of  the  Convention 
were  secret  so  that  the  delegates  could  give  full 
expression  to  their  intentions  without  fear  of 
having  them  published  to  the  world  before  they 
had  been  clothed,  and  in  some  cases  veiled,  in 
tactful  phrases.  It  was  not  chicanery  but  only 
common  sense  that  dictated  the  necessity  of  word- 
ing the  Constitution  in  a  way  best  calculated  to 
insure   its   ratification    by    the   people    at    large. 

46 


The  Federal  Constitution  47 

Hence,  while  the  members  of  the  Convention  were 
fully  aware  of  the  fact  that  the  proposed  govern- 
ment, if  put  into  effect,  would  rely  in  the  main  upon 
a  standing  army  for  defence,  yet  it  was  perceived 
by  all  that  the  prejudices  of  the  people  had  best 
be  respected.  Consequently,  as  little  as  possible 
was  written  into  the  Constitution  about  a  standing 
army,  and  much  about  militia,  from  which  it 
might  be  inferred  by  the  people  that  the  latter  was 
still  to  be  largely  depended  upon  and  that  it  was 
regarded  by  the  framers  as  of  superior  importance. 
The  foregoing  conclusion,  in  view  of  all  that  was 
said  in  the  Convention  and  that  appears  in  the 
Federalist  concerning  the  standing  army,  seems 
well  justified. 

The  provisions  of  the  Constitution  as  ratified 
concerning  the  military  powers  of  Congress  are  as 
follows : 

Congress  shall  have  power: 

To  raise  and  support  armies,  but  no  appropriation 
of  money  to  that  use  shall  be  for  a  longer  term  than 
two  years. 

To  provide  and  maintain  a  navy. 

To  make  rules  for  the  government  and  regulation 
of  the  land  and  naval  forces. 

To  provide  for  calling  forth  the  Militia  to  execute 
the  laws  of  the  Union,  suppress  insurrections,  and 
repel  invasions. 

To  provide  for  organizing,  arming,  and  disciplining 
the  Militia,  and  for  governing  such  part  of  them  as 
may  be  employed  in  the  service  of  the  United  States, 


48  Empire  and  Armament 

reserving  to  the  States  respectively  the  appointment 
of  the  Officers  and  the  authority  of  training  the  Militia 
according  to  the  discipline  prescribed  by  Congress. 

A  casual  reading  of  the  four  clauses  of  the  Con- 
stitution dealing  with  the  military  powers  of  Con- 
gress might  readily  have  justified  the  people  in 
believing  that  the  militia  was  really  to  be  relied 
upon  in  the  main  to  execute  the  laws  of  the  Union, 
to  suppress  insurrections,  and  to  repel  invasions, 
and  that  the  power  conferred  on  Congress  to  raise 
and  support  armies  included  only  the  right  to 
raise  armies  of  militia. 

It  must  be  remembered  that  the  men  who 
framed  our  Constitution  were  highly  astute,  and 
that  they  were  bent  upon  designing  a  government 
capable,  above  all  else,  of  securing  to  themselves 
and  the  property  class  they  represented  every 
possible  guarantee  of  protection.  If,  then,  they 
did  resort  to  the  finesse  suggested,  it  is  rather  more 
creditable  to  them  as  statesmen  than  otherwise. 
To  believe  that  under  the  circumstances  they  did 
not  invoke  every  art  of  diplomacy  would  be  to 
attribute  to  them  a  dulness  inconsistent  with 
what  we  know  of  their  characters.  It  is  not  to  be 
inferred,  however,  that  because  they  employed 
diplomacy,  which  has  been  so  often  styled  the 
polite  art  of  lying,  they  substituted  subterfuge 
for  tact. 

The  interpretation  which  the  people  gave  those 
clauses  of  the  Constitution  providing  for  a  stand- 


The  Federal  Constitution  49 

ing  army  was  practically  that  which  in  compara- 
tively recent  years  John  Randolph  Tucker  has 
applied  to  them.  In  his  Commentaries,  Mr. 
Tucker  says : 

The  next  clause  is  "To  provide  and  maintain  a 
navy."  It  will  be  seen  that  the  two  years'  limit  on 
appropriations  for  this  purpose  is  omitted.  A  navy 
on  the  seas  cannot  be  used,  as  an  army  on  the  land 
may  be,  for  the  destruction  of  liberty.  The  words 
used  as  to  these  two  forces  are  different.  The  words 
"to  raise  and  support  armies"  have  not  the  idea  of 
permanency  in  them,  because  there  is  the  intimation 
that  the  army  may  be  raised  only  when  a  contingency 
arises  making  it  necessary.  It  involves  the  idea  of 
raising  it  when  needed,  and  supporting  it  while  needed; 
but  let  it  disband  under  two  years'  limit  if  there  be  no 
need  for  it.  But  there  is,  in  the  words  "to  provide 
and  maintain  a  navy,"  a  very  significant  intimation 
of  its  permanency  in  maintaining  it,  that  is,  holding 
it  in  the  hand.  It  is  according  to  the  genius  of  our 
Constitution,  then,  that  while  standing  armies  are 
to  be  avoided,  the  maintenance  of  a  navy  is  to  be 
favoured. 

On  this  same  point  Reinsch,  in  his  recent  Treat- 
ise on  World  Politics  presents  the  American  view 
concerning  the  army  and  navy,  which,  if  it  be 
greatly  exaggerated,  may  be  regarded  as  the  view 
of  the  people  of  the  United  States  at  the  time  of 
the  ratification  of  the  Constitution.     He  says : 

Navies  are  by  some  deemed  especially  compatible 
with  democracy,   while  standing  armies  are  always 


50  Empire  and  Armament 

regarded  as  aristocratic  or  monarchical  institutions — 
aristocratic,  because  fostering  an  official  military- 
caste;  monarchical,  because  requiring  the  single  and 
permanent  headship  which  is  best  afforded  in  a  strong 
monarchy.  The  social  organization  favoured  by  a 
strong  army  is  thoroughly  opposed  to  democracy;  an 
artificial  code  of  caste,  honour,  special  privileges  for 
a  military  aristocracy,  subordination  of  all  interests 
to  those  of  the  army,  are  almost  inevitable  results  of 
militarism. 

The  navy,  on  the  other  hand,  cannot  exert  such  a 
deep  and  immediate  influence  on  the  internal  social 
and  political  life  of  the  nation.  Without  laying  too 
much  stress  on  the  fact  that  Athens,  Holland,  and 
Great  Britain,  the  greatest  naval  powers  of  the  ancient 
and  modern  world,  were  popular  republics,  and  that  no 
admiral  has  ever  overturned  his  country's  liberties, 
we  may  justify  the  belief  that  large  navies  are  safer 
instruments  of  power  for  democratic  states  than 
standing  armies,  from  the  very  nature  and  character 
of  the  two. 

Notwithstanding  the  view  of  the  people  that 
the  standing  army  authorized  by  the  Constitution 
was  only  to  come  into  being  under  certain  contin- 
gencies, to  be  "raised"  only  in  time  of  need,  rather 
than  maintained  in  time  of  peace,  the  Constitution 
did  not  in  the  popular  mind  sufficiently  emphasize 
the  ancient  rights  in  the  people  of  which  they  were 
so  jealous,  and  during  the  struggle  which  occurred 
in  many  States  over  the  acceptance  of  the  new 
plan  of  government,  it  was  manifest  that  much  of 
the  opposition  to  it  was  due  to  this  fact.     Indeed, 


The  Federal  Constitution  51 

Jefferson,  who  was  in  Paris  at  the  time  the  Con- 
vention finished  its  work,  opposed  the  ratification 
of  the  instrument  submitted  to  the  people  on  the 
ground  that  it  contained  no  declaration  of  rights, 
stipulating,  among  other  things,  against  the  crea- 
tion of  a  standing  army.  Fortunately,  Jefferson 
was  unable  to  block  the  ratification  of  the  Consti- 
tution, but  in  1 79 1  ten  amendments  were  adopted 
so  closely  after  the  ratification  of  the  original 
instrument  that  they  may  be  deemed  almost  a 
part  of  it.  By  these  amendments,  a  number  of 
old  and  familiar  lights  are  reflected.  The  military 
provisions  in  them  are : 

A  well  regulated  Militia,  being  necessary  to  the 
security  of  a  free  State,  the  right  of  the  people  to 
keep  and  bear  arms,  shall  not  be  infringed. 

No  soldier  shall,  in  time  of  peace,  be  quartered  in 
any  house,  without  the  consent  of  the  owner,  nor  in 
time  of  war,  but  in  a  manner  to  be  prescribed  by  law. 

But  it  is  to  the  State  constitutions  that  one 
must  look  for  the  popular  expression  of  faith  in 
the  ancient  English  institution  of  the  militia. 

In  four  State  constitutions,  it  is  declared  that 
every  member  of  society  is  bound  to  yield  his 
personal  service,  or  an  equivalent  thereto,  to  the 
State  for  the  defence  of  life,  liberty,  and  property. r 
In  many  States,  it  is  declared  that  a  person  con- 
scientiously opposed  to  bearing  arms  will  not  be 

1  Mass.,  N.  H.,  Ore.,  and  Vt. 


52  Empire  and  Armament 

compelled  thereto  if  he  will  pay  an  equivalent.1 
In  a  few  it  seems  that  he  may  be  compelled  to  bear 
arms  in  time  of  war,  as  the  exemption  applies  only 
to  military  duty  in  time  of  peace.2  "Upon  such 
terms  as  may  be  prescribed  by  law,"  he  will  be 
relieved  from  such  service.3  And  in  Maine, 
Quakers  and  Shakers  are  excused.  In  several 
States,  besides  Virginia,  the  militia  is  declared  the 
proper  and  natural  defence  of  a  free  State. 4 

It  would  seem  that  the  reason  why  the  doctrine 
that  the  militia  is  the  proper  and  natural  defence 
of  a  free  State  was  announced  more  emphatically 
in  the  Southern  States  was  because  the  principal 
threat  of  danger  in  the  South  lay  in  the  presence 
of  a  large  negro  population,  against  which  the 
militia  would  be  effective.  In  the  North,  where 
the  danger  of  internal  disorder  was  found  in  the 
presence  of  dense  urban  populations,  it  was  seen 
that  the  militia  might  be  largely  composed,  as  it 
has  always  actually  been,  of  those  whom  the  State 
most  feared.  The  more  concentrated  a  population 
the  greater  the  danger  of  public  passion  and  up- 
heavals; consequently  the  great  willingness  of  the 
people  on  sober  reflection  to  provide  for  a  force 
to  counteract  mob  action  and  violence. 

The  militia  consists  in  most  of  the  States  of  all 

'Col.,  Ida.,  111.,  Ind.,  Io.,  Ky.,  La.,  Me.,  Mo.,  N.  D.,  N.  H., 
Ore.,  S.  C,  Term.,  Tex.,  Vt.,  and  Wash. 

a  Col.,  Ida.,  111.,  Io.,  N.  D.,  Ore.,  S.  D.,  and  Wash. 
3  Fla.,  Kans.,  Mich.,  Mo.,  N.  C,  N.  Y.,  and  Wy. 
<  Ga.,  La.,  Md.,  N.  C,  N.  H.,  S.  C,  and  Tenn. 


The  Federal  Constitution  53 

able-bodied  male  persons  between  the  ages  of 
eighteen  and  forty-five,  twenty-one  and  forty-five, 
or  twenty-one  and  forty. r  In  a  few  they  must  be 
white  as  in  Indiana  and  Kansas.  In  others,  the 
whole  matter  of  the  qualifications  for  the  militia 
is  left  to  the  Legislature  to  determine  by  law.2 
In  New  York  the  minimum  strength  of  the  militia 
is  fixed  at  10,000  men  fully  armed,  equipped, 
disciplined,  and  ready  for  action. 

The  military  is,  in  all  States  except  New  York, 
declared  to  be  forever  subordinate  to  the  civil 
authority,  though  no  such  specific  provision  is 
included  in  the  Federal  Constitution. 

In  Tennessee,  martial  law  is  declared  to  be 
inconsistent  with  a  free  government,  and  in  Okla- 
homa it  is  expressly  prohibited.  In  Massachu- 
setts, Maryland,  Maine,  New  Hampshire,  South 
Carolina,  Tennessee,  Vermont,  and  West  Virginia, 
no  person  can  be  subjected  to  martial  law  except 
he  be  in  the  army,  navy,  or  in  the  militia  in  actual 
service.  But  in  Massachusetts,  New  Hampshire, 
and  South  Carolina,  any  person  can  be  subjected 
to  martial  law  by  authority  of  the  Legislature. 

Although  the  constitutions  of  but  a  few  States 
expressly  declare  the  militia  to  be  the  proper  de- 
fence of  a  free  State,  most  of  them  declare  standing 

1  Eighteen  to  forty-five  in  Ala.,  Ark.,  Col.,  Fla.,  Ida.,  111.,  Ind., 
Io.,  Ky.,  Mich.,  Miss.,  Mo.,  Mon.,  N.  D.,  0.,  Ore.,  S.  C,  S.  D., 
Utah,  Wash.,  and  N.  Y.  Twenty-one  to  forty-five  in  Kansas. 
Twenty-one  to  forty  in  N.  C. 

2  Ala.,  Cal.,  Ga.,  Ida.,  Ky.,  La.,  Md.,  Minn.,  Mon.,  Miss., 
Neb.,  Nev.,  N.  D.,  N.  J.,  N.  Y.,  Okla.,  Pa.,  S.  D.,  Tex.,  and  Wis. 


54  Empire  and  Armament 

armies  dangerous  to  liberty,  and  condemn  their 
maintenance  in  time  of  peace.  Appropriations 
for  standing  armies,  even  in  time  of  war,  are 
limited  to  one  or  two  years  in  some  of  the  States. 
It  is  only  in  Alabama,  Delaware,  Kentucky, 
Massachusetts,  Maryland,  Maine,  New  Hamp- 
shire, Pennsylvania,  and  South  Carolina,  that  a 
standing  army  may  be  maintained  in  time  of  peace 
by  the  Legislature. 

The  ancient  British  restriction  against  billeting 
soldiers  in  private  houses  in  time  of  peace  without 
the  consent  of  the  owners  is  included  in  the  consti- 
tutions of  all  the  States  except  those  of  Vermont, 
New  York,  Wisconsin,  Virginia,  and  Mississippi. 
Even  in  time  of  war,  billeting  must  generally  be 
in  accordance  with  law. 

In  a  large  number  of  States,  the  governor  may 
call  out  the  militia  to  execute  the  laws,  to  suppress 
insurrections,  and  to  repel  invasion,  but  in  Mas- 
sachusetts, New  Hampshire,  and  Tennessee  the 
militia  may  not  be  called  into  service  unless  the  Leg- 
islature declares  by  law  that  the  public  safety  re- 
quires it.  In  Texas  it  may  be  called  out  only  to 
protect  the  frontiers;  in  Oklahoma  to  protect  the 
public  health,  and  in  Arkansas,  Florida,  Louisiana, 
South  Carolina,  and  Wyoming  to  preserve  the 
public  peace. 

From  the  foregoing  analysis  of  the  constitu- 
tional provisions  for  defence  in  the  various  States, 
one  gathers  a  very  definite  impression  that  the 
people  of  the  United  States  in  ratifying  the  Federal 


The  Federal  Constitution  55 

Constitution  really  surrendered  none  of  their 
traditional  prejudices  against,  and  that  they  had 
lost  none  of  their  fears  of,  military  power.  It  is  a 
significant  fact  that  in  Oklahoma,  one  of  the  most 
recently  formed  States,  the  constitutional  restric- 
tions against  the  military  are  the  most  stringent. 

Whatever,  then,  may  have  been  the  convictions 
of  the  framers  of  the  Federal  Constitution,  however 
much  they  may  have  discounted  the  fear  of  a 
standing  army  and  have  held  the  old  institution 
of  the  militia  in  contempt  as  a  means  of  defence, 
certain  it  is  their  views  made  little  headway  in  the 
popular  mind.  They  did,  however,  secure  to  the 
Federal  Government  the  power  to  maintain  a 
standing  army  without  limitation  upon  its  size^ 
but  the  people  never  contemplated  for  an  instant 
that  a  large  standing  army  should  be  created,  and 
only  consented  to  a  small  one  in  the  belief  that 
its  size  would  render  it  harmless  to  themselves 
and  yet  enable  them  in  its  use  to  secure  certain 
foreign  commercial  and  domestic  advantages. 
Unalterably  opposed  in  principle  to  a  standing 
army,  they  were  willing,  for  selfish  reasons,  to 
tolerate  one  too  weak  to  be  of  real  danger. 

In  conclusion,  attention  must  be  called  to  the 
fact  that  during  the  Revolutionary  War  nearly 
300,000  American  citizens  served  in  the  Continen- 
tal or  regular  military  establishment  from  the 
beginning  to  the  end  of  the  war.  In  1787,  a 
large  majority  of  these  men  were  still  living  and 
about  equally  distributed  among  the  population 


56  Empire  and  Armament 

of  the  thirteen  States.  Much  of  their  prejudice 
against  a  standing  army  may  be  assumed  to  have 
been  lost,  and  their  influence  must  have  of  itself 
constituted  a  very  important  factor  in  support  of 
a  central  military  establishment,  for  they  read 
with  keen  appreciation  the  century-old  lines  of 
John  Dryden: 

And  raw  in  fields  the  rude  militia  swarms, 

Mouths  without  hands;  maintain'd  at  vast  expense, 

In  peace  a  charge,  in  war  a  weak  defence; 

Stout  once  a  month  they  march,  a  blustering  band, 

And  ever  but  in  times  of  need  at  hand. 


CHAPTER  VI 

THE  WASHINGTONIAN  DOCTRINE 

THE  best  evidence  of  the  fact  that  the  people 
were  not  responsible  for  the  vesting  of  the 
Federal  Government  with  such  unlimited  military- 
power  as  it  possesses  under  the  Constitution,  is 
that,  for  years,  Congress  was  practically  prohibited 
by  the  jealousy  of  the  people  from  exercising  its 
power  to  establish  a  standing  army  worthy  of  the 
name.  And  this  was  not  because  no  need  of  pro- 
viding for  the  national  defence  was  felt ;  for  hardly 
had  the  Constitution  gone  into  effect  when  Con- 
gress undertook,  in  1792,  to  meet  the  situation  by- 
enacting  a  comprehensive  law  looking  to  the  more 
effective  establishment  of  the  militia.  No  effort, 
whatever,  was  made  at  this  time  to  establish  a 
standing  army,  notwithstanding  past  experience 
and  the  most  ample  constitutional  authority  to 
create  an  effective  regular  army. 

The  military  edifice  proposed  in  1792  was  an 
absurd  reversion  to  the  old  system  from  which 
Washington  and  Hamilton  and  Jay  had  laboured 
apparently  in  vain  to  wean  the  people.  Again, 
the  States  were   to   maintain   paper  armies,   the 

57 


58  Empire  and  Armament 

sole  reliance  of  the  central  government.  There 
was  one  wise  provision  in  the  new  law  which 
authorized  the  President  to  employ,  under  certain 
conditions,  the  militia  of  any  of  the  other  States 
to  suppress  insurrection  in  a  State  incapable  of 
maintaining  order  without  such  aid.  Thus,  in 
1794,  the  central  government  was  able,  by  calling 
out  15,000  militia  of  the  States  of  New  Jersey, 
Maryland,  and  Virginia,  to  put  down  the  Whiskey 
Rebellion  in  Pennsylvania  which  consisted  of  an 
attempt  on  the  part  of  7000  malcontents,  who  as- 
sembled in  arms,  to  resist  the  collection  of  Federal 
excise  taxes.  "Liberty  and  no  excise"  was  the 
motto  expressive  of  their  principles.  Had  the 
people  of  the  States  called  upon  to  aid  in  putting 
down  the  rebellion  been  in  sympathy  with  it,  no 
excises  would  have  been  collected.  Excises  only 
differ  in  form  from  other  taxes ;  a  successful  refusal 
to  pay  excises  would  soon  have  induced  opposition 
to  the  payment  of  other  taxes,  and  the  Federal 
Government  would  have  been  reduced  to  a  help- 
less state  of  bankruptcy,  for  there  was  no  standing 
army  with  which  to  enforce  its  laws.  The  people 
had  been  warned  against  these  evil  contingencies 
by  Hamilton  and  Jay  with  unusual  force  of  argu- 
ment; but  to  no  avail.  Their  advice  with  respect 
to  internal  order  was  ignored  as  completely  as 
their  doctrine  of  trade  expansion  was  accepted; 
the  first  rejected  because  adverse  to  the  people's 
prejudices,  the  second  adopted  because  productive 
of  selfish  advantage. 


The  Washingtonian  Doctrine        59 


Washington  was  able  to  make  but  little  impres- 
sion upon  the  people  with  respect  to  the  necessity 
of  a  standing  army;  in  matters  pertaining  to  the 
navy,  which  so  far  existed  on  paper  in  the  antici- 
patory authority  for  its  creation,  they  were  also 
most  unreasonable. 

In  January,  1794,  a  resolution  was  agreed  to  in 
the  House  of  Representatives  declaring  "that  a 
naval  force  adequate  to  the  protection  of  the  com- 
merce of  the  United  States  against  the  Algerine 
corsairs  ought  to  be  provided."  The  force  pro- 
posed by  the  administration  was  to  consist  of  but 
six  frigates.  This  measure  had  been  urged  by 
Washington,  who  had  despaired  of  negotiating  a 
peace  with  the  Dey  of  Algiers,  whom  he  believed 
to  be  actually  preparing  to  undertake  fresh  attacks 
upon  American  merchantmen  on  the  Atlantic. 

The  grounds  of  the  violent  opposition  which 
beset  the  administration's  measure  disclose  the 
popular  sentiments  of  the  time.  It  was  viewed 
solely  in  the  light  of  present  protection  to  com- 
merce, and  at  the  same  time,  with  striking  incon- 
sistency, as  but  the  corner-stone  of  a  great  and 
permanent  naval  edifice  which  the  people  did  not 
want.  The  force  contemplated  was  too  small  to 
accomplish  the  object  it  was  designed  for,  and 
then  it  was  added  that  even  if  large  enough  it 
could  not  be  brought  into  use  soon  enough  to  be 
of  value.  By  such  a  course  of  reasoning  its  op- 
ponents arrived  at  the  conclusion  that  the  measure 
was  totally  inefficacious.     Besides,  it  was  argued, 


60  Empire  and  Armament 

a  peace  might  be  obtained  with  money  as  had 
been  done  by  other  nations  possessing  large  navies. 
The  purchase  of  peace  was  held  to  be  more  effica- 
cious as  well  as  more  economical,  for,  unless  our 
commerce  was  respected,  the  tribute  would  not 
have  to  be  paid.  Then,  too,  it  was  proposed  to 
purchase  protection  for  our  commerce  from  Euro- 
pean Powers  possessing  navies  capable  of  restrain- 
ing the  Algerians.  This  also  would  be  cheaper 
than  the  building  of  our  own  navy. 

The  principal  objection  to  the  measure,  how- 
ever, was  based  on  the  prejudice  of  the  people  to 
a  permanent  navy.  Not  only  would  the  cost  of 
its  creation  and  maintenance  interfere  with,  if  it 
did  not  prevent,  the  payment  of  the  national  debt, 
but  it  would  reduce  the  country  to  the  intolerable 
condition  of  Europe,  where,  it  was  asserted,  the 
expensiveness  of  the  navy  had  brought  oppression 
upon  the  British  people,  and  led  to  the  French 
Revolution.  It  was  argued  that  the  expensive- 
ness of  government  was  the  true  ground  of  op- 
pression, and  to  that  expense,  kings,  the  nobility, 
the  priesthood,  the  army,  and  above  all,  the  navy, 
contributed.  All  such  machinery  lessened  the 
number  of  productive,  and  increased  the  number 
of  unproductive,  hands  in  a  nation.  It  was  said 
the  United  States  had  already  advanced  far 
enough  in  the  useless  system  of  Europe.  In  addi- 
tion to  a  large  civil  list,  an  army  had  been  created 
at  immense  expense,  and  now  it  was  proposed  to 
build  a  navy !     To  build  that  navy  the  debt  would 


The  Washingtonian  Doctrine       61 

have  to  be  increased,  and  nothing  constituted  a 
more  refined  system  of  tyranny  than  the  mainte- 
nance of  a  public  debt.  Therefore,  to  build  a  navy 
would  be  to  hold  the  liberty  of  the  American  people 
at  a  lower  value  than  armed  vessels ! 

It  is  not  necessary  to  give  here  the  arguments 
advanced  by  the  supporters  of  the  measure  to 
refute  the  absurd  contentions  of  its  opponents. 
The  original  resolution  was  finally  carried  by  a 
majority  of  only  two  votes  in  the  House,  concurred 
in  by  the  Senate,  and  approved  by  Washington. 
The  strength  of  the  opposition  is  indicative  of  the 
attitude  of  the  people,  who  were  of  course  generally 
more  prejudiced  and  narrow  in  their  views  than 
their  representatives.  Notwithstanding  the  popu- 
lar opposition,  however,  Washington  had  succeeded 
in  laying  the  keel  of  the  American  navy. 

The  Whiskey  Rebellion  and  other  evidences  of 
domestic  unrest  led,  in  1795,  to  the  creation  of  a 
standing  army  of  about  5000  men.  Successive 
measures  during  the  next  three  years,  inspired  by 
growing  foreign  hostilities,  effected  small  additional 
increases  of  the  regular  army,  and  steps  were 
taken  to  fortify  the  principal  harbours  of  the 
Atlantic  seaboard.  These  measures  had  been 
forcefully  urged  by  Washington  in  a  speech  to 
Congress  in  December,  1795,  in  which  he  said: 

Fellow-citizens,  amongst  the  objects  which  will 
claim  your  attention  in  the  course  of  the  session,  a 
review  of  our  military  establishment  will  not  be  the 
least  important.     It  is  called  for  by  the  events  which 


62  Empire  and  Armament 

have  changed,  and  are  likely  still  further  to  change, 
the  relative  situation  of  our  interior  frontier.  In  this 
review,  you  will  no  doubt  allow  due  weight  to  the  con- 
sideration, that  the  questions  between  us  and  certain 
foreign  powers  are  not  yet  finally  adjusted,  that  the 
war  in  Europe  is  not  yet  terminated,  and  that  the 
evacuation  of  our  Western  posts,  when  it  shall  happen, 
will  demand  a  provision  for  garrisoning  and  securing 
them.  You  will  consider  this  subject  with  a  compre- 
hensiveness equal  to  the  extent  and  variety  of  its 
relations. 

It  was  but  a  year  later  that  Washington  de- 
livered his  famous  farewell  address  in  the  writing 
of  which  he  was  so  materially  assisted  by  Hamilton, 
and  in  which,  while  he  warned  his  countrymen 
against  party  violence,  sectional  jealousies,  and 
entangling  foreign  alliances,  he  declared  prepared- 
ness for  war  to  be  the  surest  guarantee  of  peace. 

The  Washingtonian  doctrine  was  clearly  enun- 
ciated in  Washington's  farewell  address,  and 
though  Hamilton's  influence  in  formulating  it  may 
be  detected,  it  must  be  differentiated  from  that 
doctrine  which  he  and  Jay  had  sought  to  establish 
some  years  before.  Washington  was  by  no  means 
prepared  to  counsel  a  policy  of  commercial  ag- 
gression. On  the  contrary,  he  was  among  the 
first,  if  not  the  first,  to  declare  for  peaceful  com- 
mercial expansion.  His  doctrine  was  in  no  sense 
aggressive,  but  on  the  contrary  pacific.  He  had 
abiding  faith  in  an  all-wise  Providence  and  be- 
lieved   that    the    destiny    of   his   people    lay    in 


The  Washingtonian  Doctrine       63 

peaceful  pursuits.  He  had  constantly  counselled 
against  entangling  foreign  alliances  and  that  grow- 
ing offensive  nationalistic  spirit  of  which  he  per- 
ceived traces  while  the  nation  was  yet  in  its 
swaddling  clothes.  But,  while  he  detested  every 
form  of  Jingoism,  and  urged  strict  neutrality 
towards  all  European  affairs,  yet  he  never  failed 
to  encourage  a  healthy  consciousness  of  national 
strength. 

In  expressing  his  doctrine  so  clearly,  and  under 
circumstances  which  so  forcefully  emphasized  it, 
Washington  had  a  very  obvious  purpose.  During 
his  second  term,  difficulties  had  arisen  with  no 
less  than  three  foreign  nations.  France,  after 
overthrowing  the  Bourbon  monarchy  and  estab- 
lishing a  moderate  form  of  republican  government, 
much  influenced  by  developments  in  America, 
had,  in  turn,  overthrown  the  Republic  and  entered 
upon  a  reign  of  terror.  The  United  States, 
shocked  as  were  all  other  nations  by  the  excesses 
of  the  French,  declined  to  respond  to  their  call  for 
assistance  under  the  treaty  of  alliance  of  1778 
between  France  and  the  United  States.  Out  of 
this  refusal  arose  innumerable  difficulties  and  the 
bitterest  feelings.  Disputes  had  arisen  with  Great 
Britain  over  the  North- West  Territory,  and  the 
arbitrary  searching  of  American  vessels  by  British 
seamen,  which  led  to  the  Jay  treaty  difficulties; 
and  Spain  had  threatened  to  repudiate  the  treaty 
of  1795  dealing  with  the  navigation  of  the  Missis- 
sippi River.     Under  such  circumstances,   it  was 


64  Empire  and  Armament 

not  difficult  for  Washington  to  foresee  the  dangers 
ahead,  which  dangers  prompted  him  to  give  his 
timely  warning  to  his  countrymen. 

Adams's  administration  was  indeed  a  stormy 
one,  and  a  grave  military  problem  demanded  solu- 
tion upon  his  taking  over  the  reins  of  government. 
Relative  to  the  national  defence,  his  views  were 
clearly  expressed.  In  a  speech  to  both  Houses 
of  Congress,  May  16,  1797,  he  said: 

But  although  the  establishment  of  a  permanent 
system  of  naval  defence  appears  to  be  requisite,  I  am 
sensible  it  cannot  be  formed  so  speedily  and  exten- 
sively as  the  present  crisis  demands.  .  .  . 

But  besides  a  protection  of  our  commerce  on  the 
seas,  I  think  it  highly  necessary  to  protect  it  at  home, 
where  it  is  collected  in  our  most  important  ports. 
The  distance  of  the  United  States  from  Europe,  and 
the  well-known  promptitude,  ardour,  and  courage  of 
the  people  in  the  defence  of  their  country,  happily 
diminish  the  probability  of  invasion.  Nevertheless, 
to  guard  against  sudden  and  predatory  incursions, 
the  situation  of  some  of  our  principal  seaports  demands 
your  consideration;  and  as  our  country  is  vulnerable 
in  other  interests  besides  those  of  its  commerce,  you 
will  seriously  deliberate  whether  the  means  of  general 
defence  ought  not  to  be  increased  by  an  addition  to 
the  regular  artillery  and  cavalry,  and  by  arrangements 
for  forming  a  provisional  army. 

With  the  same  view,  and  as  a  measure  which,  even 
at  a  time  of  universal  peace,  ought  not  to  be  neglected, 
I  recommend  to  your  consideration  a  revision  of  the 
laws  for  organizing,  arming,  and  disciplining  the  mili- 


The  Washingtonian  Doctrine       65 

tia,  to  render  that  natural  and  safe  defence  of  the 
country  efficacious. 

By  the  foregoing  speech  Adams  virtually  de- 
clared his  allegiance  to  the  conservative  but  firm 
Washingtonian  doctrine,  and,  however  unwilling 
he  may  have  been  to  plunge  into  war,  there  was 
no  doubt  that  he  was  desirous  of  preparing  for  the 
contingency  of  a  conflict. 

In  May,  1798,  an  act  of  Congress  provided  for 
a  provisional  force  of  10,000  men  to  be  enlisted 
for  a  period  of  three  years  in  the  event  of  a  decla- 
ration of  war  by  France  against  the  United  States, 
or  in  case  of  imminent  or  actual  invasion  by  the 
enemy,  and,  in  addition  to  this  force,  the  President 
was  empowered  to  accept  volunteers.  This  law, 
undoubtedly  greatly  influenced  by  Washington, 
who  was  to  be  commander-in-chief  of  the  pro- 
posed army,  marks  a  very  notable  departure  in 
our  military  policy,  for  regulars  and  volunteers 
were  to  be  relied  on  instead  of  militia.  The  fact, 
however,  that  the  law  was  good  in  this  respect 
did  not  relieve  the  seriousness  of  the  situation, 
for  the  contemplated  army  was  not  to  come  into 
being  until  the  enemy  had  actually  assailed,  or 
prepared  to  assail,  the  United  States. 

Writing  to  James  McHenry,  Secretary  of  War, 
in  October,  1798,  John  Adams  deplored  the  lack 
of  a  comprehensive  and  well-considered  plan  of 
national  defence  and  in  an  address  to  both  Houses 
of  Congress  the  following  December,  he  said: 


66  Empire  and  Armament 

Among  the  measures  of  preparation  which  appear 
expedient  I  take  the  liberty  to  call  your  attention  to 
the  naval  establishment.  The  beneficial  effects  of  the 
small  naval  armament  provided  under  the  acts  of  the 
last  session  are  known  and  acknowledged.  Perhaps 
no  country  ever  experienced  more  sudden  and  remark- 
able advantage  from  any  measure  of  policy  than  we 
have  derived  from  the  army  for  our  maritime  protec- 
tion and  defence.  We  ought,  without  loss  of  time, 
to  lay  the  foundation  for  an  increase  in  our  navy,  to  a 
size  sufficient  to  guard  our  coast  and  protect  our  trade. 
Such  a  naval  force  as  it  is  doubtless  in  the  power  of  the 
United  States  to  create  and  maintain,  would  also 
afford  to  them  the  best  means  of  general  defence,  by 
facilitating  the  safe  transportation  of  troops  and  stores 
to  every  part  of  our  extensive  coast. 

April  27,  1799,  Adams  had  written  Stoddert, 
Secretary  of  the  Navy,  as  follows : 

I  own  that  the  navy  has  not  afforded  to  our  com- 
merce that  complete  protection  which  might  have 
been  expected  from  it,  considering  the  vast  inferiority 
of  all  the  French  force,  both  of  public  and  private 
ships,  in  the  West  Indies 

And  in  replying  to  the  answer  of  the  House  of 
Representatives  to  a  speech  delivered  by  him 
December  23,  1798,  Adams  wrote* 

.  .  .  With  you  I  cordially  agree,  that  so  long  as 
predatory  war  is  carried  on  against  commerce,  we 
should  sacrifice  the  interests  and  disappoint  the  ex- 


The  Washingtonian  Doctrine       67 

pectations  of  our  constituents,  should  we  for  a  moment 
relax  that  system  of  maritime  defence,  which  has  re- 
sulted in  such  beneficial  effects.  With  you  I  con- 
fidently believe,  that  few  persons  can  be  found  within 
the  United  States  who  do  not  admit  that  a  navy,  well 
organized,  must  constitute  the  natural  and  efficient 
defence  of  this  country  against  all  foreign  hostility. 

But  while  Adams  wTas  not  remiss  in  directing 
the  attention  of  Congress  to  the  need  of  a  plan  of 
national  defence,  Hamilton  was  the  man  of  the 
hour. 

At  the  time  of  the  Whiskey  Rebellion,  Hamilton, 
as  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  had  actually  accom- 
panied the  troops  dispatched  against  the  insur- 
gents. Throughout  this  whole  affair,  he  had  urged 
the  adoption  of  a  vigorous  repressive  policy  on  the 
part  of  the  National  Government.  In  January, 
1795,  he  had  retired  to  private  life,  but  continued 
in  close  touch  with  public  affairs,  and  was  con- 
stantly consulted  by  Washington.  In  1798,  at 
Washington's  request,  he  had  been  placed  at  the 
virtual  head  of  the  army  when  hostilities  with 
France  first  appeared  imminent,  and,  while  acting 
in  this  capacity  with  the  rank  of  major-general 
and  the  duties  of  inspector-general,  he  devoted 
himself  with  energy  and  consummate  ability  to  the 
task  of  organizing  the  army.  He  was  particularly 
energetic  in  preparing  for  the  invasion  of  Louisiana 
and  the  Floridas. 

Hamilton's  aggressive  military  policy  at  this 
time  was  in  striking  contrast  to  the  vacillation 


68  Empire  and  Armament 

and  indecision  of  Congress.     In  a  letter  to  Otis 
dated  December  27,  1798,  he  wrote: 

In  the  enclosed  extract  of  a  letter  to  another  of  the 
government,  you  will  find  my  ideas  generally  on  the 
subject  of  your  letter.  I  adopt  this  method  of  com- 
munication as  equally  effectual  and  best  adapted  to 
the  multiplicity  of  my  avocations.  Some  additional 
remarks  in  direct  reference  to  your  particular  ques- 
tions may  perhaps  be  requisite  to  fulfil  your  object. 

Any  reduction  of  the  actual  force  appears  to  me 
inexpedient.  It  will  argue  to  our  enemy  that  we  are 
either  very  narrow  in  our  resources  or  that  our  jealousy 
of  his  designs  is  abated.  Besides  that,  with  a  view 
to  the  possibility  of  internal  disorder  alone,  the  force 
authorized  is  not  too  considerable.  The  efficiency 
of  militia  for  suppressing  such  disorders  is  not  too 
much  to  be  relied  upon.  The  experience  of  the  west- 
ern expedition  ought  not  to  be  forgotten.  That  was 
a  very  uphill  business.  There  were  more  than  one 
appearances  to  excite  alarm  as  to  the  perseverance 
of  the  troops,  and  it  is  not  easy  to  foresee  what  might 
have  been  the  result  had  there  been  serious  resistance. 
The  repetition  of  similar  exertions  may  be  found  very 
difficult,  insomuch  as  to  render  it  extremely  needful, 
in  these  precarious  times,  to  have  the  government 
armed  with  the  whole  of  the  force  which  has  been 
voted. 

There  are  several  defects  in  the  military  estab- 
lishment which  demand  reform  as  well  for  economy  as 
efficiency.  On  these  there  has  been  an  ample  com- 
munication from  the  commander-in-chief  to  the  De- 
partment of  War.     I  cannot  conceive  why  nothing 


The  Washingtonian  Doctrine       69 

has  yet  gone  to  progress.  Will  it  be  amiss  informally 
to  interrogate  the  minister?  If  the  silence  is  per- 
sisted in,  you  shall  know  from  me  the  objects. 

The  extract  answers  your  question  as  to  the  pro- 
visional army.  I  think  the  act  respecting  the  eighty 
thousand  militia  ought  likewise  to  be  revived.  The 
effect  abroad  will  be  good,  and  it  will  likewise  be  so 
at  home,  as  the  evidence  of  a  reliance  of  the  govern- 
ment on  the  militia. 

Good  policy  does  not  appear  to  me  to  require  ex- 
tensive appropriations  for  fortifications  at  the  present 
juncture.  Money  can  be  most  usefully  employed  in 
other  ways.  A  good  deal  of  previous  examination 
ought  to  lead  to  a  plan  for  fortifying  three  or  four 
cardinal  points.  More  than  this  will  be  a  misappli- 
cation of  money.  Secure  positions  for  arsenals  and 
dockyards  are  in  this  view  a  primary  object. 

Your  last  question  respecting  the  West  India 
Islands,  I  shall  reserve  for  a  future  communication. 

June  27,  1799,  he  wrote  McHenry,  Secretary  of 
War,  as  follows: 

It  is  a  pity,  my  dear  sir,  and  a  reproach,  that  our 
administration  have  no  general  plan.  Certainly 
there  ought  to  be  one  formed  without  delay.  If  the 
chief  is  too  desultory,  his  ministry  ought  to  be  the 
more  united  and  steady,  and  well-settled  in  some 
reasonable  system  of  measures. 

Among  other  things,  it  should  be  agreed  what  pre- 
cise force  should  be  created,  naval  and  land,  and  this 
proportioned  to  the  state  of  our  finances.  It  will  be 
ridiculous  to  raise  troops,  and  immediately  after  dis- 
band them.     Six  ships  of  the  line,  and  twenty  frigates 


70  Empire  and  Armament 

and  sloops  of  war  are  desirable.  More  would  not  now 
be  comparatively  expedient.  It  is  desirable  to  com- 
plete and  prepare  the  land  force  which  has  been  pro- 
vided for  by  law.  Besides  eventual  security  against 
invasion,  we  ought  certainly  to  look  to  the  possession  of 
the  Floridas  and  Louisiana,  and  we  ought  to  squint  at 
South  A  merica. l 

It  is  possible  that  the  accomplishment  of  these 
objects  can  be  attended  with  financial  difficulty? 
I  deny  the  possibility.  Our  revenue  can  be  consider- 
ably reinforced.  The  progress  of  the  country  will 
quickly  supply  small  deficiencies,  and  these  can  be 
temporarily  satisfied  by  loans,  provided  our  loans  are 
made  on  the  principle  that  we  require  the  aliment  of 
European  capital, — that  lenders  are  to  gain,  and  their 
gains  to  be  facilitated,  not  obstructed. 

If  all  this  is  not  true,  our  situation  is  much  worse 
than  I  had  any  idea  of.  But  I  have  no  doubt  that  it 
is  easy  to  devise  the  means  of  execution. 

And  if  there  was  everywhere  a  disposition,  without 
prejudice  and  nonsense,  to  concert  a  rational  plan, 
I  would  cheerfully  come  to  Philadelphia  and  assist 
in  it ;  nor  can  I  doubt  that  success  may  be  insured. 

Break  this  subject  to  our  friend  Pickering.  His 
views  are  sound  and  energetic.  Try  together  to 
bring  the  other  gentlemen  to  a  consulation.  If  there 
is  everywhere  a  proper  temper,  and  it  is  wished,  send 
for  me,  and  I  will  come. 

Yours  truly, 

A.  Hamilton. 

In  December,  1799,  Hamilton  drew  up  the 
following  plan  of  national  defence: 

1  Author's  italics.     An  imperialistic  squint? 


The  Washingtonian  Doctrine       71 

Further  Measures  Advisable  to  be  Taken  without 
Delay: 

I.  To  authorize  the  President  to  proceed  forthwith 
to  raise  the  10,000  men  already  ordered. 

II.  To  establish  an  academy  for  military  and  naval 
instruction.  This  is  a  very  important  measure  and 
ought  to  be  permanent. 

III.  To  provide  for  the  immediate  raising  of  a 
corps  of  non-commissioned  officers,  viz.,  sergeants 
and  corporals,  sufficient  with  the  present  establish- 
ment for  an  army  of  50,000  men.  The  having  these 
men  prepared  and  disciplined,  will  accelerate  ex- 
tremely the  disciplining  of  an  additional  force. 

IV.  To  provide  before  Congress  rise,  that  in  case 
it  shall  appear  that  an  invasion  of  this  country  by 
a  large  army  is  actually  on  foot,  there  shall  be  a 
draft  from  the  militia  to  be  classed,  of  a  number  suffi- 
cient to  complete  the  army  of  30,000  men.  Provi- 
sion for  volunteers  in  lieu  of  drafts.  A  bounty  to  be 
given. 

V.  To  authorize  the  President  to  provide  a  further 
naval  force  of  six  ships  of  the  line,  and  twelve  frigates, 
with  twenty  small  vessels  not  exceeding  sixteen  guns. 
It  is  possible  the  ships  of  the  line  and  frigates  may 
be  purchased  of  Great  Britain  to  be  paid  for  in  stock. 
We  ought  to  be  ready  to  cut  up  all  the  small  privateers 
and  gunboats  in  the  West  Indies,  so  as  at  the  same 
time  to  distress  the  French  Islands  as  much  as  possible 
and  protect  our  trade. 


The  war  with  France,  which  had  seemed  so 
imminent,  was  avoided  more  by  reason  of  France's 
preoccupation  with  the  great  coalition  of  Powers 


72  Empire  and  Armament 

which  Napoleon's  startling  successes  had  given 
rise  to,  than  by  any  act  of  the  United  States,  the 
weakness  of  which  caused  it  to  be  held  in  contempt 
by  the  French  people.  There  occurred  one  sharp 
naval  engagement,  resulting  in  success  for  the 
American  seamen  under  Commodore  Truxton, 
and  some  privateering  took  place,  but  peaceful 
relations  between  the  two  countries  were  re-estab- 
lished in  September,  1800.  Soon  after  the  peace 
convention  was  concluded  Adams  addressed  Con- 
gress in  the  following  words: 

.  .  .  While  our  best  endeavours  for  the  preservation 
of  harmony  with  all  nations  will  continue  to  be  used, 
the  experience  of  the  world  and  our  own  experience 
admonish  us  of  the  futility  of  trusting  too  confidently 
to  their  success.  We  cannot,  without  committing  a 
dangerous  imprudence,  abandon  those  measures  of 
self-protection,  which  are  adapted  to  our  situation, 
and  to  which,  notwithstanding  our  pacific  policy, 
the  violence  and  injustice  of  others  may  again  compel 
us  to  assent.  While  our  vast  extent  of  seacoast,  the 
commercial  and  agricultural  habits  of  our  people,  the 
great  capital  they  will  continue  to  trust  on  the  ocean, 
suggest  the  system  of  defence  which  will  be  most  bene- 
ficial to  ourselves,  our  distance  from  Europe,  and  our 
resources  for  maritime  strength,  will  enable  us  to 
employ  it  with  effect.  Seasonable  and  systematic 
arrangements,  so  far  as  our  resources  will  justify,  for 
a  navy  adapted  to  defensive  war,  and  which  may  in 
case  of  necessity  be  brought  quickly  into  one,  seem 
to  be  recommended  as  much  by  a  wise  and  true  econ- 
omy as  by  a  just  regard  for  our  future  tranquillity, 


The  Washingtonian  Doctrine       73 

for  the  safety  of  our  shores,  and  for  the  protection  of 
our  property  entrusted  to  the  ocean. 

The  present  navy  of  the  United  States,  called  sud- 
denly into  existence  by  a  great  national  exigency,  has 
raised  us  in  our  own  esteem;  and  by  the  protection 
afforded  to  our  commerce  has  effected  to  the  extent 
of  our  expectations  the  objects  for  which  it  was  created. 

In  connection  with  a  navy  ought  to  be  contemplated 
the  fortification  of  some  of  our  principal  seaports  and 
harbours.  A  variety  of  considerations,  which  will 
readily  suggest  themselves,  urge  an  attention  to  this 
measure  of  precaution.  To  give  security  to  our  prin- 
cipal ports,  considerable  sums  have  already  been  ex- 
pended, but  the  works  remain  incomplete.  It  is  for 
Congress  to  determine  whether  additional  appropria- 
tions shall  be  made  in  order  to  render  competent  to 
the  intended  purposes  the  fortifications  which  have 
been  commenced. 

The  manufacture  of  arms  within  the  United  States 
still  invites  the  attention  of  the  national  legislature. 
At  a  considerable  expense  to  the  public  this  manufac- 
tory has  been  brought  to  such  a  state  of  maturity 
as,  with  continued  encouragement,  will  supersede  the 
necessity  of  further  importations  from  foreign 
countries. 

The  writer  has  endeavoured  to  show  by  means 
of  the  writings  and  speeches  of  Washington, 
Hamilton,  Adams,  and  Jay,  how  continuously  a 
number  of  our  foremost  statesmen  had  laboured 
to  educate  their  countrymen  up  to  the  appreciation 
of  the  necessity  of  some  plan  of  national  defence. 
It  cannot  be  said  that  Hamilton  and  Jay  had  made 


74  Empire  and  Armament 

any  considerable  headway  in  establishing  their 
doctrine  of  foreign  commercial  aggression,  but 
certain  it  is  that  much  progress  had  been  made 
along  more  conservative  lines.  Indeed,  the  Wash- 
ingtonian  doctrine  had  almost  become  established. 
At  this  juncture,  however,  Jefferson  at  the  head 
of  democracy  came  into  power,  and,  within  a 
year,  a  distinct  retrogression  had  set  in,  for,  by 
act  of  March  16,  1802,  the  regular  army  was 
greatly  reduced.  From  this  time  until  the  end 
of  Jefferson's  second  term  of  office,  all  military 
measures,  whether  offensive  or  defensive  in  char- 
acter, looked  solely  to  the  employment  of  volun- 
teers and  militia,  and,  even  when  war  with  Spain 
was  impending  in  1803,  no  provision  whatever 
was  made  for  the  increase  of  the  regular  army. 

Jefferson  may  have  been  an  ardent  advocate  of 
peace,  but  he  was  no  more  so  than  Washington. 
The  difference  between  them  on  this  point  was: 
Washington  believed  in  being  prepared  to  prevent 
war  by  a  show  of  force  which  would  compel  respect, 
while  Jefferson  professed  to  believe  that  he  could 
maintain  peace  by  removing  what  he  viewed  as  a 
tempting  cause  of  war.  From  Paris,  when  war 
with  France  was  threatening  the  United  States, 
he  wrote  Washington : 

Upon  the  whole,  I  think  peace  advantageous  to  us, 
necessary  for  Europe,  and  desirable  for  Humanity. 
A  few  days  will  decide,  probably,  whether  all  these 
considerations  are  to  give  way  to  the  bad  passions 
of  kings,  and  those  who  would  be  kings. 


The  Washingtonian  Doctrine       75 

It  is  possible  Jefferson  intended  a  veiled  refer- 
ence in  this  letter  to  certain  Americans  as  well  as 
to  Napoleon  as  belonging  to  the  category  of  those 
"who  would  be  kings." 

Mr.  Bancroft  says  of  Washington:  "Like  almost 
every  great  warrior,  he  hated  war,  and  wished  to 
see  the  plague  of  mankind  banished  from  the 
earth."  In  1785,  Washington  himself  said  to  one 
of  the  French  officers  who  had  served  under  him: 

I  never  expect  to  draw  my  sword  again.  I  can 
scarcely  conceive  the  cause  that  would  induce  me  to 
do  it.  My  wish  is  to  see  the  whole  world  in  peace, 
and  its  inhabitants  one  band  of  brothers  striving  who 
would  contribute  most  to  the  happiness  of  mankind. 

Washington  did  stand  prepared,  however,  in 
1798,  to  draw  his  sword  again,  when  his  country 
called  him  to  its  defence;  but  he  never  failed  to 
plead  for  peace  when  compatible  with  the  dignity 
of  this  country,  and  he  was  not  disappointed  to 
keep  his  sword  sheathed  even  though  prepared 
to  draw  it  if  needs  be.  We  must  not  hold  Jeffer- 
son's mere  professions  in  more  esteem  than 
Washington's  frequent  demonstrations  of  the  love 
of  peace. 


CHAPTER  VII 

JEFFERSON  AND  HIS  MILITARY   POLICY 

WE  may  accept  it  as  a  fact  that  Jefferson  was 
the  first  great  American  to  give  impulse 
to  the  propaganda  of  disarmament. 

Of  course  he  did  not  originate  the  theory  of 
disarmament,  nor  did  he  repose  for  any  length  of 
time  his  faith  in  the  theory,  but  his  early  actions 
as  President  did  do  much  to  give  strength  to 
the  innumerable  theorists  who  believed  that  an 
Utopia  of  peace  was  at  hand  and  ready  to  be 
proclaimed. 

A  distinction  must  be  made  between  a  pacifist 
and  a  mere  lover  of  peace.  A  man  may  ardently 
long  for  peace  without  entertaining  any  visionary 
theories  as  to  how  to  secure  it.  A  pacifist,  on  the 
other  hand,  is  one  who  is  not  only  devoted  to  the 
cause  of  peace  but  who  entertains  some  "ism" 
which  he  claims  to  be  an  elixir  for  the  ill  of  war. 
He  either  rejects  in  toto  the  evolutionary  theory 
of  Darwin,  Spencer,  and  Huxley,  that  human 
strife  is  a  concomitant  of  human  progress,  or  ac- 
cepting the  facts  of  nature  as  revealed  in  history, 
sets  himself  to  the  task  of  establishing  a  substitute 

76 


Jefferson  and  his  Military  Policy     77 

for  the  underlying  cosmic  principles  which  pro- 
duce those  facts. 

The  writer  has  already  suggested  that  Jefferson 
might  now  properly  be  styled  a  socialist.  His 
assaults  on  the  established  institutions  of  his  day, 
for  instance  the  State  church,  estates  entail,  primo- 
geniture, and  his  uncompromising  attacks  on 
capital,  certainly  distinguish  him  in  the  democracy 
of  his  day,  if  together  they  do  not  differentiate  him 
from  the  ordinary  man  who  claimed  to  be  of  his 
political  faith.  In  his  views  on  peace  and  how  to 
attain  it,  we  find  but  another  evidence  substan- 
tiating our  claim  that  he  should  be  rated  as  a  pre- 
cursor of  Owen,  Saint-Simon,  Fourier,  Blanc, 
Marx,  Engels,  and  others,  closely  or  distantly 
related  as  their  disciples  may  claim  them  to  be. 
Their  creeds  may  have  differed,  but  a  common 
conviction  was  entertained  by  them  all: 

"A  wonderful  day  a-coming  when  all  shall  be 
better  than  well." 

Jefferson,  then,  holding  such  convictions,  at 
first  claimed  that  as  President  he  could  do  much 
to  hasten  the  coming  of  that  "wonderful  da  ," 
though  perhaps  he  might  not  actually  be  able  to 
bring  it  about.  Among  his  first  measures,  there- 
fore, were  those  reducing  the  army  and  navy. 
His  views  on  the  necessities  of  armament  and  the 
national  defence  may  best  be  established  by  his 
own  words. 

In  a  letter  to  Kosciusko,  dated  April  2,  1802, 
he  made  the  boast : 


78  Empire  and  Armament 

We  keep  in  service  no  more  than  men  enough  to 
garrison  the  small  posts  disposed  at  great  distances 
on  the  frontier.  .  .  .  They  [Congress,  *.  e.,  the  first 
Congress  convened  since  republicanism  had  gained 
its  ascendancy]  have  reduced  the  army  and  navy  to 
what  is  above  necessity.  They  are  disarming  execu- 
tive patronage,  and  preponderance,  by  putting  down 
half  the  officers  of  the  United  States  which  are  no 
longer  necessary. 

Jefferson  was  at  least  premature  in  seeking  to 
put  into  effect  his  theories  of  disarmament,  and 
of  this  fact  his  own  actions  are  the  best  proof. 
Hardly  had  he  begun  to  enforce  his  policy  when 
the  Barbary  States  of  North  Africa,  despising  our 
flag  for  its  weakness,  ignored  their  treaties  with 
the  United  States  and  undertook  to  break  up  that 
trade  which  Hamilton  and  Jay  and  Adams  had 
done  so  much  to  encourage  with  our  guns.  Added 
to  the  overt  acts  of  the  Mohammedans  was  the 
secret  treaty  of  Napoleon  with  Spain  looking  to 
the  transfer  of  Spanish  Louisiana  to  France. 
Jefferson's  theories  of  peace  at  once  went  up  in 
smoke.  His  note  was  now  very  discordant  with 
the  tone  of  peace.  In  a  letter  dated  February  25, 
1803,  in  which  he  appealed  to  the  State  govern- 
ments to  enforce  rigidly  the  existing  militia  law, 
he  added: 

None  but  an  armed  nation  can  dispense  with  a 
standing  army;  to  keep  ours  armed  and  disciplined 
is,  therefore,  at  all  times  important,  but  is  especially 
so  at  a  moment  when  rights  the  most  essential  to  our 


Jefferson  and  his  Military  Policy     79 

welfare  have  been  violated,  and  an  infraction  of 
Treaty  committed  without  colour  or  pretext;  and 
although  we  are  willing  to  believe  that  this  has  been 
the  act  of  a  subordinate  agent  only,  yet  it  is  wise  to 
prepare  for  the  possibility  that  it  may  have  been  the 
leading  measure  of  a  system. 


Then  he  writes,  while  peace  negotiations  are 
being  conducted,  "let  us  arm  the  strength  of  the 
nation  and  be  ready  to  do  with  promptitude  and 
effect  whatever  a  regard  to  justice  and  our  future 
security  may  require." 

From  this  letter,  we  see  that,  whatever  Jeffer- 
son's theories  of  peace  may  have  been  at  the  time 
he  became  President,  in  1803  he  had  in  mind  no 
practicable  substitute  for  national  arms  with  which 
to  maintain  peace.  That  his  practice  was  abso- 
lutely inconsistent  with  his  theories  is  further 
evidenced  by  the  fact  that  not  even  during  the 
peace  negotiations  of  which  he  spoke  and  had  full 
knowledge,  was  he  willing  to  forego  that  threat  of 
armed  conflict  which  ordinarily  proves  to  be  an 
immediate  cause  of  war.  Arbitration  is  capable 
of  embracing  only  the  subjugation  or  control  of 
the  proximate  and  immediate  causes  of  disputes — 
it  rarely  embraces  the  ultimate  causes  which  can 
be  perceived  only  in  the  retrospect  and  out  of 
which  the  proximate  and  immediate  causes  grow. 
These  latter  are  but  the  excrescences,  the  super- 
ficial signs,  of  an  old  distemper  which  has  irre- 
vocably produced  its  ill  effects.     In  these  facts 


80  Empire  and  Armament 

are  to  be  found  the  impotence  of  peace  confer- 
ences which  rely  for  the  removal  of  the  cancer  of 
international  antagonisms  exclusively  upon  the 
application  of  the  arbitral  balm  to  the  surface 
sore.  Peace  advocates  are  unable,  as  a  rule,  to 
detect  the  generative  process  of  the  malignant 
growth  of  war  until  its  roots  are  firmly  imbedded 
in  the  national  body,  and  until  the  proximate 
and  immediate  causes  of  strife  make  their  ap- 
pearance. 

Jefferson's  theory  had  been  that  to  disarm  the 
nation  of  which  he  was  the  political  head  would 
remove  those  dangerous  temptations  which  lead 
to  war.  He  failed  at  first  to  perceive,  as  do  all 
disarmamentists,  that  these  temptations  which  he 
sought  to  remove  from  his  own  nation  might  pre- 
sent themselves  to  some  nation  that  did  not  disarm, 
or  even  if  disarmed,  one  that  was  capable  of  arming 
more  quickly  and  efficiently  than  his  own. 

The  fallacy  of  Jefferson's  position  was  estab- 
lished by  his  own  energetic  course  in  calling  his 
country  to  arms  to  back  up  a  dispute  in  which  it 
became  involved  while  disarmed,  and  even  while 
it  was  being  sought  to  solve  the  difficulties  by 
arbitration.  That  he  had  slight  faith  in  arbitra- 
tion and  was  unwilling  to  depend  upon  peaceful 
methods  in  this  dispute  is  proved  conclusively  by 
his  own  words — "let  us  arm  the  strength  of  the 
nation  and  be  ready  to  do  with  promptitude  and 
effect  whatever  a  regard  to  justice  and  our  future 
security  may  require." 


Jefferson  and  his  Military  Policy     81 

From  the  foregoing  words  of  counsel,  which  do 
not  seem  at  all  consistent  with  Disarmament, 
Pacifism,  and  Jefferson's  other  "isms,"  we  are 
compelled  to  conclude  that  he  did  not  really  be- 
lieve in  disarmament  in  practice,  but  only  in  theory, 
and  that  his  theory  was  based  on  the  same  ancient 
prejudice  against  standing  armies  that  had  so 
firmly  gripped  the  American  people  from  the  first. 
Events  proved  that  he  was  willing  enough  to 
employ  force  in  the  settlement  of  an  international 
dispute  so  long  as  force  was  to  be  exerted  through 
the  old  medium  of  the  militia.  He  had,  therefore, 
utterly  failed  to  learn  the  military  lessons  of  the 
Revolution,  and  sacrificed  the  economy  of  pre- 
paredness to  his  unreasoning  prejudice,  which 
prejudice  he  sought  to  veil  by  professions  incon- 
sistent with  his  acts  and  his  own  words. 

Fortunately,  for  the  United  States,  the  necessity 
of  fighting  Napoleon's  superb  legions  with  Ameri- 
can militia  did  not  arise,  for,  in  1803,  the  United 
States  acquired  by  purchase  from  France  the 
Louisiana  territory,  thus  removing  the  cause  of 
the  trouble  between  the  two  countries. 

The  internal  dissensions  arising  out  of  Jefferson's 
purchase  of  Louisiana,  an  act  declared  by  many 
to  be  unconstitutional,  caused  Jefferson  to  relin- 
quish all  idea  of  relying  on  the  militia  of  the  States 
for  the  sole  support  of  the  Federal  Government. 
He  could  not  now  fail  to  perceive  the  advantages 
of  a  standing  army  over  the  "paper  troops"  of 
States  in  no  less  than  six  of  which  secession  from 


82  Empire  and  Armament 

the  Union  was  actually  being  discussed!  It  was 
in  the  new  light  which  spread  over  him  at  this 
time  that  he  approved  the  act  providing  for  the 
establishment  of  a  national  military  academy  on 
the  Hudson,  the  creation  of  which  had  been  so 
ardently  urged  by  Knox,  Washington,  Steuben, 
Hamilton,  Pickering,  and  McHenry.  The  purpose 
of  this  academy  was,  of  course,  to  furnish  the 
country  with  a  permanent  corps  of  trained  officers ! 

The  rumblings  of  an  impending  conflict,  this 
time  with  Great  Britain,  were  now  again  all  too 
audible  to  permit  Jefferson  to  theorize  on  peace 
and  attempt  to  put  into  effect  those  theories  in 
which  apparently  he  had  grown  to  repose  less 
faith  than  formerly.  But  the  harm  had  been  done 
and  the  evils  which  he  had  induced  by  his  policy 
of  dismantling  the  navy  were  upon  the  country,  for 
British  seamen  were  again  offensively  active  in 
their  depredations  upon  our  trade. 

For  years  the  British  policy  had  been  to  restrain 
our  commercial  growth.  As  early  as  1803,  an 
English  statesman  was  believed  to  have  declared, 
' '  If  there  were  no  Algiers,  we  would  have  to  con- 
struct one,"  and  yet,  in  the  face  of  such  a  threat, 
Jefferson  had  successfully  persisted  in  his  efforts 
to  render  our  foreign  trade  helpless,  and  place  our 
growing  merchant  marine  at  the  mercy  of  hostile 
interference. 

To  counteract  the  evils  of  which  he  was  the 
author,  Jefferson,  in  1807,  resorted  to  retaliatory 
measures  in  the  form  of  embargo  acts,  which  of 


Jefferson  and  his  Military  Policy     83 

course  did  not  compensate  for  our  own  loss  of  trade, 
however  much  they  may  have  annoyed  Great 
Britain.  As  a  matter  of  fact  they  not  only  proved 
disastrous  to  our  commercial  and  agricultural 
interests,  but  constituted  new  proximate  causes 
for  the  war  which  followed.  Indeed,  our  com- 
mercial interests  openly  charged  that  Jefferson 
was  seeking  to  provoke  Great  Britain  into  hostili- 
ties, a  view  which  the  British  very  naturally 
adopted. 

In  the  midst  of  the  difficulties  with  Great  Britain, 
Congress  authorized  the  President  to  employ  the 
land  and  naval  forces  of  the  United  States  in  the 
same  manner  and  under  the  same  conditions  as 
prescribed  for  the  militia,  and  this  within  four 
years  of  the  time  when  Jefferson  declared  that  by 
keeping  up  the  militia  a  regular  army  could  be 
dispensed  with! 

It  was  but  a  step  from  the  creation  of  the  Mili- 
tary Academy,  and  the  authorization  of  the  Pre- 
sident to  make  greater  use  of  the  regular  army  than 
had  been  allowed  him  in  the  past,  to  the  increase 
of  the  Federal  military  force  in  1808  when  war 
seemed  probable.  All  this  happened  during  Jeffer- 
son's second  term  in  office;  that  he  sanctioned  it 
is  an  unquestionable  fact. 

In  1809,  Madison  succeeded  as  President  to 
the  "political  mess"  Jefferson  had  stewed  for  him. 
Connecticut  and  Massachusetts  had  actually 
enunciated  the  doctrine  of  nullification  as  a  result 
of    Jefferson's    retaliatory    policy    against    Great 


84  Empire  and  Armament 

Britain,  which  had  so  disastrously  affected  their 
trade.  Insults  had  been  heaped  upon  the  national 
flag  both  by  France  and  England,  and,  going  unre- 
sented,  had  caused  an  evident  loss  of  national 
respect  at  home  and  abroad.  A  navy  worthy  of 
the  name  did  not  exist;  the  small  regular  army 
existed  only  on  paper ;  and  American  shipping  lay 
idle  in  home  harbours,  or  helpless  on  the  high  seas. 
Such  had  been  Jefferson's  uncertain  and  mixed 
military  policy  of  disarmament  and  sudden  re- 
armament, arbitration  and  retaliation,  and  peace- 
ful submission  to  insults  followed  by  sudden 
threats  of  war,  that  not  only  the  British  but  the 
American  people  were  provoked  into  a  state  of 
dangerous  resentment.  In  the  eight  years  he 
served  as  President,  not  a  single  advance  towards 
the  peaceful  solution  of  our  international  problems 
did  he  bring  about.  Leaving  the  country  involved 
in  the  most  serious  difficulties,  domestic  and  for- 
eign, he  devoted  the  next  few  years  to  theorizing, 
and  to  an  attempt  to  excuse  its  losses  by  dwelling 
on  the  loss  he  had  caused  the  enemy ! 

In  another  famous  letter  to  Kosciusko,  dated 
April  13,  181 1,  written  in  the  tranquillity  of  his 
Virginia  home,  far  removed  from  the  turmoil 
which  he  had  created,  he  wrote : 

We,  therefore,  remained  in  peace,  suffering  frequent 
injuries,  but  on  the  whole  multiplying,  improving, 
prospering  beyond  all  example.  It  is  evident  to  all 
that  in  spite  of  great  loss  much  greater  gains  have 


Jefferson  and  his  Military  Policy     85 

ensued.  When  these  gladiators  shall  have  worried 
each  other  into  ruin  or  reason,  instead  of  lying  among 
the  dead  on  the  bloody  arena,  we  shall  have  acquired 
a  growth  and  strength  which  will  place  us  hors  <Tin- 
sidte.  Peace  then  has  been  our  principle,  peace  is 
our  interest,  and  peace  has  saved  to  the  world  this 
only  plant  of  free  and  rational  government  now  exist- 
ing in  it.  If  it  can  still  be  preserved,  we  shall  soon  see 
the  final  extinction  of  our  national  debt,  and  libera- 
tion of  our  revenues  for  the  defence  and  improvement 
of  our  country.  .  .  . 

This  letter  is  too  full  of  absurdities  to  dwell  upon, 
but  in  dismissing  it  let  us  condemn  for  ever  a  policy 
of  peaceful  submission  to  insult  in  order  that  we 
may  grow  strong  enough  to  resent  insult  in  the 
future,  a  policy  that  presently  accepts  indignities 
in  order  that  our  debts  may  be  paid  and  that  our 
accumulated  profits  may  be  devoted  to  measures 
of  resistance  in  the  future ! 

The  following  month  Jefferson  wrote  Monroe 
as  follows : 

The  two  last  Congresses  have  been  the  theme  of  the 
most  licentious  reprobation  for  printers  thirsting  for 
war,  some  against  France  and  some  against  England, 
but  the  people  wish  for  peace  with  both.  They  feel 
no  incumbency  on  them  to  become  the  reformers  of 
the  other  hemisphere  and  to  inculcate,  with  fire  and 
sword,  a  return  to  moral  order.  When  indeed  peace 
shall  become  more  losing  than  war  they  may  owe  to 
their  interests  what  these  Quixotes  are  clamouring 
for  on  false  estimates  of  honour. 


86  Empire  and  Armament 

The  foregoing  letter  would  indicate  that  Jeffer- 
son in  1811  had  only  the  dimmest  perception  of 
the  real  causes  at  issue  between  France,  England, 
and  the  United  States,  and  none  whatever  of  the 
causes  of  resentment  on  the  part  of  the  American 
people. 

The  net  current  result  of  Jefferson's  influence 
for  peace  while  President  was  nil.  He  made  many- 
professions  of  the  love  of  peace.  When  no  dan- 
gers threatened  he  disarmed  his  country  and 
succeeded  well  in  reducing  it  to  a  state  of  thorough 
unpreparedness  for  war,  but  he  was  even  more 
prompt  to  threaten  the  forcible  settlement  of 
disputes  at  the  very  time  they  were  being  arbi- 
trated. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

WHAT    WAS    THE    JEFFERSON    DOCTRINE    OF    WAR? 

THE  historian  of  today  has,  as  have  many  of 
our  statesmen  and  political  leaders,  actually 
accorded  to  Jefferson  in  the  Council  of  World 
Peace  a  place  beside  Kant  and  St. -Pierre,  who 
believed  that  universal  peace  could  be  established 
by  the  application  of  the  law  that  nothing  is  good 
but  good  will,  and  that  men  might  be  led  to  act 
in  such  a  way  that  at  the  same  time  they  could 
will  that  their  belief  in  peace  would  transform 
itself  into  a  universal  law.  According  to  Kant's 
philosophy,  man  imposes  upon  himself  the  univer- 
sal system  of  laws  to  which  he  is  subject,  and  he 
is  under  obligation  to  act  only  in  conformity  with 
his  own  will. 

This  autonomy  of  the  will,  he  holds,  must  be 
correlated  with  the  systematic  combination  of 
different  rational  beings  through  the  medium  of 
common  laws;  but  the  whole  conception  is  falla- 
cious, he  admits,  if  man's  will  is  a  mere  phenome- 
non conditioned  by  casual  laws. 

That  Jefferson  had  come  under  the  influence 
of  Kant  and  St. -Pierre,  as  he  came  under  that  of 

87 


88  Empire  and  Armament 

Rousseau,  is  not  to  be  denied,  but  that  he  had 
any  real  harmony  of  thought  with  the  philosophy 
of  Kant  in  respect  to  the  possibility  of  universal 
peace  is  untrue. 

•  This  fact  is  quite  apparent  from  his  own  decla- 
ration of  the  conviction  that  "it  is  a  melancholy 
law  of  human  society  to  be  compelled  sometimes 
to  choose  a  great  evil  in  order  to  ward  off  a  greater ; 
to  deter  their  neighbours  from  rapine  by  making 
it  cost  them  more  than  honest  gains."  This  con- 
viction of  Jefferson's  belongs  more  in  the  philo- 
sophy of  Washington — the  way  to  preserve  peace 
is  to  be  prepared  for  war — than  in  that  of  Kant — 
man  by  his  conscious  will  may  impose  peace  upon 
his  fellow-beings.  Indeed,  it  negatives  the  very 
fundamental  conception  in  Kant's  philosophy, 
and  the  teachings  of  St. -Pierre.  Furthermore,  it 
is  identical  with  the  German  doctrine  that  pre- 
paredness for  war  in  a  state  will  deter  an  enemy 
from  making  war  upon  it  by  annihilating  his  hopes 
of  victory,  and  that  to  be  prepared  is,  therefore, 
more  conducive  to  peace  than  to  be  so  defenceless 
as  to  invite  war.  This  view  certainly  approaches 
the  philosophy  of  the  ancient  pessimists  more  nearly 
than  it  does  that  of  Kant.  Said  Heraclitus:  "War 
is  the  father  of  all  things."  Dionysius  wrote: 
"It  is  a  law  of  nature  common  to  all  mankind, 
which  no  time  shall  annul  or  destroy,  that  those 
who  have  more  strength  and  excellence  shall  bear 
rule  over  those  who  have  less."  And  Plato  said: 
"All  states  are  in  perpetual  war   with  all.     For 


What  Was  the  Jefferson  Doctrine  ?  89 

that  which  we  call  peace  is  no  more  than  merely  a 
name,  whilst  in  reality  nature  has  set  all  com- 
munities in  an  unproclaimed  but  everlasting  war 
with  each  other." 

Indeed  there  is  absolutely  no  nexus  between  the 
faith  of  Jefferson,  as  expressed  by  himself,  and 
that  of  the  pacifists  who  now  claim  him  as  one  of 
their  great  apostles,  for  to  hold  that  war  is  provi- 
dential and  that  it  is  a  law  of  nature  that  nations 
must  encroach  one  upon  the  other,  as  did  Jef- 
ferson, is  to  deny  the  basic  principles  of  the  creed 
of  pacifism. 

But,  at  best,  it  is  difficult  for  one  to  isolate  with 
any  degree  of  certainty  and  to  put  his  finger  upon 
Jefferson's  convictions  if  his  mere  professions  be 
disregarded.  Those  convictions  seem  to  have 
been  as  variable  as  his  military  policy.  This  the 
writer  will  attempt  to  prove,  and  in  the  endeav- 
our to  arrive  at  Jefferson's  real  doctrine  of  war  no 
regard  shall  be  had  to  his  mere  professions  on  the 
subject. 

We  have  seen  that  in  writing  to  Monroe,  in 
181 1,  he  uncompromisingly  condemned  the  desire 
on  the  part  of  the  "licentious  printers"  for  war, 
and  claimed  that  the  people  neither  wanted  nor 
found  their  interests  in  war  with  Great  Britain. 
In  1 8 14  he  wrote: 

We  cannot  blame  the  government  for  choosing  the 
war,  because  certainly  the  great  majority  of  the 
nation  thought  it  ought  to  be  chosen,  not  that  they 


90  Empire  and  Armament 

were  to  gain  by  it  dollars  and  cents ;  all  men  know  that 
war  is  a  losing  game  to  both  parties.  But  they  know 
also  that  if  they  don't  resist  encroachment  at  some 
point,  all  will  be  taken  from  them,  and  that  more 
would  then  be  lost  even  in  dollars  and  cents  by  sub- 
mission than  resistance.  It  is  a  case  of  giving  a  part 
to  save  the  whole,  a  limb  to  save  a  life.  It  is  a  melan- 
choly law  of  human  society  to  be  compelled  sometimes 
to  choose  a  great  evil  in  order  to  ward  off  a  greater; 
to  deter  their  neighbours  from  rapine  by  making  it 
cost  them  more  than  honest  gains.  The  enemy  are 
now  accordingly  disgorging  what  they  had  so  raven- 
ously swallowed.  ...  I  consider  the  war  then  entirely 
justifiable  on  our  part,  although  I  am  still  sensible  it 
is  a  deplorable  misfortune  to  us.  It  has  arrested  the 
course  of  the  most  remarkable  tide  of  prosperity  any 
nation  ever  experienced. 

The  expressions  in  this  letter  should  also  be 
compared  with  those  in  the  one  he  wrote  Kosciusko 
in  1811,  in  which  he  said:  "We  therefore  remained 
in  peace,  suffering  frequent  injuries,  but,  on  the 
whole,  multiplying,  improving,  prospering,  beyond 
all  example." 

If  human  language  means  anything  we  must 
view  Jefferson's  argument  for  peace,  in  the  one 
case,  as  diametrically  opposed  to  his  argument  for 
war,  in  the  other.  In  the  first  letter,  he  contended 
that  the  benefits  to  be  had  from  peace  greatly 
outweighed  the  considerations  in  favour  of  war — 
in  the  second,  he  declared  war  necessary  not- 
withstanding the  sacrifice  it  entailed! 


What  Was  the  Jefferson  Doctrine  ?  91 

It  is  not  a  pleasant  task  to  assume  to  make  a 
famous  philosopher,  however  mixed  his  philosophy 
may  have  been,  contradict  himself  in  his  own 
words.  It  is  attempted  here  to  show  only  the 
danger  of  building  in  the  present  upon  a  philosophy 
which  exists  principally  in  the  minds  of  those  who 
hold  up  Jefferson  as  the  great  exponent  of  dis- 
armament and  pacifism. 

In  a  letter  to  Colonel  Duane  under  date  of  August 
4,  1812,  Jefferson,  who  had  long  since  boasted  to 
Kosciusko  of  his  program  of  disarmament,  wrote: 

I  see,  as  you  do,  the  difficulties  and  defects  we 
have  to  encounter  in  war,  and  should  expect  disasters 
if  we  had  an  enemy  on  land  capable  of  inflicting  them. 
But  the  weakness  of  our  enemy  there,  will  make  our 
first  errors  innocent,  and  the  seeds  of  genius  which 
nature  sows  with  even  hand  through  every  age  and 
country,  and  which  need  only  soil  and  season  to  ger- 
minate, will  develop  themselves  among  our  military 
men.  Some  of  them  will  become  prominent,  and 
seconded  by  the  native  energy  of  our  citizens,  will 
soon,  I  hope,  to  our  force  add  the  benefits  of  skill. 
The  acquisition  of  Canada  this  year,  as  far  as  the 
neighbourhood  of  Quebec,  will  be  a  mere  matter  of 
marching,  and  will  give  us  experience  for  the  attack 
on  Halifax  the  next. 

In  the  foregoing  letter,  Jefferson  reposed  his 
faith  in  a  combination  of  nature  and  God-given 
genius  to  win  victories  for  his  country.  The  victo- 
ries were  not,  however,  won,  and  the  War  of  1812 


92  Empire  and  Armament 

proved  disastrous  to  the  United  States  from  a 
military  standpoint,  notwithstanding  the  employ- 
ment of  527,654  troops. 

In  1812,  there  were  but  5000  British  troops  in 
America.  In  18 14  there  were  16,500  British  troops 
in  Canada  and  the  United  States,  the  largest  num- 
ber present  during  a  single  year.  During  this 
same  year  the  United  States  had  235,839  men  in 
the  field,  and  that  American  genius  for  command, 
upon  which  Jefferson  had  so  confidently  relied, 
had  not  developed  sufficiently  to  enable  this 
overwhelming  force  to  drive  the  few  thousand 
British  into  the  sea — nor  had  "mere  marching" 
sufficed  to  carry  it  to  Quebec!  Indeed,  on  the 
24th  of  August,  1814,  a  small  detachment  of  Brit- 
ish troops  entered  and  burned  a  part  of  the  Ameri- 
can capital. 

Washington  in  his  farewell  speech  had  urged 
preparedness  for  war,  and,  as  we  have  seen,  had, 
on  numerous  occasions,  warned  the  country  against 
placing  its  trust  in  the  militia  for  its  defence. 
Jefferson,  in  his  last  annual  message,  as  if  to  cor- 
rect the  mistaken  view  of  his  noble  predecessor 
in  office,  had  declared  that : 

"For  a  people  who  are  free  and  who  mean  to 
remain  so,  a  well  organized  and  armed  militia 
is  their  best  defence." 

Jefferson,  who  had  seen  Philadelphia,  the  na- 
tional capital  in  1777,  captured  by  the  enemy, 
and  who  had,  himself,  when  Governor  of  Virginia, 
been  driven  at  the  head  of  his  militia  out  of  Rich- 


What  Was  the  Jefferson  Doctrine  ?  93 

mond,  had  learned  nothing.  As  a  result  of  his 
policy,  Washington,  the  national  capital  in  18 14, 
now  lay  in  smoking  ruins! 

When  the  news  of  the  capture  and  burning  of 
Washington  was  received,  the  people  everywhere 
were  indignant.  Having  conferred  upon  the 
national  government  unlimited  power  to  raise 
and  support  armies,  they  felt  that  the  trust  reposed 
in  it  had  been  abused.  It  was  no  time  to  argue 
with  them  that  their  own  prejudices  had  backed 
up  the  feeble  military  policy  which  Jefferson  had 
engrafted  upon  the  government,  and  which  Mad- 
ison had  only  continued. 

Long  ere  the  crisis  came,  Jefferson  had  begun 
to  call  attention  to  the  defects  in  the  system  of 
defence  for  which  he  himself  was  primarily  re- 
sponsible. The  misfortunes  of  the  first  two  years 
of  the  war  had  materially  altered  his  faith  in 
''nature  and  American  genius." 

In  a  letter  written  to  General  Bailey,  February 
6,  1 8 13,  Jefferson  said: 

Our  men  are  good,  but  force  without  conduct  is 
easily  baffled.  The  Creator  has  not  thought  proper 
to  mark  those  in  the  forehead  who  are  of  stuff  to  make 
good  generals.  We  are  first,  therefore,  to  seek  them 
blindfold,  and  then  let  them  learn  the  trade  at  the 
expense  of  great  losses. 

In  this  sarcastic  criticism  Jefferson  displays  re- 
markable wisdom;  a  wisdom  which  it  seems  too 
bad  he  did  not  previously  possess! 


94  Empire  and  Armament 

September  18,  1813,  he  inquires  of  General 
Duane : 

"But  when  are  to  cease  the  severe  lessons  we 
receive  by  land,  demonstrating  our  want  of  com- 
petent officers?"  To  this  criticism  he  adds  the 
comment:  "Strange  reverse  of  expectations  that 
our  land  force  should  be  under  the  wing  of  our 
little  navy!" 

Writing  under  date  of  December  14,  18 13,  to 
Don  Valentin  De  Toronda  Coruna,  he  comments 
as  follows : 

We  are  now  at  the  close  of  our  second  campaign 
with  England.  During  the  first  we  suffered  several 
checks,  from  want  of  capable  and  tried  officers;  all 
the  higher  ones  of  the  Revolution  having  died  off 
during  an  interval  of  thirty  years  of  peace. 

With  what  prevision  Jefferson  discovered  that 
capable  officers  of  experience  were  wanting  in  his 
country ! 

January  27,  1814,  he  wrote  Mr.  John  Clarke: 

"To  carry  on  our  war  with  success,  we  want 
able  officers,  and  a  sufficient  number  of  soldiers. 
The  former,  time  and  trial  can  alone  give  us;"  etc. 

Is  it  possible,  Jefferson,  the  philosopher,  did  not 
perceive  these  facts  at  the  time  he  was  boasting 
of  his  program  of  disarmament? 

Writing  to  the  President,  September  24,  1814, 
he  referred  to  the  disgraces  which  befell  the  country 
during  the  trifling  Indian  wars  of  Washington's 
time,   in  which   two  armies  were  cut   to  pieces. 


What  Was  the  Jefferson  Doctrine  ?  95 

"Everyone  knew,  and  I  personally  knew,"  he 
declared,  "because  I  was  then  of  his  council,  that 
no  blame  was  imputable  to  him,  and  that  his 
officers  alone  were  the  cause  of  the  disasters." 

In  this  letter,  Jefferson  of  course  has  reference 
to  the  inefficiency  of  the  untrained  officers  upon 
whom  Washington,  on  the  occasion  mentioned, 
was  compelled  to  rely. 

Under  date  of  February  14,  1815,  in  a  letter  to 
Lafayette,  in  which  he  discusses  the  events  of  the 
war,  he  again  refers  to  the  lack  of  officers  at  the 
beginning  of  the  war. 

"Our  thirty  years  of  peace,"  he  writes,  "had 
taken  off,  or  superannuated,  all  our  revolutionary 
officers  of  experience  and  grade;  and  our  first 
draught  in  the  lottery  of  untried  characters  had 
been  most  unfortunate."  It  was  in  the  same 
letter  that  he  claimed  the  destruction  of  the 
capital  helped  rather  than  hurt  the  country 
"by  arousing  the  indignation  of  our  country,  and 
by  marking  to  the  world  of  Europe  the  vandalism 
and  brutal  character  of  the  English  Government. 
It  has  merely  served  to  immortalize  their 
infamy." 

Let  us  here  remark  that  the  destruction  of  the 
enemy's  capital  was  regarded  as  a  very  respectable 
motive  in  the  wars  of  the  early  nineteenth  century 
— so  desirable  an  end  in  fact  that,  in  18 12,  Jeffer- 
son himself  in  forecasting  the  capture  of  Quebec 
and  Halifax  by  the  American  troops  wrote  Colonel 
Duane : 


96  Empire  and  Armament 

Halifax  once  taken,  every  Cock-boat  of  hers  [Eng- 
land's] must  return  to  England  for  repairs.  Their 
fleet  will  annihilate  our  public  force  on  the  water,  but 
our  privateers  will  eat  out  the  vitals  of  their  com- 
merce. Perhaps  they  will  burn  New  York  and  Boston. 
If  they  do,  we  must  burn  the  city  of  London,  not  by 
expensive  fleets  or  congreve  rockets,  but  by  employing 
an  hundred  or  two  Jack-the-painters,  whom  naked- 
ness, famine,  desperation,  and  hardened  vice  will 
abundantly  furnish  from  among  themselves. 

Such  a  plan  as  that  proposed  by  Jefferson  far 
surpasses  in  point  of  atrocity  anything  that  has 
transpired  in  Belgium  during  the  world  war  of  19 14. 
How  strange  such  words  seem  from  the  mouth  of 
Jefferson,  the  humanitarian,  the  disarmamentist, 
the  pacifist,  the  great  exponent  of  world-wide  peace! 
But  his  plan  at  least  had  great  economy  in  its 
favour,  and  Jefferson,  above  all  things,  was  an 
economist,  especially  in  matters  military. 

It  was  no  doubt  the  same  humanitarian  and 
economic  spirit  that  dictated  the  employment  of 
the  starved  and  depraved  vagrants  of  London, 
willing  by  reason  of  their  hunger  to  become  traitors 
in  our  service,  to  burn  their  own  capital,  that  led 
Jefferson  to  counsel  the  Secretary  of  War  in  18 15 
as  follows: 

Privateers  will  find  their  own  men  and  money.  Let 
nothing  be  spared  to  encourage  them.  They  are 
the  dagger  which  strikes  at  the  heart  of  the  enemy, 
their  commerce.  Frigates  and  seventy-fours  are  a 
sacrifice  we  must  make,  heavy  as  it  is,  to  the  preju- 


What  Was  the  Jefferson  Doctrine  ?  97 

dice  of  a  part  of  our  citizens.  They  have,  indeed, 
rendered  a  great  moral  service,  which  has  delighted 
me  as  much  as  any  one  in  the  United  States.  But 
they  have  had  no  physical  effect  sensible  to  the  enemy ; 
and  now,  while  we  must  fortify  them  in  our  harbours, 
and  keep  armies  to  defend  them,  our  privateers  are 
bearding  and  blockading  the  enemy  in  their  own  sea- 
ports. Encourage  them  to  burn  all  their  prizes,  and 
let  the  people  pay  for  them.  They  will  cheat  us  enor- 
mously. No  matter ;  they  will  make  the  merchants  of 
England  feel,  and  squeal  and  cry  out  for  peace. 

At  this  time,  Jefferson  seems  to  have  forgotten 
entirely  the  teachings  of  Kant  and  St.  Pierre. 
Visions  of  peace  flitted  only  fitfully  through  his 
mind.  It  was  in  a  vindictive  spirit  that  he  wrote 
to  Mr.  Crawford,  February,  18 15,  regretting  the 
tyrant  Bonaparte's  downfall,  inasmuch  as  that 
event  freed  England  to  prosecute  her  cause  with 
more  effect  against  the  United  States.  Speaking 
of  further  resistance  to  the  impressment  of  our 
seamen  by  Great  Britain,  he  said : 

We  must  sacrifice  the  last  dollar  and  drop  of  blood  to 
rid  us  of  that  badge  of  slavery ;  and  it  must  rest  with 
England  alone  to  say  whether  it  is  worth  eternal  war, 
for  eternal  war  it  must  be  if  she  holds  to  the  wrong. 

It  is  in  this  same  letter  that  Jefferson  advocates 
the  formation  of  a  strong  regular  army  and  laments 
the  failure  of  Congress  to  provide  one!     He  says: 

Our  means  are  abundant  both  as  to  men  and  money, 
wanting   only    skilful   arrangement;    and   experience 


98  Empire  and  Armament 

alone  brings  skill.  At  to  men,  nothing  wiser  can  be 
devised  than  what  the  Secretary  of  War  [Monroe] 
proposed  in  his  report  at  the  commencement  of  Con- 
gress. It  would  have  kept  our  regular  army  always 
of  necessity  full,  and  by  classing  our  militia  according 
to  ages,  would  have  put  them  in  a  form  ready  for 
whatever  service,  distant  or  at  home,  should  require 
them.  Congress  have  not  adopted  it,  but  their  next 
experiment  will  lead  to  it. 

On  this  same  point  of  increasing  the  regular 
army,  Jefferson  had  written  Monroe  in  January, 
1815,  commending  him  upon  his  plan  in  the  fol- 
lowing words: 

But  you  have  two  more  serious  causes  of  uneasiness; 
the  want  of  men  and  money.  For  the  former,  nothing 
more  wise  or  efficient  could  have  been  imagined  than 
what  you  proposed.  It  would  have  filled  our  ranks 
with  regulars,  and  that,  too,  by  throwing  a  just  share 
of  the  burthen  on  the  purses  of  those  whose  persons 
are  exempt  either  by  age  or  office;  and  it  would  have 
rendered  our  militia  like  those  of  the  Greeks  and 
Romans,  a  nation  of  warriors.  But  the  go-by  seems 
to  have  been  given  to  your  proposition,  and  longer 
sufferance  is  necessary  to  force  us  to  what  is 
best.  We  seem  equally  incorrigible  to  our  financial 
course. 

Having  seen  the  mixed  nature  of  Jefferson's 
convictions  with  respect  to  the  value  of  untrained 
men  and  trained  men,  both  rank  and  file,  and  as 
to  what  was  just  and  what  was  unjust  in  the  con- 


What  Was  the  Jefferson  Doctrine  ?  99 

duct  of  war,  let  us  now  see  what  were  his  later 
views  on  war  in  general  and  on  war  in  particular. 
With  respect  to  the  war  just  terminated,  in 
March,  18 15,  he  was  rather  regretful  that  peace 
had  been  concluded  before  the  experience  the 
army  had  gained  enabled  it  to  plant  the  American 
flag  on  the  walls  of  Quebec  and  Halifax,  for  which 
another  campaign  would  have  sufficed.  Then 
in  a  more  resigned  mood  he  added: 

But  peace  is  better  for  us  all;  and  if  it  could  be 
followed  by  a  cordial  conciliation  between  us  and 
England,  it  would  ensure  the  happiness  and  prosperity 
of  both.  The  bag  of  wind,  however,  on  which  they 
are  now  relying  must  be  suffered  to  blow  out  before 
they  will  be  able  soberly  to  settle  on  their  true  bottom. 
If  they  adopt  a  course  of  friendship  with  us,  the  com- 
merce of  one  hundred  millions  of  people,  which  some 
now  born  will  live  to  see  here,  will  maintain  them 
for  ever  as  a  great  unit  of  the  European  family.  But  if 
they  go  on  checking,  irritating,  injuring,  and  hostiliz- 
ing  us,  they  will  force  on  us  the  motto  "Carthago 
delenda  est."  And  some  Scipio  Africanus  will  leave 
to  posterity  the  problem  of  conjecturing  where  stood 
once  the  ancient  and  splendid  London. 

Surely  there  is  little  in  accord  with  Kant's  phi- 
losophy to  be  found  in  the  foregoing  conviction  of 
Jefferson.  Nor  does  it  argue  a  very  conciliatory 
policy  on  his  part. 

In  January,  1815,  a  certain  Mr.  Wenderoth  sent 
Jefferson  a  volume  of  discourses  to  read,  dealing 


ioo  Empire  and  Armament 

with  the  subject   of  war.     In  acknowledging  the 
favour  Jefferson  wrote: 

I  have  gone  over  them  with  great  satisfaction,  and 
concur  with  the  able  preacher  in  his  estimate  of  the 
character  of  the  belligerents  in  our  late  war,  and  law- 
fulness of  defensive  war.  I  consider  the  war,  with 
him,  as  "made  on  good  advice,"  that  is,  for  just  causes, 
and  its  dispensation  as  providential,  inasmuch  as  it 
has  exercised  our  patriotism  and  submission  to  order, 
has  planted  and  invigorated  among  us  arts  of  urgent 
necessity,  has  manifested  the  strong  and  the  weak 
points  of  our  republican  institutions,  and  the  excel- 
lence of  a  representative  democracy  compared  to  the 
misrule  of  Kings,  has  rallied  opinions  of  mankind  to 
the  natural  rights  of  expatriation,  and  of  a  common 
property  in  the  ocean,  and  raised  us  to  that  grade  in 
the  scale  of  nations  which  the  bravery  and  liberty  of 
our  citizen  soldiers,  by  land  and  by  sea,  the  wisdom 
of  our  institutions  and  their  observance  of  justice, 
entitled  us  to  in  the  eyes  of  the  world.  All  this  Mr. 
McLeod  has  well  proved,  and  from  those  sources  of 
argument  particularly  which  belong  to  his  profession. 

Here  indeed  is  an  unequivocal  and  forceful  argu- 
ment for  the  righteousness  and  justice  of  war  when 
waged  for  a  proper  cause;  Bernhardi  could  not 
present  a  stronger  one,  and  certainly  no  man  who 
regards  war  as  providential  can  justly  claim  to 
be  a  disciple  of  Kant!  Yet,  when  requested  by 
the  Rev.  Mr.  Worcester,  an  eminent  divine  of  the 
day  and  an  ardent  peace  advocate,  to  express  his 
views  on  the  justice  of  war,  he  adroitly  evaded 


What  Was  the  Jefferson  Doctrine?  101 

the  issue.  Referring  to  three  pamphlets  entitled, 
"The  Solemn  Review,"  "The  Friend  of  Peace, 
or  Special  Interview,"  and  "The  Friend  of  Peace, 
No.  2,"  Jefferson  replied: 

I  have  not  read  the  two  last  steadily  through,  be- 
cause where  one  assents  to  propositions  as  soon  as 
announced  it  is  loss  of  time  to  read  arguments  in 
support  of  them.     These  numbers  discuss  the  first 
branch  of  the  causes  of  war,  that  is  to  say,  wars  un- 
dertaken for  the  point  of  honour,  which  you  aptly 
analogize  with  the  act  of  duelling  between  individuals, 
and  reason  with  justice  from  one  to  the  other.     Un- 
doubtedly this  class  of  wars  is,  in  general,  what  you 
state  them  to  be,  "needless,  unjust,  and  inhuman,  as 
well  as  anti-Christian."     The  second  branch  of  this 
subject,  to  wit,  wars  undertaken  on  account  of  wrong 
done,  and  which  may  be  likened  to  the  act  of  robbery 
in  private  life,  I  presume  will  be  treated  in  your  future 
numbers.     I    observe   this    class    mentioned    in    the 
"Solemn  Review,"  p.  10,  and  the  question  asked,  "Is 
it  common  for  a  nation  to  obtain  a  redress  of  wrongs 
by  war?"     The  answer  to  this  question  you  will  of 
course  draw  from  history.     In  the  meantime,  reason 
will  answer  it  on  grounds  of  probability,  that  where 
the  wrong  has  been  done  by  a  weaker  nation,  the 
stronger  one  has  generally  been  able  to  enforce  redress, 
but  where  by  a  stronger  nation,  redress  by  war  has 
been  neither  obtained  nor  expected  by  the  weaker. 
On  the  contrary,  the  loss  has  been  increased  by  the 
expenses  of  the  war  in  blood  and  treasure.     Yet  it 
may  have  obtained  another  object  equally  securing 
itself  from  future  wrong.     It   may   have   retaliated 


102  Empire  and  Armament 

on  the  aggressor  in  losses  of  blood  and  treasure 
far  beyond  the  value  to  him  of  the  wrong  he  had 
committed,  and  thus  have  made  the  advantage  of 
that  too  dear  a  purchase  to  leave  him  in  a  dis- 
position to  renew  wrong  in  future.  In  this  way 
the  loss  by  the  war  may  have  secured  the  weaker 
nation  from  loss  by  future  wrong.  The  case  you 
state  of  two  boxers  both  of  whom  get  a  "terrible 
bruising,"  is  apposite  to  this.  He  of  the  two  who 
committed  the  aggression  on  the  other,  although 
victor  in  the  scuffle,  yet  probably  finds  the  aggression 
not  worth  the  bruising  it  has  cost  him.  To  explain 
this  by  numbers,  it  is  alleged  that  Great  Britain  took 
from  us  before  the  late  war  near  one  thousand  vessels, 
and  that  during  the  war  we  took  from  her  fourteen 
hundred.  That  before  the  war  she  made  slaves  of 
six  thousand  of  our  citizens,  and  that  in  the  war  we 
killed  more  than  six  thousand  of  her  subjects,  and 
caused  her  to  expend  such  a  sum  as  amounted  to  four 
or  five  thousand  guineas  a  head  for  every  slave  she 
made.  She  might  have  purchased  the  vessels  she 
took  for  less  than  the  value  of  those  she  lost,  and  used 
the  six  thousand  of  her  men  killed  for  the  purposes  to 
which  she  applied  ours,  have  saved  the  four  or  five 
thousand  guineas  a  head,  and  obtained  a  character 
of  justice  which  is  valuable  to  a  nation  as  to  an  indi- 
vidual. These  considerations,  therefore,  leave  her 
without  inducement  to  plunder  property  and  take 
men  in  future  on  such  dear  terms.  I  neither  affirm 
nor  deny  the  truth  of  the  allegations,  nor  is  their 
truth  material  to  the  question.  They  are  possible, 
and  therefore  present  a  case  which  will  claim  your 
consideration  in  a  discussion  of  the  general  question 
whether  any  degree  of  injury  can  render  a  recourse 


What  Was  the  Jefferson  Doctrine?  103 

to  war  expedient?  Still  less  do  I  propose  to  draw  to 
myself  any  part  in  this  discussion.  Age  and  its  effects 
both  on  body  and  mind  have  weaned  my  attention 
from  public  subjects,  and  left  me  unequal  to  the 
labours  of  correspondence  beyond  the  limits  of  my 
personal  concerns.  I  retire,  therefore,  from  the 
question,  with  a  sincere  wish  that  your  writings  may 
have  effect  in  lessening  this  greatest  of  human 
evils.  .  .  . 

It  is  hardly  necessary  to  endeavour  to  show,  at 
this  point,  that  Jefferson  had  abandoned  his  early 
theories  on  peace.  The  quotations  from  his  writ- 
ings which  have  been  given  will  convince  any  fair- 
minded  reader  that  the  argument  he  outlined  in 
his  reply  to  the  "Solemn  Review  "  really  presents 
his  view  of  the  justification  of  war  under  the  con- 
ditions named,  notwithstanding  the  fact  that  he 
declined  to  affirm  or  deny  the  view  presented.  But 
in  order  to  leave  no  doubts  in  the  mind  of  the 
reader,  it  should  be  added  that  Jefferson  most 
assuredly  did  contemplate  as  justifiable,  desirable, 
and  expedient  the  exercise  of  armed  force  in  the 
future,  under  certain  conditions,  and  this  fact  is 
established  by  his  own  words  in  a  letter  to  the 
President  dated  March  23,  1815,  in  which  he 
frankly  expressed  himself  as  follows: 

I  sincerely  congratulate  you  on  the  peace,  and 
more  especially  on  the  eclat  with  which  the  war  was 
closed.  The  affair  of  New  Orleans  was  fraught  with 
useful  lessons  to  ourselves,  our  enemies,  and  our  friends 


104  Empire  and  Armament 

and  will  powerfully  influence  our  future  relations  with 
the  nations  of  Europe.  It  will  show  them  we  mean 
to  take  no  part  in  their  wars,  and  count  no  odds  when 
engaged  in  our  own.  I  presume  that,  having  spared 
to  the  pride  of  England  her  formal  acknowledgment 
of  the  atrocity  of  impressment  in  an  article  of  treaty, 
she  will  concur  in  a  convention  for  relinquishing  it. 
Without  this,  she  must  understand  that  the  present  is 
but  a  truce,  determinable  on  the  first  act  of  impress- 
ment of  an  American  citizen,  committed  by  any 
officers  of  hers. 

We  have  conclusively  shown  that  Jefferson  was 
not  sincere  in  his  theories  of  disarmament,  and 
that  he  was  not  a  rational  pacifist;  that  he  con- 
tributed practically  nothing  to  the  arbitral  method 
of  settling  international  disputes.  In  respect  to 
military  policy,  his  sole  conviction  seems  to  have 
been  a  sincere  prejudice  against  a  standing  army, 
which  prejudice  he  set  aside  temporarily  whenever 
selfish  ends  dictated  the  necessity.  His  policy 
was  certainly  an  uneconomical  one  inasmuch  as 
he  persistently  failed  to  prepare  in  advance  the 
army  which  he  invariably  proposed  to  employ  as 
a  means  of  settling  disputes. 

An  important  distinction  is  to  be  made  between 
military  policy  and  doctrine  of  war.  One  might 
adhere  to  an  excellent  doctrine  of  war  but  put 
forth  a  miserably  weak  military  policy  in  its  sup- 
port, or  vice  versa. 

In  answer  to  the  question  propounded  in  the 
title  to  this  chapter — What  was  the  JefTersonian 


What  Was  the  Jefferson  Doctrine  ?  105 

doctrine? — it  may  be  said  that  that  doctrine 
was  essentially  the  same  as  the  one  accepted  by 
the  large  majority  of  rational  men.  It  exalted 
peace,  counselled  justice  and  forbearance  in  deal- 
ing with  foreign  nations,  and  contemplated  force- 
ful protection  of  national  interests  by  armed 
defensive  or  aggressive  measures,  according  as  the 
political  and  strategical  circumstances  dictated  to 
be  best.  It  did  not  embrace  the  aggressive  fea- 
tures of  the  doctrine  originated  by  Hamilton  and 
Jay,  but  in  no  other  respect  was  it  less  pacific  or 
better  calculated  to  insure  peace  than  was  that 
doctrine.  It  was  no  different  from  the  doctrine 
of  Washington,  however  feeble  may  have  been 
the  military  policy  which  supported  it.  But  the 
fact  that  in  reality  his  was  not  an  unwise  doctrine, 
when  once  he  had  settled  upon  it,  does  not  ex- 
culpate Jefferson  from  the  charge  of  inconsistency 
with  respect  to  his  declarations  and  his  actions 
involving  war  and  peace.  If  it  be  attempted  to 
condone  his  inconsistency  in  this  respect,  as  it 
has  been  by  historians  in  so  many  other  cases,  on 
the  ground  that  he  was  broad,  and  strong,  and 
wise  enough  to  adopt  a  course  contrary  to  his  own 
judgment  but  expedient  under  the  circumstances, 
then  the  attempt  to  so  explain  his  inconsistency 
itself  constitutes  an  admission  that  Jefferson  was 
not  what  he  claimed  to  be  and  what  others  have 
claimed  him  to  be — a  pacifist. 


CHAPTER  IX 

THE    CLAY-CALHOUN    DOCTRINE 

THE  first  year  of  the  nineteenth  century  marks 
the  laying  of  the  corner-stone  of  American 
imperialism  and  of  American  interference  in  the 
affairs  of  other  nations.  Whether  that  inter- 
ference was  wise  or  not  is  a  question  not  involved 
in  our  study;  the  fact  remains  it  occurred. 

The  United  States  was  seriously  threatened 
by  the  expansion  of  France,  which  had  negotiated 
with  Spain  a  secret  treaty  the  terms  of  which 
included  the  transfer  to  France  of  New  Orleans 
and  the  whole  of  Spanish  Louisiana.  When  the 
fact  of  this  treaty  was  discovered,  the  pacific 
Jefferson,  who  had  so  ardently  counselled  non- 
interference in  foreign  affairs,  with  true  inconsis- 
tency let  it  be  known  that  if  New  Orleans  and  the 
control  of  the  Mississippi  River  were  transferred 
to  France,  he  would  seek  an  offensive  alliance  with 
Great  Britain  to  drive  French  commerce  off  the 
seas.  This  threat  was  a  perfect  example  of  the 
application  of  the  Hamiltonian  doctrine  as  set 
forth  in  the  Federalist.  It  fully  embodied  Hamil- 
ton's and  Jay's  idea  that  by  aggressive  intermed- 

106 


The  Clay-Calhoun  Doctrine       107 

dling  in  foreign  affairs  an  advantage  might  be 
obtained  for  the  United  States  through  an  alliance 
which  its  own  power  and  influence  could  not  indi- 
vidually secure.  The  application  of  the  principle 
had  exactly  the  effect  claimed  for  it  by  its  origina- 
tors, for  Napoleon,  paying  no  attention  to  Jeffer- 
son's threat  at  first,  upon  becoming  involved  in  a 
war  with  Great  Britain,  perceived  that  he  could 
not  prevent  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain 
together  from  seizing  Louisiana.  Believing  that 
Great  Britain  would  take  the  lion's  share  of  the 
fruits  resulting  from  an  alliance  with  the  infant 
American  republic,  and  preferring  to  have  Louis- 
iana in  the  possession  of  the  weakling,  rather  than 
in  that  of  his  more  powerful  enemy,  as  a  political 
move  he  sold  in  1803  not  only  New  Orleans  but 
the  entire  Louisiana  territory  to  the  United 
States,  thus  thwarting  Great  Britain.  By  the 
treaty  of  purchase  the  United  States  more  than 
doubled  its  original  territory.  Hamilton  the 
aggressive  and  Jefferson  the  pacific  were  now  in 
thorough  concert,  notwithstanding  the  latter's 
strict  constructionist  views  concerning  the  Con- 
stitution and  the  frantic  cry  from  his  own  party 
that  the  acquisition  of  Louisiana  was  an  uncon- 
stitutional act.  But  Jefferson's  dream  of  expan- 
sion was  not  fulfilled  by  the  mere  acquisition  of 
Louisiana,  for  it  embraced  the  great  unknown 
continental  region  extending  to  the  Pacific,  which 
he  now  led  the  national  mind  to  dwell  upon  by 
undertaking  its  exploration.     History  credits  him 


108  Empire  and  Armament 

with  only  peaceful  designs,  but  his  pacific  inten- 
tions must  be  accepted  with  at  least  one  grain  of 
salt,  for  we  have  seen  that  whatever  he  wanted  he 
was  willing  enough  to  take  by  force. 

The  influence  of  the  growing  policy  of  expansion 
quite  naturally  focussed  men's  minds  upon  points 
without  the  national  territory,  and  encouraged 
interference  in  outside  affairs.  These  results 
found  striking  evidence  in  the  designs  of  Aaron 
Burr,  which  were  the  natural  offspring  of  the 
recently  developed  spirit  of  expansion  and  territo- 
rial aggrandizement.  In  1805  Burr  was  busily  en- 
gaged in  plotting  for  the  overthrow  of  Mexico 
and  the  establishment  of  himself  in  that  country 
as  chief.  The  empire  he  had  in  mind  was  also  to 
include  the  western  part  of  the  United  States. 
This  conspiracy,  involving  the  United  States,  Mex- 
ico, Great  Britain,  France,  and  Spain,  fell  to 
the  ground,  but  its  effect  was  lasting  for  there 
were  elements  in  it  that  convinced  the  world  that 
the  American  people  were  not  as  disinterested 
in  their  neighbours'  affairs  as  they  claimed  to  be. 

Again,  in  18 10,  when  the  inhabitants  of  the 
territory  east  of  New  Orleans  seized  the  Spanish 
fort  at  Baton  Rouge,  declared  their  independence 
of  Spain,  and  petitioned  for  annexation  to  the 
United  States,  Spain's  rights  were  not  only 
ignored,  but  the  revolutionists  were  officially  en- 
couraged by  the  attitude  of  the  administration. 

As  we  proceed  we  shall  discover  many  other 
occasions  on  which  the  people  of  the  United  States 


The  Clay-Calhoun  Doctrine       109 

have  intermeddled  without  just  pretext,  or  excuse 
of  any  kind,  in  the  affairs  of  their  neighbours, 
and  it  is  not  unnatural  that  their  professions  of 
justice  and  of  peaceable  aloofness  as  a  nation 
should  have  gained  slight  credence  abroad,  not- 
withstanding the  unmilitary  character  of  the  state 
and  the  sentiment  against  armament  in  time  of 
peace. 

At  the  beginning  of  Madison's  administration, 
in  which  war  was  declared  against  Great  Britain, 
there  was  a  strong  party  in  the  United  States 
not  only  opposed  to  war  but  favourable  to  Great 
Britain,  and  disposed,  rather  than  array  them- 
selves against  her  in  sanguinary  conflict,  to  submit 
quietly  to  her  will.  This  party  was  well  repre- 
sented in  Congress,  and  it  held  so  firmly  to  the 
pacific  doctrine  popularly  and  erroneously  ac- 
credited to  Jefferson  that  Madison  found  himself 
much  embarrassed.  But  one  ray  of  light  had 
penetrated  the  Jeffersonian  gloom  of  unprepared- 
ness,  and  that  had  been  shed  by  young  Daniel 
Webster. 

From  early  boyhood  Webster  had  been  an  ar- 
dent champion  of  the  navy.  In  one  of  his  ad- 
dresses to  Congress  he  recounts  how,  when  he  first 
left  college,  he  undertook  to  defend  the  navy 
against  the  common  charges  of  the  time  and  the 
coarse  epithets  generally  applied  to  it  in  his  New 
England  community;  how  he  insisted  on  its 
importance,  and  its  indispensable  necessity,  if  the 
country  were  to  maintain  and  extend  its  commerce. 


no  Empire  and  Armament 

The  convictions  which  Webster  entertained  as  a 
boy  he  held  in  after  years.  Mature  beyond  his 
years,  in  1806,  when  but  twenty-four  years  old, 
he  delivered  a  ringing  oration  in  which  he  dwelt 
upon  the  importance  of  protecting  American 
commercial  interests  against  the  French  and 
British. 

Nothing  is  plainer  [said  he]  than  this:  if  we  will 
have  commerce,  we  must  protect  it.  This  country 
is  commercial  as  well  as  agricultural.  Indissoluble 
bonds  connect  him  who  ploughs  the  land  with  him 
who  ploughs  the  sea.  Nature  has  placed  us  in  a 
situation  favourable  to  commercial  pursuits,  and  no 
government  can  alter  the  destination.  Habits  con- 
firmed by  two  centuries  are  not  to  be  changed.  An 
immense  portion  of  our  property  is  on  the  waves. 
Sixty  or  eighty  thousand  of  our  most  useful  citizens 
are  there,  and  are  entitled  to  such  protection  from 
the  government  as  their  case  requires. 

Webster  invoked  the  doctrine  of  protection  in 
vain — it  was  not  until  Clay,  Calhoun,  Cheves, 
and  Lowndes  roused  the  country  with  the  fire 
of  their  oratory  from  the  lethargic  spell  cast  over 
it  by  Jefferson  that  Webster's  advice  was  heeded. 

Foremost  in  the  opposition  to  war  in  181 1  was 
the  eccentric  John  Randolph  of  Roanoke,  at  this 
time  in  the  full  vigour  of  his  intellect,  who  pos- 
sessed all  the  unreasoning  prejudice  of  Jefferson 
against  standing  armies,  and  who  had  never  lost 
an  opportunity  to  foment  that  prejudice. 


The  Clay-Calhoun  Doctrine       in 

Madison's  embarrassment  was  greatly  relieved 
by  the  election  of  the  brilliant  Henry  Clay  to  the 
House  of  Representatives,  by  which  body  he  was 
chosen  Speaker.  Until  this  time  the  administra- 
tion had  been  in  a  state  of  utter  helplessness, 
thanks  to  the  grip  which  Jefferson's  policy  and 
theories  had  taken  on  the  country. 

Finally,  however,  public  sentiment  compelled 
Madison  to  take  some  step  looking  to  the  redress 
of  the  national  wrongs  suffered  at  the  hands  of 
Great  Britain.  The  people  were  no  longer  willing 
to  bear  Napoleon's  taunt  that  their  ensign  was 
not  really  a  flag  but  only  a  "piece  of  striped  bunt- 
ing," which  could  not  defend  the  ships  or  goods 
over  which  it  flew.  Jefferson's  pathetic  and 
humiliating  efforts  to  keep  the  peace  proved 
unavailing. 

In  November,  1811,  Madison  transmitted  a 
message  to  Congress  recommending  certain  meas- 
ures for  the  vindication  of  our  national  dignity, 
notwithstanding  Jefferson's  characterization  of 
those  who  advocated  such  a  step  as  "Quixotes 
clamouring  for  war  out  of  a  false  sense  of  honour." 
When  the  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations  pro- 
posed an  immediate  increase  of  the  regular  army, 
a  great  conflict  between  the  political  divisions  in 
Congress  ensued.  Randolph  mingled  his  erratic 
and  visionary  views  in  the  discussion,  and  exerted 
himself  to  the  utmost  to  kill  the  measure,  "the 
effect  of  which  would  be  worse  than  that  of  the 
locusts  of  Egypt,  famishing,  impoverishing,  and 


ii2  Empire  and  Armament 

deluging  the  country  with  blood,  and  to  erect  a 
throne  to  some  idol  conqueror." 

To  the  absurd  contentions  of  Randolph  and  his 
other  opponents,  Clay  replied  that  while  he  was 
not  an  advocate  of  standing  armies  in  time  of 
peace,  he  had  no  fear  of  them  even  then,  much  less 
in  war ;  that  he  did  not  believe  a  standing  army  of 
25,000  men  even  if  corrupted  by  ambitious  leaders 
would  be  a  threat  to  the  freedom  of  the  country, 
inasmuch  as  there  were  upwards  of  a  million  men 
capable  of  bearing  arms  to  resist  such  an  attempt 
at  usurpation. 

The  wide  extent  of  country  over  which  we  are  spread 
is  another  security  [he  said].  In  other  countries, 
France  and  England  for  example,  the  fall  of  Paris 
or  London  is  the  fall  of  the  nation.  Here  are  no  such 
dangerous  aggregations  of  people.  New  York  and 
Philadelphia,  and  Boston,  and  every  city  on  the 
Atlantic,  may  be  subdued  by  a  usurper,  and  he  will 
have  made  but  a  small  advance  in  the  accomplish- 
ment of  his  purpose.  Even  let  the  whole  country 
east  of  the  Alleghany  submit  to  the  ambition  of  some 
daring  chief,  and  the  liberty  of  the  Union  will  still  be 
unconquered.  It  will  find  successful  support  from 
the  West.  A  great  portion  of  the  militia,  nearly  the 
whole,  I  understand,  of  Massachusetts  have  arms 
in  their  hands,  and  I  trust  in  God  that  this  great  object 
will  be  persevered  in,  till  every  man  in  the  nation  can 
proudly  shoulder  the  musket,  which  is  to  defend  his 
country  and  himself.  A  people  having,  besides  the 
benefit  of  one  general  government,  other  local  govern- 
ments  in   full    operation    capable   of    exerting    and 


The  Clay-Calhoun  Doctrine       113 

commanding  great  portions  of  the  physical  power, 
all  of  which  must  be  prostrated  before  our  constitution 
is  subverted — such  a  people  have  nothing  to  fear  of 
twenty-five  thousand  regulars. 

Here  indeed  is  the  declaration  of  a  new  doctrine, 
as  sound  as  it  was  popular  at  the  time  it  was  pro- 
claimed. It  was  immediately  accepted  by  the 
majority  of  the  people,  and  Clay's  argument  pre- 
vailed, not  only  to  carry  through  the  administra- 
tion measure  providing  for  the  increase  of  the 
regular  army,  but  one  that  soon  followed  it  re- 
habilitating the  navy  which  Jefferson  had  so 
ruthlessly  dismantled.  And  here  it  should  be 
added  that  the  success  commonly  attributed  to 
Clay  was  in  no  small  measure  due  that  brilliant 
galaxy  of  young  South  Carolinians  in  the  House 
of  Representatives,  Calhoun,  Cheves,  and  Lowndes 
— from  among  whom  it  were  difficult  to  choose 
the  one  of  greatest  ability.  At  any  rate,  together 
with  Clay,  they  finally  compelled  Congress  to 
throw  down  the  glove  to  Great  Britain  in  June, 
1812. 

It  was  also  at  this  juncture  that  Webster  again 
threw  the  weight  of  his  great  influence  into  the 
scale  pan  of  reason  and  patriotism.  •  Speaking  in 
advocacy  of  building  up  the  navy  he  said : 

A  navy  sufficient  for  the  defence  of  our  coasts  and 
harbours,  for  the  convoy  of  important  branches  of  our 
trade,  and  sufficient  also  to  give  our  enemies  to  under- 
stand, when  they  injure  us,  that  they  too  are  vulner- 

8 


ii4  Empire  and  Armament 

able,  and  that  we  have  the  power  of  retaliation  as 
well  as  of  defence,  seems  to  be  the  plain,  necessary, 
indispensable  policy  of  the  nation.  It  is  the  dictate 
of  nature  and  common  sense,  that  means  of  defence 
shall  have  relation  to  the  danger. 

Thus  we  see  that  at  least  one  great  New  Eng- 
lander  repudiated  the  doctrine  of  Jefferson. 

The  military  operations  on  the  frontier  during 
the  first  year  of  the  war  resulted  in  that  series 
of  disgraceful  disasters  which  might  have  been 
expected.  Amid  all  discouragements  Clay  again 
proved  equal  to  the  occasion.  According  to  his 
biographers  he 

moved  in  majesty,  for  he  moved  in  strength.  Like 
the  Carthaginian  chief  in  the  passage  of  the  Alps, 
he  kept  his  place  in  front  of  his  comrades,  putting 
aside,  with  a  great  effort,  every  obstacle  that  opposed 
his  progress,  applauding  the  foremost  of  his  followers, 
and  rousing  those  who  lingered,  by  words  of  encourage- 
ment or  reproach,  till  he  succeeded  in  putting  them 
upon  a  moral  eminence,  from  which  they  could  look 
down  upon  the  region  where  their  prowess  was  to 
meet  with  its  long  expected  reward. 

The  first  measure  proposed  to  raise  the  drooping 
spirits  of  the  nation,  and  to  retrieve  the  gloomy 
fortunes  of  the  war,  was  a  bill  to  further  increase 
the  regular  army,  in  successful  support  of  which 
Clay  again  made  a  superb  effort. 

But  if  Clay  was  magnificent  in  this  hour  of  his 
country's  travail,  equally  so  was  Calhoun,  who 


The  Clay-Calhoun  Doctrine       115 

valiantly  supported  him.  In  a  series  of  speeches 
in  which  he  literally  tore  asunder  the  arguments  of 
those  who,  imbued  with  the  so-called  Jeffersonian 
doctrine,  did  not  consider  the  impressment  of  our 
seamen  and  the  wanton  destruction  of  our  com- 
merce as  sufficient  causes  to  justify  the  continu- 
ance of  a  hazardous  and  costly  war,  he  said : 

War  ought  to  be  continued  until  its  rational,  object, 
a  permanent  and  secure  peace,  is  obtained.  .  .  . 
America  can  never  quietly  submit  to  the  deepest  of 
injuries.  Necessity  may  compel  her  to  yield  for  a 
moment,  but  it  will  be  to  watch  the  growth  of  national 
strength,  and  to  seize  the  first  favourable  opportunity 
to  seek  redress 

On  the  occasion  of  his  first  speech,  directing  his 
shafts  at  the  opposition  members  of  Congress  with 
peculiar  force,  he  said : 

The  heat  of  debate,  the  spirit  of  settled  opposition, 
and  the  confident  prediction  of  disaster,  are  among 
the  causes  of  this  opposition  between  the  interest  of  a 
party  and  of  the  country;  and  in  no  instance  under 
our  own  government  have  they  existed  in  a  greater 
degree  than  in  relation  to  the  present  war.  The  evil 
is  deeply  rooted  in  the  constitutions  of  all  free  govern- 
ments, and  is  the  principal  cause  of  their  weakness 
and  destruction.  It  has  but  one  remedy:  the  virtue 
and  intelligence  of  the  people.  It  behooves  them, 
as  they  value  the  blessings  of  their  freedom,  not  to 
permit  themselves  to  be  drawn  into  the  vortex  of 
party  rage.     For  if,  by  such  opposition,  the  firmest 


n6  Empire  and  Armament 

government  should  prove  incompetent  to  maintain 
the  rights  of  the  nation  against  foreign  aggression, 
they  will  realize  too  late  the  truth  of  the  proposition, 
that  government  is  protection,  and  that  it  cannot  exist 
where  it  fails  of  this  great  and  primary  object. 

Calhoun,  it  will  be  noted,  added  much  to  the 
forceful  denial  of  Clay  that  no  tendency  existed 
to  make  of  government  an  agency  of  tyranny,  for 
he  set  forth  with  striking  emphasis  the  conception 
of  government  as  protection.  In  the  view  of 
one  a  standing  army  was  powerless  to  overthrow 
the  Republic;  in  that  of  the  other  it  but  enabled 
the  Republic  to  fulfil  its  real  function. 

But  Calhoun  went  even  further,  for  having 
established  the  character  of  the  war  in  its  origin 
as  one  forced  upon  the  country,  and  having  shown 
its  continuance  to  be  necessary,  he  laid  it  down  as 
a  rule  for  the  nation  that  "a  defensive  war  does 
not  become  offensive  by  being  carried  beyond  the 
limits  of  our  territory." 

Together,  Clay  and  Calhoun  delivered  the  death- 
blow to  the  so-called  Jeffersonian  doctrine  of 
pacifism  to  which  the  people  had  adhered,  and  in 
which  they  had  not  perceived  the  sham  and  the 
fallacies  which  we  are  now  able  to  do,  thanks  to 
Jefferson's  own  efforts  to  repudiate  it. 

While  upon  the  country  at  large  Clay  and 
Calhoun  exerted  the  greatest  influence,  in  New 
England  Webster  was  at  this  time  undoubtedly 
the   leading    apostle    of    national    dignity.     The 


The  Clay-Calhoun  Doctrine       117 

speech  made  by  him  in  18 14  to  encourage  enlist- 
ments sets  forth  with  such  cogency  and  unan- 
swerable logic  the  true  doctrine  that  it  must  be 
quoted  here;  he  said: 

The  humble  aid  which  it  would  be  in  my  power  to 
render  to  measures  of  government  shall  be  given 
cheerfully,  if  government  will  pursue  measures  which 
I  can  conscientiously  support.  If  even  now,  failing 
in  an  honest  and  sincere  attempt  to  procure  an 
honourable  peace,  it  will  return  to  measures  of  defence, 
and  protection,  such  as  reason  and  common  sense  and 
the  public  opinion  call  for,  my  vote  shall  not  be  with- 
holden  from  the  means.  Give  up  your  futile  projects 
of  invasion.  Extinguish  the  fires  which  blaze  on 
your  inland  frontiers.  Establish  perfect  safety  and 
defence  there  by  adequate  force.  Let  every  man  that 
sleeps  on  your  soil  sleep  in  security.  Stop  the  blood 
that  flows  from  the  veins  of  unarmed  yeomanry, 
and  women  and  children.  Give  to  the  living  time  to 
bury  and  lament  their  dead  in  the  quietness  of  private 
sorrow.  Having  performed  this  work  of  beneficence 
and  mercy  on  your  inland  border,  turn  and  look  with 
the  eye  of  justice  and  compassion  on  your  vast  popula- 
tion along  the  coast.  Unclench  the  iron  grasp  of  your 
embargo.  Take  measures  for  that  end  before  another 
sun  sets  upon  you.  With  all  the  war  of  the  enemy 
on  your  commerce,  if  you  would  cease  to  make  war 
upon  it  yourselves,  you  would  still  have  some  com- 
merce .  That  commerce  would  give  you  some  revenue. 
Apply  that  revenue  to  the  augmentation  of  your 
navy.  That  navy  in  turn  will  protect  your  commerce. 
Let  it  no  longer  be  said  that  not  one  ship  of  force, 


n8  Empire  and  Armament 

built  by  your  hands  since  the  war,  yet  floats  upon 
the  ocean.  Turn  the  current  of  your  efforts  into  the 
channel  which  national  sentiment  has  already  worn 
broad  and  deep  to  receive  it.  A  naval  force  competent 
to  defend  your  coasts  against  considerable  armaments, 
to  convoy  your  trade,  and  perhaps  raise  the  blockade 
of  your  rivers,  is  not  a  chimera.  It  may  be  realized. 
If  then  the  war  must  continue,  go  to  the  ocean.  If 
you  are  seriously  contending  for  maritime  rights, 
go  to  the  theatre  where  alone  those  rights  can  be 
defended.  Thither  every  indication  of  your  fortune 
points  you.  There  the  united  wishes  and  exertions 
of  the  nation  will  go  with  you.  Even  our  party 
divisions,  acrimonious  as  they  are,  cease  at  the 
water's  edge.  They  are  lost  in  attachment  to  the 
national  character,  on  the  element  where  that  char- 
acter is  made  respectable.  In  protecting  naval 
interests  by  naval  means,  you  will  arm  yourselves 
with  the  whole  power  of  national  sentiment,  and 
may  command  the  whole  abundance  of  the  national 
resources.  In  time  you  may  be  able  to  redress  in- 
juries in  the  place  where  they  may  be  offered;  and,  if 
need  be,  to  accompany  your  own  flag  throughout  the 
world  with  the  protection  of  your  own  cannon. 

To  such  a  desperate  state  had  the  country  been 
reduced  that  compulsory  military  service  was  ac- 
tually proposed  at  this  time.  The  proposal  met 
with  slight  favour  and  even  Webster  assailed  it. 

In  my  opinion  [he  said],  the  law  under  consideration 
for  compulsory  army  and  military  service  ought  not 
to  be  carried  into  effect.     The  operation  of  measures 


The  Clay-Calhoun  Doctrine       119 

thus  unconstitutional  and  illegal  ought  to  be  pre- 
vented by  a  resort  to  other  measures  which  are  both 
constitutional  and  legal.  It  will  be  the  solemn  duty 
of  the  State  governments  to  protect  their  own  au- 
thority over  their  own  militia  and  to  interpose  between 
their  citizens  and  arbitrary  power.  These  are  among 
the  objects  for  which  the  State  governments  exist; 
and  their  highest  obligations  bind  them  to  the  preser- 
vation of  their  own  rights  and  the  liberties  of  their 
people.  I  express  these  sentiments  here,  sir,  because 
I  shall  express  them  to  my  constituents.  Both  they 
and  myself  live  under  a  constitution  which  teaches  us 
that  the  doctrine  of  non-resistance  against  arbitrary 
power  and  oppression  is  absurd,  slavish,  and  destruc- 
tive of  the  good  and  happiness  of  mankind.  With 
the  same  earnestness  with  which  I  now  exhort  you  to 
forbear  from  the  measures,  I  shall  exhort  them  to  ex- 
ercise their  unquestionable  right  of  providing  for  the 
security  of  their  own  liberties. 

In  the  foregoing  words  Webster  clearly  enunciated 
the  doctrine  that  a  State  was  justified  in  resorting 
to  arms  to  preserve  its  rights  as  determined  by 
itself. 

At  the  close  of  the  war  the  people  were  appar- 
ently more  willing  to  maintain  an  adequate  navy, 
but  they  were  by  no  means  prepared  to  abandon 
their  prejudices  against  a  standing  army.  They 
had  consented  to  the  "raising"  of  a  standing 
army  for  use  in  the  war,  but  they  were  still  fearful 
of  maintaining  it  in  time  of  peace.  Accordingly, 
a  measure  was  introduced  in  Congress  in  February, 


120  Empire  and  Armament 

1815,  providing  for  the  military  peace  establish- 
ment and  a  very  extensive  reduction  in  the  army. 
But  Calhoun  wisely  counselled  Congress  as 
follows : 

It  is  easier  to  keep  soldiers,  than  to  get  them;  to 
retain  officers  of  skill  and  renown  in  your  service, 
than  to  make  them.  Let  us  wait  a  while  before  we 
reduce  our  army  to  a  mere  peace  establishment. 

It  was  undoubtedly  such  advice  that  saved  the 
country  from  the  same  folly  exhibited  by  Congress 
at  the  close  of  the  Revolution,  confidently  believed 
by  many  to  be  the  last  war,  when  the  regular 
army  was  reduced  to  eighty  persons.  While  the 
peace  establishment  as  fixed  by  the  law  of  March, 
1 815,  was  radically  defective  in  many  ways,  it 
did,  however,  include  a  permanent  regular  force 
of  10,000  men,  or  one  soldier  for  every  thousand 
people  in  the  country.  Notwithstanding  the  fact 
that  the  army  was  soon  reduced,  it  would  seem 
that  in  181 5  a  standing  army  was  deemed  not  so 
much  of  a  menace  to  liberty  as  it  had  been  in  the 
past  when  too  blind  obedience  had  been  given 
Jefferson's  warning  that  "for  a  people  who  are 
free  and  mean  to  remain  so,  a  well  organized  and 
armed  militia  is  their  best  defence." 


CHAPTER X 

THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE 

WHEN  James  Monroe  assumed  his  duties 
as  President  of  the  United  States  in  1817, 
he  did  so  with  a  quickened  consciousness  of 
Federal  power.  Internally  and  externally  the 
Federal  Government  had  triumphed  during  Madi- 
son's second  administration.  Not  only  had  been 
tided  over  the  grave  crisis  of  the  threatened 
secession  from  the  Union  of  Massachusetts, 
Connecticut,  and  Rhode  Island,  because  of  the 
unpopularity  of  the  war  in  New  England  as  a 
result  of  the  economic  loss  it  was  thought  to  entail 
in  that  quarter,  but  the  war  with  England  had 
been  terminated  in  virtual  victory  for  the  United 
States.  Louisiana  had  been  accepted  into  the 
Union  as  a  State,  notwithstanding  the  contention 
of  certain  New  Englanders  that  the  act  if  con- 
summated would  constitute  a  dissolution  of  the 
Union,  and  free  the  constituent  States  from  the 
obligations  of  the  compact  between  them,  and 
Commodore  Decatur  in  command  of  a  strong 
squadron  had,  in  1815,  exacted  from  Algiers 
satisfactory  assurances  that  no  further  depreda- 

121 


122  Empire  and  Armament 

tions  would  be  committed  by  her  piratical  seamen 
upon  American  commerce.  Furthermore,  Monroe's 
election  had  sounded  the  death-knell  of  the  old  Fe- 
deralist party,  which  had  outlived  its  day,  and 
had  for  some  years  past  only  resorted  to  the  most 
vexatious  obstructionist  tactics. 

At  first  Monroe  was  disposed  to  accept  the 
doctrine  proclaimed  by  Clay  and  Calhoun,  adopt- 
ing without  reservation  their  principles  that 
government  was  protection,  and  that  defensive 
war  did  not  limit  a  country  to  the  employment 
of  defensive  strategy.  Accordingly  in  his  ad- 
ministration the  army  was  effectively  employed 
against  the  Seminole  Indians  of  Florida,  as  a  result 
of  which  and  the  difficulties  in  which  Jackson 
involved  the  country,  Florida  was  purchased  from 
Spain  in  1821. 

The  arbitrary  exercise  of  military  authority  by 
Jackson  in  invading  Florida,  and  in  seizing  the 
Spanish  towns  of  St.  Marks  and  Pensacola,  gave 
the  American  people  a  distinct  start,  and  revived 
in  many  of  them  who  had,  under  the  guidance 
of  Clay  and  Calhoun,  shown  a  disposition  to  waive 
their  prejudices  against  a  standing  army,  the 
traditional  distrust  of  military  power.  Men  of 
the  stamp  of  John  Randolph,  and  the  surviving 
Federalists  of  New  England,  at  once  cried  out, 
"I  told  you  so,"  and  the  fact  that  Jackson  in 
defending  his  actions  declared  that  he  had  been 
led  by  the  government  to  believe  the  seizure  of  Flor- 
ida would  be  favourably  regarded  in  Washington 


The  Monroe  Doctrine  123 

only  added  to  the  general  alarm.  The  administra- 
tion stoutly  denied  that  it  had  given  Jackson  any 
justification  for  the  implication  he  had  drawn, 
but  Congress  was  reluctant  to  rebuke  the  powerful 
"Hero  of  New  Orleans."  In  the  minds  of  many 
of  the  people  this  reluctance  was  directly  due  to 
fear  of  Jackson,  whom  they  regarded  as  a  military 
autocrat  whose  unbridled  power  the  country  was 
forced  to  acknowledge.  It  may  be,  therefore, 
that  the  early  reduction  of  the  regular  army  was 
owing  not  alone  to  considerations  of  economy  but 
to  the  fears  of  the  alarmists  as  well. 

But  it  must  not  be  inferred  from  the  fact  that 
developments  had  tended  to  establish  the  Federal 
Government  on  a  firmer  basis  that  serious  prob- 
lems   did   not    present    themselves   for    solution. 
Especially  alarming  was  the  state  of  the  revenue, 
for  small  as  the  public  expenditure  then  was— 
only  about  twenty-one  millions  of  dollars— it  was 
still  too  great  for  the  resources  of  the  government 
at  that  period.     Reductions  of  expense,  and  loans, 
became  the  resort,  and  economy  became  the  obliga- 
tory and  the  forced  policy  of  the  time.     The  small 
regular  army  was  the  first  and  the  largest  object 
on  which  the  reduction  fell.     Small  as  it  was,  it  was 
reduced  nearly  one  half— from  10,000  to  6,000  men 
— in  1820.     The  navy  felt  it  next,  and  the  annual 
appropriation  of  one  million  dollars  for  its  main- 
tenance was  cut  in  half.     Work  on  the  fortifications 
which  had  been  inaugurated  under  a  comprehen- 
sive plan  was  all  but  brought  to  a  standstill. 


124  Empire  and  Armament 

Distress  was  the  cry  of  the  day;  relief  the 
general  demand.  State  legislatures  were  occupied 
in  devising  measures  of  local  relief;  Congress  in 
endeavouring  to  foster  trade,  commerce,  and 
industry,  convinced  that  the  general  distress 
was  due  in  large  measure  to  economic  causes. 

It  was  about  this  time  that  the  ever  widening 
horizon  of  American  political  affairs  led  Monroe 
to  broaden  his  foreign  policy.  The  Washingtonian 
doctrine  of  strict  neutrality  reinforced  by  an 
adequate  standing  army  did  not  fully  satisfy  his 
views.  Something  more  than  that  was  demanded 
— short,  however  of  the  Hamiltonian  or  aggressive 
doctrine.  The  so-called  Jeffersonian  pacific  doc- 
trine had  been  cast  into  the  discard,  and  Jefferson 
himself  in  1823  was  urging  upon  Monroe  that 
"Our  first  and  fundamental  maxim  should  be 
never  to  entangle  ourselves  in  the  broils  of  Europe. 
Our  second,  never  to  suffer  Europe  to  intermeddle 
with  Cis- Atlantic  affairs." 

The  first  maxim  proposed  at  this  time  by 
Jefferson  was  nothing  beyond  the  Washingtonian 
doctrine;  the  second  was  entirely  beyond  it.  By 
the  extension  of  the  Clay-Calhoun  idea  of  protec- 
tion to  embrace  not  merely  protection  to  the 
United  States  in  the  old  and  narrow  sense  but 
protection  through  the  control  of  Cis-Atlantic 
affairs  in  general,  Monroe  was  able  to  proclaim 
a  national  doctrine  fully  embodying  his  ideas. 

It  may  be  properly  argued  that  Monroe's 
doctrine  was  formulated  merely  to  meet  the  exigen- 


The  Monroe  Doctrine  125 

cies  of  the  time,  and  that  the  principle  it  involved 
was  no  novel  one;  that  it  was  rather  the  embodi- 
ment of  an  idea  previously  expressed  by  Adams, 
Jefferson,  and  others,  especially  by  Calhoun,  who 
had  announced  the  principle  of  aggressive  strategy 
applicable  to  national  defence.  However  that 
may  be,  the  doctrine  was  first  officially  proclaimed 
by  Monroe  and  it  must  go  under  his  name,  whether 
properly  ascribable  to  his  statesmanship  or  not. 

The  circumstances  inducing  the  declarations 
made  by  Monroe,  since  known  as  the  Monroe 
Doctrine,  are  historically  important. 

A  dispute  was  pending  over  the  north-west 
boundary  between  Great  Britain,  Russia,  and  the 
United  States,  Russia  having  assumed  to  exclude 
foreigners  from  the  disputed  territory  extending 
to  the  fifty-first  parallel  of  latitude.  In  this 
situation  there  was  believed  to  lurk  proper  cause 
for  alarm. 

Far  to  the  south,  a  more  serious  state  of  affairs 
existed.  Spain  had  persistently  sought  to  monopo- 
lize the  trade  of  her  American  possessions,  much  to 
the  loss  of  the  United  States  and  England  whose 
commerce  was  practically  denied  an  outlet  into 
the  rich  field  of  South  America.  But  when 
the  Spanish-American  colonies  revolted  against 
Joseph,  whom  Napoleon  placed  on  the  throne  of 
Spain  in  1808,  American  and  British  merchants 
were  quick  to  seize  the  opportunity  of  establishing 
commercial  relations  with  the  new  and  independent 
states,  and  during  the  next  decade  a  lucrative 


126  Empire  and  Armament 

trade  had  grown  up.  But  Spain  had  not  become 
reconciled  to  the  loss  of  her  rich  colonies  and  was 
on  the  point  of  dispatching  an  expeditionary  force 
to  reduce  them  to  their  former  state  of  submission, 
when  a  popular  revolution  broke  out  within  her  own 
borders,  a  revolution  which  soon  involved  Italy. 

The  monarchial  governments  of  Europe  had  had 
too  much  recent  experience  with  revolutions  to 
cherish  the  idea  of  another.  Indeed,  England, 
Austria,  Prussia,  and  Russia  since  1815  had  con- 
certed to  maintain  the  restored  Bourbon  King  on 
the  throne  of  France.  The  treaty  to  which  these 
powers  were  signatory  parties  provided  for  fre- 
quent joint  considerations  of  the  state  of  European 
affairs,  to  the  end,  of  course,  that  republicanism 
might  not  prosper  in  their  vicinity.  Ostensibly 
to  the  end  that  the  rulers  of  Prussia,  Russia,  and 
Austria  might  base  their  policies  "upon  the 
sublime  truths  which  are  taught  by  the  eternal 
religion  of  God  our  Saviour,  "  but  in  all  probability 
that  they  might  fortify  themselves  by  the  union  of 
their  strength  in  support  of  autocratic  ideals, 
these  three  countries  entered  into  "The  Holy 
Alliance."  In  fact  the  agreement  existing  be- 
tween them  constituted  an  alliance,  but  the  only 
thing  verging  on  a  holy  feature  in  the  combination 
seems  to  have  been  the  pious  professions  of  the 
originator  of  the  idea — the  Tsar  Alexander  I. 
In  this  connection  we  are  reminded  of  the  saying 
concerning  the  Holy  Roman  Empire — it  was  not 
holy,  Roman,  or  an  empire. 


The  Monroe  Doctrine  127 

No  sooner  had  the  Spanish  revolution  of  1820 
broken  out  than  Metternich,  the  astute  Austrian 
diplomat,  called  upon  Russia,  Prussia,  France,  and 
Great  Britain  to  unite  with  Austria  in  suppressing 
the  revolt  in  its  incipiency,  but  Great  Britain 
declined  to  be  represented  at  the  conference  which 
met  in  Verona  in  1822  for  the  purpose  of  devising 
a  plan  to  aid  Spain,  not  only  in  settling  her  home 
difficulties  but  to  recover  her  lost  colonies.  The 
growth  of  republicanism  in  South  America  may 
have  appeared  to  be  a  very  grave  threat  to  the 
continental  powers,  but  to  England,  as  to  the 
United  States,  it  only  insured  great  economic 
gain;  the  restoration  of  the  old  order  in  South 
America  would  have  meant  the  loss  of  a  lucrative 
and  growing  trade  to  both  countries. 

No  sooner  had  the  resolutions  of  the  Congress  of 
Verona  been  announced  than  the  British  Govern- 
ment proposed  to  Monroe  that  the  United  States 
unite  with  Great  Britain  in  a  joint  declaration 
against  the  proposed  action.  Without  waiting, 
however,  for  Monroe's  decision  Great  Britain  in 
October  made  her  protest  to  France. 

The  declaration  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  which 
soon  followed  was  due  not  alone  to  fear  in  the 
United  States  of  the  near  approach  of  despotism 
or  of  the  re-establishment  of  a  monarchial  form  of 
government  in  South  America,  nor  was  it  in  any 
sense  due  to  an  altruistic  desire  to  see  the  infant 
republics  in  that  quarter  free  from  interference 
and  the  danger  of  subjugation.     The  truth  seems 


128  Empire  and  Armament 

to  be  that  it  was  prompted  by  the  insistent  and 
growing  demand  for  protection  to  American  trade 
and  commerce,  and  a  strong  desire  to  secure  for 
American  merchants  a  large  share  of  the  economic 
advantages  to  be  derived  from  the  continued 
independence  of  the  former  Spanish  colonies 
at  a  time  when  such  advantages  were  of  vital 
importance. 

This  may  seem  a  crass  view  at  this  time  when  so 
much  is  said  and  written  about  our  early  love  of 
liberty  and  free  government,  about  American 
altruism  and  the  political  unselfishness  of  the 
"big  sister,"  but  the  facts  of  history  compel  us 
to  the  belief  that  the  economic  idea  of  protection 
— protection  for  American  commerce — was  the 
ruling  factor  in  determining  Monroe's  declaration 
of  American  policy  with  respect  to  European 
activity  in  this  hemisphere,  and  that  the  benefits 
Monroe's  policy  was  designed  to  insure  were 
primarily  sought  in  the  selfish  economic  interest 
of  the  people  of  the  United  States,  and  only  inci- 
dentally for  the  political  welfare  of  the  young  re- 
publicans of  South  America.  In  fact  politics 
were  only  involved  as  the  means  to  an  end,  and 
had  the  infant  republics  of  Latin  America  been 
absolute  monarchies,  sultanates,  or  tyrannical 
democracies,  the  Monroe  Doctrine  would  in  all 
probability  have  been  proclaimed  just  the  same, 
though  reference  to  the  forms  of  government 
existing  in  South  America  would  necessarily  have 
been  omitted;  notwithstanding  Mr.  Root's  belief 


The  Monroe  Doctrine  129 

that  it  "crystallized  the  sentiment  for  human 
liberty  and  human  rights  which  has  saved  Ameri- 
can idealism  from  the  demoralization  of  narrow- 
selfishness,  and  has  given  to  American  democracy 
its  true  world  power  in  the  virile  potency  of  a 
great  example."  But  he  certainly  hit  the  nail  on 
the  head  when  he  added,  "It  responded  to  the 
instinct  of  self-preservation  in  an  intensely  practical 
people." 

Let  us  now  examine  the  nature  of  Monroe's 
declaration.  In  his  message  to  Congress  in  1823 
he  included  two  passages  which  together  enunciate 
a  doctrine  of  non-colonization  and  non-interven- 
tion. The  first  passage  referred  to  the  dispute 
in  the  north-west  between  Great  Britain,  Russia, 
and  the  United  States,  already  referred  to.     It  is : 

The  occasion  has  been  judged  proper  for  asserting 
as  a  principle  in  which  the  rights  and  interests  of  the 
United  States  are  involved,  that  the  American  conti- 
nents, by  the  free  and  independent  conditions  which 
they  have  assumed  and  maintained,  are  henceforth 
not  to  be  considered  as  subjects  for  future  colonization 
by  any  European  powers. 

The  second  part  of  Monroe's  message  related 
exclusively  to  the  proposed  action  of  the  Holy 
Alliance.     It  is  as  follows : 

We  owe  it,  therefore,  to  candour  and  to  the  amicable 
relations  existing  between  the  United  States  and  these 
Powers  to  declare  that  we  should  consider  any  attempt 
on  their  part  to  extend  their  system  to  any  portion  of 


130  Empire  and  Armament 

this  hemisphere  as  dangerous  to  our  peace  and  safety. 
With  the  existing  colonies  and  dependencies  of  any 
European  Power  we  have  not  interfered  and  shall  not 
interfere.  But  with  the  governments  who  have 
declared  their  independence  and  maintained  it,  and 
whose  independence  we  have,  on  great  consideration 
and  just  principles,  acknowledged,  we  could  not  view 
any  interposition  for  the  purpose  of  oppressing  them, 
or  controlling  in  any  other  manner  their  destiny,  by 
any  European  Power,  in  any  other  light  than  as  the 
manifestation  of  an  unfriendly  disposition  towards  the 
United  States. 

It  has  been  well  argued  that  both  the  conditions 
which  inspired  the  first  passage  of  Monroe's 
message,  or  that  passage  respecting  future  coloni- 
zation of  the  American  continents,  and  the 
language  employed,  prove  that  it  related  to  an 
acquisition  of  territory  by  original  occupation  or 
settlement;  that  no  restriction  on  the  acquisition 
of  territory  by  gift,  purchase,  or  like  voluntary 
transfer,  or  even  by  conquest,  was  intended,  and 
further,  that  while  it  did  not  strictly  commit  the 
United  States  to  the  application  of  the  principle 
to  territory  other  than  that  immediately  in  dispute 
in  the  north-west,  in  prospective  consideration  it 
involved  the  vast  tracts  of  unclaimed  land  on  the 
continent  still  unexplored  and  unoccupied,  upon 
which  the  establishment  of  a  European  colony 
with  the  exclusive  trade  policies  then  professed 
by  all  continental  governments  could  not  fail  to 
prejudice  the  trade  relations  of  the  United  States. 


The  Monroe  Doctrine  131 

This  view  seems  well  established  by  the  fact 
that  not  only  was  the  controversy  in  question 
settled  by  treaty  with  Russia  in  1825,  but  that 
President  John  Quincy  Adams  considered  it 
necessary  to  reassert  the  doctrine  in  1826,  in  the 
instructions  of  the  United  States  delegates  to  the 
Panama  Congress,  a  case  in  which  its  proposed 
application  was  limited  to  its  adoption  by  each 
separate  state  as  a  protection  of  the  territory 
claimed  by  that  state,  and  not  committing  the 
powers  concerned  as  a  body  to  "a  joint  resistance 
against  any  future  attempt  to  plant  a  colony." 
The  question,  however,  was  not  considered  by  the 
Panama  Congress,  owing  to  the  non-arrival  of 
the  instructed  United  States  delegates,  and  this 
phase  of  the  doctrine  remained  in  abeyance  for 
twenty  years.  To  repeat,  the  second  passage  of 
the  message  referred  to  the  proposed  action  of  the 
Holy  Alliance  and  was  primarily  designed  to 
protect  American  trade  rather  than  South  Ameri- 
can republics,  in  the  political  forms  of  which  neither 
the  United  States,  nor  of  necessity  Great  Britain, 
the  latter  so  active  in  encouraging  our  action, 
were  deeply  interested  at  the  time.  The  com- 
munity of  interest  which  Great  Britain  recognized 
as  existing  between  herself  and  the  United  States 
was  surely  not  political  in  nature,  and  her  appeal 
to  the  United  States  for  co-operation  in  a  common 
interest  conclusively  establishes  the  interest  Mon- 
roe sought  to  subserve  as  the  interest  of  trade; 
the  only  possible  common  interest  between  England 


132  Empire  and  Armament 

and  the  United  States.  The  means  he  resorted 
to  was  the  forceful  enunciation  of  a  policy  of 
protection  unlimited  in  its  operation  by  the 
territorial  boundaries  of  the  United  States.  In 
this  he  went  beyond  the  Clay-Calhoun  doctrine 
which  contemplated  offensive  strategy  in  defensive 
war.  Monroe's  doctrine  embraced  the  principle 
of  defensive  strategy  in  time  of  peace,  coupled 
with  the  unequivocal  threat  of  offence  should  the 
trade  rights  of  the  United  States  be  encroached 
upon. 

The  significance  of  Monroe's  bold  doctrine  was 
immediately  recognized  in  Europe,  where  the 
imperialistic  principle  that  the  flag  follows  trade 
was  already  well  formulated.  Within  the  year 
after  Monroe's  declaration,  the  Austrian  Counsel- 
lor of  State,  in  commenting  on  the  new  doctrine, 
wrote : 

The  message  of  the  President  of  the  United  States 
is  an  epoch-making  act  in  the  history  of  our  times. 
Every  line  of  it  deserves  to  be  considered  with  the 
most  earnest  attention.  Not  only  the  present  atti- 
tude of  that  mighty  and  productive  federation  towards 
Europe,  but  also  the  relation  of  both  American 
continents  to  the  Old  World  are  here  enunciated  with 
a  clarity  and  precision  which  end  all  doubts  and 
duplicities. 

The  separation  of  America  from  Europe  has  been 
completed  irrevocably.  If  the  reconquest  of  the 
colonies  on  the  continent  or  their  voluntary  return  to 
the  old  rule  had  not  already  become  impossible,  this 


The  Monroe  Doctrine  133 

opposition  of  the  North  American  people,  which  has 
so  long  been  developed  and  which  has  only  now  been 
openly  declared,  would  alone  be  sufficient  to  banish 
all  thoughts  of  it. 

If  Monroe  had  actually  contemplated  the  com- 
plete separation  of  the  Old  World  from  the  New, 
he  could  not  have  been  more  successful,  as  events 
have  proved,  but  this  result  he  had  no  intention 
of  bringing  about  when  he  merely  sought  to  pre- 
vent Europe  from  denying  the  United  States  the 
full  freedom  of  trade  in  this  hemisphere.  Nor 
did  he  perceive  that  he  was  placing  in  the  hands 
of  posterity  a  veritable  Pandora's  box  of  national 
doctrines,  from  which  one  made  to  order  for  every 
contingency  of  the  future  might  be  extracted  by 
our  statesmen  and  scholars. 

I  do  not  propose  to  discuss  here  the  innumerable 
interpretations  that  have  been  given  the  Monroe 
Doctrine,  some  of  which  have  led,  no  doubt,  to 
its  misapplication,  and  some  to  the  extension  of 
Monroe's  original  conception,  until  no  semblance 
exists  between  the  old  and  the  new.  Nor  shall  I 
attempt  to  establish  the  perverted  forms  of  the 
doctrine  as  beneficial  or  injurious  to  the  United 
States,  to  Europe,  to  the  Orient,  to  the  South 
American  republics,  or  to  humanity  and  human 
liberty.  It  seems  sufficient  to  say  here  that  the 
original  doctrine  proved  its  own  efficacy,  and 
that  it  was  a  striking  example  of  a  defensive 
political  measure  in  which  the  threat  of  offensive 


134  Empire  and  Armament 

support  was  obvious  to  the  world.  That  the 
threat  it  contained  was  obvious  even  at  the  time 
it  was  made  is  proved  by  the  words  of  the  great 
Austrian  statesman,  Metternich,  who  may  be 
assumed  to  have  voiced  the  opinion  of  at  least 
one  member  of  the  Holy  Alliance. 


CHAPTER  XI 

THE  JACKSONIAN  DOCTRINE 

WHATEVER  else  Monroeism  may  have  ac- 
complished, beyond  all  else  it  gave  to  a 
rising  Americanism  that  fillip  which  suddenly  in- 
tensified the  consciousness  of  national  power  among 
our  people.  This  effect  was  the  natural  result 
of  Monroe's  policy  of  exclusion,  and  brought 
about  that  development  in  the  United  States  for 
which  the  nineteenth  century  is  conspicuous  in  the 
history  of  nations  in  general.  But  while  the 
Americanism  of  the  early  nineteenth  century  was 
much  encouraged  by  Monroeism,  that  policy  of 
exclusion  was  itself  but  a  reaction  from  European 
political  development.  The  Congress  of  Vienna, 
which  sought  to  circumscribe  the  Powers  of 
Europe,  exercised  a  potent  influence  in  causing 
all  the  nations  of  the  world  to  strive  for  completely 
self-sufficing  life,  with  the  result  that  each  of  them 
had  developed  a  clearly  marked  individuality. 

In  the  United  States  the  section  which  devel- 
oped the  nationalistic  spirit  the  most  rapidly 
was  that  one  farthest  removed  from  contact  with 
Europe — the   Western   frontier.     Before  the   end 

i35 


136  Empire  and  Armament 

of  Monroe's  second  term  the  Union  comprised 
twenty  States;  of  the  seven  new  ones  all  except 
Louisiana  and  Maine  were  more  or  less  removed 
from  European  influence.  It  was  not  foreign 
trade  and  commerce,  nor  industry  involving 
foreign  capital,  that  absorbed  the  energies  of  the 
settlers  of  the  new  Western  States.  It  was  the 
problem  of  internal  development  and  those  prob- 
lems involved  in  pushing  forward  the  frontier 
that  proved  all-engrossing  to  their  enterprising 
settlers.  These  distinctly  American  interests  de- 
veloped a  distinct  American  class,  with  its  provin- 
cialisms and  its  social  democracy.  Out  of  this 
provincialism  and  social  democracy  of  the  West 
arose  that  intense  American  spirit  that  gave  life 
to  and  distinguished  the  Western  Democracy  to 
which  the  exclusive  national  policy  of  Monroe 
naturally  appealed  with  great  force.  Indeed, 
Monroe  had,  in  a  measure,  unconsciously  responded 
to  the  demands  of  the  West  in  seeking  to  safeguard 
the  interests  of  the  East,  and  he  gave  to  the  two 
sections  the  first  common  cause  upon  which  they 
might  unite. 

Western  Democracy,  however,  while  it  found 
the  policy  of  exclusion  eminently  congenial  to  its 
ideals,  was  soon  to  put  forth  in  Andrew  Jackson  a 
champion  of  an  intenser  nationalism  than  even 
the  Monroe  Doctrine  embraced.  The  advent  of 
Jackson  upon  the  American  political  arena  marked 
a  revolution  in  American  thought  which  must  be 
traced  from  its  sources. 


The  Jacksonian  Doctrine  137 

At  the  age  of  twenty-nine  Andrew  Jackson 
found  himself  a  member  of  the  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives, and  as  a  member  of  that  body  he  heard 
Washington  deliver  in  person  his  last  message  to 
Congress.  One  of  his  first  political  acts  was  sug- 
gestive of  his  strong  nationalistic  tendencies,  for 
he  was  one  of  the  twelve  extreme  Republicans  who 
voted  against  the  adoption  of  the  address  to 
Washington  in  approval  of  his  administration. 

Jackson's  disapproval  of  Washington's  admin- 
istration was  based  in  large  measure  upon  his 
objection  to  the  Jay  Treaty,  which  did  not  satisfy 
the  fierce  spirit  of  Americanism  rankling  in  his 
breast.  Jackson  wanted  war  with,  and  revenge 
against,  England.  He  did  not  perceive,  as  did 
Washington,  that  the  country  was  yet  unprepared 
for  war,  and  mistook  Washington's  policy  of 
waiting  until  the  country  was  better  prepared 
to  fight,  for  that  so-called  Jeffersonian  policy  of 
pacifism,  always  so  repugnant  to  him. 

There  was  not  a  pacific  thought  in  Jackson's 
mind  at  this  or  any  other  time.  In  his  first  Con- 
gress he  strongly  advocated  an  appropriation  to 
defray  the  expenses  of  Sevier's  expedition  against 
the  turbulent  Cherokees;  he  voted  for  the  bill 
providing  funds  with  which  to  carry  into  effect 
the  pending  naval  program  which  included  the 
completion  of  the  frigates  Constitution,  Constel- 
lation, and  United  States,  all  of  which  were  to 
win  such  imperishable  renown ;  and  he  vehemently 
protested  against  the  payment  of  further  black- 


138  Empire  and  Armament 

mail  to  Algiers.  His  wrath  against  France  and 
England  was  only  fanned  by  the  applause  which 
his  constituents  rendered  his  actions  in  Congress 
from  1796  to  1798. 

Retiring  from  the  Senate  in  1798,  Jackson  be- 
came commander-in-chief  of  the  Tennessee  militia 
in  1801,  and  then  his  successful  military  career 
began.  His  firmness  under  all  circumstances 
won  for  him  the  nickname  of  "Old  Hickory,"  and 
his  brilliant  victory  over  Pakenham  and  the 
British  veterans  in  181 5,  that  of  the  "Hero  of 
New  Orleans.'' 

But  in  his  very  military  successes  many  people 
found  cause  to  distrust  Jackson.  To  the  popular 
mind  he  was  the  very  embodiment  of  arbitrary 
military  power;  while  his  victory  over  the  British 
was  lauded  as  "almost  incredible,"  and  although 
the  pride  of  the  nation  was  touched  by  it,  his 
success  only  served  to  call  attention  to  the  tre- 
mendous power  Jackson  had  acquired,  especially 
among  the  soldiers  the  credit  of  whose  arms  he  had 
restored.  All  recognized  too  that  this  magnificent 
achievement  of  arms  had  resulted  from  Jackson's 
personal  efforts,  almost  entirely  unsupported  by 
the  government.  "What  could  he  not  do  with 
force  behind  him  if  adequately  supported?"  was 
the  query  quick  to  arise  in  the  minds  of  the  more 
timid  in  whom  had  been  sedulously  cultivated  the 
fear  of  a  military  autocrat  by  Jefferson  and  Ran- 
dolph and  others  of  the  pacific  ilk.  Unfortunately 
just  at  the  time  when  the  traditional  prejudice 


The  Jacksonian  Doctrine  139 

of  the  people  at  large  was  smothered  in  the  rejoic- 
ing following  upon  Jackson's  victory,  when  their 
fears  of  military  power  were  allayed  if  not  dispelled, 
an  untoward  event  occurred.  Jackson  became  in- 
volved in  a  conflict  with  the  civil  authorities  of 
New  Orleans  and  placed  the  city  which  he  had 
saved  under  martial  law. 

Whether  Jackson  was  right  or  wrong  in  this 
action  is  immaterial  so  far  as  the  effect  it  had  upon 
the  nation  is  concerned,  and  when  within  the  next 
two  years  he  became  involved  in  an  acrimonious 
controversy  with  the  Secretary  of  War  and  offi- 
cially forbade  his  officers  to  pay  heed  to  any  order 
from  the  War  Department  not  issued  through  him, 
all  the  warnings  of  Jefferson  and  Randolph  and 
the  others  who  had  so  persistently  inveighed 
against  the  upgrowth  of  military  power  were  re- 
called. General  Scott,  himself  a  soldier,  only 
added  to  the  state  of  popular  alarm  by  referring 
to  Jackson's  action  as  one  verging  upon  mutiny. 
But  Calhoun,  who  succeeded  Crawford  as  Secre- 
tary of  War  in  October,  1817,  with  great  good  tact 
averted  further  conflict  between  the  civil  and 
military  authorities.  In  the  meantime,  however, 
Jackson  had  challenged  Scott  to  a  duel  for  his 
remark  and  the  country,  greatly  scandalized, 
looked  in  fear  and  trembling  upon  the  alarming 
altercation  between  the  two  military  chieftains, 
while  the  -military  sentiment  largely  supported 
Jackson. 

The  situation  in  its  best  aspect  was  not  a  reas- 


140  Empire  and  Armament 

suring  one.  Jackson  was  undoubtedly  conscious 
of  his  power,  but  by  very  reason  of  his  own  in- 
nocence of  any  intent  to  misuse  it,  did  many 
things  which  were  promptly  misconstrued.  The 
country  was  also  conscious  of  his  power,  and  it 
seemed  that  some  strange  fate  contrived  to  inten- 
sify rather  than  allay  the  popular  fear  of  Jackson, 
for  in  1818,  as  we  have  seen,  he  invaded  Florida, 
seized  St.  Marks  and  Pensacola,  punished  the 
maurading  Seminoles,  and  returned  to  United 
States  territory  to  find  the  country  on  the  brink 
of  war  with  both  Great  Britain  and  Spain  as  the 
result  of  his  energetic  campaign. 

Jackson  claimed  that  he  was  authorized  by  an 
emissary  from  the  President  to  invade  Florida, 
and  the  evidence  strongly  points  to  the  fact  that 
he  was  not  altogether  unjustified  in  taking  the 
course  he  did.  But  Monroe  refused  to  concede 
such  justification  and  was  strongly  urged  by  every 
member  of  his  cabinet  but  one  to  disavow  Jack- 
son's acts.  Upon  John  Quincy  Adams's  advice 
alone  Monroe  assumed  full  responsibility,  but 
restored  the  captured  towns.  Neither  Spain  nor 
Great  Britain  being  in  the  mood  for  war,  a  settle- 
ment was  finally  made  under  which  Florida  was 
purchased  from  Spain. 

The  effect  which  Jackson's  seemingly  arbitrary 
nature  had  upon  the  people  of  the  East,  whom  he 
kept  in  a  constant  state  of  alarm,  was  just  the 
reverse  of  that  it  exerted  upon  the  Western  popu- 
lace.    The    hardy    frontier    element    worshipped 


The  Jacksonian  Doctrine  141 

Jackson  as  a  hero  and  regarded  him  as  the  Well- 
ington and  not  as  the  Napoleon  of  America.  They, 
like  Clay  of  Kentucky,  cherished  no  fear  of  mili- 
tary dictatorship,  or  of  the  military  power  which 
went  with  a  standing  army,  and  so  the  very  thing 
which  excited  mistrust  of  Jackson  in  the  older 
and  more  conservative  sections  of  the  country 
in  which  men's  hands  were  softer  and  their  bodies 
less  hardy  than  in  the  West,  where  continuous 
struggle  with  the  savages  made  all  men  soldiers, 
led  the  frontier  element  to  repose  in  him  the  utmost 
confidence.  To  the  growing  Democracy  of  the 
West  Jackson  seemed  to  embody  the  very  spirit  of 
their  nationalism. 

Though  he  was  much  misunderstood  in  the 
East,  Jackson's  popularity  in  the  West  and  South 
was  so  great  in  1824  as  to  cause  his  nomination 
for  the  Presidency.  But  he  was  by  no  means 
without  support  in  the  North  where  he  had  a  large 
following  in  Pennsylvania,  New  Jersey,  and  New 
York. 

Among  Jackson,  Adams,  Clay,  and  Crawford, 
Jackson  was  much  the  strongest  candidate  and 
Clay  proved  to  be  the  weakest  in  the  race.  For 
Jackson  it  was  unfortunate  that  Clay,  who  owed 
his  support  almost  entirely  to  the  West,  should  be 
the  first  candidate  to  be  eliminated,  for  Clay  was 
intensely  hostile  to  him.  Not  only  had  Clay,  like 
Calhoun,  condemned  Jackson's  conduct  in  Florida 
as  arbitrary,  but  he  believed  Jackson  to  be  a 
military    autocrat    and    no    statesman.     Accord- 


142  Empire  and  Armament 

ingly  he  threw  his  support  to  Adams  who  was 
finally  elected. 

But  the  star  of  the  Western  Democracy  was  in 
the  ascendant,  and  during  the  next  four  years 
Jackson  gained  strength  in  the  East,  where  he  had 
come  to  be  better  understood,  and  therefore  less 
distrusted.  People  who  at  first  had  seen  in  him 
only  an  arrogant  soldier  began  to  understand 
that  he  had  resorted  to  violent  methods  for  useful 
ends,  and  in  scrutinizing  his  record  were  unable 
to  discover  a  single  instance  in  which  he  had  used 
his  tremendous  military  power  for  his  own  selfish 
advantage.  Indeed,  between  the  years  1824  and 
1828  there  occurred  a  distinct  revulsion  of  feeling 
in  certain  sections  of  the  country  where  the  people 
had  regarded  Jackson  as  a  dangerous  soldier,  and 
at  the  time  of  his  second  candidacy  his  military 
features  were  portrayed  as  those  of  a  hero  rather 
than  as  those  of  an  ambitious  and  truculent  auto- 
crat, so  that  with  Clay  and  Crawford  out  of  the 
running,  Jackson  was  able  to  sweep  the  South  as 
well  as  the  West,  defeating  Adams  by  more  than 
double  the  electoral  vote  cast  for  the  latter. 
Calhoun  was  re-elected  Vice-President. 

The  cabinet  formed  by  Jackson  and  that  recently 
formed  by  Wilson,  both  of  whom  were  borne  into 
office  upon  the  flood  of  Democracy,  bear  a  striking 
resemblance  to  each  other  in  the  obscurity  of  most 
of  the  members  at  the  time  they  were  chosen. 

During  Jackson's  first  administration  a  new 
political  alignment  occurred,  the  dissatisfied  fac- 


The  Jacksonian  Doctrine  143 

tions  of  the  Western  Democracy  combining  with 
the  undemocratic  elements  of  the  North  and  East 
under  the  leadership  of  Clay  to  form  the  Whig 
party.  The  name  of  the  new  party  is  significant 
of  its  sentiment ;  Jackson  was  held  up  by  the  fol- 
lowers of  Clay  as  a  veritable  tyrant  with  a  following 
of  reactionary  Tories.  Meantime  Calhoun,  still 
cherishing  presidential  aspirations,  had  become 
personally  estranged  from  Jackson  and  was  at 
loggerheads  with  the  administration. 

Such  was  the  situation  when  the  most  important 
incident  of  Jackson's  career,  in  connection  with 
our  study,  occurred.  A  narration,  in  some  detail, 
of  the  events  leading  up  to  this  situation  seems 
necessary  in  order  to  disclose  the  character  and 
political  status  of  the  man  who  was  to  pronounce 
two  new  and  important  national  doctrines. 

The  immediate  circumstances  giving  rise  to  the 
first  of  these  doctrines  had  to  do  with  an  attempt 
on  the  part  of  South  Carolina  to  declare  inoperative 
a  Federal  law  within  the  boundaries  of  that  State, 
her  action  being  preceded  by  similar  ones  on  the 
part  of  three  other  States  of  the  Union. 

During  the  administration  of  John  Quincy 
Adams  a  dispute  had  arisen  between  the  Federal 
Government  and  the  State  of  Georgia  over  the 
lands  of  the  Creek  Indians.  A  treaty  was  nego- 
tiated, in  1825,  by  Federal  commissioners  with 
the  Creek  Indians  under  the  terms  of  which  those 
Indians  were  to  accept  in  lieu  of  their  Georgia 
holdings  land  beyond  the  Mississippi;  but  certain 


144  Empire  and  Armament 

chiefs  refused  to  abide  by  the  treaty,  in  the  making 
of  which  they  had  no  part.  In  1826,  the  govern- 
ment drew  up  a  new  treaty  which  assigned  those 
Indians  unwilling  to  remove,  certain  lands  claimed 
by  them  in  Georgia,  but  the  State  government 
this  time  opposed  its  objection  and  threatened  to 
resist  with  the  force  of  arms  the  efforts  of  certain 
Federal  agents  to  survey  the  territory  allotted  the 
Indians  under  the  second  treaty.  Neither  Con- 
gress nor  the  administration  made  any  effort  to 
enforce  the  decision  of  the  Supreme  Court  in  this 
case,  and  Georgia  was  left  to  settle  her  dispute 
with  the  Creeks  in  her  own  way. 

The  Georgia  case  was  the  first  in  which  a  State 
government  had  actually  set  at  naught  the  Federal 
authority.  The  Hartford  Convention  had  un- 
doubtedly contemplated  such  action,  and  the  ad- 
mission of  Louisiana  had  given  rise  :to  threats  and 
grave  forebodings.  Webster,  as  we  have  seen,  had 
declared  it  to  be  the  duty  of  a  State  to  resist  with 
arms  any  Federal  law  that  in  its  own  judgment 
seemed  to  encroach  upon  its  sovereignty.  The 
claim  of  a  right  on  the  part  of  the  States  to  annul 
Federal  enactments  was  by  no  means  a  novel  one 
and  the  American  people  should  be  taught  that  this 
doctrine  was  first  pronounced  in  New  England  and 
not  in  South  Carolina;  that  Webster  pronounced  it 
long  before  Calhoun.  Nevertheless  it  was  natural 
that  in  the  Georgia  altercation  the  Federal  Gov- 
ernment was  at  a  loss  to  know  exactly  what  to 
do,  by  reason  of  its  very  inexperience. 


The  Jacksonian  Doctrine  145 

It  was  not  long  before  another  instance  of  re- 
sistance to  a  Federal  decree  was  to  occur.  In 
accordance  with  the  treaty  of  Ghent  (18 14)  the 
dispute  between  the  United  States  and  Great 
Britain  over  the  Maine-Canada  boundary  had 
been  referred  to  the  King  of  the  Netherlands  as 
arbitrator,  who  finally  rendered  a  decision  favour- 
able to  the  claims  of  Canada.  Against  this  de- 
cision both  Maine  and  Massachusetts  protested, 
and  declared  that  if  Congress  ratified  the  finding 
they  would  regard  the  Federal  decree  as  null  and 
void,  and  in  no  way  binding  on  either  common- 
wealth. Their  threats  practically  forced  Con- 
gress to  reject  the  arbitrator's  decision  on  a  more 
or  less  specious  ground. 

The  foregoing  facts  enable  us  to  trace  the  growth 
of  the  doctrine  that  a  State  possessed  the  right  to 
nullify  Federal  laws  when,  in  the  opinion  of  a 
State  government,  they  trespassed  upon  the  rights 
of  the  State.  The  growing  belief  in  this  right 
was  only  confirmed  in  certain  quarters  by  still 
another  incident.  Between  1828  and  1830,  Geor- 
gia, having  settled  her  difficulties  with  the  Creeks, 
had  taken  steps  to  bring  the  Cherokee  Indians 
under  her  jurisdiction.  These  Indians  called  upon 
the  United  States  for  protection  and  the  Supreme 
Court  sustained  their  appeal.  John  Quincy  Ad- 
ams had  championed  their  cause  and  had  actually 
maintained  a  force  of  Federal  troops  among  them 
for  their  protection,  but  no  sooner  had  Jackson 
become  President  than  he  withdrew  the  military 


146  Empire  and  Armament 

from  the  Cherokee  country  and  refused  to  enforce 
the  rights  guaranteed  the  Indians  by  the  Supreme 
Court.  Not  only  was  it  generally  believed  that 
Jackson  was  hostile  to  John  Marshall  and  the 
Supreme  Court  itself,  but  he  had  little  sympathy 
for  Indians,  with  whom  his  experience  had  been 
that  of  a  frontiersman.  The  real,  underlying 
motive  which  inspired  Jackson's  action  with 
respect  to  the  Cherokees  was  no  doubt  miscon- 
strued in  South  Carolina,  where  it  appeared  that 
he  had  only  connived  at  the  principle  asserted  by 
Georgia  in  1826,  later  by  Maine  and  Massachu- 
setts, and  now  by  Georgia  again.  The  occasion 
was,  therefore,  deemed  propitious  by  Calhoun  and 
his  South  Carolinian  followers  to  rid  themselves 
of  the  "tariff  of  abominations"  which  even  in  its 
modified  form  weighed  so  heavily  upon  South 
Carolina.  Furthermore,  it  was  well  known  that 
Jackson  was  opposed  to  the  principle  of  protective 
tariff.  But  it  was  at  this  juncture  that  Calhoun 
reckoned  without  his  host,  and  committed  a  po- 
litical error  which  perhaps  he  would  never  have 
been  guilty  of  at  the  time  in  question  had  he  been 
more  in  accord  with  Jackson,  and  better  informed 
of  the  real  convictions  of  his  chief.  He  seems  to 
have  completely  lost  sight  of  the  fact  that  his  own 
doctrine — government  is  protection — might  be 
construed  to  apply  either  to  the  protection  of  a 
State  or  to  that  of  the  country  at  large,  and,  in  a 
sense,  he  had  checkmated  himself  by  placing  in 
the  hands  cf  the  Federal  Government  the  very 


The  Jacksonian  Doctrine  147 

doctrine  which  was  to  be  invoked  against  South 
Carolina. 

Jackson  was  not  unaware  of  the  vague  discus- 
sion going  on  about  nullification.  His  action  in 
withdrawing  the  Federal  troops  from  Georgia 
was  unfortunately  coupled  with  almost  complete 
silence  on  his  part,  and  certainly  no  open  declara- 
tion as  to  his  convictions  in  the  matter.  Even 
the  famous  speech  of  Webster  in  repfy  to  Hayne 
elicited  no  public  expression  from  him  until  shortly 
thereafter  at  a  dinner  commemorating  Jefferson's 
birthday  he  volunteered  the  toast,  "Our  Federal 
Union:  it  must  be  preserved!"  Jackson's  expres- 
sion on  this  occasion  was  so  forceful  and  pointed 
that  Calhoun  sought  to  annul  its  effect  with  a 
speech  in  which  he  proposed  the  toast,  "Liberty, 
dearer  than  the  Union!" 

These  events  only  served  to  definitely  complete 
the  issue;  South  Carolina  no  longer  hesitated  to 
take  the  fateful  step.  In  November,  1832,  she 
declared  the  tariff  laws  of  1828  and  1832  null  and 
void  within  her  boundaries ;  measures  were  adopted 
to  put  her  decision  into  effect  on  and  after  Febru- 
ary 1,  1833,  and  the  Federal  Government  was 
warned  that  South  Carolina  would  secede  from 
the  Union  if  an  effort  was  made  to  enforce  the 
United  States  revenue  laws  against  her  after  that 
date. 

Jackson,  "Old  Hickory,"  the  "Hero  of  New 
Orleans,"  was  not  the  President  to  be  bluffed 
after  once  having  made  up  his  mind  as  to  his  proper 


148  Empire  and  Armament 

course.  He  had  declared  that  the  Union  must 
be  saved  and  he  now  proposed  to  save  it  without 
regard  to  what  action  he  had  taken  in  the  past. 
Proclaiming  in  December  his  intention  of  enforcing 
the  laws  of  the  United  States  in  spite  of  any  resist- 
ance that  might  be  offered,  he  despatched  a  naval 
force  under  Lieutenant  Farragut  to  Charleston 
Harbour,  and  ordered  General  Scott  to  mobilize  his 
troops  and  prepare  them  to  enter  South  Carolina 
at  his  command. 

It  was  in  the  Presidential  Proclamation  announc- 
ing his  intent  to  enforce  the  laws  of  the  United 
States  as  construed  by  him  that  Jackson  enun- 
ciated a  doctrine  even  more  important  to  American 
nationalism  than  that  of  Monroe.  Written  by 
Livingston,  Jackson's  doctrine  was  couched  in  the 
following  words: 

I  consider  the  power  to  annul  a  law  of  the  United 
States,  assumed  by  one  State,  incompatible  with  the 
existence  of  the  Union,  contradicted  expressly  by  the 
letter  of  the  Constitution,  unauthorized  by  its  spirit, 
inconsistent  with  every  principle  on  which  it  was 
founded,  and  destructive  of  the  great  object  for  which 
it  was  formed. 

Whatever  legal  justification  for  her  position 
South  Carolina  may  have  had,  and  the  author 
proposes  no  discussion  on  the  constitutional  points 
of  nullification  and  secession,  one  thing  is  certain: 
Jackson's  doctrine  was  that  the  Federal  military 


The  Jacksonian  Doctrine  149 

power  would  be  employed  to  execute  the  law  as 
construed  by  the  United  States  courts. 

If  Jackson's  doctrine  be  regarded  as  a  false  one, 
that  is,  as  one  opposed  to  the  constitutional  rights 
of  a  State,  then  Jefferson's  view  that  a  standing 
army  would  prove  dangerous  to  the  liberties  of 
the  people  had  been  justified,  and  the  prejudices 
of  the  people  against  a  standing  army  were  not 
misconceived.  On  the  other  hand,  if  Calhoun's 
doctrine  that  "government  is  protection,"  and 
that  a  government  which  failed  to  afford  protec- 
tion must  fail,  be  accepted  as  a  sound  one,  it  is 
necessary  to  view  "protection"  from  the  Federal 
standpoint  as  well  as  from  that  of  the  people  of  a 
single  State  and  their  sympathizers,  to  properly 
define  the  scope  of  governmental  protection. 
This  fact  Calhoun  himself  must  have  perceived, 
as  did  the  people  of  the  United  States  at  large, 
who  approved  the  resolute  attitude  of  Jackson. 
The  South  Carolinians  held  him  to  be  an  autocrat 
with  the  usual  instrument  of  tyranny  at  his  back 
— the  warnings  of  Jefferson  were  recalled  by  them 
all  too  late.  But  the  people  of  South  Carolina  were 
not  by  any  means  all  of  one  mind ;  there  were  ' '  Sub- 
missionists"  as  well  as  "Nullifiers,"  the  former 
called  "Unionists,"  the  latter  known  as  "Fire-eat- 
ers," though  all  were  States'  Rights  partisans. 
"We  can  die  for  our  rights,"  cried  the  Nullifiers, 
and  to  this  fiery  slogan  answered  the  Submissionists, 
"You  will  die  and  not  get  your  rights." 

In  the  meantime  Calhoun  had  been  counselling 


150  Empire  and  Armament 

restraint  for  he  saw  only  too  clearly  that,  right 
or  wrong,  the  attitude  of  South  Carolina  had  not 
struck  the  chord  of  national  sympathy,  and  that 
actual  resistance  to  Jackson  would  probably  ful- 
fil the  prediction  of  the  South  Carolina  "Union- 
ists," who  held  a  convention  at  Columbia  and 
determined  to  uphold  the  Federal  law. 

There  may  have  been  much  doubt  as  to  the 
course  South  Carolina  would  pursue,  but  with 
respect  to  Jackson's  determination  there  was  no 
division  of  opinion.  He  swore  he  would  make  the 
blue  cockades  of  the  Nullifiers  as  scarce  as  blue 
roses,  if  armed  resistance  to  the  Federal  Govern- 
ment were  actually  offered.  Fortunately  it  was 
not  necessary  for  him  to  attempt  to  make  good  his 
threat,  for  when  February  1st  came,  the  Nullifiers 
deferred  action  pending  a  consideration  in  Con- 
gress of  Clay's  compromise  tariff,  which  was  soon 
adopted,  not,  however,  before  a  bill  was  passed 
by  Congress  providing  for  the  enforcement,  if 
necessary,  of  the  old  law. 

Clay's  timely  action  saved  the  situation  and 
left  both  the  dignity  of  the  United  States  and  that 
of  South  Carolina  unimpaired — in  the  opinions 
of  the  partisans  in  the  controversy. 

Calhoun  loudly  proclaimed  that  South  Carolina's 
threat  had  brought  about  the  repeal  of  an  obnox- 
ious law,  and  that  his  doctrine  of  "government 
is  protection"  was  vindicated  by  the  success  of 
the  government  of  South  Carolina  in  protecting 
the  rights  of  the  people  of  that  State. 


The  Jacksonian  Doctrine  151 

In  the  presidential  election  of  1832  the  people 
of  the  United  States  ratified  Jackson's  doctrine 
that  the  Federal  Government  was  designed  to 
protect  the  Union  by  giving  him  an  electoral  vote 
of  219,  as  opposed  to  49  for  Clay,  and  1 1  for  Floyd; 
the  last  was  South  Carolina's  favourite  candidate. 
Clay  carried  Maryland,  Delaware,  Connecticut, 
Rhode  Island,  and  Massachusetts.  All  the  rest 
of  the  country,  including  half  of  New  England, 
went  for  Jackson. 

In  the  support  Clay  found  in  Massachusetts, 
Connecticut,  and  Rhode  Island,  it  is  not  difficult 
to  detect  a  lingering  devotion  to  the  principles  of 
the  Hartford  Convention,  and  to  those  adhered 
to  by  Massachusetts  in  her  own  attempt  at  nulli- 
fication, which  manifested  itself  negatively — that 
is  by  opposition  to  Jackson  through  the  support  of 
Clay. 

To  two  things  must  be  attributed  the  fact  that 
Jackson  was  enthusiastically  commended  by  the 
American  people  for  the  threat  of  employing  the 
Federal  military  power  against  a  State — his  per- 
sonality, and  the  rising  spirit  of  nationalism,  the 
two  being  interrelated.  Incipient  nationalism, 
or  the  provincial  Americanism  of  the  West,  pro- 
duced Jackson,  and  Jackson  diffused  the  very 
Americanism  of  which  he  was  the  product,  broad- 
cast over  the  land.  From  being  fearfully  regarded 
by  many  as  a  military  tyrant  threatening  to  usurp 
the  reins  of  government  and  establish  himself  as 
dictator  over  a  subjugated  people,  by  the  very 


152  Empire  and  Armament 

violence  of  his  course,  in  the  exercise  of  the  powers 
which  were  entrusted  to  him  with  such  misgivings, 
he  established  himself  in  less  than  eight  years  as 
"the  saviour  of  society,"  and  "champion  of  the 
people,"  and  the  most  popular  hero  in  America. 
Clay  and  Calhoun  might  seek  to  undermine  his 
power  and  destroy  the  confidence  of  the  people 
in  their  great  leader  by  bringing  down  on  him  the 
censure  of  the  Senate  for  certain  of  his  acts  they 
claimed  to  be  unconstitutional,  but  the  only 
result  was  to  be  the  charge  that  the  Senate  itself 
was  an  aristocratic  institution  and  one  that  should 
be  abolished!  With  the  people  Jackson  was 
secure.  They  no  longer  feared  that  his  military 
power  would  be  turned  against  them  in  his  own 
interest.  Indeed,  he  had  not  augmented  the 
army  by  a  single  soldier  during  his  entire  admin- 
istration. 

But  if  Jackson  had  given  the  country  an  inter- 
state or  intranational  doctrine,  he  was  now  to 
give  them  a  new  international  doctrine  more 
important  in  fusing  the  people  into  a  nation  than 
any  influence  in  the  antecedent  history  of  the 
United  States. 

Washington  had  wisely  counselled  strict  neu- 
trality, but  he  had  gone  so  far  in  restraining  the 
country  at  a  time  when  it  was  really  incapable  of 
resenting  foreign  affronts  without  serious  conse- 
quences that  he  had  actually  brought  the  harshest 
condemnation  upon  himself.  Jefferson  had  al- 
lowed our  commerce  to  be  almost  wiped  off  the 


The  Jacksonian  Doctrine  153 

seas  while  he  was  preaching  his  pacifist  theories 
and  characterizing  the  resentment  of  those  who 
wanted  war  as  Quixotic.  Clay,  Calhoun,  Web- 
ster, Lowndes,  and  Cheves  had  lashed  Congress 
into  declaring  war  when  the  national  self-respect 
was  all  but  gone.  The  national  honour  vindicated, 
Monroe  had  sought  to  guard  against  future  wars 
by  a  frank  threat  of  resistance  to  any  future  ag- 
gressions. But  it  remained  for  Jackson  to  exhibit 
to  the  world  the  determination  on  the  part  of  the 
United  States,  not  merely  to  resist  aggressions, 
but  to  insist  upon  its  rights.  The  day  that  Jack- 
son proclaimed  the  doctrine  that  the  United 
States  would  forcibly  demand  every  mark  of 
respect  rightfully  belonging  to  a  sovereign  state, 
that  day  and  not  until  then  did  the  United  States 
take  its  place  in  the  hegemony  of  nations.  Then 
it  was,  and  not  before  then,  that  Europe  learned 
of  the  birth  of  a  new  world  power. 

Jackson's  conviction  concerning  the  self-respect 
of  his  country  was  early  announced  by  him,  as  we 
have  seen,  when  he  refused  with  but  a  few  others 
to  join  in  commending  Washington's  administra- 
tion. His  ideal  of  national  self-respect  was  the 
same  one  he  cherished  for  the  individual  man — 
it  cannot  be  retained  if  allowed  to  be  trampled 
underfoot  with  impunity — and  when  he  came  into 
power  he  only  bided  his  time  until  he  might  give 
his  people  an  example  of  his  conception  of  true 
national  manhood.  His  standard  may  have  been 
tinged  with  the  influence  of  the  West,  where  the 


154  Empire  and  Armament 

strength  of  the  good  right  arm  was  too  often 
mistaken  for  real  character,  but  the  rule  of  the 
frontier,  where  the  man  himself  and  not  his  name, 
or  his  fame,  or  his  wealth,  is  weighed  in  the  balance, 
was  a  good  one  for  a  nation  to  observe  in  dealing 
with  other  powers  all  too  prone  to  govern  their 
conduct  in  accordance  with  the  principle  that 
might  makes  right. 

Accordingly,  when  in  1833  a  draft  for  the  pay- 
ment of  the  first  installment  of  the  damages  fixed 
in  the  treaty  of  1831  between  the  United  States 
and  France,  providing  for  the  reimbursement  of 
the  United  States  for  the  spoliation  of  its  commerce 
prior  to  1815,  was  returned  unpaid  by  the  French 
minister  of  finance,  Jackson  was  presented  with 
the  opportunity  he  had  been  waiting  for.  The 
treaty  of  payment,  after  long  and  patient  negotia- 
tions, had  been  consummated  in  his  first  adminis- 
tration. The  claims  of  every  country  except  the 
United  States  had  been  fully  satisfied  by  France. 
Louis  Philippe  had  brought  the  matter  of  the  pay- 
ment before  the  Chambers,  and  no  appropriation 
had  been  forthcoming.  Jackson  saw  nothing  to 
be  gained  by  further  parleying.  Accordingly, 
in  his  annual  message  of  1834,  he  recommended 
to  Congress  that  a  law  be  passed  authorizing  the 
capture  of  enough  French  vessels  out  of  which  to 
make  good  the  French  debt.  France  was  en- 
raged; she  threatened  war  unless  Jackson  should 
apologize  at  once,  but  apologizing  was  not  Jack- 
son's habit,   and  while  he  had  no  intention  of 


The  Jacksonian  Doctrine  155 

making  a  retraction,  he  did  intend  to  collect  the 
just  claim  in  his  hands  if  the  use  of  force  were 
necessary  to  do  it. 

While  no  effort  was  made  to  increase  the  stand- 
ing army  at  this  time,  bills  were  introduced  in 
Congress  providing  appropriations  aggregating 
four  and  a  half  million  dollars  for  the  fortifications 
on  the  Atlantic  seaboard. 

Upon  the  advice  of  Great  Britain,  in  which 
country  Jackson  was  better  understood,  perhaps, 
than  in  France,  the  debt  was  paid  amid  hurrahs 
in  America  for  "Old  Hickory."  The  hour  had 
struck  which  seemed  to  mark  the  passage  of  the 
time  when  potentate,  men,  or  any  power  could 
trifle  with  the  United  States — that  country  whose 
people  Andrew  Jackson  had  transformed  into  the 
American  Nation  by  giving  them,  first,  the  intra- 
national doctrine,  "Our  Federal  Union:  it  must 
be  preserved!"  and  second,  the  international  doc- 
trine, "The  United  States  demands  the  rights  of 
Sovereignty." 


CHAPTER  XII 

THE  POLK  DOCTRINE  OF  IMPERIALISM 

IT  is  paradoxical  but  true,  we  are  told,  that  the 
very  accentuation  of  nationalism  may  lead, 
and  if  carried  out  to  its  ultimate  conclusions  must 
inevitably  lead,  to  a  revival  of  the  idea  of  imperi- 
alism. History  shows  that  when  once  committed 
to  nationalism  it  is  difficult  to  restrain  a  people 
from  carrying  their  state  beyond  the  stage  of 
development  where  internal  solidarity  alone  is 
assured.  That  very  unity  of  purpose  in  the 
national  mind,  when  once  established,  places  at 
the  disposal  of  the  more  aggressive  leaders  a  force 
which  soon  proves  uncontrollable  and  which  is 
apt  to  burst  through  the  artificial  limitations  of 
national  boundaries  along  the  lines  of  least  re- 
sistance. Where  no  real  resistance  exists,  or 
where  it  is  slight,  this  force  is  invariably  directed, 
the  plea  being  that  national  solidarity  requires 
the  extension  of  old  bounds  up  to  and  against  the 
proximate  forces  which  for  lack  of  resistance 
themselves  might  lead  to  encroachments  upon  the 
state  initiating  the  defensive  expansion.  And  so 
it  goes,  the  line  of  demarkation  between  aggressive 

156 


The  Polk  Doctrine  of  Imperialism  157 

nationalism  and  imperialism  only  being  perceptible 
in  the  retrospect. 

It  is  often  asserted  that  Jefferson  initiated  the 
imperialistic  movement  in  the  United  States.  Per- 
haps so,  but  the  author  rather  chooses  to  consider 
him  as  one  who  remained  within  the  bounds  of 
legitimate  nationalism,  though  he  undoubtedly  did 
much  to  generate  the  force  which  has  expanded 
the  state  beyond  those  lines  along  which  resistant 
forces  opposed  themselves.  The  acquisition  of 
Louisiana  and  Florida  undoubtedly  marked  the 
beginning  of  our  expansion,  and  along  with  other 
forces  generated  the  heat  that  has  resulted  in 
the  greater  expansion  which  we  are  now  able  to 
see  carried  the  state  bounds  over  the  legitimate 
lines  of  nationalism  into  the  field  of  imperialism. 

But  granting  that  Jefferson  and  Monroe  initi- 
ated the  imperialistic  movement,  it  remained  for 
others  to  give  it  that  formality  which  entitles  it 
to  its  name,  and  in  the  record  of  their  careers 
we  shall  trace  the  development  of  imperialism 
from  a  mere  national  impulse  to  an  all-compelling, 
overpowering  international  force. 

So  commanding  was  Jackson's  influence  with 
the  people  of  the  United  States,  notwithstanding 
the  political  assaults  upon  his  record  by  Calhoun, 
Clay,  and  the  entire  Whig  party,  that  he  was  able 
to  name  Van  Buren,  his  Secretary  of  State,  as 
his  successor. 

Van  Buren's  term  was  mainly  one  of  domestic 
interest.     He  firmly  adhered  to  the  Washington- 


158  Empire  and  Armament 

ian  doctrine  of  strict  neutrality  in  connection 
with  the  Canadian  insurrection  in  1837,  and 
actually  employed  the  military  to  suppress  viola- 
tions of  the  neutrality  laws  by  United  States  citi- 
zens, a  number  of  whom  were  active  in  helping 
fit  out  in  United  States  territory  an  insurrection- 
ary expedition.  Van  Buren  suffered  much  in 
popularity,  especially  in  his  own  State,  as  a  result 
of  his  stringent  efforts  to  maintain  neutrality  in 
fact  as  well  as  in  theory,  and  the  necessity  of  such 
action  on  his  part  only  illustrates  the  growing 
tendency  of  Americans  to  depart  from  the  old 
ideals  of  non-interference  in  foreign  affairs.  It 
was  estimated  that  not  less  than  200,000  American 
citizens,  banded  together  under  the  name  of 
"Canadian  patriots,"  had  planned  to  enter  and 
annex  Canada  to  the  United  States. 

Jackson's  readiness  to  demand  the  national 
rights,  and  his  success  in  doing  so,  by  arousing  a 
keen  sense  of  the  national  strength,  had  done  much 
to  engender  a  spirit  of  Jingoism  not  only  highly 
intolerant  of  foreign  interference  in  the  affairs  of 
the  United  States,  but  conducive  of  arrogant 
intermeddling  in  all  foreign  affairs  in  North  and 
South  America  with  slight  regard  for  the  rights  of 
others.  In  the  latter  respect  Jingoism  was  as  much 
to  be  deplored  as  it  was  fruitful  of  national  solidar- 
ity in  the  other.  Thus  not  only  in  the  Canadian 
case  did  popular  sentiment  seem  to  countenance 
intermeddling  in  the  American  affairs  of  Great 
Britain,  but   a  demand  was   soon   heard  on  all 


The  Polk  Doctrine  of  Imperialism  159 

sides  for  the  annexation  of  the  republic  of  Texas, 
which  had  declared  its  independence  of  Mexico, 
and  which,  in  1837,  had  made  proposals  looking 
to  its  annexation  to  the  United  States.  Believing 
that  annexation  would  result  in  a  war  with  Mexico, 
Van  Buren  discouraged  the  Texans  in  every  way 
possible,  but  the  people  of  the  United  States,  cer- 
tainly a  large  portion  of  them,  were  entirely  indif- 
ferent as  to  the  result — they  wanted  Texas  and 
were  willing  to  accept  war  along  with  annexation. 
Jingoism  was  rampant,  and  its  very  worst  features 
were  exhibited  in  that  frame  of  mind  to  which  it 
had  brought  the  country,  that  is  a  mental  attitude 
of  careless  indifference  to  the  consequences  of  war. 

Within  the  space  of  a  few  years  the  American 
people  had  taken  an  important  part  in  an  in- 
surrection of  Canadian  subjects  against  Great 
Britain,  in  a  revolution  of  Spanish  subjects  at 
Baton  Rouge,  a  former  Vice-President  had  fo- 
mented, in  conjunction  with  British  and  Spanish 
officials,  a  conspiracy  against  the  sovereignty  of 
Mexico,  an  American  army  had  invaded  Spanish 
territory  and  seized  Spanish  cities,  President 
Jefferson  had  actually  threatened  Napoleon  him- 
self with  war,  and  the  annexation  of  the  Mexican 
territory  of  Texas,  forcibly  if  necessary,  had  been 
widely  advocated.  Europe  had  been  warned, 
however,  by  Monroe  that  no  intermeddling  in 
American  affairs  would  be  tolerated.  Such  was 
the  inconsistent  record  of  the  peaceable  Republic 
of  the  United  States ! 


160  Empire  and  Armament 

The  people  of  the  United  States  really  believed 
that  they  were  of  a  peaceable  disposition  and 
plumed  themselves  upon  their  humanitarian  ideals. 
The  ambitions  of  monarchs  might  have  convulsed 
Europe  in  war,  but  the  American  people,  devoted 
to  peace,  had  only  resorted  to  force  when  tbe 
aggressions  of  the  Barbary  States  and  Great 
Britain  compelled  it  in  self-defence.  Thus  they 
reasoned  and  were  well  content. 

During  Van  Buren's  administration,  much  to 
the  regret  of  all,  the  Indian  troubles  of  Florida  had 
necessitated  the  increase  of  the  army  little  by 
little,  until,  in  1838,  it  numbered  12,577  men>  but 
of  course  such  a  small  force  was  easily  controlled, 
and  besides,  necessity  had  saddled  it  upon  the 
country. 

The  Canadian  difficulties  in  one  section  had 
hardly  been  settled  when  a  fresh  altercation  broke 
out  along  the  Maine  border.  The  old  dispute 
had  never  been  entirely  ended  and  now  flared  up 
with  added  heat.  The  British  and  American 
people  were  both  passionate  in  demanding  war, 
and  to  meet  the  situation  Congress  in  March,  1839, 
directed  the  President  to  resist  British  encroach- 
ments and  empowered  him  to  call  on  the  States 
for  such  a  force  of  militia  as  circumstances  might 
require.  At  this  time  nine  of  the  thirteen  regular 
regiments,  including  all  the  artillery,  were  in 
Florida,  and  the  rest  distributed  along  the  fron- 
tier. To  make  the  militia  more  efficient  it  was 
designed  by  the  War  Department  to  concentrate 


The  Polk  Doctrine  of  Imperialism  161 

State  troops  at  various  points,  for  purposes  of 
training,  without  regard  to  State  territory.  The 
plan  produced  a  storm  of  protest,  and  even  Daniel 
Webster  in  his  famous  Bunker  Hill  speech  of 
September  10,  1840,  vigorously  assailed  it  as  an 
unconstitutional  measure.     Said  Webster: 

We  protest  against  the  plan  of  the  Administration 
respecting  the  training  and  disciplining  of  the  militia. 
The  President  now  admits  it  to  be  unconstitutional; 
and  it  is  plainly  so,  on  the  face  of  it,  for  the  training 
of  the  militia  is  by  the  Constitution  expressly  reserved 
to  the  States.  If  it  were  not  unconstitutional,  it 
would  yet  be  unnecessary,  burdensome,  entailing 
enormous  expenses,  and  placing  dangerous  power  in 
executive  hands.  It  belongs  to  the  prolific  family 
of  executive  projects,  and  it  is  a  consolation  to  find 
that  at  least  one  of  its  projects  has  been  so  scorched 
by  public  rebuke  and  reprobation,  that  no  man  raises 
his  hand  or  opens  his  mouth  in  its  favour. 

And  in  Richmond,  on  the  5th  of  October,  he 
delivered  an  address  in  which  he  said: 

The  terms  used  are  the  most  precise  and  particular : 
"Congress  may  provide  for  calling  out  the  militia 
to  execute  the  laws,  to  suppress  insurrection,  and  to 
repel  invasion."  These  three  cases  are  specified,  and 
these  are  all.  .  .  .  March  the  militia  of  Virginia  to 
Wheeling  to  be  drilled!  Why  such  a  thing  never 
entered  into  the  head  of  any  man,  never,  never.  .  .  . 
It  adds  a  negative  in  those  golden  words  reserving 
to  the  States  the  appointment  of  officers  and  the 
training  of  the  militia.     That's  it.     Read  this  clause, 


162  Empire  and  Armament 

and  then  read  Mr.  Poinsett's  project  that  the  militia 
are  to  be  trained  by  the  President ! 

Poinsett's  wise  plan  met  with  such  little  favour 
that  it  was  abandoned.  It  is  mentioned  here 
simply  to  indicate  the  beginning  of  a  struggle  on 
the  part  of  the  Federal  Government  to  get  control 
of  the  militia  that  continues  to  the  present  day 
and  which  must  ultimately  succeed  if  the  State 
troops  are  to  be  of  any  real  value  to  the  country 
in  time  of  serious  need. 

The  Doctrine  of  Federal  Coercion,  asserted  by 
Jackson,  had  not  only  estranged  Clay  and  Calhoun 
from  the  Democratic  party,  but  as  time  passed  and 
their  influence  made  itself  felt  more  and  more  in 
the  South,  the  feeling  against  coercion  intensified 
and  extended.  Neither  Clay  nor  Calhoun  pos- 
sessed the  strength  to  obtain  the  Presidency, 
but  Clay  was  strong  enough  to  dictate  a  candidate 
to  defeat  Van  Buren  for  re-election.  As  a  Demo- 
crat Van  Buren  represented  the  Jacksonian  Doc- 
trine of  Federal  Coercion,  which  lost  him  the  vote 
of  the  South,  and  as  a  President  unwilling  to 
plunge  the  country  into  war  with  England  on  every 
pretext,  he  antagonized  the  Jingoes  of  the  North. 
Clay  perceived  the  opportunity  he  had  to  con- 
solidate the  Jingo  opposition  with  that  of  the 
South,  and  shrewdly  brought  about  the  strange 
combination  of  two  elements,  one  deprecating 
the  use  of  too  much  force,  the  other  demanding 
that  more  be  used,  by  nominating  General  William 


The  Polk  Doctrine  of  Imperialism  T63 

Henry  Harrison.  The  South  knew  that  Harrison's 
election  would  be  a  virtual  victory  for  Clay  who 
would  be  the  real  power  behind  the  throne.  The 
West  largely  supported  Harrison  because  he  was 
its  own  rough  and  ready  son.  The  Jingoes  only 
knew  that  he  was  a  soldier  who  had  won  great 
repute  in  the  War  of  18 12,  and  they  wanted  above 
all  things  a  soldier  President — such  another  as 
Jackson.  They  desired  to  capitalize  the  very 
qualities  of  the  soldier  which  are  responsible  for 
the  prejudices  ordinarily  existing  against  him. 
In  the  popular  mind  it  is  too  often  assumed  that 
all  soldiers  are  inherent  autocrats,  incapable  of 
exercising  their  power  except  for  arbitrary  ends; 
it  erroneously  concludes  that,  between  the  rapid 
decision  of  the  soldier  and  his  determination  in 
enforcing  his  will,  there  exists  some  essential  rela- 
tion to  a  predisposition  lending  itself  to  radical 
views  and  conduct.  The  mental  process  by  which 
the  man  uninitiated  into  military  affairs  by  educa- 
tion or  training  arrives  at  such  beliefs  is  not  as 
strange  as  it  appears  to  be  to  military  men  in 
general,  who  overlook  the  fact  that  tyrants  have 
invariably  set  themselves  up  and  maintained  their 
sway  by  the  employment  of  military  force,  and 
that  only  the  tyrants,  and  not  those  who  have 
exercised  great  military  power  to  the  sole  advan- 
tage of  the  people,  are  ordinarily  recalled  to  the 
popular  mind.  They  fail  to  understand  that  men 
like  Washington  and  Jackson,  who  exercised 
almost  dictatorial  military  power,  soon  lose  their 


164  Empire  and  Armament 

features  as  military  dictators  because  of  the  fact 
that  their  power  was  not  arbitrarily  employed 
against  the  people;  in  other  words,  that  when  a 
military  leader  employs  his  power  to  the  advantage 
of  his  country  he  is  known  to  posterity  as  a  states- 
man or  as  a  wise  ruler,  and  that  when  he  uses  it 
to  the  end  of  self-aggrandizement  he  is  known  in 
history  as  an  ambitious,  designing,  tyrannical 
soldier.  The  result  is  that  time  tends  to  hide 
the  patience,  the  loyalty,  the  devotion,  the  faith- 
fulness, and  the  self-sacrifice  of  military  men  as  a 
class,  and  to  throw  into  relief  the  vicious  nature 
of  a  few  as  the  typical  characteristic  of  all  soldiers. 

But  if  the  American  people  had  drawn  unwar- 
ranted conclusions  as  to  Jackson,  the  Jingoes  were 
destined  to  do  the  same  in  the  case  of  Harrison. 
He  was  a  soldier,  but  was  also  a  rational  man,  and 
there  was  nothing  arbitrary  or  ultra-radical  about 
his  nature. 

Harrison  wanted  Clay  to  become  his  Secretary 
of  State,  but  for  political  reasons  Clay  preferred 
to  remain  independent,  and  Webster  accepted  the 
portfolio  of  foreign  affairs,  retaining  it  after  the 
death  of  Harrison  and  the  succession  of  Tyler. 

Tyler  and  Webster  together  solved  the  difficul- 
ties of  the  Maine-Canada  boundary  dispute  with 
England,  which,  due  to  the  passions  of  the  people, 
seriously  threatened  war.  Jingoism  was  again 
rampant;  the  Senate  was  hostile  to  Tyler,  and  it 
was  not  due  to  any  desire  or  effort  on  the  part  of 
the  American  people  as  a  whole  that  war  was 


The  Polk  Doctrine  of  Imperialism  165 

averted.  Indeed,  their  insistance  upon  war  seri- 
ously embarrassed  Webster. 

In  1843,  Webster  retired  from  office  and  Cal- 
houn became  Tyler's  Secretary  of  State.  That 
Jackson  had  not  failed  to  establish  the  right  of  the 
Federal  Government  to  employ  Federal  troops 
in  suppressing  internal  disorders  was  evidenced 
by  the  use  of  such  troops  during  Tyler's  Adminis- 
tration to  put  down  Dorr's  Rebellion  in  Rhode 
Island.  Thus  we  see  that  the  principle  of  coer- 
cion was  adopted  by  the  Whigs. 

As  early  as  1 836  Calhoun  had  declared  in  favour 
of  the  annexation  of  Texas,  and  the  project  was 
revived  upon  his  becoming  Secretary  of  State. 
Learning  of  the  movement  on  foot,  Mexico  noti- 
fied the  United  States  that  annexation  would  be 
regarded  as  a  cause  of  war. 

Calhoun  was  a  strong  advocate  of  annexation. 
One  reason,  among  others,  why  he  desired  annexa- 
tion may  have  been  suggested  in  a  speech  he  made 
in  the  Senate  on  the  "Three  Million  Bill,"  provid- 
ing funds  for  the  prosecution  of  the  Mexican  War, 
in  February,  1847.  On  that  occasion,  in  referring 
to  the  country's  need  of  more  territory,  he  said: 

What  we  want  is  space  for  our  growing  population 
— and  what  we  ought  to  avoid  is  the  addition  of  other 
population  of  a  character  not  suited  to  our  institu- 
tions. We  want  room  to  grow.  We  are  increasing 
at  the  rate  of  600,000  annually,  and  in  a  short  time 
the  increase  will  be  at  the  rate  of  1,000,000.  To  state 
it  more  strongly — we  double  once  in  twenty-three 


166  Empire  and  Armament 

years ;  so  that  at  the  end  of  that  period  we  will  number 
forty  millions,  and  in  another  twenty-three  years, 
eighty  millions,  if  no  disaster  befalls  us.  For  this 
rapidly  growing  population  all  the  territory  we  now 
possess,  and  even  that  which  we  might  acquire,  would 
in  the  course  of  a  few  generations  be  needed.  It  is 
better  for  our  people  and  institutions,  that  our  popu- 
lation should  not  be  too  much  compressed. 

But  it  must  not  be  assumed  that  Calhoun  had 
any  imperialistic  designs  upon  Mexico.  On  the 
contrary,  in  the  speech  already  quoted  from,  he 
delivered  an  opinion  on  what  our  relations  to 
Mexico  should  be  that  might  be  pondered  with 
advantage  today.     His  counsel  was  as  follows : 

When  I  said  there  was  a  mysterious  connection 
between  the  fate  of  our  country  and  that  of  Mexico, 
I  had  reference  to  the  great  fact  that  we  stood  in  such 
relation  to  her  that  we  could  make  no  disposition  of 
Mexico,  as  a  subject  or  conquered  nation,  that  would 
not  prove  disastrous  to  us;  nor  could  we  conquer  and 
subdue  her  without  great  sacrifice  and  injurious 
effects  to  our  institutions. 

Hence  my  opinion,  already  expressed,  that  it  is 
our  true  policy  not  to  weaken  or  humble  her,  but  to 
desire  to  see  her  under  a  safe  and  stable  government, 
and  capable  of  sustaining  all  the  relations  which 
ought  to  exist  between  independent  nations. 

Clay,  Benton,  and  Webster  succeeded  in  de- 
feating the  treaty  of  annexation  when  first  brought 
before    the    Senate,    notwithstanding    Calhoun's 


The  Polk  Doctrine  of  Imperialism  167 

advocacy  of  the  measure.  Their  successful  oppo- 
sition, however,  at  this  time  only  postponed  the 
consummation  of  the  plan.  Polk,  who  was  nomi- 
nated to  succeed  Tyler  on  a  platform  of  expansion 
which  contemplated  the  annexation  of  Texas  and 
Oregon,  was  elected  in  1844.  In  December,  1845, 
the  independent  Republic  of  Texas  was  annexed, 
and  in  1846  war  was  declared  upon  Mexico. 

Polk  brought  the  Mexican  War  to  a  successful 
close  in  1848.  The  fruits  of  that  war  were  an 
agreement  on  the  part  of  Mexico  relinquishing 
all  claims  to  all  her  former  territory  north  of  the 
Rio  Grande,  and  the  cession  by  Mexico  to  the 
United  States  of  New  Mexico  and  Upper  California. 

The  empire  that  the  United  States  gained  by 
the  war  embraced  the  present  territory  of  Texas, 
California,  Nevada,  and  Utah,  with  parts  of  New 
Mexico,  Arizona,  Colorado,  and  Wyoming. 

Again  it  must  not  be  assumed  that  because  the 
spirit  of  nationalism  had  seized  upon  the  American 
people,  that  because  the  Jingo  had  made  them 
more  aggressive,  they  were  less  prejudiced  against 
permanent  military  institutions  in  1846  than  they 
had  been  three  quarters  of  a  century  before. 

Our  public  men  were  deep  students  of  Tocque- 
ville,  whose  celebrated  work,  Democracy  in  Amer- 
ica, written  in  1835,  had  become  the  national 
political  primer.  Tocqueville  had  done  much 
to  lull  them  into  a  false  sense  of  security.  "The 
great  advantage  of  the  United  States,"  he  wrote, 
' '  does  not  consist  in  a  Federal  Constitution  which 


i68  Empire  and  Armament 

allows  them  to  carry  on  great  wars,  but  in  a  geo- 
graphical position  which  renders  such  enterprises 
improbable."  And,  adds  Tocqueville:  "After 
all,  and  in  spite  of  all  precautions,  a  large  army 
and  a  democratic  people  will  always  be  a  source 
of  great  danger;  the  most  effectual  means  of  di- 
minishing that  danger  would  be  to  reduce  the 
army.  .  .  ." 

Statistics  would  seem  to  indicate  that  our 
Government  had  weaned  itself  from  such  fallacies, 
for  they  show  that  31 ,024  regular  troops  and  73,532 
volunteers  were  employed  during  the  Mexican 
War.  These  features  alone  would  indicate  that  our 
military  policy  had  improved  in  as  much  as  United 
States  volunteers  instead  of  militia  were  employed, 
and  in  as  much  as  the  regular  army  bore  a  higher 
proportion  to  the  raw  troops  than  in  any  previous 
war.  The  facts  are,  however,  that  the  first  battles 
were  fought  with  but  2000  regulars,  and  that 
General  Scott  was  forced  to  enter  the  Mexican 
capital  with  but  6000  men.  The  largest  number 
vScott  ever  had  before  that  event  was  13,500.  Had 
adequate  measures  been  taken  to  provide  him  at 
first  with  the  great  army  finally  raised,  the  war 
would  have  been  shorter  and  far  less  costly  in 
men  and  money.  But  notwithstanding  its  un- 
necessary prolongation  and  the  stupidity  with 
which  it  was  conducted,  the  Mexican  War  did  in 
one  respect  mark  a  great  revolution  in  American 
military  policy,  for  it  witnessed  the  complete 
decay  of  the  old  militia  system.     No  longer  was 


The  Polk  Doctrine  of  Imperialism  169 

the  militia  to  be  regarded  as  the  "great  bulwark 
of  national  defence." 

But  the  lesson  was  only  partly  learned  for 
President  Polk  himself  in  lauding  the  expedient 
of  employing  volunteers,  admitted  his  failure  to 
perceive  the  utterly  absurd  extravagance  of  the 
system,  however  superior  it  may  have  been  to  the 
old  one.  In  his  message  to  Congress,  December, 
1846,  he  stated: 

Well  may  the  American  people  be  proud  of  the 
energy  and  gallantry  of  our  regular  and  volunteer 
officers  and  soldiers.  The  events  of  these  few  months 
afford  a  gratifying  proof  that  our  country  can,  under 
any  emergency,  confidently  rely  for  the  maintenance 
of  her  honour  and  the  defence  of  her  rights  on  an 
effective  force  ready  at  all  times  voluntarily  to  relin- 
quish the  comforts  of  home  for  the  perils  and 
privations  of  the  camp.  And  though  such  a  force 
may  be  for  the  time  expensive,  it  is  in  the  end  eco- 
nomical, as  the  ability  to  command  it  removes  the  ne- 
cessity of  employing  a  large  standing  army  in  time 
of  peace  and  proves  that  our  people  love  their  institu- 
tions and  are  ever  ready  to  defend  and  protect  them. 

It  can  hardly  be  denied  that  President  Polk 
anticipated  war  with  Mexico  by  at  least  two  years. 
Mexico  had  since  1 837  threatened  war  in  the  event 
Texas  were  annexed,  and  in  1844,  the  very  plat- 
form on  which  Polk  was  elected  demanded  an- 
nexation. For  him,  then,  in  1846  to  speak  of  the 
economy  of  employing  over  73,000  volunteers  and 
31,000  regulars  against  the  36,000  troops  of  the 


170  Empire  and  Armament 

enemy,  when  the  regular  army  alone  if  increased 
to  30,000  in  time,  would  have  sufficed,  was  nothing 
short  of  criminal  stupidity. 

That  others  beside  Polk  were  obsessed  with  such 
ignorance  is  manifest  from  the  speech  of  Webster, 
at  this  same  time  (December,  1846),  in  which  he 
said,  in  part: 

I  might  go  further,  and  say  that  at  Bunker  Hill 
the  newly  raised  levies  and  recruits  sheltered  them- 
selves behind  some  temporary  defences,  but  at  Mon- 
terey the  volunteers  assailed  a  fortified  city.  At 
any  rate,  Gentlemen,  whatever  we  may  think  of  the 
origin  of  the  contest  which  called  them  there,  it  is 
gratifying  to  see  to  what  extent  the  military  power 
of  the  Union  may  be  depended  on,  whenever  the 
exigencies  of  the  country  may  require  it.  It  is  grati- 
fying to  know  that,  without  the  expense  or  the  danger 
of  large  standing  armies,  there  is  enough  military 
spirit,  enough  intelligence,  enough  perseverance,  and 
patience,  and  submission  to  discipline,  amongst  the 
young  men  of  the  country  to  uphold  our  stars  and 
stripes  whenever  the  Government  may  order  them  to 
be  unfurled. 

The  views  expressed  by  Polk  and  Webster,  were 
not  only  generally  entertained  in  1846,  but  in 
1866,  and  they  are  widely  adhered  to  at  the  present 
time.  John  Randolph  Tucker,  an  eminent  com- 
mentator on  the  Constitution,  writing  well  after 
the  war  between  the  States,  in  enumerating  the 
agencies  which  lend  themselves  to  despotism, 
says: 


The  Polk  Doctrine  of  Imperialism  171 

Another  and  more  fearful  instrument  of  despotism 
is  a  standing  armed  force,  which,  organized  to  and 
habituated  to  the  discipline  of  obedience  to  author- 
ity, are  the  reliable  defenders  of  power  against  the 
unorganized  forces  of  rebellion. 

In  this  unqualified  expression  Mr.  Tucker  at- 
tempts no  distinction  between  a  permanent  force 
of  trained  citizens  and  a  permanent  force  of  mer- 
cenaries, and  he  has  done  more  harm  than  good, 
for  it  is  certainly  in  the  unqualified  sense  that  his 
remark  will  be  accepted  by  the  people  whose 
prejudices  time  and  experience  have  done  so  little 
to  remove. 

Story,  Curtis,  Burgess,  and  other  commentators 
on  the  Constitution,  admitting  the  necessity  of 
a  Federal  military  force,  have  sought  to  teach 
the  American  people  that  such  a  force  is  indispens- 
able to  their  own  protection  and  that  of  the  Govern- 
ment. Their  works  have  done  much  to  obliterate 
among  the  educated  the  prejudices  engendered 
by  Jefferson,  De  Tocqueville,  and  other  writers  of 
authority,  and  to  show  them  that  such  a  standing 
army  as  may  be  maintained  under  our  Constitu- 
tion is  necessarily  bereft  of  the  vicious  features 
of  ancient  mercenary  forces  which  were  indeed 
"instruments  of  tyranny."  But  the  old  prejudice 
continues  to  find  expression  in  the  highest  counsels. 
Mr.  Bryan,  the  late  Secretary  of  State,  exerts 
himself  on  every  possible  occasion  to  foment  it. 
It  was  but  recently  that  Senator  Teller  said  in  the 
Senate:  "The  fighting  force  of  a  republic  is  the 


172  Empire  and  Armament 

great  body  of  the  people,  and  not  a  paid  soldiery- 
called  regulars.  You  must  rely  upon  the  people 
and  not  upon  an  army.  An  army  is  a  vain  delu- 
sion. It  may  today  be  for  you;  it  may  be  against 
you  tomorrow."  Thus  do  such  statesmen  of 
mediaeval  thought  mislead  their  people. 

The  national  policy  represented  by  Polk  may 
justly  be  deemed  imperialistic  in  as  much  as  it 
had  in  view  the  addition  of,  and  actually  did 
succeed  in  leading  to  the  acquisition  of,  so  vast  an 
empire  at  the  expense  of  a  foreign  Power.  Polk 
not  only  totally  disregarded  the  Washingtonian 
doctrine  of  strict  neutrality,  but  he  went  even 
beyond  the  Hamiltonian  conception  of  mere 
trade  expansion,  and  the  Clay-Calhoun  doctrine 
that  government  is  protection,  and  that  a  State 
is  not  limited  to  defensive  measures  to  preserve 
its  rights.  In  vain  did  Calhoun  seek  to  stem  the 
tide  of  imperialism.  Declaring  that  he  had  op- 
posed the  war,  which  his  own  determination  to 
annex  Texas  had  brought  about,  first  on  the  ground 
that  it  was  easily  avoidable,  second  on  the  ground 
that  the  President  had  exceeded  his  authority  in 
ordering  troops  into  the  disputed  territory,  and 
third  on  the  ground  of  policy,  in  1848  he  cried 
out  against  its  continuance.     Said  he : 

But  now  other  topics  occupy  the  attention  of  Con- 
gress and  of  the  country — military  glory,  extension 
of  the  Empire,  and  the  aggrandizement  of  the  country. 
To  what  is  this  great  change  to  be  attributed?  Is  it 
because  there  has  been  a  decay  of  the  spirit  of  liberty 


The  Polk  Doctrine  of  Imperialism  173 

among  the  people?  I  think  not.  I  believe  that  it 
was  never  more  ardent.  The  true  cause  is,  that  we 
have  ceased  to  remember  the  tenure  by  which  liberty 
alone  can  be  preserved.  We  have  had  so  many  years 
of  prosperity — passed  through  so  many  difficulties 
and  dangers  without  the  loss  of  liberty — that  we  begin 
to  think  that  we  hold  it  by  right  divine  from  heaven 
itself.  Under  this  impression,  without  thinking  or 
reflecting,  we  plunge  into  war,  contract  heavy  debts, 
increase  vastly  the  patronage  of  the  Executive,  and 
indulge  in  every  species  of  extravagance,  without 
thinking  that  we  expose  our  liberty  to  hazard.  It  is 
a  great  and  fatal  mistake.  The  day  of  retribution 
will  come;  and  when  it  does,  awful  will  be  the  reckon- 
ing, and  heavy  the  responsibility  somewhere. 

And  again  the  same  year,  when  hostilities  had 
just  ceased,  Calhoun  said: 

I  hope  we  shall  never  take,  by  an  aggressive  war, 
one  foot  of  territory  by  conquest.  We  pay  by  the 
treaty  the  full  value — more  than  the  full  value — a 
hundred  times  more  than  the  full  value,  as  far  as 
Mexico  is  concerned;  for  it  is  worse  than  useless  to 
her,  and  I  rejoice  it  is  so.  I  wish  to  square  accounts 
liberally  and  justly  with  Mexico,  and  we  have  done 
so,  and  hence  my  desire  that  Mexico  shall  ratify  this 
treaty  and  receive  this  money. 

Were  the  foregoing  remarks  intended  for  pure 
sarcasm?  Whether  so  or  not,  Calhoun  had  been 
too  late  in  his  protests  against  war  and  his  pro- 
testations of  regret.  It  was  beyond  his  power,  in 
1848,  by  such  methods,  as  it  was  on  the  part  of 


174  Empire  and  Armament 

the  Government  by  the  payment  of  money,  to 
destroy  the  spirit  and  correct  the  evils  of  the  grow- 
ing imperialism.  For  them  he  was  largely  respon- 
sible, and  his  attitude  was  typical  of  others  who 
loudly  deplore  war  while  their  double  dealings 
with  peace  induce  it.  And  so  in  Calhoun,  the 
self-professed  lover  of  peace,  we  find  much  guilt 
of  war,  just  as  we  found  the  great  pacifist  Jeffer- 
son in  one  breath  declaring  peace  desirable  at  all 
cost,  but  war  to  be  Providential,  and  secretly 
egging  on  his  Government  to  renew  the  strife  on 
the  slightest  pretence!  The  truth  is  these  great 
men,  like  so  many  others  who  profess  to  love  peace, 
wanted,  as  pointed  out  by  Tolstoi,  only  that  peace 
which  would  enable  them  to  impose  upon  the 
world  the  pax  Romana. 

Polk  was  at  least  frank.  He  professed  none 
of  the  philosophic  optimism  of  Rousseau  and 
Jefferson.  His  policy  was  distinctly  realistic;  he 
felt  that  his  duty  was  to  secure  the  existence 
of  his  State  and  he  set  about  his  self-imposed  task 
with  an  energy  and  lack  of  regard  for  consequences 
truly  Teutonic. 

During  Tyler's  Administration,  Webster  as 
Secretary  of  State  had  declined  to  consider  a  pro- 
position from  England  and  France  for  a  joint 
agreement  with  Spain  as  to  the  disposition  of 
Cuba,  stating  that,  while  the  United  States  did 
not  intend  to  interfere  with  the  control  of  Cuba 
by  Spain,  it  could  not  consent  to  the  ownership 
of  the  island  by  any  other  Power. 


The  Polk  Doctrine  of  Imperialism  175 

Meantime  the  Texan  Government,  after  its 
proposals  of  annexation  had  been  made  to  the 
United  States  in  1837,  had  been  playing  a  double 
game.  It  had  come  to  an  agreement  with  Great 
Britain  whereby,  in  return  for  the  latter's  action 
in  securing  the  recognition  of  its  independence 
by  Mexico,  Texas  pledged  itself  not  to  be  annexed 
to  any  other  country.  This  agreement  had  been 
approved  by  Mexico,  and  was  awaiting  the  final 
action  of  Texas  when  Calhoun  became  Secretary 
of  State.  Knowledge  of  the  dealings  of  Texas 
hastened  action  on  Calhoun's  part.  He  entered 
office  March  6th,  and  on  April  12th  a  treaty  of 
annexation  was  signed. 

The  Russian  dispute  over  the  northwest  terri- 
tory having  been  settled  by  treaty  in  1826,  the 
United  States  and  Great  Britain  became  involved, 
in  1845,  in  another  serious  altercation,  this  time 
over  the  possession  of  the  Oregon  territory.  The 
Democratic  National  Convention,  which  nomi- 
nated Polk,  had  passed  a  resolution  declaring  for 
the  "  reoccupation  "  of  Oregon,  as  well  as  for  the 
"  reannexation "  of  Texas,  and  the  Jingoes  were 
loudly  crying  "Fifty-four  Forty  or  Fight."  Thus, 
when  Polk  came  into  office  he  found  the  United 
States  in  contact  with  a  foreign  Power  at  three 
different  points,  and  a  high  state  of  excitement 
existing  in  England  as  well  as  in  the  United  States. 
The  occasion  was  a  propitious  one  for  him  to 
propose  an  extension  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  in 
furtherance  of  his  imperialistic  designs.     In  his 


176  Empire  and  Armament 

inaugural  address  in  1845,  he  not  only  advocated 
the  Oregon  claim  in  its  entirety,  that  is  up  to  the 
fifty-fourth  parallel,  but  he  took  occasion  to  say: 

It  should  be  distinctly  announced  to  the  world  as 
our  settled  policy,  that  no  European  colony  or  do- 
minion shall  with  our  consent  be  planted  or  estab- 
lished in  any  part  of  the  North  American  continent. 

This  bold  extension  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
only  served  to  popularize  Polk  with  the  Jingoes 
at  his  back.  Congress  actually  upheld  him  by  a 
resolution  authorizing  him  to  give  notice  that  the 
joint  occupation  of  the  disputed  territory  would  be 
terminated.  Fortunately  for  the  United  States 
the  treaty  finally  entered  into  with  Great  Britain 
in  June,  1846,  fixing  upon  the  forty-ninth  parallel, 
just  as  the  American  army  was  entering  Mexican 
territory,  again  averted  war  with  that  country. 
But  peace  was  due  to  James  Buchanan,  Secretary 
of  State,  and  the  British  Government,  and  not  to 
the  American  people  on  this  occasion  any  more 
than  it  was  in  1842;  indeed,  in  each  succeeding 
crisis,  the  frenzied  cries  of  the  Jingoes  for  war 
grew  less  restrained. 

In  1848,  the  insurgents  who  had  succeeded  in 
temporarily  setting  aside  the  Mexican  Govern- 
ment, tendered  the  sovereignty  of  Yucatan  to 
Great  Britain,  Spain,  and  the  United  States.  In 
his  annual  message  to  Congress  for  that  year,  Polk 
practically  repeated  the  warning  to  European 
Governments  given  by  him  three  years  before. 


The  Polk  Doctrine  of  Imperialism  177 

But  not  alone  did  the  doctrine  of  Polk  include 
an  inhibition  against  the  acquisition  by  a  foreign 
Power  of  territory  in  the  Western  Hemisphere  by 
voluntary  transfer  or  conquest  of  occupied  terri- 
tory, and  against  a  protectorate  over  other 
American  States  in  North  America.  In  1846  the 
encroachments  of  the  British  on  the  Mosquito 
Coast  and  other  portions  of  Central  America,  drew 
from  Polk  some  pointed  declarations  respecting  the 
paramount  interest  of  the  United  States  in  the  Isth- 
mus of  Panama,  all  tending  to  broaden  the  applica- 
tion of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  but  it  was  in  the 
treaty  of  that  year  with  New  Granada,  or  Colom- 
bia, that  the  most  radical  departure  brought  about 
by  Polk  was  effected.  In  Article  35  of  that  treaty 
the  United  States  bound  itself  to  ' '  guarantee  posi- 
tively and  efficaciously  .  .  .  the  perfect  neutral- 
ity of  the  Isthmus"  [of  Panama]  and  "the  rights 
of  sovereignty  and  property  which  New  Granada 
has  and  possesses  over  the  said  territory." 

Thus  we  see  that  the  doctrine  of  Polk  not  only 
embraced  coercion  of  the  States  of  the  Union, 
armed  aggression  against  foreign  States,  the  pre- 
servation of  the  Western  Hemisphere  free  from 
foreign  influence,  peaceful  or  hostile,  a  protectorate 
over  all  American  States  in  North  America,  but 
an  actual  guarantee  of  independence  for  at  least 
one  South  American  State.  Verily  was  Polk 
the  greatest  American  imperialist,  by  and  with 
the  consent  of  the  American  people! 


CHAPTER  XIII 

JINGOISM   RAMPANT 

THE  inconsistencies  in  the  foreign  policy  of  the 
United  States — that  is,  a  self -professed  deter- 
mination not  to  interfere  with  other  American 
States  or  with  the  colonies  of  foreign  States,  and 
its  actual  concrete  interference  under  Polk,  natu- 
rally resulted  in  grave  embarrassments.  Polk 
had  openly  advocated  the  military  occupation  of 
Yucatan,  and  a  bill  had  been  introduced  in  the 
Senate  authorizing  such  a  step.  Calhoun,  the 
only  surviving  member  of  Monroe's  Cabinet, 
combatted  this  action  as  an  unwarranted  extension 
of  Monroe's  Doctrine,  declaring  that  Monroe  had 
never  contemplated  the  use  of  force,  but  evidence 
was  adduced  tending  to  show  that  the  views  of 
John  Quincy  Adams,  recently  deceased,  were  in 
conflict  with  those  of  Calhoun,  for  it  was  shown 
that  Adams  during  Polk's  Administration  had  de- 
clared it  indispensably  necessary  to  make  large 
expenditures  on  armament  to  maintain  the  exclu- 
sive policy  of  Monroe.  Calhoun  was  undoubtedly 
right  in  his  contention  that  the  Yucatan  case  was 
one  to  which  the  Monroe  Doctrine  was  not  prop- 

178 


Jingoism  Rampant  179 

erly  applicable,  and  he  so  impressed  his  views 
upon  Congress  that  Polk's  recommendations  were 
ignored.  We  thus  see  that  at  an  early  date,  a 
President,  Congress,  and  Monroe's  Secretary  of 
War  were  in  thorough  disaccord  over  the  scope  of 
the  national  doctrine  of  exclusion. 

But  it  was  in  1850,  during  Taylor's  Administra- 
tion, that  Monroe's  true  policy  of  exclusion  was 
fatally  abandoned  in  the  execution  of  the  Clayton- 
Bulwer  Treaty  of  1850,  having  for  its  dual  objects 
the  promotion  of  the  construction  of  an  inter- 
oceanic  canal  across  the  isthmus  of  Central  America 
and  the  restriction  of  British  territorial  dominion 
in  that  quarter.  Territorial  developments  on  the 
Pacific  Coast  had  concentrated  the  attention  of 
the  country  upon  the  importance  of  a  connecting 
link  between  the  East  and  the  West,  and  British 
activity  in  Central  America  was  regarded  in  the 
United  States  with  jealous  disfavour.  The  settle- 
ment of  Belize  had  already  become  a  virtual  col- 
ony of  Great  Britain,  and  it  was  feared  that  the 
growing  British  influence  would  soon  establish  a 
protectorate  over  the  Mosquito  Coast  notwith- 
standing Polk's  firm  stand  in  1846. 

The  fatal  treaty  embraced  a  joint  guarantee 
by  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States  concerning 
the  canal  to  be  constructed,  and  it  was  agreed 
that  neither  of  the  signatory  parties  would  occupy, 
fortify,  colonize,  or  assume  or  exercise  any  do- 
minion over  any  part  of  Central  America.  This 
treaty  was  the  first  instance  in  which  the  United 


180  Empire  and  Armament 

States  joined  with  a  European  Power  in  the  man- 
agement of  political  interests  in  the  Western  Hemi- 
sphere, and  it  is  notable  not  only  because  it  was 
a  distinct  and  radical  departure  from  the  exclusive 
policy  of  Monroe,  but  because  it  undertook  in 
concert  with  a  foreign  Power  to  regulate  important 
American  interests.  Says  Wharton:  "It  under- 
takes, in  concert  with  a  foreign  Power,  to  deter- 
mine a  question  the  most  important  to  the  United 
States  that  can  arise  outside  of  our  own  territory." 
And  says  Mr.  Foster,  Secretary  of  State  under 
Harrison : 

The  treaty  marks  the  most  serious  mistake  in  our 
diplomatic  history;  and  is  the  single  instance,  since 
its  announcement  in  1823,  of  a  tacit  disavowal  or 
disregard  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  by  the  admission 
of  Great  Britain  to  an  equal  participation  in  the 
protection  and  control  of  a  great  American  enterprise. 

Upon  the  accession  of  Taylor  to  the  Presidency 
in  1848,  an  event  occurred  which  strikingly  illus- 
trates the  temper  of  the  American  people  and 
their  willingness  to  interfere  in  foreign  affairs. 
The  Hungarian  revolt  was  then  in  progress  and 
a  great  democratic  uprising  throughout  Europe 
threatened  the  existing  forms  of  government  on 
that  continent.  The  American  people,  far  from 
letting  foreign  political  affairs  take  their  own 
course  were  intensely  interested  in  the  outcome, 
and  Taylor,  secretly  dispatched  an  agent  to 
Europe  to  study  political  conditions  with  a  view 


Jingoism  Rampant  181 

to  the  recognition  of  Hungary  if  a  way  could  be 
found  to  do  it.  Taylor  went  so  far  as  to  declare 
in  his  annual  message  to  Congress  in  1849,  that 
his  action  had  been  taken  in  obedience  to  American 
sentiment  in  order  that  the  United  States  might 
be  the  first  to  welcome  Hungary,  should  her  inde- 
pendence be  established,  into  the  sisterhood  of 
nations.  This  confession  disclosed  the  most  fla- 
grant disregard  of  Austria's  rights  on  the  part  of 
the  Administration,  which  openly  resorted  to  the 
device  of  excusing  itself  on  the  ground  of  the 
hostility  of  American  sentiment  to  Austria.  The 
fact  that  it  was  the  duty  of  the  Government  to 
assuage  that  hostility  instead  of  utilizing  it  for 
political  advantage,  does  not  seem  to  have  occurred 
to  the  President  and  his  advisers.  Whatever 
American  sentiment  may  have  been,  as  a  neutral 
it  was  the  duty  of  the  United  States  to  withhold 
all  official  support,  moral  or  physical,  until  Kos- 
suth and  his  revolutionists  should  have  estab- 
lished the  independence  of  Hungary.  To  do 
otherwise  was  but  to  intermeddle  in  international 
affairs. 

The  Austrian  diplomatic  agent  strenuously 
protested  against  President  Taylor's  action  in 
sending  an  agent  among  the  revolutionists,  and 
against  the  tone  of  his  message.  A  diplomatic 
controversy  arising  out  of  Taylor's  acts  ensued, 
continuing  over  into  Fillmore's  Administration 
when  Webster  as  Secretary  of  State  gave  voice 
to  Jingoism  in  a  most  undignified  and  undiplo- 


182  Empire  and  Armament 

matic  reply  to  the  insistent  Austrian  representa- 
tions. Webster's  correspondence  was  a  veritable 
Jingo  tirade,  setting  forth,  with  a  fervid  eloquence 
more  suited  to  the  stump  than  to  diplomacy,  the 
growth  and  destiny  of  the  United  States.  It 
created  the  greatest  enthusiasm  among  the  Ameri- 
can people  whose  blatancy  was  only  intensified 
by  the  undignified  tenor  of  Webster's  reply,  which 
was  so  impregnated  with  the  spirit  of  the  Jingo 
that  even  Webster  himself  sought  to  excuse  its 
temper  on  the  ground:  first,  that  he  "thought  it 
well  enough  to  speak  out  and  tell  the  people  of 
Europe  who  and  what  we  are,  and  awaken  them 
to  a  just  sense  of  the  unparalleled  growth  of  this 
country;  second,  I  wished  to  write  a  paper  which 
would  touch  the  national  pride." 

Webster's  explanation  of  his  letter  is  of  course 
no  excuse  whatever,  but  only  convicts  him  by  his 
own  words  of  having  succumbed  to  the  popular 
frame  of  mind.  Such  was  the  national  attitude 
that  in  1851  by  a  resolution  of  Congress  Kossuth 
was  brought  from  his  refuge  in  Turkey  in  an  Ameri- 
can ship  of  war  to  the  United  States,  praised  by 
the  President  in  his  annual  message,  publicly 
presented  to  the  President  by  the  Secretary  of 
State,  ceremoniously  received  by  both  Houses  of 
Congress,  and  accorded  a  triumphal  progress 
throughout  the  country.  These  attentions,  de- 
signed to  be  offensive  to  Austria,  encouraged 
Kossuth  to  attempt  to  enlist  the  United  States 
Government  in  the  cause  of  Hungarian  independ- 


Jingoism  Rampant  183 

ence.  The  nation  was  all  but  swept  from  its  feet 
by  the  popular  hero,  possessing  as  he  did  no  mean 
abilities  as  an  orator.  One  who  reads  the  press 
of  the  time  cannot  but  conclude  that  the  Ameri- 
cans had  become  utterly  careless  of  their  inter- 
national obligations  to  Austria  and  were  at  one  time 
quite  willing  to  render  Kossuth  the  political  and 
financial  aid  he  desired,  from  which  outrageous 
action  they  were  saved  by  a  sober  second  thought 
that  seemed  to  intervene  as  if  through  Providence. 

But  the  Kossuth  episode  so  offended  the  Austrian 
Government  that,  after  protesting  in  vain  against 
the  moral  support  the  American  State  officials 
by  their  reception  of  Kossuth  and  their  public 
utterances  were  affording  the  revolution,  it  sanc- 
tioned the  withdrawal  of  its  diplomatic  represen- 
tative from  Washington. 

Two  years  after  this  important  altercation  the 
United  States  almost  became  involved  in  war  with 
Austria  over  one  Martin  Koszta,  a  former  aide- 
de-camp  of  Kossuth's,  who  had  escaped  to  America 
and  taken  out  preliminary  naturalization  papers. 
In  1853,  he  was  arrested  by  Austrian  authority 
in  Smyrna  at  which  place  his  release  from  deten- 
tion was  demanded  by  an  American  naval  officer 
in  command  of  a  United  States  sloop-of-war. 
Threatening  to  open  fire  upon  the  Austrian  vessels 
unless  his  demand  was  complied  with,  Captain 
Ingraham  cleared  his  vessel  for  action  in  the  face 
of  tremendous  odds,  with  the  result  that  Koszta 
was    released    to    the    French    authorities.     The 


184  Empire  and  Armament 

boldness  of  Ingraham  appealed  to  the  Jingoes  with 
great  force.  He  was  heralded  as  a  hero  and  made 
much  of.  The  American  people  neither  knew  nor 
cared  whether  he  had  been  right  or  wrong  in  his 
conduct.  His  willingness  to  fight  was  the  main 
thing;  it  gratified  the  national  pride  beyond  words, 
and  appealed  to  the  aggressive  spirit  of  the  Ameri- 
cans. What  cared  they  for  Austria?  Had  they 
not  already  bearded  her  until  they  despised  her 
threats  ?  And  here  it  should  be  noted  that  Ingra- 
ham's  attitude  was  typically  American.  He  was 
no  more  prepared  to  assail  the  Austrian  forces  at 
Smyrna  than  the  United  States  was  prepared  with 
a  handful  of  ships  and  less  than  15,000  soldiers  to 
engage  in  a  war  with  Austria  or  Spain,  both  of 
which  countries  she  had  with  impunity  given  re- 
peated causes  for  war.  ' '  We  have  whipped  England 
twice,  and  we  can  do  it  again,"  was  the  popular 
belief,  a  sentiment  which  fortified  the  American 
people  in  their  utter  contempt  for  the  international 
rights  of  other  nations. 

Pierce's  Administration,  following  that  of  Fill- 
more, is  noted  in  American  annals  as  the  ' '  Heyday 
of  the  Filibuster."  Young  America  and  Jingoism 
were  by  this  time  rampant.  In  the  attitude  of 
the  Federal  Government  and  public  sentiment 
at  large,  much  encouragement  for  the  active 
aggressions  of  United  States  citizens  upon  neigh- 
bouring States  was  found. 

Just  as  the  germs  of  Burr's  conspiracy  may  be 
found  in  the  sentiment  for  expansion  and  inter- 


Jingoism  Rampant  185 

meddling  in  the  affairs  of  neighbouring  States 
which  existed  in  1804,  so  to  the  aggressive  Ameri- 
can policy  during  Polk's,  Tyler's,  and  Fillmore's 
administrations  may  other  attempts  on  the  part 
of  American  citizens  to  overthrow  neighbouring 
sovereignties  be  traced.  Ever  since  the  days  when 
Louisiana  was  first  purchased  an  element  of  the 
people  of  the  Mississippi  Valley  had  dreamed  of 
the  extension  of  the  national  territory  to  include 
Central  America  in  order  to  bring  the  entire  Gulf 
under  the  sway  of  the  United  States.  By  these 
people  the  Mexican  War  was  welcomed  as  an 
opportunity  to  accomplish  the  desired  end,  but 
when  the  war  failed  in  this,  it  remained  for  William 
Walker,  an  American  adventurer,  to  attempt,  in 
1853,  with  the  connivance  of  the  authorities 
at  Washington  it  is  thought  by  some,  to  con- 
quer the  Mexican  State  of  Sonora  and  to  secure 
for  the  United  States  one  or  more  of  the  Central 
American  countries.  Fully  arming  and  equip- 
ping an  expeditionary  force  on  United  States  soil, 
the  bold  filibuster  landed  his  men  at  La  Paz, 
in  Lower  California,  captured  several  towns, 
proclaimed  himself  President,  and  took  up  his 
march  for  the  interior.  To  escape  capture  at  the 
hands  of  the  superior  Mexican  force  dispatched 
against  him,  he  crossed  over  into  the  United  States 
and  surrendered  to  the  United  States  authorities 
at  San  Diego.  Tried  in  the  Federal  Court  at  San 
Francisco  for  violating  the  neutrality  laws,  he 
was  acquitted,   much  to  the  disgust  of  Mexico 


1 86  Empire  and  Armament 

whose  sovereignty  had  been  violated.  Had  the 
Mexican  general  done  on  this  occasion  what 
Jackson  did  with  respect  to  the  marauders  of 
Florida  when  he  followed  them  into  neighbouring 
territory,  a  war  would  certainly  have  resulted 
between  the  United  States  and  Mexico. 

Walker  was  not  satisfied  with  the  failure  of  his 
Mexican  invasion.  The  United  States  had  by 
Polk's  treaty  of  1846  guaranteed  the  neutrality 
of  New  Granada,  and  declared  her  paramount 
interest  in  the  Isthmus  of  Panama  and  Central 
America  generally.  Walker,  however,  now  actu- 
ally undertook  to  secure  for  American  interests 
the  State  of  Nicaragua  in  which  a  revolution  was 
raging.  Landing  in  1855  at  Realejo,  with  another 
armed  force  fitted  out  in  the  United  States,  he 
succeeded  in  capturing  Granada  and  making  an 
arrangement  with  General  Corral,  the  President, 
whereby  he  became  Secretary  of  War  and  com- 
mander-in-chief. Soon  Walker  and  Corral  quar- 
relled, with  the  result  that  Walker  had  the  latter 
tried  and  shot. 

After  waging  a  successful  war  against  Costa 
Rica,  Walker  had  himself  proclaimed  President  of 
Nicaragua,  but  he  was  soon  compelled  to  deliver 
himself  up  to  an  American  ship  of  war  which 
transported  him  to  New  Orleans  where  he  was 
placed  under  bond  to  keep  the  peace!  This  ab- 
surd action  was  an  affront  to  the  dignity  of  Nicar- 
agua and  Costa  Rica,  and  only  encouraged  Walker 
to  further  prosecute  his  plans,  so  that  in  November, 


Jingoism  Rampant  187 

1857,  but  six  months  after  his  release  in  New  Or- 
leans, he  was  back  in  Nicaragua  with  a  large  force 
of  Americans  and  insurrectionists  behind  him. 
Again  driven  from  this  country,  in  1858,  he  set 
out  from  the  United  States  to  subjugate  Honduras 
and,  failing  at  first  in  his  plan,  succeeded  in  land- 
ing in  i860  with  a  fresh  expedition  at  Ruatan. 
After  capturing  Truxillo  he  was  compelled  to  flee, 
this  time  seeking  asylum  on  a  British  vessel,  the 
commander  of  which  properly  turned  him  over  to 
the  outraged  Honduran  authorities,  by  whom  he 
was  tried  and  shot. 

Thus  did  the  United  States  permit  its  citizens 
to  violate  the  sovereignty  of  Mexico,  Nicaragua, 
Costa  Rica,  and  Honduras,  of  which  countries  it 
posed  before  Europe  as  the  great  and  unselfish 
protector.  Not  only  did  President  Pierce  receive  a 
minister  from  Walker  while  the  latter  was  in  illegal 
possession  of  Nicaragua,  but  he  went  so  far  as  to 
write  a  letter  to  an  enthusiastic  Walker  meeting 
in  New  York,  commending  the  "heroic  efforts" 
of  the  international  brigand  in  behalf  of  Nicaragua, 
and  later  in  his  annual  message  he  condemned  the 
action  of  the  naval  officer  who  turned  Walker 
over  to  the  civil  authorities  in  New  Orleans  as  "  a 
great  error."  Pierce  at  this  time  was  an  avowed 
advocate  of  the  "Americanization"  of  Central 
America;  in  spirit  if  not  in  letter,  going  beyond 
Polk's  policy  of  insuring  its  neutrality,  and  openly 
violating  the  spirit  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty 
which  guaranteed  the  neutrality  of  Central  America. 


1 88  Empire  and  Armament 

Another  prominent  Jingo  imperialist  of  this 
proud  era  in  American  history  was  one  John  An- 
thony Quitman,  a  New  Yorker  by  birth,  a  general 
officer  in  the  United  States  Volunteers  during  the 
Mexican  War,  and  governor  of  Mississippi  in  1849. 
In  1836  he  had  taken  a  conspicuous  part  in  the 
Texas  revolution  and  in  the  Mexican  War  he 
had  rendered  gallant  service,  leading  the  assault 
at  Vera  Cruz  and  commanding  the  expedition 
against  Alvarado. 

While  governor  of  Mississippi  he  was  solicited 
by  General  Lopez  to  lead  a  filibustering  expedition 
for  the  capture  of  Cuba,  in  which  island  a  revolu- 
tion headed  by  Lopez  was  in  progress.  Learning 
of  Quitman's  negotiations  with  Lopez,  Mexico, 
Central  America,  and  Spain  strenuously  protested 
to  the  Government  in  Washington,  and  upon  their 
just  representations,  Quitman  was  indicted,  as 
Walker  had  been,  in  the  United  States  Court. 
Resigning  his  office,  he  was  tried  in  the  district 
court  for  East  Louisiana,  the  jury  disagreeing. 
In  1854,  ne  was  again  arrested  because  of  his 
interest  in  another  Cuban  expedition  but  this  time 
he  was  not  even  tried,  being  elected  a  member  of 
Congress  in  1855  and  appointed  chairman  of  the 
Military  Committee  as  a  mark  of  governmental 
disfavour ! 

The  circumstances  connected  with  these  cases 
naturally  led  Spain,  Mexico,  and  the  States  of 
Central  America,  to  repose  little  faith  in  the  in- 
tegrity of  the  United  States  whose  Government 


Jingoism  Rampant  189 

viewed  with  apathy  the  most  flagrant  violation 
by  its  citizens  of  every  law  of  neutrality.  Further- 
more, it  was  confidently  believed  abroad  that  these 
violations  were  instigated  by  that  Government. 

So  notoriously  lax  at  this  time  was  the  United 
States  Government  in  preventing  filibustering  ex- 
peditions from  leaving  its  shores  for  Cuba,  that 
the  governments  of  Great  Britain  and  France, 
sympathizing  with  Spain,  actually  gave  instruc- 
tions to  their  naval  officials  to  co-operate  with 
Spanish  war  vessels  in  preventing  the  landing  of 
these  American  armed  meddlers.  These  Powers 
then  sought,  with  the  most  pacific  intent,  to  nego- 
tiate a  tripartite  treaty  with  the  United  States, 
guaranteeing  the  possession  of  Cuba  to  Spain, 
but  their  efforts  were  futile.  The  expeditions 
continued  until  Lopez,  leader  of  the  Cuban  revolu- 
tion, was  captured  and  executed  along  with  a  large 
part  of  his  force  which  was  mainly  composed  of 
Americans.  This  caused  a  storm  of  indignation 
in  the  United  States,  and  the  Spanish  consulate 
at  New  Orleans  was  actually  stormed  and  de- 
molished by  a  mob.  So  thoroughly  in  sympathy 
with  this  act  was  American  sentiment  that  the 
demand  of  the  Spanish  Minister  in  Washington 
for  redress  was  at  the  time  virtually  denied. 

Notwithstanding  the  attitude  of  the  United 
States  with  respect  to  the  transfer  of  the  possession 
of  Cuba  by  Spain,  an  act  unequivocally  opposed 
by  Jefferson  in  1808,  and  by  Clay  and  by  Web- 
ster at  later  dates,  Polk  made  a  serious  but  un- 


190  Empire  and  Armament 

successful  effort  in  1848  to  purchase  for  the  United 
States  the  "Gem  of  the  Antilles."  Europe  and 
Latin  America,  of  course,  felt  that  opposition  on 
the  part  of  the  United  States  to  the  transfer  of 
Cuba  by  Spain  to  a  European  Power  was  simply 
due  to  the  fact  that  the  Americans  wanted  the 
island  for  themselves,  and  it  would  seem  that 
this  was  true,  for  the  American  imperialists  were 
not  long  satisfied  to  let  the  matter  rest,  so  that 
when  Pierre  Soule  was  appointed  Minister  to  Spain 
by  Pierce,  in  1853,  the  question  was  reopened. 
Soule  was  an  ardent  imperialist,  especially  inter- 
ested in  the  acquisition  of  more  slave  territory. 
He  did  his  best  to  involve  his  country  in  a  foolish 
war  with  Spain  over  a  trivial  incident  occurring  in 
connection  with  an  American  merchant  vessel  at 
Havana,  and  publicly  sympathized  with  the  insur- 
rection of  1854  in  Madrid,  while  officially  repre- 
senting the  United  States  at  the  Spanish  Court. 
Failing  to  plunge  his  country  into  war,  notwithstand- 
ing a  high  state  of  popular  excitement  over  the 
Havana  incident,  he  next  addressed  himself  to  the 
task  of  securing  Cuba  without  regard  to  the  willing- 
ness of  Spain  to  part  with  her  possession.  Having 
been  instructed  to  confer  with  the  American  minis- 
ters at  Paris  and  London  with  a  view  to  devising 
some  plan  for  the  acquisition  of  Cuba  that  would 
be  satisfactory  to  France,  England,  and  Spain, 
Soule,  in  concert  with  Mason  and  Buchanan,  drew 
up  a  remarkable  document,  mainly  his  own  work, 
known  as  "The  Ostend  Manifesto."     This  instru- 


Jingoism  Rampant  191 

ment,  after  citing  the  reasons  why  Spain  should 
sell  Cuba  to  the  United  States,  the  price  deemed 
reasonable,  and  the  benefits  that  would  accrue  to 
European  governments  from  such  a  transfer, 
announced  that  should  Spain  decline  the  offer  of 
the  United  States,  the  latter  would  be  justified 
"by  every  law,  human  and  divine,"  in  taking  the 
island  by  force.  This  somewhat  Prussian  prin- 
ciple of  right  on  the  part  of  the  United  States,  as 
asserted  by  Soule,  was  not  popularly  received  as 
he  had  believed  it  would  be,  and  the  people  of  the 
United  States  magnanimously  decided  that  if  Spain 
would  not  voluntarily  sell  Cuba  it  should  not  be 
seized. 

While  the  people  of  the  United  States  should 
not  be  charged  with  the  instigation  of  Soule's 
manifesto  to  Europe,  certainly  it  was  the  aggres- 
sive sentiment  among  them  that  made  such  an 
absurdity  possible.  Soule  was  but  the  extreme  of 
extremists.  Cuba  was  ardently  desired  by  a  large 
number  of  Americans  who  would  have  been  glad 
of  a  pretext  upon  which  to  seize  the  island,  though 
not  as  frank  in  admitting  it  as  was  Soule;  four 
years  after  the  Ostend  Manifesto  the  President  in 
his  message  again  urged  the  purchase  of  Cuba  and 
a  proposal  was  made  in  the  United  States  Senate 
to  authorize  another  offer  to  Spain  for  the  island. 

It  was  in  1853  that  the  spirit  of  American  impe- 
rialism was  highly  gratified  by  the  dispatch  of  Com- 
modore Perry  to  Japan  for  the  purpose  of  opening 
trade  relations  with  the  exclusive  island  kingdom 


192  Empire  and  Armament 

of  the  Pacific.  Various  other  attempts  to  estab- 
lish such  relations  had  failed,  but  the  Western 
Hemisphere  had  grown  all  too  small  for  Americans 
and  their  demands  were  now  insistent. 

Entering  the  Bay  of  Yeddo  with  his  fleet,  by 
firm  persistence,  Perry  succeeded  in  concluding 
a  treaty  in  1854.  In  the  words  of  an  American 
statesman,  Japan  was  "gently  coerced." 

Perry's  success,  justly  hailed  as  a  great  diplo- 
matic achievement,  initiated  the  extension  of 
American  interests  into  the  Orient,  with  what 
astounding  results  need  not  here  be  commented 
upon.  Mention  of  the  incident  is  important  at 
this  point  as  showing  the  irresistible  spirit  of  impe- 
rialism of  the  times.  And  how  out  of  accord  with 
the  declaration  of  Monroe  was  that  spirit!  Said 
Monroe : 

"With  the  existing  colonies  and  dependencies  of 
any  European  Power  we  have  not  interfered  nor 
shall  we  interfere." 

If  brought  before  the  assembled  nations  under 
a  count  of  interference  in  violation  of  the  self- 
imposed  national  pledge  of  Monroe,  how  would 
plead  Polk  and  Pierce  and  all  the  other  offenders 
who  have  followed  them? 


CHAPTER  XIV 

IMPERIALISM  A   FACT:  ITS  DANGERS 

IN  1848,  for  the  third  time  in  twenty  years,  a 
popular  war  hero  was  elevated  by  the  American 
people  to  the  highest  office  in  their  gift.  The 
election  of  General  Zachary  Taylor,  largely  by 
the  Jingo  influence,  marks  an  epoch  in  the  history 
of  the  empire  over  which  he  was  called  to  rule. 

As  the  old  soldier  surveyed  from  his  proud  emi- 
nence, the  nation,  he  could  but  see  that  its  territo- 
rial and  political  horizons  in  no  sense  coincided. 
Far,  far  off  into  the  illimitable  distance  American 
influence  and  interests  extended  themselves — how 
far  no  man  might  know — for  the  American  empire 
was  then,  as  now,  undefined. 

What  an  empire  was  that  which  had  been 
erected  by  Washington,  the  Adamses,  Jefferson, 
Madison,  Monroe,  Jackson,  Clay,  Calhoun,  Web- 
ster, and  Polk!  Nor  was  it,  as  we  have  seen, 
erected  at  the  expense  of  the  American  people, 
whose  liberties  remained  intact.  This,  the  great 
American  Empire,  owed  nothing  to  militarism; 
no  more  to  pacificism. 

The  inborn  prejudices  of  the  people  had  rendered 
13  193 


194  Empire  and  Armament 

militarism  impossible,  but  their  suddenly  formed 
spirit  of  aggressive  nationalism  was  none  the  less 
entirely  out  of  accord  with  the  philosophic  optim- 
ism of  Kant  and  St.  Pierre  and  Rousseau.  These 
two  great  facts  the  author  has  persistently  sought 
to  throw  into  relief  by  concurrently  dwelling,  first 
upon  the  traditional  prejudice  of  the  American 
people  against  armies,  which  at  times  seemed  to 
have  been  subdued,  only  to  flare  up  again  with  un- 
diminished intensity,  and  second,  upon  the  Jingo- 
ism which  made  the  early  American  always  careless 
of  the  consequences  of  his  own  conduct  in  relation 
to  the  rights  and  claims  of  others. 

Not  in  a  single  instance  in  the  early  history  of 
the  United  States  was  a  leader,  however  wise, 
however  adroit,  able  to  erect  a  military  institution 
of  any  strength,  even  though  the  constitutional 
foundation  for  one  was  secured.  Nevertheless, 
notwithstanding  the  utter  lack  of  military  pre- 
paredness at  all  times,  no  leader,  however  popular, 
was  able  to  restrain  the  popular  desire,  or  tone 
down  the  popular  clamour  for  war,  whenever  a 
seeming  cause  therefor  arose,  without  serious  loss 
of  influence.  So  striking  are  these  inconsistencies 
that  they  would  seem  to  deny  the  contention  of 
the  pacifist  that  disarmament  is  a  guarantee  of 
peace.  Certainly  history  discloses  no  people  who 
in  the  valour  of  their  ignorance  have  been  more 
willing  to  provoke  war  whenever  they  conceived 
a  material  right  to  be  at  stake,  or  race  of  men 
more  intemperate  in  asserting  their  claims,  than 


Imperialism  a  Fact:  Its  Dangers  195 

the  Americans.  Their  early  history  negatives 
the  general  and  unqualified  claim  that  in  govern- 
ments rather  than  in  peoples  are  to  be  found  the 
germs  of  war. 

The  history  of  the  United  States  during  the  half- 
century  succeeding  the  war  between  the  States, 
like  that  of  the  period  preceding  that  titanic  con- 
flict, also  evidences  the  fact  that  people  as  well 
as  governments  may  be  responsible  for  national 
aggressions. 

Over  the  French  occupation  of  Mexico  the 
American  people  became  greatly  excited  and,  im- 
mediately upon  the  close  of  the  war  between  the 
States,  demanded  that  a  large  veteran  army  com- 
manded by  one  of  their  most  aggressive  military 
leaders,  be  massed  along  the  Rio  Grande  ready 
for  action.  In  this  case  there  was  no  evidence 
whatever  of  a  disposition  on  the  part  of  the  Ameri- 
cans to  arbitrate  the  question  of  France's  claim. 
They  simply  announced  their  own  decision  and 
declared  they  would  fight  if  it  were  not  accepted 
forthwith  by  France. 

In  1892  the  United  States  became  involved  in 
a  dispute  with  Great  Britain  over  the  Bering  Sea 
fisheries,  and  by  assuming  a  most  arbitrary  atti- 
tude caused  great  embarrassment  to  the  British 
Government  which  all  along  had  been  willing  to 
arbitrate  the  question  at  issue.  Arbitration  even- 
tually resulted  in  a  decision  against  the  United 
States  on  most  of  the  points  at  issue.  The  same 
year  the  United  States  became  involved  in  a  most 


196  Empire  and  Armament 

unfortunate  dispute  with  Chile  by  reason  of  un- 
warranted intermeddling  in  a  local  revolution  by 
the  United  States  Minister.  The  outcome  was 
the  killing  by  an  irresponsible  mob  of  two  Ameri- 
can sailors  and  the  injury  of  a  number  of  others. 
The  people  of  the  United  States,  who  knew  nothing 
of  the  real  causes  of  the  trouble,  loudly  demanded 
satisfaction,  and  great  enthusiasm  for  the  threat- 
ened war  was  everywhere  manifested.  War  was 
averted  by  an  apology  and  the  payment  of  an 
indemnity  on  the  part  of  Chile. 

In  1893-4  aggressive  action  was  taken  by  the 
United  States  Government  in  connection  with  the 
Brazilian  revolution.  In  this  case  the  Govern- 
ment was  entirely  justified  and  its  uncompromis- 
ing action  undoubtedly  exerted  a  material  influ- 
ence in  bringing  about  the  failure  of  the  attempt 
to  re-establish  monarchical  government  in  Brazil. 
The  point  to  be  noted  here  is  the  enthusiastic 
acclaim  with  which  the  readiness  on  the  part  of 
the  American  admiral  to  fight  was  received  by  the 
peaceably  disposed  Americans.  The  press  of  the 
period  discloses  an  entire  ignorance  of,  and  care- 
lessness as  to,  the  undetermined  rights  of  the 
Chilians  and  the  Brazilian  revolutionists. 

The  truth  is,  as  declared  by  John  Bassett  Moore, 
the  American  people  enjoy  wars,  and  it  had  been 
a  long  time  since  their  desire  for  one  had  been 
gratified.  It  was  but  a  short  time  after  the  Chilian 
and  Brazilian  incidents  when  they  all  but  forced 
one.     For  a  long  time  Venezuela  and  Great  Britain 


Imperialism  a  Fact:  Its  Dangers  197 

had  been  waging  a  diplomatic  contest  over  the 
western  boundary  of  British  Guiana.  When,  in 
1895,  it  became  apparent  that  Great  Britain  did 
not  intend  to  yield  her  points  in  the  case,  Venezuela 
began  to  clamour  for  protection  at  the  hands  of 
the  United  States.  In  July,  1895,  the  American 
Secretary  of  State,  Richard  Olney,  demanded  that 
Great  Britain  answer  whether  she  was  willing  to 
arbitrate  the  question  and  boldly  announced  that 
the  United  States  was  master  in  the  Western 
Hemisphere,  saying: 

The  United  States  is  practically  sovereign  on  this 
Continent  and  its  fiat  is  law  upon  the  subjects  to 
which  it  confines  its  interposition.  Why?  It  is 
not  because  of  the  pure  friendship  or  good  will  felt 
for  it.  It  is  not  simply  by  reason  of  its  high  character 
as  a  civilized  state,  nor  because  wisdom  and  equity  are 
the  invariable  characteristics  of  the  dealings  of  the 
United  States.  It  is  because  in  addition  to  all  other 
grounds,  its  infinite  resources  combined  with  its 
isolated  position  render  it  master  of  the  situation  and 
practically  invulnerable  against  any  or  all  other 
Powers. 

These  were  bold  remarks  to  address  to  Great 
Britain,  but  their  very  boldness  and  the  threat 
they  contained  caused  them  to  be  hailed  with  a 
frenzy  of  delight  in  the  United  States.  War  was 
everywhere  discussed  without  a  semblance  of  mis- 
giving as  to  the  ability  of  the  United  States  to 
overcome  the  "Mistress  of  the  Seas"  on  her  own 
element. 


198  Empire  and  Armament 

Mr.  Olney's  extraordinary  document  fortu- 
nately did  not  arouse  the  warlike  sentiment  of  the 
Britons  as  it  did  that  of  the  Americans.  Lord 
Salisbury  replied  with  moderation  but  firmness, 
declaring  that  this  startling  extension  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  was  unacceptable  in  the  present 
controversy,  whereupon  President  Cleveland  com- 
municated a  message  to  Congress,  December  17, 
1895,  which  created  in  the  United  States  at  least 
all  the  outward  and  visible  signs  of  the  prelimina- 
ries to  war.  He  requested  that  a  commission  be 
appointed  to  ascertain  the  true  boundary  between 
Venezuela  and  British  Guiana,  and  declared  it  to 
be  the  duty  of  the  United  States  "to  resist  by 
every  means  in  its  power,  as  a  wilful  aggression 
upon  its  rights  and  interests,  the  appropriation 
by  Great  Britain  of  any  lands  or  the  exercise  of 
governmental  jurisdiction  over  any  territory  which 
after  investigation,  we  have  determined  of  right 
belongs  to  Venezuela."  He  declared  that  he  was 
conscious  of  the  responsibilities  which  he  thus 
incurred,  but  intimated  that  war  between  Great 
Britain  and  the  United  States,  much  as  it  was  to 
be  deplored,  was  not  comparable  to  "a  supine 
submission  to  wrong  and  injustice  and  the  conse- 
quent loss  of  national  self-respect  and  honour." 
"In  other  words,"  observes  Mr.  Beard,  "we  were 
to  decide  the  dispute  ourselves  and  go  to  war  on 
Great  Britain  if  we  found  her  in  possession  of 
lands  which  in  our  opinion  did  not  belong  to  her." 

Contrary  to  expectation,  and  the  ill-concealed 


Imperialism  a  Fact :  Its  Dangers  199 

hope  of  the  Jingoes,  Mr.  Cleveland's  attitude  was 
not  opposed  by  bluster  and  temper  in  Great  Brit- 
ain, but  it  was  greatly  deplored  as  an  unreasoning 
threat  to  the  natural  good  feeling  existing  between 
the  countries,  and  the  sacrifice  of  a  valued  friend- 
ship to  an  insignificant  matter.  The  British 
Government  courteously  aided  the  American 
Commissioners  in  their  search  for  evidence.  Pend- 
ing the  search,  dealing  directly  with  Venezuela, 
Lord  Salisbury  arranged  for  an  international  court 
of  arbitration.  The  good  humour  of  the  British 
on  this  occasion  saved  the  situation,  but  the  out- 
come was  hailed  in  America  as  the  result  of  Mr. 
Cleveland's  boldness,  and  he  was  lauded  as  "a 
sterling  representative  of  the  true  American 
spirit."  The  arbitration  resulted  in  the  substan- 
tiation of  Great  Britain's  claims  on  every  point. 
The  whole  incident  might  be  styled  "An  ex-parte 
war  in  embryo."  Had  Great  Britain  shown  the 
slightest  excitement  or  desire  to  fight  it  would 
almost  surely  have  resulted  in  a  serious  conflict 
between  the  two  great  English-speaking  empires 
which  would  have  been  an  inestimable  calamity  to 
the  world.  Yet,  the  press  of  the  United  States 
seemed  to  cherish  the  so-called  American  victory 
far  more  than  it  did  the  averting  of  actual 
hostilities.  Years  after  the  event  one  great  journal 
summed  up  the  Venezuelan  episode  as  follows : 

Lord  Salisbury  and  the  British  Government  came 
down  from  their  high  horse,  the  British  lion  slunk 


200  Empire  and  Armament 

away  with  its  much  twisted  tail  between  its  legs,  and 
England  agreed  to  arbitrate  the  boundary  dispute. 
England  got  most  of  the  territory  it  claimed  in  the 
final  outcome,  but  it  got  it  by  a  judicial  decree  and 
not  by  force  of  arms. 

This  is  a  truly  characteristic  sample  of  Ameri- 
can pacifism,  naively  formulated  as  a  taunt  to  a 
foreign  State  that  it  had  been  compelled  to  secure 
by  arbitration  what  it  could  not  seize  by  force  of 
arms.  Less  honour  to  Great  Britain  for  such  a 
dastardly  act !  It  is  such  unwitting  disclosures  of 
the  inner  conscience  that  exhibit  the  true  spirit  of 
the  speaker. 

"The  true  American  spirit"  found  expression 
in  1898.  The  Spanish  War,  while  fully  justified, 
was  most  acceptable  to  the  Americans.  There 
was  little  real  regret.  The  pressure  of  imperial- 
ism was  too  great  to  be  longer  confined.  In  i860 
Buchanan,  in  1866  Seward,  in  1870  Grant,  in 
1880  Hayes,  in  1881  Garfield,  had  referred  in  pub- 
lic documents  to  the  foreign  interests  of  the  United 
States  in  such  a  way  that  there  could  be  no  doubt 
as  to  the  gradual  extension  of  those  interests  and 
the  rights  in  connection  with  them  which  the 
United  States  proposed  to  exercise.  In  1889,  the 
United  States  had  joined  Great  Britain  and  Ger- 
many in  a  protectorate  over  the  Samoan  Islands, 
departing  absolutely  and  irrevocably  from  what 
Secretary  Gresham  declared  to  be:  "the  traditional 
and  well-established  policy  of  avoiding  entangling 


Imperialism  a  Fact:  Its  Dangers  201 

alliances  with  foreign  Powers  in  relation  to  objects 
remote  from  this  hemisphere. ' '  During  Harrison's 
Administration  provision  had  been  made  for  the 
annexation  of  the  Hawaiian  Islands,  after  a  revo- 
lution fomented  in  great  part  by  American  inter- 
ests. The  Spanish  War  afforded  the  opportunity 
to  annex  these  islands  to  the  United  States.  And 
so  the  Empire  grew. 

If  the  empire  which  President  Taylor  surveyed 
in  1848  was  a  vast  one,  how  shall  we  characterize 
the  American  Empire  of  today?  How  shall  we 
answer  those  who,  looking  merely  at  the  form  and 
not  at  the  substance,  deny  that  our  course  is  an 
imperialistic  one?  Shall  we  be  compelled  to  urge 
upon  them  the  conception  that  interests  and  com- 
munications go  to  make  up  empire  as  well  as 
territory?  Or  shall  we  accept  their  view  that  the 
lack  of  a  national  army  and  a  navy  equal  in 
strength  to  those  of  other  Powers  who  frankly 
claim  the  title  of  empire,  makes  of  the  United 
States  a  purely  domestic,  self-centred  Republic, 
without  interests  extending  over,  and  across  the 
world,  and  into  realms  scarce  known  to  man? 
Surely  we  cannot  close  our  eyes  to  the  facts  of 
Empire.  Because  time  has  not  tended  to  remove 
the  early  anomaly  of  American  national  char- 
acter, and  because  today  Americans  are  no  nearer 
militarism  than  in  the  days  of  Jefferson,  we  are 
not  justified  in  the  belief  that  the  United  States  is 
not  an  empire. 

Indeed,  there  is  no  essential  connection  between 


202  Empire  and  Armament 

empire  building  and  militarism,  notwithstanding 
the  fact  that  militarism  lends  itself  to  national 
expansion,  as  it  does  to  the  glorification  of  mon- 
archs.  Machiavelli  taught  that  the  State  was 
the  real  source  of  all  happiness,  a  teaching  that 
appealed  to  kings  on  their  tottering  thrones,  and 
who  promptly  seized  upon  this  doctrine  and,  on 
the  plea  of  strengthening  their  States,  incidentally 
secured  themselves  through  the  medium  of  mili- 
tarism which  cries  out  in  unison  with  the  Grand 
Monarch — L'etat  c'est  moi.  But  if  militarism  is 
not  necessarily  the  progenitor  of  imperialism, 
neither  is  it  essentially  the  offspring  of  imperialism. 
Calhoun,  Clay,  and  Webster  laid  down  forever 
their  work  of  empire  building  almost  simultane- 
ously; Calhoun  in  1850;  Clay  and  Webster  in 
1852.  But  they  carried  with  them  to  the  grave 
their  prejudices  against  militarism. 

The  speech  of  Webster,  delivered  July  4,  1851, 
the  seventy-fifth  anniversary  of  American  Inde- 
pendence, embodying  the  military  conceptions  of 
our  empire  builders,  shows  those  conceptions  to 
be  so  strikingly  similar  to  American  ideals  of  today 
that  it  must  be  quoted  here  at  length. 

While  the  country  has  been  expanding  in  dimensions, 
in  numbers,  and  in  wealth,  the  Government  has  ap=- 
plied  a  wise  forecast  in  the  adoption  of  measures 
necessary,  when  the  world  shall  no  longer  be  at  peace, 
to  maintain  the  national  honour,  whether  by  appro- 
priate display  of  vigour  abroad,  or  by  well-adapted 
means  of  defence  at  home.     A  navy,  which  has  so 


Imperialism  a  Fact:  Its  Dangers  203 

often  illustrated  our  history  by  heroic  achievements, 
though  in  peaceful  times  restrained  in  its  operations 
to  narrow  limits,  possesses  in  its  admirable  elements, 
the  means  of  great  and  sudden  expansion,  and  is 
justly  looked  upon  by  the  nation  as  the  right  arm  of 
its  power.  An  army  still  smaller,  but  not  less  perfect  in 
its  detail,  has  on  many  a  field  exhibited  the  military  ap- 
titudes and  prowess  of  the  race,  and  demonstrated  the 
wisdom  which  has  presided  over  its  organization  and 
government,  while  the  gradual  and  slow  enlargement 
of  these  respective  military  arms  has  been  regulated 
by  a  jealous  watchfulness  over  the  public  treasure, 
there  has  nevertheless,  been  freely  given  all  that 
was  needed  to  perfect  their  quality ;  and  each  affords 
the  nucleus  of  any  enlargement  that  the  public  exi- 
gencies may  demand,  from  the  millions  of  brave  hearts 
and  strong  arms  upon  the  land  and  water. 

The  navy  is  the  active  and  aggressive  element  of 
national  defence;  and,  let  loose  from  our  own  sea- 
coast,  must  display  its  power  in  the  seas  and  channels 
of  the  enemy.  To  do  this,  it  need  not  be  large;  and  it 
can  never  be  large  enough  to  defend  by  its  presence 
at  home  all  our  ports  and  harbours.  But,  in  the 
absence  of  the  navy,  what  can  the  regular  army  or  the 
volunteer  militia  do  against  the  enemy's  line  of  battle- 
ships and  steamers,  falling  without  notice  upon  our 
coast?  What  will  guard  our  cities  from  tribute,  our 
merchant-vessels  and  our  navy  yards  from  conflagra- 
tion? Here,  again  we  see  a  wise  forecast  in  the  system 
of  defensive  measures,  which,  especially  since  the 
close  of  the  war  with  Great  Britain,  has  been  steadily 
followed  by  our  Government. 

While  the  perils  from  which  our  great  establishments 
had  just  escaped  were  yet  fresh  in  remembrance,  a 


204  Empire  and  Armament 

system  of  fortifications  was  begun,  which  now,  though 
not  quite  complete,  fences  in  our  important  points 
with  impassable  strength.  More  than  four  thousand 
cannon  may  at  any  moment,  within  strong  and  per- 
manent works,  arranged  with  all  the  advantages  and 
appliances  that  the  art  affords,  be  turned  to  the  pro- 
tection of  the  sea-coast,  and  be  served  by  the  men 
whose  hearths  they  shelter.  Happy  for  us  that  it  is 
so,  since  these  are  means  of  security  that  time  alone 
can  supply ;  and  since  the  improvements  of  maritime 
warfare,  by  making  distant  expeditions  easy  and 
speedy,  have  made  them  more  probable,  and  at  the 
same  time,  more  difficult  to  anticipate  and  provide 
against.  The  cost  of  fortifying  all  the  important 
points  of  our  coast,  as  well  upon  the  whole  Atlantic 
as  the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  will  not  exceed  the  amount 
expended  on  the  fortifications  of  Paris. 

In  this  connection  one  most  important  facility  in 
the  defence  of  the  country  is  not  to  be  overlooked; 
it  is  the  extreme  rapidity  with  which  the  soldiers  of 
the  army,  and  any  number  of  the  militia  corps,  may 
be  brought  to  any  point  where  a  hostile  attack  shall 
at  any  time  be  made  or  threatened.  And  this  exten- 
sion of  territory  embraced  within  the  United  States, 
increase  of  its  population,  commerce,  and  manufac- 
tures, development  of  its  resources  by  canals  and  rail- 
roads, and  rapidity  of  inter-communication  by  means 
of  steam  and  electricity,  have  all  been  accomplished 
without  overthrow  of,  or  danger  to,  the  public  liber- 
ties, by  any  assumption  of  military  power ;  and,  indeed, 
without  any  permanent  increase  of  the  army,  except 
for  the  purpose  of  frontier  defence,  and  of  affording 
a  slight  guard  to  the  public  property;  or  of  the  navy, 
any  further  than  to  assure  the  navigator  that  in  what- 


Imperialism  a  Fact:  Its  Dangers  205 

soever  sea  he  shall  sail  his  ship,  he  is  protected  by  the 
stars  and  stripes  of  his  country.  This,  too,  has  been 
done  without  the  shedding  of  a  drop  of  blood  for 
treason  or  rebellion;  while  systems  of  popular  repre- 
sentation have  regularly  been  supported  in  the  State 
governments,  and  in  the  general  Government;  while 
laws,  national  and  State,  of  such  character  have  been 
passed,  and  have  been  so  wisely  administered,  that  I 
may  stand  up  here  today,  and  declare,  as  I  now  do 
declare,  in  the  face  of  all  the  intelligence  of  the  age, 
that,  for  the  period  which  has  elapsed,  from  the  day 
that  Washington  laid  the  foundation  of  this  Capitol, 
to  the  present  time,  there  has  been  no  country  upon 
earth  in  which  life,  liberty,  and  property  have  been 
more  amply  and  steadily  secured,  or  more  freely  en- 
joyed, than  in  these  United  States  of  America.  Who 
is  there  that  will  deny  this?  Who  is  there  prepared 
with  a  greater  or  a  better  example  ?  Who  is  there  that 
can  stand  upon  the  foundation  of  facts,  acknowledged 
or  proved,  and  assert  that  these  our  republican  insti- 
tutions have  not  answered  the  true  ends  of  govern- 
ment beyond  all  precedent  in  human  history? 

A  change  of  date,  a  change  of  name,  is  all  that 
need  be  made  in  Webster's  speech  to  give  the 
twentieth  century  American  orator  his  annual 
patriotic  address.  Indeed,  the  annual  message 
of  President  Wilson  in  19 14  is  strikingly  similar 
in  sentiment  to  this  address  of  Webster  which 
has  been  quoted.  The  two  should  be  carefully 
compared  by  the  historian. 

It  is  just  such  authoritative  declarations  of 
peaceful  temper  and  intent  as  the  one  made  by 


206  Empire  and  Armament 

Webster  that  have  beguiled  the  American  people 
into  believing,  and  that  has  confirmed  them  in  the 
conviction  that  their  really  aggressive,  militant 
foreign  policy  has  been  one  of  respect  of  the  rights 
of  all  nations,  and  total  abstinence  from  interfer- 
ence with  foreign  affairs.  Over  and  over  again  our 
statesmen  have  adverted  to  Washington's  warning 
against  "foreign  entanglements,"  always  assert- 
ing that  his  advice  has  been  rigidly  adhered  to. 
But  invariably,  whenever  the  occasion  has  made 
it  possible,  the  old  spirit  of  aggression  has  mani- 
fested itself. 

Clausewitz  may  have  expounded  the  philosophy 
of  war  to  Europe ;  Darwin  and  Spencer  and  Huxley 
may  have  forced  upon  the  scientific  world  their 
theories  of  evolution,  applicable  to  organisms  and 
societies  alike ;  Fichte  and  Hegel  and  Haeckel  may 
have  adopted  these  theories  to  the  ends  of  govern- 
ment; Bagehot  may  have  preached  the  doctrine 
of  national  evolution  in  England,  and  Nietzsche 
and  Treitschke  in  Germany;  and  De  Vries  may 
have  presented  a  theory  of  evolution  more  in  har- 
mony with  the  sudden  mutations  of  war  than  are 
the  earlier  doctrines  of  evolution  based  on  the 
principle  of  the  survival  of  the  fittest,  but  no 
philosophy  or  influence  has  served  to  materially 
alter  American  military  policy  as  formulated  a 
century  ago.  It  may  also  be  said  that  the  people 
of  the  United  States  pay  as  little  heed  today  to 
the  warning  that  temporary  weakness  may  mean 
loss  of  national  existence  as  they  did  in  the  days 


Imperialism  a  Fact:  Its  Dangers  207 

of  Washington,  and  they  refuse  absolutely  to 
accept  it  as  an  inexorable  law  of  progress  that 
inferior  races  are  made  for  the  purpose  of  serving 
the  superior.  But  while  they  may  reject  these 
Machiavellian  maxims,  they  should  not  blind 
themselves  to  certain  incontrovertible  facts,  writ 
large  upon  their  own  imperial  record,  nor  are  they 
by  their  rejection  of  those  facts  able  to  becloud 
their  record. 

Militarism  did  not  lead  to  the  acquisition  by 
the  United  States  of  Alaska,  of  the  Hawaiian 
Islands,  of  Porto  Rico,  of  Tutuila  in  the  Samoan 
group,  of  Guam  in  the  Ladrones,  of  the  Philip- 
pines, or  to  the  building  of  the  Panama  Canal. 
For  these,  not  militarism,  but  a  great  resistless 
undercurrent  of  national  imperialism,  the  force 
of  which  was  generated  by  our  early  statesmen, 
is  responsible.  In  their  persistent  denial  of  the 
fact  of  our  imperialism  which  transcends  mere 
territorial  boundaries,  however  extensive,  the 
American  people  are  untrue  to  themselves. 

Turning  backward  through  the  pages  of  Ameri- 
can history  they  ascribe  to  our  statesmen,  as  for 
instance  to  Monroe,  motives  unsuspected  by  those 
persons  and  their  contemporaries  alike,  but  which 
nevertheless  led  inevitably  to  the  present,  and 
would  have  the  world  believe  that  they  have 
created  an  empire  without  knowing  it.  The 
empire  has  been  created,  however,  and  no  force 
of  logic  can  reverse  the  current  of  history  or  com- 
pel the  national  subconsciousness  back  into  an 


208  Empire  and  Armament 

attitude  of  mere  nationalism.  American  imperial- 
ism lies  deep  in  the  soul  of  the  nation;  nor  can  it 
be  disturbed  by  the  opposition  of  a  political  ad- 
ministration. It  is  a  great  popular  movement  and, 
as  in  all  such  movements,  there  is  in  it  a  power- 
ful element  of  passionate,  unreasoning,  almost  un- 
conscious national  enthusiasm  which  is  regarded 
in  a  very  unfavourable  light  by  the  people  of 
South  America  whose  interpretation  of  our  history 
does  not  harmonize  with  our  own.  Their  con- 
victions are  well  summarized  by  the  able  publicist, 
Calderon,  who  says : 

The  northern  Republic  has  been  the  beneficiary 
of  an  incessant  territorial  expansion;  in  1803,  it  ac- 
quired Louisiana;  in  1819,  Florida;  in  1845  and  1850, 
Texas;  the  Mexican  provinces  in  1848  and  1852,  and 
Alaska  in  1858.  The  annexation  of  Hawaii  took 
place  in  1898.  In  the  same  year  Porto  Rico,  the 
Philippines,  Guam,  and  one  of  the  Marianne  Islands, 
passed,  by  the  Treaty  of  Paris,  into  the  hands  of  the 
United  States.  They  obtained  the  Samoan  Islands 
in  1890,  wished  to  buy  the  Danish  West  Indies  in 
1902,  and  planted  their  imperialistic  standard  at 
Panama  in  1903.  Interventions  have  become  more 
frequent  with  the  expansion  of  frontiers.  The  United 
States  have  recently  intervened  in  the  territory  of 
Acre,  there  to  found  a  republic  of  rubber  gatherers; 
at  Panama,  there  to  develop  a  province  and  construct 
a  canal;  in  Cuba,  under  cover  of  the.  Piatt  amend- 
ment, to  maintain  order  in  the  interior;  in  San  Domingo 
to  support  the  civilizing  revolution  and  overthiow 
the  tyrants;  in  Venezuela,  and  in  Central  America, 


Imperialism  a  Fact:  Its  Dangers  209 

to  enforce  upon  these  nations,  torn  by  intestine  dis- 
orders, the  political  and  financial  tutelage  of  the  impe- 
rial democracy.  In  Guatemala  and  Honduras  the 
loans  concluded  with  the  monarchs  of  North  American 
finance  have  reduced  the  people  to  a  new  slavery. 
Supervision  of  the  customs  and  the  dispatch  of  pacifi- 
catory squadrons  to  defend  the  interests  of  the  Anglo- 
Saxon  have  enforced  peace  and  tranquillity;  such  are 
the  means  employed.  .  .  .  The  Yankee  ideal,  then,  is 
fatally  contrary  to  Latin- American  independence.1 

Now  it  is  not  the  accuracy  of  Calderon's  infer- 
ences but  the  truth  of  his  summary  of  our  expan- 
sive acts  that  is  important  in  this  study.  Again, 
it  is  not  whether  those  inferences  are  correct  or 
not,  but  the  fact  that  they  are  believed  by  the 
world  to  be  correct  that  matters.  That  summary 
should  impress  upon  us  the  fact  that  the  orbit  of 
the  American  planet  is  no  longer  a  circle,  or  even 
an  eccentric  ellipse,  uncrossed  by  the  paths  of 
other  national  bodies.  Indeed,  its  path  since  the 
days  of  Monroe  and  Polk  has  been  the  parabola 
of  imperialism  tracing  its  course  far  off  into  the 
infinity  of  the  future.  The  fact  that  collision  with 
other  imperialistic  bodies  has  not  so  far  occurred, 
does  not  justify  the  belief  that  no  such  collision 
ever  will  occur.  Let  us  cease  to  view  this  direful 
contingency  in  the  prejudiced  spirit  of  the  Jingo, 
that  spirit  always  so  restless  of  restraint  when 
danger  threatens.  A  confession  of  willingness  to 
consider  the  possible  dangers  of  the  future,  now, 

'F.  Garcia  Calderon,  Latin  America,  pp.  303-304;  306. 


210  Empire  and  Armament 

in  the  calmness  of  the  peace  which  we  enjoy  with 
all  the  world,  does  not  demand  that  we  shall  com- 
mit ourselves  to  a  program  of  excessive  armament, 
that  we  shall  "weight  Mars  down  so  heavily  with 
armour"  as  to  reduce  him  to  a  state  of  inertia,  or 
that  we  shall  revert  to  an  obsolete  social  state 
through  militarism,  by  misconstruing,  as  do  the 
Germans,  the  principle  of  survival  of  the  fittest  to 
be  the  equivalent  of  devil  take  the  hindmost. 

Our  national  danger  is  certainly  not  that  of  mili- 
tarism, but  it  is  one  even  greater — impertinent 
imperialism  which  fosters  the  invasion  of  one- 
half  of  the  world  while  reserving  to  its  exclusive 
exploitation  the  other  half.  Our  greatest  danger 
and  most  serious  threat  of  war  is  found  in  that 
present  day  Monroeism  which  has  led  us  on  to 
an  imperialism  transcending  the  wildest  fancies 
of  Monroe  and  Polk,  until  in  19 12  the  United 
States  Senate  actually  resolved : 

That  when  any  harbour  or  other  place  on  the 
American  Continents  is  so  situated  that  the  occupation 
thereof  for  naval  or  military  purposes  might  threaten 
the  communications  or  the  safety  of  the  United  States, 
the  government  of  the  United  States  could  not  see 
without  grave  concern  the  possession  of  such  harbour 
or  other  place  by  any  corporation  or  association  which 
has  such  a  relation  to  another  government,  not  Ameri- 
can, as  to  give  that  government  practical  power  of 
control  for  national  purposes. 

And  such  now  is  Monroeism.  Even  at  this 
hour  when  an  empire  of  American  interests  and 


Imperialism  a  Fact:  Its  Dangers  211 

territory  spreads  itself  world-wide  over  the  uni- 
verse, when  what  Webster  said  of  England  might 
be  applied  in  his  exact  words  to  America — a  Power 
which  has  dotted  over  the  surface  of  the  whole 
globe  with  her  possessions  and  military  posts; 
whose  morning  drum-beat,  following  the  sun  and 
keeping  company  with  the  hours,  circles  the 
earth  with  one  continuous  and  unbroken  strain  of 
the  martial  airs  of  the  United  States. 

And  yet  it  is  not  altogether  futile  for  those  who 
really  cherish  peace  to  seek  to  remove  the  ultimate 
cause  of  war  which  the  subconscious  and  ever- 
swelling  enthusiasm  of  American  imperialism, 
coupled  with  perverted  Monroeism,  sustains,  and 
that  there  is  such  a  present  cause  and  that  it  is 
possible  to  remove  it  cannot  well  be  doubted. 

It  is  a  sound  general  principle  that  a  poor  doc- 
trine, well  and  consistently  applied,  is  better  than 
a  good  doctrine  constantly  perverted  or  misap- 
plied. So  that  even  if  we  accept  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  in  its  original  form  as  a  good  one,  we 
cannot  deny  that  its  effect  has  been  to  lead  to  fre- 
quent misapplications  and  perversions,  for  there 
has,  perhaps,  never  been  a  national  doctrine  that 
has  been  so  illy  defined  and  so  variously  construed. 
This  is  unfortunate,  for  if  there  is  anything  that 
would  seem  to  require  clarity  of  expression,  and 
a  common  understanding,  certainly  on  the  part 
of  those  called  upon  to  put  it  into  effect,  it  is  a 
national  doctrine  which  by  its  persistence  has 
assumed  the  character  of  a  popular  shibboleth. 


212  Empire  and  Armament 

The  Monroe  Doctrine  has  never  been  under- 
stood, either  in  America  or  abroad.  The  proof  of 
this  assertion  is  to  be  found,  it  is  submitted,  in  the 
fact  that  President  John  Quincy  Adams,  who  was 
Secretary  of  State  under  James  Monroe,  when  he 
asserted  the  doctrine  in  1826,  as  has  been  shown, 
sought  to  apply  it  in  a  way  conclusive  of  the  fact 
that  his  conception  of  the  doctrine  was  not  that 
so  commonly  attributed  to  its  framer.  Again, 
in  1848,  when  Polk,  without  invoking  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  in  so  many  words,  sought  to  apply  the 
principle  of  exclusion  first  proclaimed  in  that 
doctrine,  Calhoun,  who  had  been  Secretary  of 
War  under  Monroe  and  Secretary  of  State  under 
Tyler,  declared  that  Monroe's  doctrine  did  not 
apply  to  the  Yucatan  case  in  question,  and  in 
conformity  with  his  view  the  recommendation  of 
the  Chief  Executive  was  overruled  by  Congress. 

These  facts  clearly  establish  the  point  that  at 
an  early  day  there  existed  a  complete  disagreement 
between  the  President,  Congress,  and  Calhoun 
who  had  not  only  held  the  foreign  portfolio  but 
had  actually  been  a  member  of  the  Cabinet  of 
Monroe  who  announced  the  doctrine  which  gave 
rise  to  the  misunderstanding.  Some  weight  should 
also  be  attached  to  the  fact  that  Calhoun,  like 
Clay,  was  an  original  exponent  of  American 
nationalism,  and  that  his  tendencies  were  very 
naturally  selfish  respecting  national  rights  as 
conceived  by  him.  But  the  attitude  of  John 
Quincy  Adams  is  even  more  significant  than  that 


Imperialism  a  Fact:  Its  Dangers  213 

of  Calhoun,  for  while  Calhoun  contributed  much 
to  Monroe's  state  policy,  Adams  was  actually  the 
American  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  at  the  time 
Monroe  proclaimed  his  doctrine  and  undoubtedly 
aided  materially  in  its  formulation.  Indeed  the 
actual  conception  of  that  doctrine  has  been  fre- 
quently attributed  to  Adams.  It  would  seem 
then,  that  if  Adams  did  not  know  Monroe's  intent 
as  to  the  scope  of  his  foreign  policy,  no  one  could 
have  known  it  except  Monroe  himself.  What 
Adams's  conception  of  that  policy  was  we  may 
infer  from  the  fact  that  in  instructing  his  delegates 
to  the  Panama  Congress  of  1826,  he  expressly 
excluded  the  idea  that  "a  joint  resistance  against 
any  future  attempt  to  plant  a  colony ' '  on  the  two 
American  continents  by  a  foreign  Power  should  be 
proposed,  but  that  each  South  American  state 
should  be  urged  to  adopt  separately  the  doctrine 
of  foreign  exclusion  proclaimed  by  Monroe  on 
behalf  of  the  United  States.  But  even  in  the  face 
of  such  facts  the  extensions  of  Monroe's  doctrine, 
sought  to  be  applied  by  Polk,  and  actually  applied 
by  others,  are  all  bundled  together  under  the  title 
of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  until  now  it  requires  a 
judicial  examination  to  isolate  the  real  doctrine 
from  its  perverted  forms.  In  this  fact  lurks  the 
gravest  danger. 

Whatever  view  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  one  may 
present,  whatever  interpretation  of  a  particular 
case  in  which  it  is  invoked  one  may  accept,  it  is 
certain  that  he  will  find  serious  opposition  along 


214  Empire  and  Armament 

historical  as  well  as  political  lines.  Were  this 
lack  of  accord  restricted  to  the  ignorant,  or  to  those 
who  exerted  no  national  influence,  the  danger 
would  not  be  so  great,  but  as  a  matter  of  fact 
the  most  divergent  views  on  our  most  important 
national  doctrine  exist  among  our  statesmen, 
public  men,  and  eminent  scholars. 

In  191 3,  a  prominent  scholar,  perhaps  the  fore- 
most authority  in  this  country  on  Latin-America 
and  its  affairs,  produced  a  work  entitled  The  Mon- 
roe Doctrine,  an  Obsolete  Shibboleth.  Reference  is 
here  made,  of  course,  to  Hiram  Bingham  of  Yale 
University.  The  contents  of  his  thoughtful  book 
accorded  well  with  its  title,  and  the  dedication  of 
the  work  to  James  Bryce  was  but  a  covert  en- 
couragement of  the  foreign  sentiment  on  our  South 
American  policy.  So  forceful  and  important  were 
Bingham's  arguments  against  the  American  policy, 
that  an  attempt  was  actually  made  to  have  his 
presentation  of  the  case  officially  considered  by 
Congress.     But  Bingham  is  only  one  of  many. 

There  are  those  who  assert  that  the  Monroe 
Doctrine,  including  its  extensions  and  perversions, 
has  proved  the  salvation  of  political  liberty,  not 
only  in  America,  North  and  South,  but  through- 
out the  world;  and  there  are  those  who  contend 
that  it  has  made  of  South  America  an  enormous 
Santo  Domingo,  by  preserving  it  for  a  people 
incapable  of  retaining  their  own  liberties.  There 
are  those  who  claim  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
has  been  a  blessing  to  all  mankind  through  the 


Imperialism  a  Fact:  Its  Dangers  215 

hope  and  encouragement  it  has  given  oppressed 
humanity  by  the  virile  potency  of  its  example; 
and  there  are  others  who  declare  that  it  has  barred 
the  progress  of  civilization  by  denying  the  over- 
crowded millions  of  Europe  from  seeking  oppor- 
tunity in  South  America,  and  that  in  many  ways 
it  has  been  more  fatal  to  humanity  than  the 
ferocity  and  ignorance  of  the  Turk ;  that  it  has  gal- 
vanized into  the  appearance  of  republics  political 
cadavers,  reeking  with  rottenness  and  degradation 
and  crying  out  for  decent  burial;  that  it  has  pre- 
vented Switzerlands  from  developing  for  the  sake 
of  Uruguays  and  Paraguays  and  continual  revo- 
lution ;  that  it  protects  vice,  ignorance,  and  general 
unenlightenment.  And  there  are  others  who  assert 
that  it  tends  to  mongrelize,  and  to  depress  wages 
in  the  United  States  by  directing  the  course  of 
immigration  to  North  America;  and  that  it  re- 
tards the  development  of  American  trade  by  main- 
taining an  unproductive  and  uncommercial  people 
in  exclusive  possession  of  the  rich  and  almost 
untouched  resources  of  South  America.  And 
then  it  is  asserted  that  a  strict  adherence  to  the 
doctrine  of  foreign  exclusion  in  South  America 
is  essential  on  the  part  of  the  United  States  as  a 
defensive  military  measure,  and  that  for  that 
purpose  if  for  no  other,  it  should  receive  national 
support,  but  it  is  even  more  strenuously  argued 
that  the  continuance  of  our  present  Latin-Ameri- 
can policy  in  the  present  age  of  imperialism  is 
the  surest  possible  guarantee  of  war  with  foreign 


216  Empire  and  Armament 

Powers  across  whose  path  of  inevitable  expansion 
it  throws  us;  that  the  countless,  starving  hordes 
of  Europe  and  the  Orient  will  not  relinquish  their 
designs  upon  the  only  remaining  field  of  exploita- 
tion without  a  struggle;  and  that  our  own  course 
of  imperialism  and  impertinence  is  bound,  sooner 
or  later,  to  aggravate  the  growing  resentment 
of  other  Powers  beyond  the  point  of  peaceable 
submission  to  our  will. 

However  extravagant  many  of  the  assertions 
in  connection  with  our  Latin-American  policy  may 
be,  the  mere  fact  of  those  assertions  evidences 
a  surprising  lack  of  unanimity  of  mind  as  to  our 
national  policy.  It  is  submitted  that  in  that  very 
lack  of  accord  is  to  be  found  a  graver  danger 
than  any  of  those  hereinbefore  pointed  out  in  the 
extravagant  condemnations  of  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine, for  if  our  foremost  statesmen,  those  actually 
entrusted  with  the  helm  of  the  American  ship  of 
State,  and  our  foremost  publicists  and  most 
eminent  scholars,  entertain  conflicting  views  as  to 
the  wisdom  of  the  policy  to  which  we  continue 
to  adhere,  and  as  to  the  real  scope  of  the  national 
doctrine,  it  stands  to  reason  that  foreign  govern- 
ments will  not  always  interpret  it  in  the  way  most 
favourable  to  the  United  States.  Indeed,  they 
are  far  more  apt  to  take  that  view  most  favourable 
to  their  own  ends. 

Let  us  assume,  however,  that  the  nations  of  the 
earth  are  really  desirous  of  respecting  American 
claims — how  shall   they   do  so  when  the   United 


Imperialism  a  Fact:  Its  Dangers  217 

States  itself  is  uncertain  as  to  what  those  claims 
really  are?  May  we  reasonably  expect  that  for- 
eign governments  will  take  the  pains  to  inform 
themselves  of  the  view  which  each  new  administra- 
tion takes  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine?  Shall  we 
compel  foreign  ministers  to  keep  constantly  in 
touch  with  the  American  political  market,  so  to 
speak,  and  inform  themselves  whether  Monroe 
Doctrine  stock  is  up  or  down?  And  suppose  an 
erroneous  interpretation  of  that  doctrine  be  made 
in  foreign  councils,  an  honest  misinterpretation 
such  as  that  made  by  President  Polk  and  others 
in  authority  in  the  United  States,  shall  the  penalty 
for  the  mistake  be  war?  In  all  probability,  yes, 
emphatically,  yes. 

War  would  undoubtedly  result  from  an  inten- 
tional violation  of  the  principles  laid  down  in  the 
Monroe  Doctrine,  or  in  any  popular  conception 
of  that  doctrine  in  vogue  at  the  time,  almost  as  a 
matter  of  course,  for  the  reason  that  the  Monroe 
shibboleth  has  in  reality  become  a  fetish  with  the 
people  of  the  United  States.  Our  President  and 
his  ministry  would  be  powerless  under  the  cir- 
cumstances to  restrain  American  Jingoism,  which 
even  in  time  of  national  calm  dominates  Congress. 
A  cool-headed  President  may  be  able  to  restrain 
the  nation  in  such  a  case  as  the  recent  one  involv- 
ing the  landing  of  troops  at  Vera  Cruz,  but  even 
then  his  hands  will  be  full,  nor  will  every  President 
be  capable  of  breasting  the  tide  in  the  same  manful 
way  that    Mr.  Wilson  did,  assuming  that   he  is 


218  Empire  and  Armament 

willing  to  do  so.  But  no  President  would  be  able 
to  resist  the  popular  demand  for  war  were  the 
national  fetish  involved. 

In  the  event  of  an  unintentional  violation,  in  all 
probability  the  result  would  not  be  different.  In 
the  first  place  the  innocent  offender  would  either 
be  given  no  opportunity  to  explain  before  a  na- 
tional insult  was  passed,  or  an  explanation  would 
be  demanded  in  such  stentorian  tones  as  to  cause 
just  affront.  In  the  second  place  no  explanation 
that  was  not  coupled  with  complete  retraction 
and  a  virtual  acknowledgment  of  our  protectorate 
in  South  America  would  be  satisfactory  to  Jin- 
goism rampant,  and  that  acknowledgment  has 
never  been  made,  nor  ever  will  be,  by  Europe  or 
Japan. 

It  may  be  argued  that  statesmanship  and  the 
pacific  temper  of  our  people  would  enable  war  to 
be  averted  in  the  cases  assumed  for  discussion. 
This  would  be  possible  if  our  people  have  really 
become  pacific  at  heart,  and  if  the  violation  were 
not  the  result  of  a  well-considered  act,  but  at  this 
time  expansion  falls  within  a  predetermined  policy 
of  imperialism,  whereas  formerly  it  was  more  or 
less  fortuitous.  Then  again  formerly  it  was  easier 
for  a  foreign  Power  to  ' '  try  us  out ' '  than  it  is  now, 
and  retract  without  serious  loss  of  dignity,  as  in 
the  case  of  France  in  Mexico.  At  that  time  France 
had  announced  no  definite  policy  of  expansion 
and  her  real  motives  could  be  covered  up.  It  was 
also  easier  to  plead   a  misinterpretation   of  our 


Imperialism  a  Fact:  Its  Dangers  219 

doctrine  then  than  now,  for  events  since  1866 
have  proved  to  the  world  that  an  inhibition  against 
foreign  political  activity  of  every  kind  is  embraced 
in  our  Monroe  fetish.  As  it  was,  in  1866,  in  spite 
of  the  most  polite  assurances  on  the  part  of 
France  that  she  had  no  sinister  designs,  and  not- 
withstanding the  fact  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
was  not  involved,  public  opinion  compelled  the 
massing  of  our  veteran  army  under  Sheridan  along 
the  Rio  Grande.  The  explanations  which  France 
made  then  could  not  be  made  now  without  a  loss 
of  dignity  which  her  people  would  not  tolerate. 

There  is  no  reason  to  suppose  that  Jingoism 
would  be  less  blatant  now  than  it  was  in  1866  when 
war  had  somewhat  chastened  the  nation  and  toned 
down  the  desire  for  war;  certainly  it  would  not 
be  less  so  than  in  1895  when  Cleveland  brought 
the  country  to  the  very  brink  of  war  which  was 
averted  principally  by  reason  of  the  good  humour 
of  the  British  and  the  good  sense  of  their  minister 
to  Venezuela,  who  practically  ignored  the  screams 
of  the  American  eagle  and  went  on  about  his 
business  in  a  really  pacific  way. 

We  have  seen  that  there  is  slight  chance  that 
the  American  people  will  ever  contribute  much 
to  lessen  the  immediate  causes  of  war;  in  fact  that 
one  of  their  most  persistent  national  traits  seems 
to  be  to  cry  out  for  war  when  the  real  crisis  comes, 
notwithstanding  all  their  claims  to  a  peaceful 
disposition.  Now  let  us  illustrate  the  point  that 
even  our  own  pacifists  do  not  deal  with  the  ulti- 


220  Empire  and  Armament 

mate  causes  of  war  in  an  intelligent  and  serious 
way. 

' '  The  one  way  for  a  man  to  rise  above  the  Pre- 
sidency of  the  United  States  is  to  ascend  into  the 
international  realm  and  there  work  for  peace 
through  justice.  Mr.  Taft  has  taken  this  upward 
step."  So  declares  Mr.  Hamilton  Holt  in  his  fore- 
word to  a  series  of  the  published  lectures  under  the 
title  of  The  United  States  and  Peace,  which  were 
delivered  by  Mr.  Taft  under  the  auspices  of  the 
New  York  Peace  Society.  The  following  is  what 
Mr.  Taft  contributes  to  the  question  of  Monroeism, 
and  how  he  proposes  to  remove  the  dangers  arising 
out  of  that  vexed  question. 

While  the  assertion  of  the  doctrine  covers  both 
continents,  the  measures  of  the  United  States  in  ob- 
jecting to  an  invasion  of  the  policy  [he  says]  might  be 
much  less  emphatic  in  the  case  where  it  was  attempted 
in  countries  as  remote  as  Argentina,  Brazil,  and  Chile 
than  in  the  countries  surrounding  the  Caribbean  Sea 
or  brought  close  to  the  United  States  by  the  opening 
of  the  Panama  Canal. 

And  again  he  says: 

In  other  words,  the  extent  of  our  intervention  to 
enforce  the  policy  is  a  matter  of  judgment,  with  a 
notice  that  it  might  cover  all  America.  It  therefore 
follows  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  so  far  as  it  applies 
to  Argentina,  Brazil,  and  Chile,  the  so-called  ABC 
governments  of  South  America,  is  now  never  likely 
to  be  pressed,  first  because  they  have  reached  such  a 


Imperialism  a  Fact:  Its  Dangers  221 

point  that  they  are  able  to  protect  themselves  against 
any  European  interference,  and,  second,  because  they 
are  so  remote  from  us  that  a  violation  of  the  doctrine 
with  respect  to  them  would  be  little  harmful  to  our 
interests  and  safety.1 

Rarely  will  one  find  so  much  gall  in  a  mixture 
obviously  prescribed  as  a  soothing  syrup.  In 
the  first  place  the  attempt  to  distinguish  between 
South  American  countries  on  the  ground  of  rela- 
tive remoteness  is  puerile  in  this  day  of  rapid  trans- 
portation. Brazil  is  nearer  the  United  States  than 
Uruguay  and  Paraguay ;  not  as  distant  as  Ecuador, 
and  no  more  remote  than  Bolivia  and  Peru.  Mr. 
Taft  must  know  that  communications  and  not 
territorial  location  largely  determines  remoteness. 
In  the  second  place,  we  find  Mr.  Taft  as  an  avowed 
pacifist  defending  the  right  of  the  United  States 
to  exercise  its  own  judgment  as  to  when  it  shall 
apply  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  and  to  give  a  notice 
that  it  may  cover  all  America.  In  other  words, 
he  sees  in  the  indefiniteness  of  its  application 
no  danger  whatever.  This  indefiniteness  is  some- 
what relieved  by  the  fact,  a  fact  which  Mr.  Taft 
does  not  seem  to  appreciate,  that  if  the  doctrine 
may  cover  all  America,  that  it  actually  embraces 
all  America  at  all  times  within  the  scope  of  its  appli- 
cation, leaving  only  the  uncertainty  as  to  whether 
the  United  States  in  its  sole  judgment,  a  judgment 

1  The  italics  in  the  foregoing  passages  are  not  those  of  Mr. 
Taft,  but  of  the  writer,  who  uses  them  for  emphasis. 


222  Empire  and  Armament 

depending  upon  the  political  caprice  of  any  parti- 
cular administration,  will  invoke  the  doctrine. 
This  uncertainty  does  not  tend  to  that  common 
understanding  so  essential  to  harmony.  In  the 
third  place,  Mr.  Taf  t  admits  that  the  ABC  Powers 
are  capable  of  protecting  themselves  against 
hostile  aggression.  Others  might  not  be  so  willing 
to  admit  this,  yet,  granting  for  the  sake  of  argu- 
ment that  it  is  true,  Mr.  Taft  sees  no  danger  what- 
ever in  a  situation  in  which  the  United  States  is 
likely  to  interfere  in  the  affairs  of  sovereign  states 
capable  of  managing  their  own  affairs.  He  fails 
utterly  to  see  that  it  is  the  very  likelihood  of  our 
interference  that  destroys  the  confidence  of  the 
ABC  Powers  in  our  Government  and  the  Ameri- 
can people.  It  is  that  very  likelihood  which  may 
materialize  into  actual  interference  when  in  the 
sole  judgment  of  the  United  States  it  seems  advis- 
able, that  to  the  South  American  states  seems 
inconsistent  with  their  dignity,  and  seems  to 
place  them  before  the  world  in  the  position  of 
protectorates  of  the  United  States. 

Mr.  Taft,  however  conscientious  and  laudable 
may  have  been  his  attempt,  has  contributed  little 
of  value  to  the  solution  of  the  South  American 
question.  He  has,  however,  strikingly  emphasized 
the  dangers  it  involves  in  attempting  to  deny  that 
they  exist,  and  for  this  reason  his  study  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  is  a  valuable  one. 

Should  war  ever  actually  occur  as  a  result  of 
the  Monroe  fetish  the  historian  will  in  the  retro- 


Imperialism  a  Fact:  Its  Dangers  223 

spect  detect  three  causes  for  the  conflict.  The 
first,  or  ultimate  cause,  will  be  the  present  inde- 
terminate nature  of  Monroeism;  the  second,  or 
the  proximate  cause,  will  be  the  desire  of  foreign 
Powers  to  share  in  the  exploitation  of  South 
America;  and  the  third,  or  immediate  cause,  will  be 
some  overt  act  in  connection  with  that  continent. 

The  time,  then,  has  come,  it  seems  to  the  author, 
for  American  pacifists  to  recognize  their  greatest 
opportunity.  Let  them  recall  the  attempt  made 
in  this  country,  in  1853,  when  the  Cuban  annexa- 
tion question  was  agitating  the  nation,  to  compel 
Congress  to  make  a  frank  declaration  of  American 
policy  by  giving  legislative  sanction  to  the  prin- 
ciples expressed  in  the  doctrine  of  Monroe  and 
Polk. 

If  the  ultimate  cause  of  a  future  war  lurks  in 
the  uncertainty  of  our  Monroeism,  surely  it  can- 
not be  difficult  to  make  a  new,  definite,  and  full 
declaration  of  our  South  American  policy.  If 
needs  be,  let  it  frankly  embrace  the  Monroe,  and 
the  Polk,  and  the  Grant,  and  the  Cleveland,  and 
the  Roosevelt  conceptions,  but  whatever  it  be 
designed  to  embrace,  let  it  be  fair  and  let  it  be 
definitely  proclaimed  to  all  the  world  in  order  that 
the  peace  lovers  and  the  pacifists  of  other  nations 
may  aid  in  preventing  their  governments  from 
provoking  us  into  war.  As  surely  as  pacifism 
remains  content  to  apply  its  balm  to  the  running 
sore  alone,  its  efforts  at  curing  the  cancerous 
growth  of  war  will  remain  unavailing,  for  when  it 


224  Empire  and  Armament 

is  too  late  the  unmilitary  but  militant  voice  of 
America  will  again  be  heard  to  cry  out  for  war ! — 
that  war  which  her  people  have  shown  them- 
selves so  willing  to  provoke,  whenever  self-interest 
seemed  to  dictate  its  expediency. 


PART  II 

ARMAMENT  AND  THE  PROBLEM  OF 
ADEQUATE  NATIONAL  DEFENCE 


is  225 


CHAPTER  XV 

ADEQUATE   DEFENCE    INDISPENSABLE  TO  PACIFISM 

THE  dangers  attending  a  policy  of  national 
imperialism  have  been  shown  concurrently 
with  the  facts  of  the  evolution  of  American  im- 
perialism. Furthermore,  it  has  been  shown  that 
along  with  the  inherent  dangers  of  an  imperialistic 
policy  there  is,  in  the  case  of  the  United  States,  a 
national  characteristic  tending  to  aggravate  those 
inherent  dangers.  But  it  must  not  be  assumed 
that  there  is  not  a  sincere  conscious  desire  on  the 
part  of  thinking  Americans  to  subvert  the  evils 
of  that  underlying  aggressive  national  spirit  which 
has  invariably  manifested  itself  in  the  restless 
struggle  group  comprising  the  people  of  the  United 
States.  It  is  only  contended  that,  so  far,  a  pacific 
spirit  has  not  been  the  controlling  factor  in  Ameri- 
can history.  Nor  will  it  ever  be  until  the  true 
scope  and  the  limitations  of  legitimate  pacifism 
are  generally  understood  and  appreciated,  for 
without  this  duality,  cross  purposes  and  conflict 
will  only  continue  between  men  working  for  the 
same  end — peace. 

While  the  word   pacifism   is  not  to  be  found 
227 


228  Empire  and  Armament 

except  in  the  most  recent  dictionaries,  I  think  one 
is  justified  in  distinguishing  between  pacifism  in 
its  true  sense  and  the  fanciful  theories  advanced 
by  those  who  claim  the  title  of  pacifist.  Pacifism 
is  that  "ism"  embracing  within  its  scope  meas- 
ures productive  of  peaceable  relations  between 
nations,  states,  and  governments.  It  may  have 
perpetual  peace  as  an  aim;  it  does  not  necessarily 
embody  its  attainment  by  disarmament  or  by 
means  of  an  international  posse  comitatus,  as  a 
present  possibility.  And  this  we  know — much 
harm  is  done  the  cause  of  pacifism  by  those  who 
in  its  name  proffer  the  world  their  various  "elixirs" 
of  universal  and  perpetual  peace,  most  of  which  are 
to  serious  minded  students  of  history  obviously 
impotent  quacks. 

True  pacifism  may  best  be  defined  as  propa- 
ganda which  to  some  extent  is  adequate  to  accom- 
plish the  end  of  peace.  The  minute  physical 
force,  such  as  that  exercisable  by  an  international 
police,  is  proposed  as  a  means  of  compelling  peace, 
one  demurs  to  the  proposition  that  such  a  means 
is  within  the  scope  of  pacifism,  for  the  element 
of  physical  compulsion  if  brought  into  play  is 
itself  but  a  warlike  force,  war  being  the  exercise 
of  force  through  the  use  of  arms.  Pacifism  em- 
braces no  such  means.  War  cannot  be  set  aside 
by  war. 

True  pacifism,  or  pacifism  that  is  adequate  to 
accomplish  the  ends  of  peace — not  immediate 
universal  peace  but  more  peaceable  relations  be- 


Adequate  National  Defence       229 

tween  men  organized  into  states — must  embody 
purely  ethical  propaganda  as  opposed  to  physical 
means. 

One  who  is  unendowed  with  a  spirit  of  patience 
and  who  is  ignorant  of  the  laws  of  nature  will  only 
become  discouraged  by  the  apparent  failure  of  his 
efforts  as  a  pacifist.  The  requisite  amount  of 
patience  for  a  pacifist  in  the  true  sense  is  very 
great,  nor  will  any  amount  suffice  if  it  be  not  at- 
tended by  a  broad  knowledge  of  the  cosmic  law. 
The  path  of  pacifism  is  strewn  all  along  with  the 
fallen  forms  of  the  backsliders,  once  ardent  and 
hopeful  spirits  whose  patience  was  exhausted  or 
whose  knowledge  was  too  limited  to  enable  them 
to  struggle  on  towards  the  promised  but  elusive 
haven  of  peace.  Such  a  one,  for  instance,  was 
John  Adams,  who  in  answer  to  an  invitation  to 
become  a  member  of  a  society  for  the  promotion 
of  peace,  replied : 

Quincy,  February  6,  1816. 

Dear  Sir, 

I  have  received  your  kind  letter  of  the  23rd  of 
January,  and  I  thank  you  for  the  pamphlets  inclosed 
with  it. 

It  is  very  true,  as  my  excellent  friend,  Mr.  Norton, 
has  informed  you,  that  I  have  read  many  of  your 
publications  with  pleasure. 

I  have  also  read,  almost  all  the  days  of  my  life,  the 
solemn  reasonings  and  pathetic  declamations  of  Eras- 
mus, of  Fenelon,  of  St.  Pierre,  and  many  others  against 
war,  and  in  favour  of  peace.  My  understanding  and 
my  heart  accorded  with  them  at  first  blush.      But, 


230  Empire  and  Armament 

alas!  a  longer  and  more  extensive  experience  has  con- 
vinced me  that  wars  are  as  necessary  and  as  inevita- 
ble, in  our  system,  as  Hurricanes,  Earthquakes,  and 
Volcanoes. 

Our  beloved  country,  sir,  is  surrounded  by  enemies, 
of  the  most  dangerous,  because  the  most  powerful 
and  most  unprincipled  character.  Collisions  of  na- 
tional interest,  of  commercial  and  manufacturing 
rivalries,  are  multiplying  around  us.  Instead  of  dis- 
couraging a  martial  spirit,  in  my  opinion,  it  ought  to 
be  excited.  We  have  not  enough  of  it  to  defend  us 
by  sea  or  land. 

Universal  and  perpetual  peace  appears  to  me,  no 
more  nor  less  than  everlasting  passive  obedience,  and 
non-resistance.  The  human  flock  would  soon  be 
fleeced  or  butchered  by  one  or  a  few. 

I  cannot  therefore,  sir,  be  a  subscriber  or  a  member 
of  your  society. 

I  do,  sir,  most  humbly  supplicate  the  theologians, 
the  philosophers,  and  the  politicians,  to  let  me  die  in 
peace.     I  seek  only  repose. 

With  the  most  cordial  esteem,  however, 
I  am,  sir,  your  friend  and  servant, 

John  Adams. 

In  this  reply  Mr.  Adams  displayed  both  a  lack 
of  patience  and  an  ignorance  of  the  cosmic  law, 
the  latter  not  having  been  formulated  for  him  by 
the  great  pioneer  trio  of  evolution.  He,  like  many 
before  him,  including  Plato  and  Dionysius  and 
Luther,  had  experienced  only  enough  of  the  cosmic 
process  to  know  that  war  is  inevitable,  but  not 
enough  to  know  that  it  is  within  the  power  of  man, 


Adequate  National  Defence       231 

and  that  it  is  his  ethical  duty  to  strive  to  set  aside 
the  cosmic  process  in  all  its  persistence,  and  that 
even  though  failing  to  set  it  aside,  yet,  to  mitigate 
the  severity  of  its  sway.  This  is  what  Huxley 
meant  when  he  wrote: 

.  .  .  Society  differs  from  nature  in  having  a  definite 
moral  object;  whence  it  comes  about  that  the  course 
shaped  by  the  ethical  man — the  member  of  society 
or  citizen — necessarily  runs  counter  to  that  which  the 
non-ethical  man — the  primitive  savage,  or  man  as  a 
mere  member  of  the  animal  kingdom — tends  to  adopt. 
The  latter  fights  out  the  struggle  for  existence  to  the 
bitter  end,  like  any  other  animal;  the  former  devotes 
his  best  energies  to  the  object  of  setting  limits  to  the 
struggle. 

And  again: 

Men  in  society  are  undoubtedly  subject  to  the 
cosmic  process.  As  among  other  animals,  multipli- 
cation goes  on  without  cessation,  and  involves  severe 
competition  for  the  means  of  support.  The  struggle 
for  existence  tends  to  eliminate  those  less  fitted  to 
adapt  themselves  to  the  circumstances  of  their  exist- 
ence. The  strongest,  the  most  self-assertive,  tend  to 
tread  down  the  weaker.  But  the  influence  of  the 
cosmic  process  on  the  evolution  of  society  is  the 
greater  the  more  rudimentary  its  civilization.  Social 
progress  means  a  checking  of  the  cosmic  process  at 
every  step  and  the  substitution  for  it  of  another, 
which  may  be  called  the  ethical  process;  the  end  of 
which  is  not  the  survival  of  those  who  may  happen 


232  Empire  and  Armament 

to  be  the  fittest,  in  respect  of  the  whole  of  the  condi- 
tions which  obtain,  but  of  those  who  are  ethically 
the  best. 

As  I  have  already  urged,  the  practice  of  that  which 
is  ethically  best — what  we  call  goodness  or  virtue — 
involves  a  course  of  conduct  which,  in  all  respects,  is 
opposed  to  that  which  leads  to  success  in  the  cosmic 
struggle  for  existence.  In  place  of  ruthless  self- 
assertion  it  demands  self-restraint;  in  place  of  thrust- 
ing aside,  or  treading  down,  all  competitors,  it  requires 
that  the  individual  shall  not  merely  respect,  but  shall 
help  his  fellows;  its  influence  is  directed,  not  so  much 
to  the  survival  of  the  fittest,  as  to  the  fitting  of  as 
many  as  possible  to  survive.  It  repudiates  the  gladia- 
torial theory  of  existence.  It  demands  that  each  man 
who  enters  into  the  enjoyment  of  the  advantages  of 
a  polity  shall  be  mindful  of  his  debt  to  those  who  have 
laboriously  constructed  it;  and  shall  take  heed  that 
no  act  of  his  weakens  the  fabric  in  which  he  has  been 
permitted  to  live.  Laws  and  moral  precepts  are 
directed  to  the  end  of  curbing  the  cosmic  process  and 
reminding  the  individual  of  his  duty  to  the  commun- 
ity; to  the  protection  and  influence  of  which  he  owes, 
if  not  his  existence  itself,  at  least  the  life  of  something 
better  than  a  brutal  savage.  .  .  . 

Let  us  understand,  once  for  all,  that  the  ethical 
progress  of  society  depends,  not  on  imitating  the 
cosmic  process,  still  less  in  running  away  from  it,  but 
in  combating  it.  It  may  seem  an  audacious  proposal 
thus  to  pit  the  microcosm  against  the  macrocosm  and 
to  set  man  to  subdue  nature  to  his  higher  ends ;  but  I 
venture  to  think  that  the  great  intellectual  difference 
between  the  ancient  times  .  .  .  and  our  day  lies  in 
the  solid  foundation  we  have  acquired  for  the  hope 


Adequate  National  Defence      233 

that   such  an  enterprise   may  meet  with    a  certain 
measure  of  success. 


It  is  just  as  wrong  to  argue  from  these  words 
that  the  theory  of  evolution  does  not  permit  of 
ethical  efforts  directed  against  the  cosmic  process, 
as  it  is  to  assume  that  society,  whatever  the  efforts 
of  the  aggregates  thereof  may  be,  is  not  subject 
to  the  cosmic  process. 

The  propaganda  of  true  pacifism  is  justified 
then,  by  the  theory  of  evolution,  to  the  extent  that 
the  conditions  of  the  struggle  under  the  cosmic 
process  may  be  mitigated  by  the  ethical  efforts  of 
men,  though  it  does  not  justify  the  belief  that  the 
cosmic  process  may  be  completely  set  aside;  far 
less  that  it  is  already  set  aside.  War  is  undoubtedly 
a  great  illusion,  to  borrow  the  phrase  of  Norman 
Angell,  but  so  is  crime,  hate,  envy,  and  in  fact, 
all  unsocial  acts  and  tendencies.  The  facts  of 
everyday  life  deny  that  man  has  reached  a  stage 
of  ethical  development  in  which  unsocial  acts 
cannot  occur,  and  contemporary  history  refutes 
the  contention  that  nations  will  no  longer  resort 
to  war.  Were  nations  no  longer  prone  to  resort 
to  war  as  a  justifiable  agency  it  would  be  gramma- 
tically incorrect  to  refer  to  war  as  an  illusion.  In 
fact,  human  society  has  not  yet  progressed  to  an 
ethical  stage  in  which  force  employed  to  compel 
right  is  regarded  as  immoral.  Moral  as  well  as 
political  law  is  yet  upheld  by  force.  The  power 
of  the  law  is  not  referred  to  as  an  illusion  because 


234  Empire  and  Armament 

the  existing  limitations  of  human  character  are 
recognized.  And  so,  in  the  code  of  international 
law,  we  find  the  armed  intervention  of  a  state 
justified  upon  certain  grounds.  Intervention  in 
behalf  of  a  population  oppressed  by  its  govern- 
ment, to  assist  a  state  in  suppressing  popular 
disorders  which  it  itself  cannot  subdue,  is  a  moral 
duty,  moral  because  necessary  to  the  welfare  of 
society,  and  necessary  because  the  ethical  process 
has  not  yet  superseded  the  cosmic  process.  "Think 
not  that  I  am  come  to  send  peace  on  earth :  I  come 
not  to  send  peace,  but  a  sword."  Thus  spake 
Christ,  but  he  did  not  mean,  as  the  militarist 
assumes,  that  the  strong  should  wield  the  sword 
against  the  weak,  but  that  the  strong  should  wield 
the  sword  in  the  defence  of  and  for  the  uplift  of 
the  weak — as  Huxley  says,  to  make  the  unfit 
fitter. 

On  the  ground  of  material  expediency  the  United 
States  is  no  doubt  justified  in  refusing  to  intervene 
in  Mexico;  the  reasons  given  by  the  Administra- 
tion through  the  expressions  of  the  President 
clearly  establish  the  fact  that  ethical  considerations 
are  not  the  controlling  factors  in  the  policy  of  the 
Government.  The  interests  of  pacifism  may  be 
subserved  by  allowing  the  devil  unrestrained  sway, 
undisputed  dominion  in  Mexico.  But  there  are 
many,  who  like  Huxley,  are  unwilling  to  admit 
that  it  is  not  the  ethical  duty  of  strong  nations 
to  allow  the  cosmic  process  in  Mexico  to  work  it- 
self out  unchecked.     Many  also,  who  know  noth- 


Adequate  National  Defence      235 

ing  whatever  of  the  evolutionary  theory,  believe  it 
is  the  moral  duty  of  the  strong  to  help  the  unfit  to 
be  fitter,  even  if  the  compulsion  of  arms  is  necessary 
to  attain  that  end. 

If  the  United  States  justifies  its  intervention 
on  behalf  of  the  Cubans,  in  1898,  on  moral  grounds, 
it  would  seem  inconsistent  to  attempt  to  justify 
itself  on  similar  grounds  for  allowing  the  Mexicans 
to  bleed  themselves  to  death,  for  the  gratification 
of  a  succession  of  factious  leaders  who  apparently 
do  not  possess  even  a  veneer  of  culture.  The  author 
is  not  prepared  to  say  that  it  is  not  politically  and 
economically  wise  for  the  United  States  to  hold 
aloof  from  interfering  in  the  affairs  of  Mexico. 
Many  think  it  is,  so  many  that  the  Administra- 
tion seems  to  find  encouraging  support  for  its 
policy.  But  this  is  certain :  the  more  compelling 
the  political  and  economic  arguments  in  support 
of  the  President's  policy,  the  more  obvious  it  is 
that  the  selfish  material  interests  of  that  state, 
so  often  declared  to  be  "the  hope  of  humanity," 
and  not  a  conception  of  moral  duty  to  the  world, 
dictates  its  course  in  its  dealing  with  the  world, 
for  no  one  can  deny  that  Mexico  would  be  ethi- 
cally better  off  if  the  United  States  were  to  take 
upon  itself  the  burden  of  establishing  law  and 
order  within  its  boundaries.  As  evidence,  also, 
of  the  fact  that  the  United  States  has  not  reached 
the  plane  of  ethical  development  in  which  force  is 
not  apt  to  be  misused,  it  is  declared  by  many  publi- 
cists that  once  in  Mexico  she  would  remain  in  posses- 


236  Empire  and  Armament 

sion.  That  belief  is  assigned  by  many  as  a  reason 
against  the  expediency  of  intervention.  In  this  view 
it  is  the  contemplated  disadvantage  of  the  United 
States  and  not  the  benefit  of  Mexico  that  controls. 
The  time  has  not  yet  come  when  a  great  moral 
sacrifice  on  the  part  of  one  State  for  the  benefit 
of  another  is  seriously  and  generally  contemplated, 
unless  the  material  gains  to  be  had  will  probably 
offset,  if  not  exceed,  the  material  losses,  and  when 
such  is  the  case  there  is,  of  course,  really  no  sacri- 
fice at  all.  The  reader's  thoughts  at  once  return 
to  Cuba,  but  who  shall  say  how  much  of  revenge 
for  a  national  insult,  how  much  of  the  spirit  of 
imperialism,  how  much  of  a  feeling  of  moral 
obligation,  entered  into  the  decision  of  the  United 
States  in  that  case?  Certain  it  is  the  imperialists 
had  long  had  their  eyes  on  Cuba,  and  certain  it  is 
that  intervention  did  not  come  until  the  supposed 
national  insult  compelled  it,  notwithstanding  a 
decade  of  massacre  and  rapine  in  that  unfortunate 
island,  and  which  was  no  more  revolting  to  the 
world  in  1898  than  it  had  been  in  1897  and  the 
years  immediately  preceding. 

But  the  United  States  twice  abandoned  Cuban 
soil,  says  the  pacifist,  and  in  doing  so  gave  to  the 
world  a  great  moral  precept.  In  reply  one  need 
only  suggest  the  reading  of  the  treaty  which  de- 
fines the  relation  of  the  United  States  to  Cuba, 
and  a  review  of  the  political  situation  in  1898. 
When  the  national  press  was  able  to  enumerate 
the  possible  offsets  to  the  losses  a  war  of  interven- 


Adequate  National  Defence       237 

tion  would  entail,  certain  it  is  that  the  Government 
was  not  ignorant  of  the  opportunity  a  war  would 
afford  to  recoup  those  losses  in  territory,  trade, 
and  extended  influence,  and  long  since  the  United 
States  has  balanced  the  Cuban  account  which 
shows  a  startling  profit.  No.  The  world  will  not 
credit  the  United  States  with  a  sacrifice  in  the  case 
of  Cuba. 

These  various  conclusions  lead  to  the  practi- 
cal consideration  of  pacifism.  Surely  since  it  is 
impractical  to  regard  the  cosmic  process  as  set 
aside,  even  if  it  may  be  gradually  superseded  in 
the  future,  it  is  irrational  to  launch  forth  upon  a 
campaign  of  ethical  opposition  in  the  interest  of 
mitigation,  by  subjecting  society,  more  completely 
than  it  is  at  present,  to  the  cosmic  process  of 
struggle.  Just  that  is  what  the  disarmamentists 
propose  to  do.  But  how  unwise  it  would  be  to 
set  out  in  search  of  the  wolf  of  war  whose  presence 
we  admit  and  which  we  propose  to  slay,  while  the 
lamb  of  peace  remains  unguarded  in  the  pasture! 
Such  is  the  illogical  proposal  of  the  disarmament- 
ists. Admitting  in  one  breath  that  war  is  bane- 
fully  present  and  that  it  is  a  menace  to  human 
happiness,  in  the  next  breath  they  ask  the  world 
to  proceed  on  the  assumption  that  it  is  not  a 
menace.  In  one  breath  they  characterize  war 
as  "the  great  illusion";  in  the  next  they  assure 
us  that  the  end  of  strife  is  near  at  hand. 

The  truth  is,  the  Goddess  of  Peace  is  a  woman 
of  the  most  fickle  nature.     Cajoled  by  her  charms, 


238  Empire  and  Armament 

men  cast  discretion  aside  and  flirt  with  the  allur- 
ing creature,  careless  of  all  experience  and  the 
warnings  of  history.  The  counsels  of  the  sages 
are  either  entirely  forgotten  or  denied  with  impa- 
tience when  recalled  to  our  minds  by  the  unin- 
fatuated.  "Times  are  changed,"  we  confidently 
aver;  a  single  smile  of  the  fair  entrancer  puts  the 
lie  upon  every  maxim  which  experience,  the  bit- 
terest experience,  may  have  advanced.  And  so, 
with  discredit,  comes  disuse,  and  finally  atrophy 
of  warlike  powers,  a  process  which  attains  its 
ultimate  result  at  the  very  stage  in  the  decay  of 
physical  resisting  power  when  the  hardy  traits  of 
men  are  most  needed.  Men  grow  to  regard  in- 
dividual wealth  and  luxury  as  the  true  sources 
of  national  power,  forgetting  that  these  are  often 
the  very  causes  of  national  weakness  and 
dissolution. 

The  first  cost  of  insurance  is  high.  Were  eter- 
nal life  guaranteed,  who  would  assume  the  burden 
of  an  annual  premium?  The  Goddess  of  Peace 
has  promised  the  nation  an  enduring  release  from 
war.  Nothing  is  more  natural  then,  than  that 
the  demagogue,  in  looking  for  the  source  from 
which  his  own  selfish  wants  are  to  be  supplied, 
should  assail  the  supposedly  useless  policy  of 
national  insurance,  for  by  doing  so  he  makes  his 
capital — political  capital  as  an  economist,  financial 
capital  as  a  needy  seeker  of  means  for  his  own 
projects  and  aggrandizement.  And  then,  the  in- 
evitable   occurs,   the  immutable  laws  of   nature 


Adequate  National  Defence       239 

assert  themselves;  death  claims  his  due  and  the 
banners  of  war  are  once  more  unfurled.  Then 
we  see,  but  all  too  late,  how  cheap  is  the  final 
cost  of  insurance  against  these  dread  and  inevit- 
able contingencies.  Then  it  is  we  turn  in  disgust 
from  the  fickle  goddess  who  has  only  betrayed  us 
as  she  did  our  forefathers,  and  who  smiles  no  more 
upon  the  victims  of  her  deceit.  Such  is  the  ever- 
recurring  cycle  of  history,  in  every  chapter  of 
which  evidence  of  the  process  is  found.  It  seems 
inexplicable  that  man  cannot  heed  the  warning 
against  that  strange  fatuity  which  persistently 
robs  him  of  the  power  of  perception — perception 
of  the  most  fundamental  facts.  The  scientific 
experiences  of  Archimedes,  of  Galileo,  of  Newton, 
of  Bacon,  are  writ  into  the  most  modern  texts. 
The  political  experience  of  mankind  is  seldom 
included  in  its  bearing  upon  peace  and  war,  and 
never  heeded,  if  perchance  presented.  The  most 
learned  scholar  accepts  the  principles  of  science 
so  long  as  the  science  is  not  that  of  war. 

Rational  men  do  not  consult  dentists  upon 
medical  questions,  but  they  accept  with  the  utmost 
confidence  the  views  of  a  politician  upon  matters  of 
a  military  nature.  Who  has  not  seen  the  views 
of  a  local  editor  presented  with  assurance,  and 
accepted  with  confidence,  in  refutation  of  the 
views  of  the  professional  soldier?  The  cheap  and 
senseless  oratory  of  a  single  senator  will  consign 
to  the  national  waste-basket  the  most  thoughtful 
report  of  the  Secretary  of  War. 


240  Empire  and  Armament 

We  read  and  reread,  print  and  reprint,  the  words 
of  Washington  and  other  great  statesmen  until 
they  touch  upon  the  one  subject  of  war  and  the 
danger  of  vv^ar.  That  portion  we  utterly  ignore 
and  would  gladly  expunge  it  from  the  record,  for 
we  believe  it  to  be  valueless  because  times,  as  we 
say,  have  changed  in  respect  to  that  very  element 
of  human  nature  which  has  given  history  its  same- 
ness throughout  the  ages.  And  so  we  read  with 
approval  and  full  credence  reports  of  the  early 
elimination  of  national  strife,  ignoring  the  fact 
that  in  the  lifetime  of  those  who  herald  the  advent 
of  universal  peace,  the  greatest  struggles  in  the 
history  of  man  have  occurred. 

Such  is  the  strange  fatuity  of  our  people,  that 
they  bitterly  resent  the  cry  of  wolf  and  condemn 
the  foresighted  advocate  of  adequate  armament 
as  a  public  enemy  of  good  morals  and  a  nuisance. 
Intellectual,  capable  men,  characterized  b}^  the 
sanity  of  their  views  in  all  other  respects,  simply 
close  their  eyes  and  refuse  to  consider  the  prob- 
ability of  the  persistence  of  war,  however  infre- 
quent it  may  become.  They  say:  "We  will  cross 
the  bridge  when  we  come  to  it."  Would  these 
same  men,  who  have  learned  from  the  process  of 
nature  that  rain  falls  from  an  apparently  clear 
sky,  build  a  structure  with  no  roof  and  refuse  to 
provide  protection  for  their  possessions  by  placing 
a  roof  on  the  building  until  the  storm  broke  ?  No. 
Yet  rainfall  seems  to  be  no  more  of  a  certainty  than 
social  conflict,  however  bright  the  political  sky. 


Adequate  National  Defence       241 

Today  we  are  told  by  the  deluded  disarmament- 
ists  that  it  is  foolish  extravagance  to  be  prepared 
for  war;  that  preparedness  is  not  only  an  ineffec- 
tual means  of  preserving  peace  but  that  it  provokes 
war;  that  a  free  people  need  not  be  armed  and 
disciplined,  and  that  no  uniform  and  well-digested 
military  policy  is  necessary.  The  wisdom  of 
Washington  is  denied  absolutely,  and  strange 
though  it  may  be,  our  people  accept  the  advice 
of  ignorant  demagogues  and  deluded  theorists  in 
preference  to  that  of  the  founder  of  their  liberties, 
whose  whole  life  was  devoted  to  the  acquisition 
of  peace.  Shall  we  continue  to  heed  the  views  of 
the  disarmamentists  ?  Shall  we  follow  them  with 
their  theories,  or  shall  we  take  counsel  from  the 
experience  of  every  age,  while  striving  to  change 
the  nature  of  men  and  to  elevate  the  conscience 
of  their  governments? 

Let  us  strive  on  and  continue  to  enlighten  the 
advocates  of  war,  but  let  us  be  prepared  to  over- 
whelm every  possible  enemy  with  arms  should  he 
refuse  to  be  educated  and  prefer  to  assail  us  instead. 

The  pacifist  must  ever  keep  in  mind  the 
parable  of  the  foolish  virgins  in  the  Gospel.  He 
should  also  ponder  the  admonition  contained  in 
the  text : ' '  Put  on  the  whole  armour  of  God. ' '  The 
emphasis,  of  course,  is  upon  whole, — the  moral 
and  spiritual  preparation  for  the  fulfilment  of 
social  and  international  duty.  If  the  spiritual 
and  the  moral  concepts  are  duly  correlated  with 
the  material  concept  of  armament,  all  will  be  well 
16 


242  Empire  and  Armament 

with  humanity  in  spite  of  the  persistence  of  the 
cosmic  process  and  the  unsocial  characteristics 
of  man. 

Pacifism,  to  be  adequate,  must  recognize  the 
cosmic  process.  To  be  practical  it  must  compound 
education  and  adequate  defensive  measures 
against  the  uneducated,  or  the  "blond  beasts"  of 
the  human  race  who  wage  a  gladiatorial  contest 
for  survival.  As  the  power  of  this  element  is  re- 
duced by  education,  by  ethical  effort,  armament 
may  be  correspondingly  reduced;  a  too  rapid  dis- 
armament on  the  part  of  the  ethical  workers  would 
only  tend  to  reinvest  the  "blond  beasts"  with  their 
pristine  strength.  And  here  let  it  be  added  that 
the  "blond  beasts"  of  the  world  are  those  states 
imbued  with  the  morals  of  Nietzsche,  who  taught, 
"You  shall  love  peace  as  a  means  to  new  wars. 
And  the  short  peace  better  than  the  long . "  "  Men 
shall  be  trained  for  war,  and  woman  for  the  solace 
of  the  warrior.  Everything  else  is  folly."  With 
such  a  philosophy  extant  and  openly  professed  by 
no  inconsiderable  portion  of  the  world's  society, 
to  seriously  consider  disarming  the  more  enlight- 
ened element  of  that  society  is  but  to  court  the 
submersion  of  its  ideals  in  the  depths  of  ignorance, 
is  but  to  contemplate  reversion  to  Teutonic  bar- 
barism, or,  regarded  from  the  German  viewpoint, 
is  but  to  contemplate  an  advance  to  Prussian 
civilization. 

It  is  perfectly  logical  to  seek  to  overthrow  the 
sway  of  Mars  and  yet  not  assent  to  disarmament. 


Adequate  National  Defence       243 

Mars  must  be  recognized  as  the  great  Goliath  of 
our  day,  and  we  must  not  throw  away  the  sling 
with  which  he  may  be  slain.  The  shirt  of  mail  is 
too  stoutly  woven  to  be  penetrated  by  words 
alone. 

The  sling  which  pacifists  must  employ  in  as- 
sailing the  giant  Mars  must  not  be  robbed  of  its 
missile.  Let  education  be  the  sling  and  adequate 
armament  the  missile.  For  the  present  there  is 
need  of  both — education  to  eradicate  the  false 
philosophy  of  the  "blond  beast,"  and  armament  to 
save  the  enlightened  portions  of  the  earth  from 
his  dominion  during  the  educative  process. 

How  truly  spoke  Nicholas  Murray  Butler  when 
he  said: 

Disarmament  will  never  come  by  pressure  from 
without  a  nation,  but  only  by  pressure  from  within. 
If  justice  is  established  between  nations,  peace  will 
follow  as  a  matter  of  course.  The  reign  of  peace 
will  cause  armaments  to  atrophy  from  disuse.  Dis- 
armament will  follow  peace  as  an  effect,  not  precede 
it  as  a  cause. 

War  as  a  pastime  for  autocratic  rulers  will 
eventually  be  eliminated  by  education ;  as  a  cosmic 
agency  it  will  continue,  however  infrequent  the 
ethical  efforts  of  man  may  make  it.  Already 
states  venturing  into  war  are  beginning  to  justify 
their  decision  to  fight  when  in  the  right,  and  to 
proffer  the  world  apologetic  lies  when  in  the  wrong. 
This  is  a  hopeful  sign.     It  does  not  indicate,  how- 


244  Empire  and  Armament 

ever,  that  a  time  is  rapidly  approaching  when 
states  in  the  right  will  not  employ  force  to  assert 
their  right,  for  such  a  non-resisting  attitude  would 
be  but  the  complete  setting  aside  of  the  cosmic 
process  in  which  the  fit  survive,  the  word  "fit" 
as  applied  to  society  being  used  in  its  ethical  rather 
than  in  its  brute  sense. 

Since  society  has  not  reached  its  highest  attain- 
able stage  of  development  there  must  be  human 
elements  below  the  attainable  stage,  and  these 
elements  stand  at  varying  degrees  of  development. 
The  lower  in  the  scale  an  element  stands  the  more 
subject  it  is  to  the  cosmic  process  of  which  alone 
it  has  experience,  and  at  whatever  stage  it  stands 
it  is  always  subject  to  the  danger  either  of  actual 
reversion  to  a  lower  stage  by  reason  of  moral  de- 
terioration, or  of  relative  retrogression  by  reason  of 
being  surpassed  in  the  progressive  struggle.  It  is 
this  moving  onward  and  upward,  slipping  back- 
ward and  downward,  at  varying  rates,  that  makes 
struggle  between  the  elements  of  society,  organ- 
ized into  states,  as  much  a  law  of  the  cosmic  pro- 
cess today  as  it  was  in  the  dawn  of  history. 
Struggle  implies  friction;  friction  between  states 
involves  national  rights.  How  fatal  to  human 
progress  and  enlightenment  would  be  the  quies- 
cent yielding  of  a  progressing  state  obedient  to 
the  wish  of  one  whose  social  leadership  it  were 
about  to  usurp  by  inherent  right.  Would  even 
the  Creator  wish  for  such  a  condition  ? 

Bagehot  has  shown  that  the  evolution  of  society 


Adequate  National  Defence       245 

is  attended  by  the  same  contingencies,  the  same 
law  of  probability,  the  same  law  of  the  survival 
of  the  fit,  as  are  organic  bodies,  and  there  are 
degrees  of  fitness  in  the  scale  of  life. 

The  fit  survive,  and  the  fittest  lead  and  dominate, 
as  did  the  reptiles  in  Mesozoic  time  and  the  mammals 
in  Tertiary  time.  Among  mammals  man  is  dominant 
because  he  is  the  fittest.  Nations  break  up  or  become 
extinct  when  they  are  no  longer  fit,  or  equal  to  the 
exigencies  of  the  struggle  of  life. 

So  wrote  John  Burroughs.  But  nowhere  is  it 
suggested  except  in  Germany  that  a  nation  may 
undertake  to  help  out  the  cosmic  process  or  that 
a  state  by  use  of  force  is  justified  by  cosmic  law  in 
"trampling  down  weaker  nations,  as  we  do  weeds 
of  the  field,  or  in  ploughing  and  harrowing  the 
world"  with  siege  guns  and  bayonets  to  plant  its 
own  Kultur,  however  good  that  Kultur  may  be. 
There  may  be  several  good  cultures,  the  natural 
friction  between  which  in  the  cosmic  process  may 
produce  a  still  higher  one.  In  the  last  analysis 
perpetual  peace  would  eliminate  this  friction; 
therefore  the  impossibility  of  attaining  perpetual 
peace  inasmuch  as  the  complete  setting  aside  of 
the  cosmic  process  is  a  prerequisite  to  its  attain- 
ment. 

To  the  philosophic  mind  the  outlook  is  by  no 
means  discouraging.  Viewed  in  human  perspec- 
tive the  evolutionary  theory  in  all  its  aspects 
seems  to  set  at  nought  human  effort.     Cosmism 


246  Empire  and  Armament 

approaches  too  near  the  infinite  to  be  readily 
grasped  by  the  unphilosophical  mind ;  to  the  care- 
ful thinker,  on  the  contrary,  it  establishes  perfect 
order  out  of  chaos.  The  pacifist  must  be  a  cos- 
mologist;  not  a  mere  casualist  ready  to  offset 
chance  by  theorizing  on  preventive  methods. 

The  cosmologist  who  undertakes  the  work  of 
pacifism  will  recognize  at  the  outset  the  limita- 
tions of  ethical  endeavour,  and  hence  will  not 
be  disappointed  by  the  recurrence  of  conflicts 
along  the  upward  path  of  human  progress.  He 
will  recognize  adequate  armament,  not  only  as 
compatible  with,  but  as  indispensable  to,  pacifism, 
and  he  will  know  how  to  intelligently  discern  be- 
tween necessary  measures  for  defending  the  van- 
tage he  has  gained  with  so  much  of  patient  toil, 
and  militarism,  which  is  the  weapon  of  the  "blond 
beast."  Between  the  two  there  is  no  essential 
relation.  Of  this  fact  we  have  striking  evidence 
in  Switzerland  where  a  larger  proportion  of  men 
are  trained  in  arms  than  in  Germany.  Who 
would  say  that  Switzerland  is  a  menace  to  peace  ? 

It  is  time  now  that  those  who  earnestly  desire 
to  labour  for  the  cause  of  peace,  in  so  far  as  it  is 
possible  of  attainment,  recognize  certain  limita- 
tions ;  first  of  all  let  them  understand  that  disarm- 
ament is  a  condition  subsequent,  not  a  condition 
precedent,  to  their  end.  Nations  must  be  edu- 
cated and  false  philosophies  eradicated.  Were 
every  nation  on  earth  to  beat  its  swords  into 
ploughshares  and  its  spears  into  pruning-hooks,  a 


Adequate  National  Defence       247 

race  of  men  clothed  in  ignorance  and  armed  with 
a  false  philosophy  would  prove  a  greater  menace 
to  peace  than  did  the  Imperial  Army  of  Germany 
in  1914,  for  force,  whether  exerted  by  arms  or  com- 
merce or  universities,  is  after  all  but  relative  in  the 
struggle  for  social  hegemony.  Professors  may  be 
more  dangerous  than  generals:  in  Germany  they 
have  been  the  creators  of  the  warrior  class.  Arma- 
ment may  or  may  not  be  the  concomitant  of  mili- 
tarism. Disarmament  is  in  no  sense  the  equivalent 
of  the  repudiation  of  militarism. 

The  so-called  pacifists  have  until  now  erred 
in  accepting  as  facts  conclusions  which  are  not 
facts.  Built  up  upon  a  false  hypothesis,  their 
arguments  appear  irrefutable  to  the  casual  thinker. 
If  we  grant  that  war  is  an  illusion  we  at  the  same 
time  admit  that  it  is  believed  in  by  the  deluded, 
and  the  fact  that  a  part  of  human  society  is  de- 
luded makes  disarmament  illogical  until  the  illu- 
sion is  entirely  destroyed  or  reduced  to  a  negligible 
factor. 

After  a  long  discussion  of  the  folly  of  assuming 
that  war  is  profitable,  Mr.  Norman  Angell,  in- 
advertently writes  in  The  Great  Illusion  :  "For 
it  is  a  fact  in  human  nature  that  men  will  fight 
more  readily  than  they  will  pay,  and  that  they 
will  take  personal  risks  much  more  readily  than 
they  will  disgorge  money,  or,  for  that  matter,  earn 
it."  He  then  gives  a  quotation  from  Bacon  in 
support  of  his  argument : ' '  Man  loves  danger  better 
than  travail."     In  the  truth  of  these  statements 


248  Empire  and  Armament 

we  find  the  reason  for  the  necessity  of  defensive 
armament.  War  may  be  an  illusion  but,  having 
admitted  that  men  will  fight  rather  than  work, 
would  Mr.  Angell  have  those  who  want  their  due 
and  are  entitled  to  it  place  themselves  at  the 
mercy  of  the  predatory  by  disarming? 

Turning  to  Isaiah  the  theoretical  peacemakers 
read: 

And  He  shall  judge  among  the  nations,  and  shall 
rebuke  many  people :  and  they  shall  beat  their  swords 
into  ploughshares  and  their  spears  into  pruning-hooks ; 
nation  shall  not  lift  up  sword  against  nation;  neither 
shall  they  learn  war  any  more. 

But  who  shall  say  that  the  words  of  the  Prophet 
have  yet  been  fulfilled?  Is  not  the  acknowledged 
fact  of  that  very  selfishness  of  men  and  nations 
against  which  disarmamentists  inveigh  sufficient 
proof  that  Christ's  kingdom  has  not  yet  come  in 
its  fulness?  As  long  as  a  great  imperial  race  of 
soldiers  espouse  the  German  philosophy  of  war, 
we  are  not  justified  in  disarming,  and  may  only 
say  with  the  hymn-writer : 

Hasten  the  time  appointed, 

By  prophets  long  foretold, 
When  all  shall  dwell  together, 

One  Shepherd  and  one  fold. 

Let  war  be  learned  no  longer, 

Let  strife  and  tumult  cease, 
All  earth  His  blessed  Kingdom, 

The  Lord  and  Prince  of  Peace. 


Adequate  National  Defence       249 

Tennyson  was  but  dreaming  when  he 

Heard  the  heavens  fill  with  shouting,  and  there  rain'd 

a  ghastly  dew 
From  the  nations'  airy  navies  grappling  in  the  central 

blue; 
Till  the  war  drum  throbb'd  no  longer,  and  the  battle 

flags  were  furl'd 
In  the  Parliament  of  man,  the  Federation  of  the  world. 


CHAPTER  XVI 

ADEQUATE   DEFENCE   CONFOUNDED  WITH 
MILITARISM 

IT  has  already  been  indicated  that  militarism  and 
adequate  national  defence  must  not  be  con- 
founded by  the  workers  for  peace.  A  wise  dis- 
crimination must  be  exercised  in  respect  to  these, 
otherwise  the  pacifist  will  but  defeat  his  own  end. 
First  of  all  he  must  recognize  the  present  limitations 
of  human  society,  and  second,  he  must  thoroughly 
understand  the  nature  of  those  political  tendencies 
leading  to  militarism  in  order  that  he  may  guard 
against  their  development,  or  destroy  them  where 
they  exist.  The  destruction  of  all  armament  or 
means  of  defence  would  not  destroy  militarism, 
which  is  a  mental  state  evidenced  by  a  physical 
condition.  The  physical  condition,  however,  is 
in  no  sense  conclusive  of  the  mental  state  of  mili- 
tarism. 

Militarism  is  that  political  state  of  mind  which 
confuses  government  with  force,  and  which,  in 
order  to  attain  the  maximum  power  for  govern- 
ment, commits  it  to  the  hands  of  a  warrior  class, 

which  rules  for  the  aggrandizement  of  the  state 

250 


Adequate  Defence  not  Militarism  251 

rather  than  for  the  collective  interest  of  the  indi- 
viduals comprising  it.  'It  is  evidenced  by  giving 
undue  prominence  and  precedence  to  the  military 
caste  in  the  conduct  of  national  affairs.  It  is  not 
necessary  that  the  military  caste  be  highly  trained 
in  arms  or  that  it  be  relatively  numerous;  the 
only  essential  is  that  it  possess  actual  control  of 
the  will  of  the  masses.  Certainly  no  one  would 
assert  that  Switzerland  is  committed  to  militar- 
ism, and  yet  a  larger  proportion  of  men  are  trained 
in  arms  in  Switzerland  than  in  Germany.  At  the 
same  time  the  military  proficiency  of  the  Swiss 
army  is  probably  greater  than  that  of  the  Russian 
army.  Again,  any  attempt  to  determine  whether 
militarism  exists  by  a  mere  consideration  of  the 
amount  of  money  a  nation  expends  on  its  army  is 
futile.  Gauged  by  such  a  standard  the  United 
States,  which  is  not  even  a  military  nation,  would 
stand  high  in  the  scale  of  militarism.  This  fact 
is  illustrated  by  the  following  comparison  between 
the  approximate  military  expenditures  of  the  five 
great  Powers  for  the  year  191 1. 

1 .  Great  Britain $364,000,000 

2.  Russia 321 ,000,000 

3.  Germany 315,000,000 

4.  United  States 266,000,000 

5.  France 263,000,000 

All  that  is  necessary  to  be  done  to  disclose  the 
fallacy  of  such  a  rating  is  to  figure  the  above  expen- 
ditures per  capita  of  the  population,  thus  arriving 


252  Empire  and  Armament 

at  the  individual  military  burden  in  each  of  these 
countries  based  on  the  above  figures,  which  is 
approximately : 


Great  Britain $8.00 

France 6.00 

Germany 4.80 

United  States 3.00 

Russia 2.10 


The  reason  why  the  United  Kingdom  and  the 
United  States  compare  so  favourably  with  the 
European  countries  in  point  of  military  expendi- 
ture is,  of  course,  because  theirs  are  not  national 
armies  based  on  compulsory  service;  their  soldiers 
are  paid.  In  addition,  in  the  United  States  the 
military  system  is  highly  uneconomic  and  expen- 
ditures are  largely  in  the  hands  of  politicians,  who 
secure  tremendous  appropriations  for  new  army 
posts  and  navy  yards  of  little  real  value  in  the 
problem  of  national  defence.  If  the  pension  ap- 
propriations were  added  to  those  for  the  army  and 
navy,  the  United  States  would  stand  near  the  top 
in  both  of  the  scales  given. 

During  the  past  thirteen  years  the  four  great 
Powers  of  Europe  have  expended  vast  sums  of 
money  on  their  military  establishments,  as  follows : 

Army  Navy 

Great  Britain                 $2,915,900,000  $858,070,000 

France 2,488,603,000  389,530,000 

Russia 4,284,000,000  283,645,000 

Germany 2,380,000,000  515,520,000 


Adequate  Defence  not  Militarism  253 

Average 
Total  Annual 

Expenditure 

Great  Britain $3>773>97o,ooo       $290,305,384 

France 2,878,133,000         221,394,846 

Russia 4,567,645,000         351.357,307 

Germany 2,895,520,000         222,732,307 

The  military  and  naval  appropriations  of  the 
United  States  for  the  year  191 5  aggregate  $240,- 
146,492,  which  is  very  little  less  than  the  average 
of  the  appropriations  of  the  four  great  Powers  of 
Europe  for  the  past  decade,  or  $271,441,711.  In 
other  words,  the  United  States  is  spending  nearly 
as  much  on  its  actual  military  establishment  as 
the  average  expenditure  of  the  European  Powers, 
and  more  than  Germany  and  France  spent  while 
at  peace.  Its  total  military  burden,  $240,146,492 
for  army  and  navy  plus  $174,484,093  for  pensions, 
or  $414,630,545,  is  vastly  in  excess  of  the  peace 
burden  of  any  European  power. 

It  is  also  a  noteworthy  fact  that  the  individual 
military  burden  of  the  people  of  the  United  States 
for  the  year  191 5  was  $4.60,  whereas  the  average 
individual  burden  of  the  German  people  for  the 
past  thirteen  years  was  but  $3.70.  In  the  sweep- 
ing generalizations  so  commonly  encountered  al- 
together too  little  consideration  is  given  the 
individual  military  burden  which  alone  forms  the 
basis  of  just  comparisons.  It  is  not  the  aggre- 
gate amount  expended  by  a  state  but  how  much 
its  citizens  or  subjects  are  called  upon  to  contri- 


254  Empire  and  Armament 

bute  individually  that  determines  the  real  weight 
of  their  military  burden. 

Militarism,  then,  has  derived  its  name,  not  from 
itself  but  from  that  medium  through  which  it 
manifests  its  power — the  military  institution.  But 
obviously  some  other  gauge  is  necessary  to  test 
militarism  than  the  relative  proportion  of  trained 
soldiers  and  the  cost  of  maintaining  them. 

Nations  may  be  classified  both  with  respect  to 
the  status  of  their  military  institutions  and  the 
temper  of  the  national  disposition,  as  follows: 

1.  Militaristic,  militant;  German  type. 

2.  Military,  militant;  French  type. 

3.  Military,  pacific;  Swiss  type. 

4.  Unmilitary,  militant;  American  type. 

5.  Unmilitary,  pacific;  Dutch  type. 

To  one  or  the  other  of  these  five  classes  all 
nations  belong;  to  which  class  a  particular  one 
belongs  depends  upon  the  opinion  of  the  judge  in 
the  case.  The  difference  between  the  German  and 
the  French  types  is  the  difference  between  mili- 
tancy and  militarism,  and  to  express  that  difference 
it  may  be  allowable  in  this  age  of  philological  expe- 
diency to  employ  the  newly  coined  word  "militar- 
istic" as  a  peculiarly  appropriate  derivative  of 
militarism.  It  will  be  recalled  that  militarism 
has  been  defined  as  that  excess  of  militancy  which 
commits  government  to  the  military  as  the  best 
means  of  applying  force  to  government. 

Where  states  possessing  the  various  characteris- 


Adequate  Defence  not  Militarism  255 

tics  enumerated  actually  exist  side  by  side  in  the 
narrowed  world  of  today,  when  states  are  neither 
insulated  from  dangerous  contact  with  each  other 
by  time  or  distance,  it  is  obvious  that  the  Swiss 
type  is  the  one  that  the  practical  pacifist  should 
hold  as  his  model  for  the  time  being,  and  until  by 
patient  toil  he  can  eliminate  both  militancy  and 
militarism  as  ruling  factors  in  the  other  types. 

The  distinction  between  a  state  in  which  militar- 
ism exists  and  a  militant  state,  so  far  as  the  practi- 
cal pacifist  is  concerned,  is  that  the  former  is  an 
existing  threat  to  peace  economically  equipped 
for  the  uneconomic  and  unsocial  conflict  it  tends 
to  provoke,  while  the  latter  may  be  no  less  a  threat 
to  peace  but  is  uneconomically  organized  from  a 
military  point  of  view.  Thus,  Germany  prepared 
herself  to  attain  the  ends  of  militarism  at  the  least 
cost  to  herself,  while  the  United  States,  which  is 
characterized,  as  shown  by  its  history,  by  an  ag- 
gressive spirit  easily  aroused,  has  never  prepared 
itself.  The  latter  contemplates  instantaneous  prep- 
aration rather  than  advance  preparation.  Of  the 
two,  the  German  method  has  proved  the  more 
effective  and  relatively  the  less  costly,  from  a 
purely  economic  standpoint.  The  American  idea 
is  briefly  and  pointedly  summed  up  by  certain  of 
our  so-called  pacifists,  one  of  whom,  Mr.  Bryan, 
says:  "The  President  knows  that  if  the  country 
needed  1,000,000  men,  and  needed  them  in  a  day, 
the  call  would  go  out  at  sunrise  and  the  sun  would 
go  down  on  1 ,000,000  men  in  arms."     And  by  Sen- 


256  Empire  and  Armament 

ator  Teller,  who  sees  economy  in  lack  of  prepara- 
tion because,  as  he  says,  "The  fighting  force  of  a 
republic  is  the  great  body  of  the  people,  and  not  a 
paid  soldiery  called  'regulars.'  You  must  rely 
upon  the  people,  not  upon  an  army.  An  army  is 
a  vain  delusion.  It  may  today  be  for  you;  it  may 
be  against  you  tomorrow." 

These  authorities,  if  they  be  such,  fail  to  per- 
ceive that  a  people  capable  of  yielding  such  instan- 
taneous military  support  to  their  government 
must  necessarily  be  maintained  at  a  very  high 
pitch  of  militancy,  else  they  would  be  incapable 
of  doing  that  which  they  are  depended  upon  to  do. 
They  also  fail  to  understand  that  it  is  the  aggres- 
sive spirit  of  the  warrior  and  not  merely  the  exist- 
ing means  of  defence  that  leads  to  breaches  of 
international  peace. 

Militarism  is  thoroughly  misunderstood  by  the 
world  at  large,  and  by  the  people  of  the  United 
States  in  particular.  It  is  confounded  with  every- 
thing of  a  military  nature.  It  is  not  generally 
believed  that  a  small,  more  or  less  ineffective, 
army  constitutes  militarism,  but  an  army  of  any 
magnitude  and  efficiency  is  at  once  put  down  as 
militarism.  This  mistake  manifests  itself  in  the 
annual  message  of  President  Wilson,  in  1914,  from 
which  is  extracted  the  following  discussion  of 
national  defence: 

The  other  topic  I  shall  take  leave  to  mention  goes 
deeper  into  the  principles  of  our  national  life  and 
policy.     It  is  the  subject  of  national  defence. 


Adequate  Defence  not  Militarism  257 

It  cannot  be  discussed  without  first  answering  some 
very  searching  questions.  It  is  said  in  some  quarters 
that  we  are  not  prepared  for  war.  What  is  meant  by 
being  prepared?  Is  it  meant  that  we  are  not  ready 
upon  brief  notice  to  put  a  nation  in  the  field,  a  nation 
of  men  trained  to  arms?  Of  course,  we  are  not  ready 
to  do  that;  and  we  shall  never  be  in  time  of  peace  so 
long  as  we  retain  our  present  political  principles  and 
institutions.  And  what  is  it  that  it  is  suggested  we 
should  be  prepared  to  do?  To  defend  ourselves 
against  attack  ?  We  have  always  found  means  to  do 
that,  and  shall  find  them  whenever  it  is  necessary 
without  calling  our  people  away  from  their  necessary 
tasks  to  render  compulsory  military  service  in  times 
of  peace. 

Allow  me  to  speak  with  great  plainness  and  direct- 
ness upon  this  great  matter  and  to  avow  my  convic- 
tions with  deep  earnestness.  I  have  tried  to  know 
what  America  is,  what  her  people  think,  what  they 
are,  what  they  most  cherish,  and  hold  dear.  I  hope 
that  some  of  their  finer  passions  are  in  my  own  heart, 
some  of  the  great  conceptions  and  desires  which  gave 
birth  to  this  government,  and  which  have  made  the 
voice  of  this  people  a  voice  of  peace  and  hope  and 
liberty  among  the  peoples  of  the  world,  and  that, 
speaking  my  own  thoughts,  I  shall,  at  least  in  part, 
speak  theirs  also,  however  faintly  and  inadequately, 
upon  this  vital  matter. 

We  are  at  peace  with  all  the  world.  No  one  who 
speaks  counsel  based  on  fact  or  drawn  from  a  just 
and  candid  interpretation  of  realities  can  say  that 
there  is  reason  to  fear  that  from  any  quarter  our  inde- 
pendence or  the  integrity  of  our  territory  is  threatened. 
Dread  of  the  power  of  any  other  nation  we  are  incap- 
17 


258  Empire  and  Armament 

able  of.  We  are  not  jealous  of  rivalry  in  the  fields 
of  commerce  or  of  any  other  peaceful  achievement. 
We  mean  to  live  our  own  lives  as  we  will,  but  we  mean 
also  to  let  live.  We  are,  indeed,  a  true  friend  to  all 
nations  of  the  world,  because  we  threaten  none,  covet 
the  possessions  of  none,  desire  the  overthrow  of  none. 
Our  friendship  can  be  accepted,  and  is  accepted  with- 
out reservation,  because  it  is  offered  in  a  spirit  and  for 
a  purpose  which  no  one  need  ever  question  or  suspect. 
Therein  lies  our  greatness.  We  are  the  champions  of 
peace  and  of  concord.  And  we  should  be  very  jealous 
of  this  distinction  which  we  have  sought  to  earn. 
Just  now  we  should  be  particularly  jealous  of  it,  be- 
cause it  is  our  dearest  present  hope,  that  this  character 
and  reputation  may  presently,  in  God's  providence, 
bring  us  an  opportunity  such  as  has  seldom  been 
vouchsafed  any  nation,  the  opportunity  to  counsel 
and  obtain  peace  in  the  world  and  reconciliation  and 
a  healing  settlement  of  many  a  matter  that  has  cooled 
and  interrupted  the  friendship  of  nations.  This  is 
the  time  above  all  others  when  we  should  wish  and 
resolve  to  keep  our  strength  by  self-possession,  our 
influence  by  preserving  our  ancient  principles  of 
action. 

From  the  first  we  have  had  a  clear  and  settled  policy 
with  regard  to  military  establishments.  We  never 
have  had,  and  while  we  retain  our  present  principles 
and  ideals  we  never  shall  have,  a  large  standing  army. 
If  asked,  Are  you  ready  to  defend  yourselves?  we 
reply,  Most  assuredly,  to  the  utmost;  and  yet  we  shall 
not  turn  America  into  a  military  camp.  We  will  not 
ask  our  young  men  to  spend  the  best  years  of  their 
lives  making  soldiers  of  themselves.  There  is  another 
sort  of  energy  in  us.     It  will  know  how  to  declare  itself 


Adequate  Defence  not  Militarism  259 

and  make  itself  effective,  should  occasion  arise.  And 
especially  when  half  the  world  is  on  fire  we  shall  be 
careful  to  make  our  moral  insurance  against  the 
spread  of  the  conflagration  very  definite  and  certain 
and  adequate,  indeed. 

Let  us  remind  ourselves,  therefore,  of  the  only 
thing  we  can  do  or  will  do.  We  must  depend  in  every 
time  of  national  peril,  in  the  future  as  in  the  past,  not 
upon  a  standing  army,  nor  yet  upon  a  reserve  army, 
but  upon  a  citizenry  trained  and  accustomed  to  arms. 
It  will  be  right  enough,  right  American  policy,  based 
upon  our  accustomed  principles  and  practice,  to 
provide  a  system  by  which  every  citizen  who  will 
volunteer  for  the  training  may  be  made  familiar  with 
the  use  of  modern  arms,  the  rudiments  of  drill  and 
manoeuvre,  and  the  maintenance  and  sanitation  of 
camps.  We  should  encourage  such  training  and 
make  it  a  means  of  discipline,  which  our  young  men 
will  learn  to  value.  It  is  right  that  we  should  provide 
it  not  only,  but  that  we  should  make  it  as  attractive 
as  possible,  and  so  induce  our  young  men  to  undergo 
it  at  such  times  as  they  can  command  a  little  freedom 
and  can  seek  the  physical  development  they  need,  for 
mere  health's  sake,  if  for  nothing  more.  Every  means 
by  which  such  things  can  be  stimulated  is  legitimate, 
and  such  a  method  smacks  of  true  American  ideas. 
It  is  right  too,  that  the  National  Guard  of  the  States 
should  be  developed  and  strengthened  by  every  means 
which  is  not  inconsistent  with  our  obligations  to  our 
own  people  or  with  the  established  policy  of  our  govern- 
ment. And  this,  also,  not  because  the  time  or  occa- 
sion specially  calls  for  such  measures,  but  because  it 
should  be  our  constant  policy  to  make  these  provisions 
for  our  national  peace  and  safety. 


260  Empire  and  Armament 

More  than  this  carries  with  it  a  reversal  of  the 
whole  history  and  character  of  our  policy.  More  than 
this,  proposed  at  this  time,  permit  me  to  say,  would 
mean  merely  that  we  had  lost  our  self-possession, 
that  we  had  been  thrown  off  our  balance  by  a  war  with 
which  we  have  nothing  to  do,  whose  causes  cannot 
touch  us,  whose  very  existence  affords  us  opportuni- 
ties of  friendship  and  disinterested  service  which 
should  make  us  ashamed  of  any  thought  of  hostility 
or  fearful  preparation  for  trouble.  This  is  assuredly 
the  opportunity  for  which  a  people  and  a  government 
like  ours  were  raised  up,  the  opportunity  not  only  to 
speak,  but  actually  to  embody  and  exemplify  the 
counsels  of  peace  and  amity  and  the  lasting  concord 
which  is  based  on  justice  and  fair  and  generous  dealing. 

A  powerful  navy  we  have  always  regarded  as  our 
proper  and  natural  means  of  defence ;  and  it  has  always 
been  of  defence  that  we  have  thought,  never  of  aggres- 
sion or  of  conquest.  But  who  shall  tell  us  now  what 
sort  of  navy  to  build?  We  shall  take  leave  to  be 
strong  upon  the  seas,  in  the  future  as  in  the  past; 
and  there  will  be  no  thought  of  offence  or  of  provoca- 
tion in  that.  Our  ships  are  our  natural  bulwarks. 
When  will  the  experts  tell  us  just  what  kind  we  should 
construct — and  when  will  they  be  right  for  ten  years 
together,  if  the  relative  efficiency  of  craft  of  different 
kinds  and  uses  continues  to  change  as  we  have  seen 
it  change  under  our  very  eyes  in  these  last  few  months  ? 

But  I  turn  away  from  the  subject.  It  is  not  new. 
There  is  no  new  need  to  discuss  it.  We  shall  not 
alter  our  attitude  toward  it  because  some  amongst  us 
are  nervous  and  excited.  We  shall  easily  and  sensibly 
agree  upon  a  policy  of  defence.  The  question  has 
not  changed  its  aspects  because  the  times  are  not 


Adequate  Defence  not  Militarism  261 

normal.  Our  policy  will  not  be  for  an  occasion.  It 
will  be  conceived  as  a  permanent  and  settled  thing, 
which  we  will  pursue  at  all  seasons,  without  haste  and 
after  a  fashion  perfectly  consistent  with  the  peace  of 
the  world,  the  abiding  friendship  of  states,  and  the 
unhampered  freedom  of  all  with  whom  we  deal.  Let 
there  be  no  misconception.  The  country  has  been 
misinformed.  We  have  not  been  negligent  of  national 
defence.  We  are  not  unmindful  of  the  great  respon- 
sibility resting  upon  us.  We  shall  learn  and  profit  by 
the  lesson  of  every  experience  and  every  new  circum- 
stance; and  what  is  needed  will  be  adequately  done. 

In  this  message  of  Mr.  Wilson  the  old  national 
prejudice  looms  up  in  all  its  pristine  strength. 
Like  so  many  that  have  gone  before  him  he  proffers 
the  people  a  conclusion,  based  upon  a  premise  to 
the  falsity  of  which  their  prejudice  blinds  them. 
His  views  may  be  formulated  as  follows : 

Standing  Army  =  Militarism 
Militarism  =  Loss  of  Popular  Liberty 
Loss  of  Popular  Liberty  =  Despotism 
. ' .     Standing  Army  =  Despotism 

The  keystone  of  his  conclusion  is  based  on  the 
utterly  false  premise  that  an  enlarged  regular 
military  force  would  inevitably  result  in  militar- 
ism. He  does  not  perceive  that  militarism  is  not 
a  product  of  an  army  but  of  a  false  philosophy 
that  turns  over  the  nation  to  the  army.  He  makes 
no  distinction  between  a  state  in  which  an  auto- 
cratic government  can  force  upon  the  people  the 


262  Empire  and  Armament 

false  philosophy  of  militarism,  and  one  in  which 
the  government  must  derive  its  philosophy  from 
the  people.  He  sees  in  the  creation  of  a  regular 
army  adequate  to  his  country's  needs  a  danger  of 
foisting  the  false  philosophy  of  militarism  upon 
the  nation,  and  in  the  military  training  of  a  rela- 
tively much  larger  number  of  men  by  the  States 
no  danger  whatever  of  diffusing  that  same  philo- 
sophy. But  the  great  evil  of  his  message  is  that 
in  declaring  against  the  danger  of  militarism  he 
actually  lulls  the  nation  into  the  belief  that  other 
dangers  do  not  now  surround  the  empire,  nor  does 
he  perceive  the  fact  that  a  regular  force  inadequate 
to  the  purposes  for  which  it  is  maintained  has  no 
economic  justification  whatever.  If  our  army  is 
incapable  of  defending  the  country,  as  declared 
by  the  Secretary  of  War,  the  Chief  of  Staff,  and 
every  other  military  expert  in  the  world,  then  it  is 
a  useless  burden  in  its  inadequate  state.  If  means 
of  defence  are  unnecessary,  then  why  maintain 
any  army?  If  we  accept  as  correct  the  statement 
that  the  army  is  unnecessary  then  we  are  com- 
pelled to  believe  that  the  United  States  with  the 
sanction  of  the  Government  is  maintaining  an 
unnecessary  institution  at  a  cost  exceeding  that 
of  the  great  peace  army  of  the  German  Empire. 
If  we  accept  as  correct  the  statement  that  the 
army  is  inadequate  to  the  national  defence,  the 
logical  inference  is  that  a  vast  sum  of  money  is 
being  wasted  by  the  government  upon  an  army 
which  is  incapable  of  doing  that  for  which  it  is 


Adequate  Defence  not  Militarism  263 

supported.  Which  view  of  the  situation  shall  one 
take?  In  either  case  is  the  cause  of  pacifism 
advanced?  In  but  one  definite  conclusion  are  we 
justified.  In  view  of  the  complete  disagreement 
between  the  President  and  the  Secretary  of  War, 
either  the  President  has  repudiated  his  Minister, 
or  the  Minister  has  repudiated  his  President. 

The  writer  cannot  go  the  full  pace  of  Treitschke. 
Like  Mr.  Garrison,  the  Secretary  of  War,  he  prays 
that  America  may  be  spared  both  what  he  con- 
siders the  delusions  of  Mr.  Bryan,  the  former 
Secretary  of  State,  and  the  militarism  of  Hegel, 
Nietzsche,  Treitschke,  and  Bernhardi.  But  Treit- 
schke is  not  in  error  in  all  things,  and  especially 
sound  were  his  views  on  national  defence.  He 
wrote: 

Under  ordinary  circumstances  the  right  to  bear 
arms  must  always  be  looked  upon  as  the  privilege  of 
a  free  man.  It  was  only  during  the  last  period  of  the 
Roman  Empire  that  the  system  of  keeping  mercena- 
ries was  adopted.  And,  as  mercenary  troops  consisted, 
except  for  their  officers,  of  the  lowest  dregs  of  society, 
the  idea  soon  became  prevalent  that  military  service 
was  a  disgrace,  and  the  free  citizen  began  to  show 
himself  anxious  not  to  take  part  in  it.  This  conception 
of  the  mercenary  system  has  gone  on  perpetuating 
itself  through  the  ages,  and  its  after-effects  have  been 
strikingly  demonstrated  even  in  our  own  day.  Our 
century  has  been  called  on  to  witness,  in  the  formation 
of  the  national  and  civil  guards,  the  most  immoral 
and  unreasonable  developments  of  which  the  military 


264  Empire  and  Armament 

system  is  capable.  The  citizens  imagined  themselves 
too  good  to  bear  arms  against  the  enemies  of  their 
country,  but  they  were  not  averse  to  playing  as 
soldiers  at  home,  and  even  to  being  able  to  defend 
their  purse  if  it  should  happen  to  be  in  danger. 

Hence  the  truly  disgusting  institution  of  the  national 
guard,  and  the  inhuman  legal  provision  that  in  the 
event  of  a  popular  disturbance  the  adored  rabble  might 
receive  an  immediate  shaking  at  the  hands  of  the 
guard.  The  army  was  only  to  interfere  if  things 
became  serious.  This  shows  a  complete  failure  to 
realize  the  moral  nobility  of  the  duty  of  defence.  The 
right  to  bear  arms  will  ever  remain  the  honorary 
privilege  of  the  free  man.  All  noble  minds  have 
more  or  less  recognized  the  truth  that  "The  God  who 
created  iron  did  not  wish  men  to  be  thralls."  And 
it  is  the  task  of  all  reasonable  political  systems  to 
keep  this  idea  in  honour. 

The  National  Guard  in  the  United  States  is,  of 
course,  now  on  a  higher  plane  than  that  of  Europe 
which  is  referred  to  by  Treitschke,  and  should  be 
encouraged  in  every  way  possible.  As  a  matter 
of  fact  its  status  is  merely  that  of  a  less  efficient 
and  relatively  more  costly  regular  force  than  the 
one  completely  controlled  by  the  Federal  Govern- 
ment and  known  as  the  regular  army.  In  any 
discussion  of  the  militia  a  wide  distinction  must 
be  made  between  the  present  organized  militia 
of  the  United  States  and  the  unorganized  male 
population  of  which  about  15,000,000  men  are 
said  to  be  capable  of  bearing  arms.     The  average 


Adequate  Defence  not  Militarism  265 

military  qualities  of  these  men  cannot,  of  course, 
be  compared  with  those  of  the  hardy  colonists 
of  our  early  history,  or  of  the  volunteers  of  the 
middle  nineteenth  century.  It  is  to  the  unorgan- 
ized militia  that  Treitschke's  remarks  should  be 
taken  to  apply,  and  of  this  militia  his  views  are 
not  opposed  to  those  of  Washington,  who  wrote : 

The  jealousy  of  a  standing  army,  and  the  evils  to 
be  apprehended  from  one,  are  remote,  and,  in  my 
judgment,  situated  and  circumstanced  as  we  are,  not 
at  all  to  be  dreaded;  but  the  consequence  of  wanting 
one,  according  to  my  ideas,  formed  from  the  present 
view  of  things,  is  certain  and  inevitable  ruin.  For, 
if  I  were  called  upon  to  declare  upon  oath  whether 
the  militia  had  been  most  serviceable  or  hurtful,  upon 
the  whole,  I  should  subscribe  to  the  latter. 

It  is  proper  here  to  enquire  what  experience 
on  the  part  of  Mr.  Wilson,  Mr.  Bryan,  and  Mr. 
Teller  leads  them  to  deny  the  wisdom  of  Washing- 
ton, whose  experience  of  militia  was  as  extensive 
as  it  was  unfortunate? 

"From  the  first,"  writes  Mr.  Wilson,  "we  have 
had  a  clear  and  settled  policy  with  regard  to  mili- 
tary establishments."  This  declaration  reminds 
one  of  the  chapter  on  snakes  in  the  natural  history 
of  Ireland.  The  only  clear  and  definite  feature  of 
the  military  policy  of  the  United  States  has  been 
a  prejudice  against  soldiery  that  has  persistently 
prevented  the  provision  of  adequate  national 
defence,  and  the  economic  and  efficient  organiza- 


266  Empire  and  Armament 

tion  of  the  inadequate  armament  which  has  been 
provided. 

Much  of  the  opposition  to  adequate  armament 
seems  to  be  based  on  the  erroneous  conviction  that 
armament  is  uneconomic.  This  is  due  to  the 
fact  that  the  true  meaning  of  economy  is  not 
thoroughly  understood.  In  the  first  place  there  is 
a  marked  distinction  between  the  economics  of 
war  and  the  economics  of  armament,  which  dis- 
tinction is  as  a  rule  completely  ignored. 

The  crux  of  the  whole  armament  question  which 
is  so  deeply  stirring  the  national  mind  at  present 
is  not  whether  armament  is  costly  and  is  a  burden. 
Everyone  knows  that  it  is  costly.  The  real  point 
at  issue  is  whether  it  is  an  unnecessary  burden. 
It  is  submitted  that  in  view  of  the  mental  state 
of  other  peoples,  as  shown  by  their  national  philo- 
sophy, adequate  national  armament  is  not  as 
burdensome  as  would  be  our  condition  without 
proper  means  of  defence. 

Here  again  one  runs  the  risk  of  being  character- 
ized as  a  militarist  if  he  advocates  adequate  de- 
fensive measures.  The  author  reserves  the  right, 
however,  to  deprecate  war  and  at  the  same  time 
advocate  adequate  national  armament,  holding 
without  apology  the  conviction  of  Washington, 
the  father  of  our  country,  that  the  best  way  to 
preserve  peace  is  to  be  prepared  for  war.  The 
fact  that  the  views  of  Washington  and  Treitschke 
on  this  point  are  identical  does  not  weaken  the 
position  of  Washington.     One  can  accept  some 


Adequate  Defence  not  Militarism  267 

of  Treitschke's  philosophy,  as  was  said  before, 
without  going  his  full  pace.  For  instance,  when 
he  asserted  that  a  state  not  possessing  an  army, 
under  existing  conditions,  would  suffer  tremen- 
dously in  trade  and  prestige,  and  that  its  loss  of 
revenue  through  such  a  lack  would  be  incalculable, 
he  was  right,  and  not  only  Washington's  views 
but  those  of  Mr.  Taft,  the  avowed  peace  advocate, 
are  in  accord  with  his.     Says  Mr.  Taft : 

I  am  strongly  in  favour  of  bringing  about  a  condition 
of  securing  international  peace  in  which  armies  and 
navies  may  either  be  dispensed  with  or  be  maintained 
at  a  minimum  size  and  cost;  but  I  am  not  in  favour 
of  putting  my  country  at  a  disadvantage  by  assum- 
ing a  condition  in  respect  to  international  peace  that 
does  not  now  exist,  and  I  am  opposed  to  injuring  the 
useful  prestige  and  weight  of  her  international  influ- 
ence, which  under  present  conditions  an  adequate 
army  and  an  adequate  navy  are  required  to  maintain. 

It  is  anticipated  that  the  old  arguments  will  be 
advanced :  that  sharp  weapons  in  the  hands  of  na- 
tions are  dangerous  possessions;  that  familiarity 
with  them  tempts  men  to  test  their  skill ;  and  that, 
therefore,  armament  induces  war.  These  conten- 
tions are  sound  if  it  be  conceded  that  the  army  is 
free  to  dictate  war  whenever  it  desires  to  experi- 
ment with  its  weapons,  or  if  the  people  possessing 
the  armament  is  a  "Nation  in  Arms,"  labouring 
under  the  delusion  of  a  false  philosophy.  It  is 
not  true,  however,  where  the  military  caste  is  ab- 


268  Empire  and  Armament 

solutely  subordinate  to  a  civil  government  as  in 
the  United  States  it  is  bound  to  be. 

And  then  there  are  the  arguments  that  arma- 
ment has  only  a  relative  adequacy,  and  that  to  be 
of  real  value  even  for  defence,  it  must  be  main- 
tained at  a  parity  with  that  of  the  state  against 
which  it  is  designed  to  defend;  that  if  carried 
to  their  logical  conclusions  efforts  looking  to  an 
armament  that  is  adequate  must  lead  to  the  absurd 
attempt  to  weight  down  Mars  so  heavily  with 
armour  as  to  render  him  immobile.  The  fallacy 
of  these  arguments  is  that  they  ignore  the  fact 
that  a  nation  is  free  to  determine  for  itself  what  is 
adequate  to  its  circumstances,  and  that  its  terri- 
torial and  political  situations  coupled  with  its 
reserve  power  of  defence  largely  determine  the 
adequacy  of  armament.  The  point  may  be  il- 
lustrated by  the  case  of  the  United  States.  It  is 
absurd  to  contend  that  we  must  maintain  an  army 
of  the  size  of  that  of  Germany  or  Japan  in  order 
to  safeguard  our  country  against  their  possible 
aggressions.  Adequate  armament  for  the  United 
States  contemplates  only  a  force  capable  of  re- 
sisting such  sudden  assaults  as  any  Power  may  be 
tempted  to  make  upon  us,  and  which,  if  success- 
ful, would  prevent  or  greatly  hinder  the  develop- 
ment of  our  reserve  power  of  resistance,  which, 
undeveloped,  however  limitless  in  latent  strength, 
is  as  useless  in  a  crisis  as  iron  in  a  mine  is  to  a 
rolling  mill  or  undiscovered  gold  nuggets  in  Alaska 
are  to  a  government  mint.     We  may  know  that 


Adequate  Defence  not  Militarism  269 

such  resources  exist  but  of  what  practical  use  can 
they  be  if  the  facilities  for  transforming  them  are 
destroyed? 

One  of  the  most  common  economic  fallacies 
concerning  armament  is  found  in  the  conclusion 
that  a  state  is  necessarily  oppressed  by  the  weight 
of  an  armament  which  consumes  a  large  portion 
of  its  fiscal  budget.  Thus  it  was  argued  that  the 
German  people  who  were  taxed  but  $4.80  per 
capita  for  military  purposes  when  the  individual 
burden  of  the  people  of  Great  Britain  was  $8.00, 
France  $6.00,  the  United  States  $3.00  not  includ- 
ing the  pension,  were  being  crushed  by  the  cost 
of  their  armament  because  over  one  third  of  their 
budget  was  devoted  to  the  support  of  the  military 
establishment.  The  cost  of  that  establishment 
was  of  course  enormous,  but  national  expenditures 
for  any  purpose,  however  large,  are  only  relatively 
large,  and  the  actual  military  burden  of  the  indi- 
viduals of  a  state  is  not  to  be  reckoned  from  the 
portion  of  the  budget  devoted  to  armament.  In 
other  words,  the  fact  that  one  third  of  the  budget 
is  expended  on  armament  does  not  mean  that  the 
people  are  being  crushed  by  that  armament.  The 
full  force  of  this  contention  will  be  appreciated 
if  we  recall  that  even  Germany  expended  on  the 
maintenance  of  her  huge  peace  establishment  less 
than  three  per  cent,  of  the  actual  income  of  the 
German  people,  whereas  three  times  that  amount 
was  expended  by  those  same  people  on  intoxicat- 
ing beverages.     Professor  Emery  is  the  authority 


270  Empire  and  Armament 

for  this  estimate.  If  it  be  correct,  the  German 
people,  as  Professor  Emery  points  out,  were  able 
to  fully  provide  for  that  military  burden  which  in 
the  opinion  of  many  was  crushing  them,  by  drink- 
ing one  third  less  beer!  Such  a  course  might 
have  been  fatal  to  the  Germans  but  it  would  have 
been  a  very  simple  way  for  most  people  to  avoid 
being  crushed.  Truly  is  the  picture  the  disarm- 
amentist  paints  a  ludicrous  one.  He  would  have 
us  see  a  poor  peasant  reluctantly  turning  over  to 
a  ruthless  imperial  official  his  last  greasy  penny 
while  he  holds  in  his  left  hand  a  three-cent  flagon 
of  beer!  He  would  have  us  see  a  race  of  people 
noted  for  the  prosperity  of  their  commerce,  noted 
for  their  educational  institutions  and  their  good 
government,  leaders  of  scientific  thought  and  in 
the  forefront  of  all  the  arts  and  sciences,  bowed 
down  beneath  the  weight  of  an  annual  military 
appropriation  which  was  not  as  large  in  time  of 
peace  as  that  of  the  United  States!  How  can 
serious-minded  persons  continue  to  gaze  with 
complacence  upon  such  caricatures  of  the  facts  ? 

It  may  be  argued  that  the  uneconomic  consump- 
tion of  intoxicants  is  not  evenly  distributed  among 
the  German  people,  whereas  the  war  tax  is  uni- 
formly imposed;  that,  therefore,  many  are  com- 
pelled to  contribute  their  pennies  to  the  support 
of  the  army  who  cannot  reduce  their  consumption 
of  beer  for  the  reason  they  do  not  consume  any. 
This  point  cannot  well  be  taken.  The  fact  that 
the  imperial  tax  is  not  fairly  levied  does  not  make 


Adequate  Defence  not  Militarism  271 

the  cost  of  armament  uneconomic.  A  defective 
system  of  taxation  cannot  make  rain  unproduc- 
tive, nor  men,  nor  battleships  a  burden  out  of  all 
proportion  to  their  value. 

During  the  past  fifty  years,  the  German  people 
transformed  the  "dark  and  bloody  ground"  of 
Europe  into  a  garden  of  peace  and  prosperity. 
The  one  great  war  they  waged  during  that  time 
lasted  less  than  a  year.  By  being  prepared,  Ger- 
many compelled  the  conquered  enemy  to  defray 
the  cost  of  the  war  and  to  contribute  a  handsome 
balance  to  her  treasury.  The  preparation  that 
enabled  her  to  do  this  cost  the  people,  as  we  have 
seen,  one  third  as  much  as  their  beer.  In  return 
for  the  outlay  she  not  only  attained  victory  over 
her  enemy,  but  other  economic  advantages  as 
well.  The  fact  that  a  false  philosophy  has  led  to 
the  misuse  of  Germany's  armament  in  the  war  of 
1914,  does  not  in  the  least  affect  the  economic 
advantages  obtained  with  that  armament  in  the 
past.  Was  the  reign  of  peace  which  Germany  en- 
joyed during  half  a  century,  with  all  the  oppor- 
tunity for  industrial  development  and  commercial 
expansion  it  afforded,  worth  the  amount  the  United 
States  has  paid  its  military  pensioners  in  that 
time? 

Another  economic  fallacy  concerning  armament 
is  found  in  the  belief  that  for  every  soldier  taken 
from  the  ranks  of  the  industrials,  a  loom  stands 
idle  and  national  productiveness  is  reduced  to  that 
extent.     As  a  matter  of  fact   the   army  of  any 


272  Empire  and  Armament 

country  is  a  valuable  agency  in  the  absorption  of 
the  unemployed.  It  is  not  claimed,  of  course, 
that  the  army  is  directly  recruited  from  among 
the  unemployed,  only  that  the  unemployed  ele- 
ment is  reduced  by  the  army.  Professor  Ely, 
one  of  the  deepest  thinkers  of  our  time,  concedes 
this  fact  when  he  states  that  from  the  present 
condition  of  concentrated  production  in  private 
hands  there  results  a  vast  industrial  reserve  army 
of  unemployed  men  vainly  seeking  work,  an  army 
which  depresses  wages  at  all  times,  and  which  in 
periods  of  unusual  prosperity  cannot  be  entirely 
exhausted,  while  periods  of  depression  swell  it 
to  enormous  proportions. 

Those  nations  which  maintain  large  standing 
armies  based  on  compulsory  service  do  not  con- 
cede that  national  productiveness  is  diminished 
by  the  amount  of  industrial  labour  of  which  the 
men  in  the  army  are  capable.  If  there  were  not 
unemployed  in  such  countries  it  might  more  prop- 
erly be  held  that  national  productiveness  was 
reduced.  If  the  546,000  men  of  the  French  and 
the  640,000  men  of  the  German  peace  establish- 
ments had  been  turned  back  to  industrial  pursuits, 
how  much  larger  would  have  been  the  army  of 
unemployed  in  those  countries  it  is  not  easy  to 
calculate.  We  should  in  attempting  such  a  cal- 
culation also  have  to  consider  the  loss  of  em- 
ployment due  to  the  vast  demands  which  the 
supply  of  the  army  entails, — the  machine  shops, 
the  factories,  the  navy  yards  that  would  be  idle. 


Adequate  Defence  not  Militarism  273 

Compulsory  military  service  and  the  absorption 
of  surplus  workers  by  the  army  involves  the  prin- 
ciple of  national  socialism.  For  that  very  reason 
it  will  always  be  decried  by  the  labour  socialists 
who  make  great  capital  out  of  the  army  of  the 
unemployed  in  their  attacks  upon  the  army  of  the 
employed.  Wherever  military  service  tends  to 
reduce  unemployment  most,  there  socialist  opposi- 
tion to  the  army  will  be  the  most  vehement. 
National  socialism  is  but  a  governmental  an- 
ticipation of  the  arguments  of  popular  socialism, 
and,  therefore,  not  only  weakens  the  latter,  but 
strengthens  the  state.  The  ultimate  destruc- 
tion of  centralized  power  being  the  avowed  aim 
of  socialism,  armies  are  the  special  objects  of 
attacks  by  socialists.  In  England  we  hear  less  of 
the  uneconomic  nature  of  the  navy  than  in  Ger- 
many, notwithstanding  the  fact  that  the  British 
navy  is  many  times  more  costly  than  the  German 
navy.  The  explanation  may  in  part  be  found 
in  the  difference  between  the  Fabian  and  the 
labour  socialists. 

The  real  gist  of  the  armament  problem  is  not 
whether  armament  is  costly  or  not — everyone 
admits  that  it  is  costly — but  whether  it  is  more 
costly  than  the  lack  of  it. 

John  Stuart  Mill,  the  great  economist,  claimed 
that  until  labourers  and  employers  performed  the 
work  of  industry  in  the  spirit  in  which  soldiers 
perform  that  of  an  army,  industry  would  never 
be  moralized;  that  armies  would  remain  in  spite 
18 


274  Empire  and  Armament 

of  the  anti-social  character  of  their  direct  object. 
He  also  declared  that  armies  had  proved  the  chief 
school  of  moral  co-operation.  These  truths  must 
be  taken  into  consideration  as  economic  factors 
as  well  as  moral  factors.  They  account  for  the 
unparalleled  industrial  development  of  the  United 
States  during  the  Civil  War  and  subsequent  thereto 
when  a  highly  developed  spirit  of  co-operation, 
moral  and  physical,  alone  made  possible  many 
peaceful  conquests  which  would  not  have  been 
effected  without  such  a  spirit.  They  account 
for  the  phenomenal  development  of  Japan  which 
in  a  generation  has  been  transformed  from  bar- 
barism to  a  state  of  industrial  and  commercial 
pre-eminence  in  the  Orient;  they  account  for  the 
late  supremacy  of  German  industrialism  in  Europe. 
It  would  seem  then  that  military  pay-rolls  are 
not  altogether  unproductive.  Indeed,  they  pro- 
duce much  that  would  not  be  had  were  it  not  for 
them. 

The  disarmamentist  fails  to  see  that  an  army 
is  but  a  school  for  future  wage  earners  in  which 
they  undergo  a  thorough  and  rigid  course  of  moral, 
mental,  and  physical  development  preparing  them 
to  compete  more  successfully  with  their  fellow-men 
upon  being  discharged  from  the  service.  Where 
compulsory  service,  the  very  best  form  of  military 
service,  is  in  effect,  the  training  which  the  young 
soldier  undergoes  is  received  by  him  at  the  form- 
ative period  of  his  life  when  habits  of  discipline 
and  high  ideals  of  manhood  can  best  be  impressed 


Adequate  Defence  not  Militarism  275 

upon  him,  indirectly  giving  to  the  future  army  of 
wage  earners  those  qualities  of  the  soldier  so  highly 
esteemed  by  the  economist,  Mill.  Is  the  agency 
that  accomplishes  this  result  uneconomic  ?  Surely 
it  would  be  superfluous  to  contrast  with  such  an 
advantage  as  that  afforded  by  the  army  to  in- 
dustrialism, the  disadvantages  of  the  anti-social 
circumstances  which  beset  the  army  of  the  unem- 
ployed, the  offspring  of  which  we  find  in  socialism, 
communism,  anarchism,  and  all  the  other  "isms" 
from  brotherly  love  down  to  unrestrained  violence. 
Some  people  seem  to  think  that  the  money 
expended  on  armament  might  just  as  well  be 
loaded  on  a  lighter  in  the  form  of  bullion,  carried 
out  to  sea,  and  the  ship  scuttled.  It  never  occurs 
to  them  that  the  demand  for  ships,  arms,  equip- 
ment, ammunition  consumed  in  time  of  peace, 
and  military  supplies  in  general,  affords  employ- 
ment to  a  vast  army  of  employees  and  industrial 
workers,  or  that  the  money  paid  to  soldiers  is  used 
by  them  for  any  useful  purpose.  They  simply 
consider  the  military  budget  as  representing  so 
much  capital  lost  to  the  world — a  total  economic 
loss.  As  a  matter  of  fact  the  money  expended  on 
armament  is  just  so  much  capital  put  into  circula- 
tion. The  people  of  the  state  that  spends  the 
least  on  armament  are  apt  to  lose  more  of  what 
is  expended  than  the  people  of  a  state  where  vast 
sums  are  demanded  for  the  military  establish- 
ment, for  the  greater  the  home  demand  for  arms 
and  military  supplies  the  more  apt  the  state  is  to 


276  Empire  and  Armament 

be  self-sufficing  and  the  less  the  capital  that  goes 
abroad.  In  other  words,  the  demand,  if  large 
enough,  will  justify  the  investment  of  capital  for 
the  production  of  the  necessaries  of  armament  at 
home. 

The  functions  of  armament  are  essentially 
economic.  Even  if  it  be  conceded  that  armament 
invariably  produces  a  military  caste  and  that  a 
military  caste  possesses  unsocial  tendencies,  arma- 
ment cannot  be  charged  with  the  uneconomic 
nature  of  the  abuses  to  which  it  is  subjected,  any 
more  than  a  flail  can  be  said  to  be  uneconomic 
because  the  thresher  is  apt  in  his  anger  to  turn  it 
upon  his  neighbour. 

Prestige  is  an  economic  product  of  armament. 
It  enables  the  nationals  of  a  state  possessing  it  to 
go  abroad  and  seek  opportunities  in  foreign  lands 
whose  governments  respect  their  rights  and  afford 
them  protection.  The  degree  of  the  protection 
those  governments  afford  an  alien,  the  extent  of 
his  rights,  are  largely  based  on  the  prestige  of  his 
national  flag,  and  that  prestige  depends  largely 
upon  the  ability  of  that  flag  to  protect  its  subjects ; 
that  ability  in  turn  depends  directly  upon  the 
adequacy  of  armament. 

Police  protection  at  home  and  abroad,  to  person 
and  property,  is  an  economic  product  of  armament. 
No  one,  not  even  the  most  insane  optimist,  con- 
siders the  municipal  police  force  of  New  York  City 
an  uneconomic  institution  because  he  accepts 
human  nature  as  it  is  and  perceives  that  the  cost 


Adequate  Defence  not  Militarism  277 

of  police  protection  is  but  the  cost  of  opportunity 
for  productive  efforts.  It  is  not  uneconomic  to 
purchase  opportunity.  An  adequate  armament 
is  only  a  necessary  police  force,  to  provide  that 
protection  throughout  the  nation  and  throughout 
the  world  which  municipal  police  forces  cannot 
guarantee.  It  enables  our  ships  to  sail  the  seas 
free  from  hostile  interference  just  as  the  metro- 
politan police  force  prevents  highwaymen  from 
waylaying  the  city  resident  on  the  streets.  The 
security  of  our  merchant  vessels  and  citizens 
abroad  is  guaranteed  by  our  armament  just  as  a 
city  police  force  protects  a  visitor  from  the  rural 
districts  or  from  some  other  town.  But  most  im- 
portant of  all,  armament  through  the  security  it 
affords  encourages  foreign  trade  and  commerce, 
and  promotes  intercourse  between  foreign  peoples, 
all  of  which  tends  toward  a  better  understanding 
between  the  nations  of  the  earth  and  to  tone  down 
those  racial  antagonisms  which  constitute  the 
ultimate  causes  of  war.  Foreign  capitalists  and 
merchants  would  not  invest  in  American  property, 
nor  ours  in  foreign  property,  unless  they  knew  that 
their  governments  afforded  them  protection,  any 
more  freely  than  a  man  would  set  up  in  business 
in  a  town  notorious  for  lack  of  police  protection. 
Venturesome  spirits  would  take  the  chance  in 
either  case,  but  legitimate  business  intercourse 
would  be  discouraged  and  the  ordinary  man  would 
look  elsewhere  for  his  opportunity.  But  we  need 
not  enter  the  field  of  speculation.     We  need  only 


278  Empire  and  Armament 

consider  the  tangible  protection  armament  renders 
vested  property  rights  of  foreigners  in  such  coun- 
tries as  China,  Turkey,  and  Mexico  where  aliens 
are  admitted  but  not  fully  protected  by  local 
government.  Guarantees  of  protection  in  many 
other  countries  are  secured  by  threats  of  force, 
and  though  yielded  reluctantly  are  given  for  fear 
of  the  punishment  that  foreign  ships  of  war, 
marines,  and  soldiers  will  inflict.  Surely  an 
agency  which  promotes  commercial  intercourse 
between  the  nations  and  protects  vested  property 
rights  on  foreign  soil  cannot  be  rightly  called 
uneconomic. 

Insurance  against  loss  by  domestic  and  foreign 
violence  is  an  economic  function  of  armament. 
This  function  is  closely  akin  to  the  police  func- 
tion, but  it  embraces  more  than  mere  protection. 
Armament  enables  a  state  to  compel  the  reim- 
bursement of  its  nationals  who  have  suffered  loss 
from  the  neglect  of  foreign  states.  At  home  it  not 
only  protects  them  against  the  violation  of  their 
person  and  property  to  the  extent  that  it  is  ade- 
quate to  do  so,  but  it  provides  the  means  by  which 
their  redress  may  be  enforced  in  the  event  they 
suffer  remedial  injury.  It  has  completely  set 
aside,  as  far  as  the  individual  is  concerned,  the 
old  maxim  that  might  makes  right.  It  makes 
the  rights  of  the  weakest  individual  in  society  as 
strong  as  those  of  the  strongest.  Shall  we  call 
such  an  agency  uneconomic? 

Notwithstanding   the   valuable   uses   to   which 


Adequate  Defence  not  Militarism  279 

wars  have  been  put  and  the  progress  that  has  been 
made  through  war  in  the  civilization  of  the  world, 
it  is  a  sound  philosophy  that  declares  war  to  be 
uneconomic  and  seeks  to  substitute  some  less  de- 
structive agency  to  accomplish  the  progressive 
ends  of  man.  But  it  is  an  unsound  philosophy 
that  declares  adequate  armament  uneconomic  in 
an  age  of  unsocial  habits  among  men.  There  is 
a  fundamental  distinction  between  war  and  arma- 
ment which  the  disarmamentist  and  the  other 
dreamers  do  not  see.  This  distinction  is  that  war, 
whatever  the  social  credits  may  be  in  any  par- 
ticular case,  destroys  wealth  or  consumes  without 
economic  replacement,  and  that  armament  both 
produces  and  makes  full  replacement  for  all  that 
it  consumes.  War  is  a  devastating  fire.  The  city 
that  rises  on  the  old  site  may  be  a  vast  improve- 
ment over  the  original  one,  humanity  may  be 
better  off  for  the  loss  of  the  old  and  the  upbuilding 
of  the  new  one,  but  yet  there  was  an  economic 
loss.  Adequate  armament  is  a  protective  insti- 
tution, a  police  and  a  fire  department  and  an 
insurance  company  combined.  If  the  protective, 
preventive,  and  indemnifying  features  of  armament 
are  economic,  then  armament  itself  if  adequate 
is  a  valuable  institution  in  the  economy  of  a  state. 
But  this  is  granted — when  human  nature  is  purged 
of  the  violence  and  the  heat  and  the  selfishness  of 
which  it  is  compounded,  then  armament  will  be 
uneconomic. 

We  have  seen  that  no  regard  for  the  final  warn- 


280  Empire  and  Armament 

ing  of  Washington  has  ever  been  displayed  by  the 
people  of  the  United  States.  Until  now  it  has 
been  attempted  to  justify  the  neglect  upon  one 
of  three  grounds:  that  a  standing  army  of  ade- 
quate size  is  dangerous;  that  armament  is  un- 
necessary; or  that  even  if  necessary  preparedness 
is  too  costly.  But  from  the  inherited  jealousy  of 
an  army,  the  opposition  to  the  creation  of  the 
means  of  adequate  national  defence  has  now  in 
part  shifted  to  a  professed  fear  of  militarism.  Is  it 
not  sad  to  contemplate  that  there  can  be  a  think- 
ing man  in  the  United  States,  statesman,  scholar, 
or  historian,  who  seriously  believes  that  a  regular 
army  of  200,000  men,  which  would  be  adequate 
in  size  to  our  needs,  would  really  endanger  his 
civic  liberties?  Such  a  belief  is  a  reflection  upon 
the  character  of  the  other  100,000,000  people  of 
the  United  States  which  should  be  made  with 
caution.  On  this  point  one  recalls  with  pride  the 
stirring  words  of  Henry  Clay,  uttered  at  a  time 
when  our  political  institutions  were  far  less  secure 
than  at  present.  That  there  are  many  who  enter- 
tain the  convictions  of  the  President  is,  alas,  too 
true,  a  fact  due  to  a  complete  misconception  of 
the  meaning  of  militarism,  a  meaning  which  can 
best  be  elucidated  by  tracing  the  evolution  of 
militarism  as  it  exists  in  the  world  today,  and  as 
it  is  expressed  in  the  German  philosophy  of  war, 
for  it  is  that  philosophy  itself  that  is  militarism. 


CHAPTER  XVII 

THE  EVOLUTION  OF  THE  FALSE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  WAR1 

PROBING  deep  into  the  soil  of  history  we  find 
petrified  forms,  familiar  as  living  organisms 
to  us  today.  The  forms  have  not  changed.  In 
500  B.C.  Heraclitus,  the  sage  of  Ephesus,  whom 
Zeno  and  the  Stoics  praised,  held  that  "War  is 
the  father  of  all  things."  His  philosophy  found 
complete  survival  and  expression,  near  twenty- 
five  hundred  years  later,  in  the  words  of 
John  Ruskin  of  England,  who  in  his  famous 
essay  on  "War"  claimed  that  war  was  the  in- 
spiration of  all  art  and  the  source  of  all  human 
achievement. 

Following  close  upon  Heraclitus,  Dionysius 
taught  (b.c.  431-367)  that 

It  was  a  law  of  nature  common  to  all  mankind, 
which  no  time  shall  annul  or  destroy,  that  those  who 
have  more  strength  and  excellence  shall  bear  rule 
over  those  who  have  less. 

1  Extracted  from  a  pamphlet  containing  several  of  the  author's 
lectures  at  the  Virginia  Military  Institute,  and  before  the  Bel- 
gian Relief  Association  of  Richmond,  Va. 

281 


282  Empire  and  Armament 

And  Plato,  his  contemporary,  held: 

All  states  are  in  perpetual  war  with  all.  For  that 
which  we  call  peace  is  no  more  than  merely  a  name, 
whilst  in  reality  nature  has  set  all  communities  in  an 
unproclaimed  but  everlasting  war  with  each  other. 

It  was  Vegetius  (350  a.d.)  who,  in  his  great 
military  work,  declared  that  "who  would  desire 
peace  should  be  prepared  for  war,"  and  Horace 
(b.c.  65-8)  who  said,  "In  peace,  as  a  wise  man,  he 
should  make  suitable  preparation  for  war."  Bear- 
ing in  mind  these  maxims,  the  Venetians  at  an 
early  date  inscribed  in  their  great  armory  the 
words :  ' '  Happy  is  that  city  which  in  time  of  peace 
thinks  of  war."  And  so,  when  Washington  ad- 
vised his  countrymen  that  "To  be  prepared  for 
war  is  one  of  the  most  effectual  means  of  preserv- 
ing peace,"  he  was  but  repeating  the  age-old  coun- 
sels of  the  sages,  whose  convictions  are  perfectly 
reflected  today  in  the  works  of  many  eminent 
scholars.  It  was  Walter  Bagehot,  of  England, 
who  in  his  epochal  work,  Physics  and  Politics 
(1872),  developed  as  his  main  thesis  the  idea  of 
race  character  and  the  advancement  of  civiliza- 
tion through  the  continuous  struggle  of  competing 
groups  for  expansion  and  supremacy,  in  which  the 
process  of  natural  selection  operated,  as  in  the 
case  of  all  organic  life,  to  bring  about  the  survival 
of  the  fittest — the  word  fittest,  of  course,  express- 
ing no  essential  relation  to  physical  superiority, 
as  assumed  by  the  Germans. 


The  False  Philosophy  of  War    283 

Darwin,  Spencer,  and  Huxley  had  anticipated 
Bagehot  in  the  application  of  the  theory  of  survival 
of  the  fittest  to  biology  in  general.  While  they 
had  not  attributed  to  war  the  meritorious  func- 
tion claimed  for  it  by  their  contemporary,  they 
had  proclaimed  human  strife  to  be  a  primary 
agency  of  selection  in  the  evolution  of  men  and 
nations.  Indeed,  was  it  not  Huxley  who  declared 
that  supra-national  society  is  continually  in  danger 
of  reverting  to  the  state  of  nature  in  which  con- 
tracts are  void  and  the  binding  force  of  treaties 
unknown,  a  state  in  which  the  only  way  of  settling 
disputes  is  to  fight  them  out  ?  In  this  connection 
we  should  consider  the  utterances  of  Bethmann- 
Hollweg  with  reference  to  the  value  of  treaties. 

The  views  of  Darwin,  Spencer,  Huxley,  Bagehot, 
Ruskin,  English  all,  are  fully  incorporated  in  the 
philosophy  of  our  own  great  American  sociologist, 
Lester  Frank  Ward,  who  asserts  that  war  or 
human  conflict  is  the  prime  element  of  human 
progress,  and  who  declares  that  war  can  be  miti- 
gated but  never  eliminated;  that  when  nations 
cease  to  war  they  cease  to  progress.  And  in  Hol- 
land Hugo  de  Vries  has  answered  the  objection 
that  the  sudden  changes  wrought  by  modern  war 
are  not  in  accord  with  the  Darwinian  theory  of 
gradual  selection  through  the  slow  process  of  evo- 
lution, by  advancing  his  theory  of  sudden  and 
accidental  mutation,  a  theory  of  evolution  applic- 
able to  nations  which  has  been  accepted  by  Henri 
Bergson,  of  France,  and  Steinmetz,  of  Holland. 


284  Empire  and  Armament 

Aristotle  formulated,  in  the  fourth  century 
before  Christ,  a  conception  of  an  ideal  state,  and 
in  that  state  centralized  power  was  emphasized, 
as  it  might  be  assumed  it  would  have  been  by  the 
mentor  of  Alexander  the  Great.  Near  two  thou- 
sand years  later,  Machiavelli  (a.d.  1469-1527),  the 
Florentine,  in  The  Prince,  and  other  works,  cham- 
pioned the  cause  of  state  nationalism  and  held  that 
a  people  found  their  highest  expression  in  the 
power  of  the  state.  His  political  philosophy  em- 
braced the  principles  that  in  great  historical  de- 
velopments, as  at  the  birth  of  nations,  ordinary 
rules  of  morality  cannot  be  held  binding  upon 
governments,  whose  sole  duty  it  is  to  secure  the 
existence  of  a  state  in  which  morality  and  civiliza- 
tion can  thrive,  and  that  the  national  end  justifies 
the  political  means  employed  in  its  furtherance. 
"War,"  said  Machiavelli,  "ought  to  be  the  only 
study  of  a  prince  " ;  and  by  a  prince  he  meant  every 
sort  of  state,  however  constituted.  "He  ought," 
says  this  great  political  doctor,  ' '  to  consider  peace 
only  as  a  breathing-time,  which  gives  him  leisure 
to  contrive,  and  furnishes  ability  to  execute 
military  plans." 

In  England,  Sir  Thomas  More,  the  contem- 
porary of  Machiavelli,  preached  the  doctrine  of 
Utopia,  a  model  state,  in  which  peace  and  content- 
ment were  elements  of  the  fanciful  conception, 
while  Francis  Bacon,  a  few  years  later  (1561-1626), 
in  thorough  accord  with  the  ancient  pessimists, 
declared  human  conflict  to  be  inevitable;  that 


The  False  Philosophy  of  War    285 

force  and  warlike  qualities  would  alone  enable  a 
state  to  survive;  and  adhered  to  the  Machiavel- 
lian principle  that  in  the  weakness  of  one  state  is 
found  the  opportunity  and  strength  of  another. 
Then  came  Thomas  Hobbes  (1 588-1 679),  whose 
deep  study  of  politics  and  human  nature  led  the 
old  philosopher  to  declare  that  war  was  the  state 
of  nature.  Was  it  strange  that  Bacon  and  Hobbes 
should  have  embraced  the  philosophy  of  Luther? 

Martin  Luther  (1 483-1 546)  was  the  founder  of 
what  is  now  regarded  as  a  distinct  German  litera- 
ture. In  a  sense  his  works  gave  birth  to  a  German 
nation  just  as  they  gave  expression  to  German 
thought.  Having  traced  the  philosophic  concep- 
tions of  war  from  the  ancients  to  our  own  time, 
without  regard  to  the  influence  of  German  thought, 
let  us  now  develop  the  Teutonic  conception,  and  in 
doing  so,  we  shall  see  that  the  Germans,  under  a 
malevolent  influence,  have  gone  entirely  astray  in 
their  efforts  to  formulate  a  philosophy  justifying 
their  aim  of  world  empire. 

It  no  doubt  comes  as  a  surprise  to  many,  upon 
undertaking  an  investigation  of  the  philosophy 
of  war,  to  discover  that  Luther,  the  great  Christian 
Reformer,  ushering  in  the  Renaissance,  adhered 
rigidly  to  the  philosophy  of  war  which,  as  expressed 
by  modern  Germany,  seems  so  vicious  to  the 
world.     Said  Luther: 

It  will  be  shown  that  it  [war]  is  a  business,  divine 
in  itself,  and  as  needful  and  necessary  to  the  world 
as  eating  or  drinking,  or  any  other  work. 


286  Empire  and  Armament 

Now,  of  course,  it  is  impossible  to  isolate  the 
philosophic  influence  of  Luther,  the  German,  from 
the  rest  of  the  world.  Not  only  did  he  inspire 
much  of  the  philosophy  of  Bacon,  in  the  century 
following  his  death,  but  his  influence  has  exerted 
itself  upon  every  philosopher  since  his  time,  includ- 
ing Darwin,  Spencer,  Huxley,  Bagehot,  Ruskin, 
de  Vries,  Bergson,  and  the  others  we  have  con- 
sidered, and  those  we  shall  consider  hereafter. 

Out  of  the  reaction  resulting  from  the  universal 
suffering  and  degradation  of  Central  Europe  during 
the  period  of  the  Marlborough  wars,  arose  the 
pacific  philosophy  of  the  optimist,  the  Abbe  de 
St. -Pierre.  In  a  sense,  this  French  clerical  may 
be  regarded  as  the  father  of  modern  pacifism, 
though  the  humanizing  influence  of  Grotius, 
Erasmus,  and  Fenelon  must  not  be  forgotten. 
In  a  notable  series  of  works,  he  stigmatized  war 
as  hostile  to  religion  and  first  sought  to  array  the 
influence  of  the  Church,  an  institution  itself 
erected  in  war,  against  human  conflict  and  the 
political  wars  of  the  time.  The  writings  of  St.- 
Pierre  elicited  about  as  much  refutation  as  they 
did  support,  producing,  however,  a  number  of 
disciples  in  later  years,  among  whom  the  most 
prominent  have  been,  perhaps,  Immanuel  Kant, 
Count  Lyoff  Tolstoi,  and  Norman  Angell  and 
Andrew  Carnegie  of  the  present  day.  Rousseau 
(i  712-1778)  is  supposed  to  have  exerted  much 
influence  against  war,  as  did  also  Thomas  Jefferson. 
Of  the  latter  I  can  only  deny  that  he  contributed 


The  False  Philosophy  of  War    287 

anything  to  the  cause  of  peace  but  sweeping  profes- 
sions of  pacific  tenor,  coupled  with  the  substantial 
assertion  that  it  was  a  law  of  nature  that  war  was 
inevitable  and  providential.  One  who  reads  the 
correspondence  of  Jefferson  certainly  cannot  con- 
scientiously classify  him  as  a  pacifist  in  spirit, 
although  it  has  become  the  habit  of  latter-day 
writers,  even  scholars  of  authority  such  as  Profes- 
sor Reinsch,  to  couple  the  name  of  Jefferson  with 
those  of  St. -Pierre  and  Kant.1 

During  the  days  of  the  French  Revolution  and 
the  War  of  Liberation,  Germany  produced  the 
two  great  thinkers,  Immanuel  Kant  (1 724-1 804) 
and  Georg  Wilhelm  Friedrich  Hegel  (1 770-1 831), 
the  latter  often  confused  with  his  son,  the  historian, 
of  a  later  period.     Writes  Ernest  Barker  of  Oxford : 

Kant  was  the  philosopher  of  Duty,  stern  daughter 
of  the  voice  of  God — duty,  supreme  over  all  alleged 
"interests,"  and  dominant  over  all  pretensions  of 
power.  He  held  before  Europe  the  ideal  of  a  per- 
manent peace  achieved  by  "a  federal  league  of  na- 
tions, in  which  even  the  weakest  member  looks  for 
protection  to  the  united  power."  An  austere  sense 
of  law,  pervading  and  controlling  at  once  individual 
life,  the  life  of  the  state,  and  even  the  life  of  the  Euro- 
pean comity  or  commonwealth  of  states — this  was  the 
note  of  his  teaching.  Hegel,  in  reaction  against  what 
he  regarded  as  the  bare  austerity  of  Kant,  preached  a 
different  doctrine.  Duty,  he  held,  was  the  fulfilling 
of  a  station  in  the  community.     It  was  an  empty 

1  See  pages  86,  88  supra. 


288  Empire  and  Armament 

concept  apart  from  the  state.  Faithfully  to  dis- 
charge his  function  as  a  member  of  his  state — this  is 
the  duty  of  man.  Along  this  line  Hegel — perhaps 
influenced  by  admiration  for  Prussia — advanced  to  a 
conception  of  the  state  as  something  of  an  absolute, 
something  of  an  ultimate,  to  which  the  individual 
must  be  adjusted,  and  from  his  relation  to  which  he 
draws  his  meaning  and  being.  The  state,  he  could 
write,  is  the  Universal,  which  has  become  "for  itself," 
consciously  and  explicitly,  all  that  it  is  "in  itself," 
in  its  latent  and  potential  nature.  Thus  self-con- 
scious and  self-moved,  it  is  a  real  individual,  which 
can  exist  by  itself  in  the  world  as  an  ultimate.  As  for 
the  citizen,  the  apparent  individual — why,  he  is  an 
atom,  which,  "seeking  to  be  a  centre  for  itself,  is 
brought  by  the  state  back  into  the  life  of  the  universal 
substance."  Absolute,  ultimate,  universal — the  state 
becomes  a  sort  of  transcendental  majesty,  cui  nihil 
viget  simile  aut  secundum.  It  is  significant  that  Hegel, 
in  his  philosophy  of  the  state,  devotes  less  than  a  page 
to  international  law;  it  is  still  more  significant  that 
he  can  say,  "the  state  of  war  shows  the  omnipotence 
of  the  state  in  its  individuality;  country  and  father- 
land are  then  the  power,  which  convicts  of  nullity 
the  independence  of  individuals."  It  is  here — in  this 
neglect  of  international  law,  and  in  this  glorification 
of  war — that  one  lays  one's  finger  on  a  permanent  and 
essential  attribute  of  German  political  thought  and 
practice.  If  Kant  is  the  philosopher  of  one  side  of 
Prussia;  if  he  expresses  that  deep  sense  of  duty  which 
made  Frederick  the  Great  the  first  servant  of  the  state, 
Hegel  is  the  philosopher  of  another  side,  and  Hegel 
expresses  that  sense  of  the  absolute  finality  of  the 
state  which  made  Frederick  seize  Silesia  in  spite  of  an 


The  False  Philosophy  of  War    289 

international  guarantee  of  the  integrity  of  the  Austrian 
dominions,  and  impelled  him  to  carry  Prussia  further 
and  further  along  the  paths  of  militarism. 

Whether  or  not  the  more  practical  philosophy 
of  Hegel  annulled  the  idealism  of  Kant,  the  latter 
was  the  first  great  German  exponent  of  perpetual 
peace.  Had  there  been  no  Hegel,  Kant's  philo- 
sophy might  have  taken  root  in  the  German  humus, 
but  it  was  doomed  to  be  sown  in  a  soil  fertilized 
for  another  growth.  Kant's  philosophy  was  based 
on  the  optimistic  principle  that  man  by  his  con- 
scious effort  could  create  the  laws  under  which  he 
existed,  and  it  neither  accepted  the  principles  of 
the  ancient  and  mediaeval  philosophy  of  war,  nor 
embraced  the  pessimism  of -the  theory  of  evolution. 
It  denied  alike  the  Platonian  and  the  Darwinian 
concepts.  But  just  as  Grotius,  Erasmus,  Fene- 
lon,  and  St. -Pierre  gave  impetus  to  pacifism  in 
Europe,  so  Kant  aroused  interest  in  his  dream  of 
perpetual  peace  in  the  New  World  where  the  optim- 
ism of  Rousseau  and  Jefferson  had  made  itself 
felt.  The  reaction  incident  to  the  Napoleonic 
wars  led  certain  philanthropists  in  Massachu- 
setts to  establish  a  society  for  the  discourage- 
ment of  war  which  published  the  expressions  of 
many  public  men  of  the  time  in  its  journal,  known 
as  The  Friend  of  Peace.  Mr.  Jefferson,  when 
called  upon,  evaded  the  question  completely  in 
an  adroitly  framed  reply,  pleading  pre-occupation 
and  infirmity  of  age, I  but  John  Adams,  with  char- 

1  See  supra. 


290  Empire  and  Armament 

acteristic  boldness,  declined  to  subscribe  to  the 
fanciful  theories  of  Perpetual  Peace.     Wrote  he: 

I  have  also  read,  almost  all  the  days  of  my  life, 
the  solemn  reasonings  and  pathetic  declamations  of 
Erasmus,  of  Fenelon,  of  St. -Pierre,  and  many  others 
against  war,  and  in  favour  of  peace.  My  understand- 
ing and  my  heart  accorded  with  them,  at  first  blush, 
but  alas!  a  longer  and  more  extensive  experience  has 
convinced  me  that  wars  are  as  necessary  and  inevita- 
ble, in  our  system,  as  Hurricanes,  Earthquakes,  and 
Volcanoes.  .  .  .  Instead  of  discouraging  a  martial 
spirit,  in  my  opinion  it  ought  to  be  excited.  We  have 
not  enough  of  it  to  defend  us  by  sea  or  land.  Uni- 
versal and  perpetual  peace  appears  to  me,  no  more 
nor  less  than  everlasting  passive  obedience,  and  non- 
resistance.  The  human  flock  would  soon  be  fleeced 
and  butchered  by  one  or  a  few. 

Adams's  views  are  thus  also  seen  to  be  more  in 
accord  with  those  of  Luther  than  with  those  of 
Kant,  and  may  be  taken  as  typical  of  those  of  the 
majority  of  the  American  publicists  of  his  time. ' 

The  lack  of  philosophic  influence  exerted  by 
Kant  upon  the  thought  of  his  own  countrymen  is 
well  illustrated  by  a  few  passages  from  the  works 
of  two  of  his  contemporaries,  whose  names  are  the 
greatest  in  German  literature — Goethe  and  Schil- 
ler.    Like 

Skylarks  in  the  Teuton  dawn, 
Poets  of  the  German  morn, 

1  See  those  of  Washington,  Madison,  Hamilton,  Jay,  and 
others,  supra. 


The  False  Philosophy  of  War    291 

these  peerless  bards  sang  their  martial  and  inspir- 
ing songs  at  the  cradle-side  of  the  new-born  nation. 
Wrote  immortal  Goethe  (1749-1832): 

Dreams  of  a  peaceful  day? 
Let  him  dream  who  may! 
"War"  is  our  rallying  cry, 
Onward  to  victory! 

and  also 

That  which  thou  didst  inherit  from  thy  sires, 
In  order  to  possess  it,  must  be  won. 

While  the  great  Schiller  (1 759-1805)  wrote: 

Man  is  stunted  by  peaceful  days, 
In  idle  repose  his  courage  decays. 
Law  is  the  weakling's  game, 
Law  makes  the  world  the  same. 
But  in  war  man's  strength  is  seen, 
War  ennobles  all  that  is  mean, 
Even  the  coward  belies  his  name. 

It  was  Goethe  who,  in  Faust,  expressed  the 
opinion  that  it  was  the  work  of  Germans  to  make 
the  habitable  world  worth  living  in,  while  Schiller 
boasted,  ' '  Our  language  shall  reign  over  the  whole 
world,"  and  that  "the  German  day  lasts  until  the 
end  of  time."  These  modest  claims  found  echo 
in  Heine,  who  declared  that  "not  Alsace  and  Lor- 
raine, but  all  France  shall  be  ours." 

Following  close  upon  Goethe  and  Schiller,  the 


292  Empire  and  Armament 

great  national  poets,"dramatists,  prose  writers,  and 
historians  of  the  infant  Germany,  whose  stirring 
words  filled  the  mind  and  fired  the  imagination  of 
every  patriot  in  the  Teutonic  fatherland,  came 
Karl  von  Clausewitz  (i  780-1 831).  Like  Goethe 
and  Schiller,  Clausewitz  was  the  product  of  the 
most  heroic  age  in  German  history — the  War  of 
Liberation.  At  this  time,  not  the  dove  of  Kant, 
but  the  blood  and  iron  doctrine  of  Frederick  the 
Great  was  foremost  in  the  German  mind.  Gnie- 
senau,  Scharnhorst,  and  Blucher  were  the  names 
the  nation  cherished,  and  it  was  as  their  pupil 
that  Clausewitz  prepared  his  epochal  treatise  on 
War,  embodying  a  philosophy  of  war  as  complete 
as  it  has  proved  convincing  to  the  political  and 
military  scientists  of  the  whole  world. 

The  philosophy  of  Clausewitz  is  as  fundamental 
as  it  is  profound.  Withal  it  is  adapted  to  the 
martial  nature  as  is  the  Koran  to  the  denizen  of  the 
desert.  It  portrays  war  stripped  of  all  accessories, 
as  the  scientific  exercise  of  force  for  the  attain- 
ment of  a  political  object,  unrestrained  by  any  law 
save  that  of  expediency.  It  does  not  concern 
itself  with  the  ethics  of  group  struggle,  nor  has 
it  regard  to  its  moral  features,  but  accepts  war 
as  emanating  from  a  force  inherent  in  all  living 
organisms.  Upon  it  the  German  people  based 
their  hopes  of  national  greatness,  and  though 
differing  as  to  minor  details  every  prominent 
statesman  and  soldier  has  given  it  a  common  in- 
terpretation— Durch  Nacht  und  Blut  zur  Licht — ■ 


The  False  Philosophy  of  War    293 

"through  ignorance  and  strife  to  light."  Thus  do 
the  Germans  interpret  their  national  colours — 
black,  red,  and  white — the  red  streak  representing 
the  scientific  war  of  Clausewitz  as  a  means  of 
attaining  the  national  destiny;  the  white  streak 
representing  that  coveted  place  in  the  sun  of  which 
Bismarck  and  the  Kaisers  have  spoken  so  much. 

Clausewitz  preceded  Darwin  by  a  score  or  more 
of  years,  and,  says  the  brilliant  Colonel  Maude  of 
England : ' '  What  Darwin  accomplished  for  Biology 
Clausewitz  did  for  the  Life-History  of  Nations." 
And  here,  it  should  be  added,  biologically  the 
philosophy  of  Clausewitz  is  sound.  The  perverted 
form  of  the  evolutionary  theory  of  nations  is  not 
the  creation  of  Clausewitz,  who  simply  recognized 
the  unethical  nature  of  men  in  society  and  sought 
by  the  scientific  employment  of  force  to  counteract 
the  cosmic  process  to  the  advantage  of  his  own 
nation. 

Immanuel  Hermann  von  Fichte  (1 797-1 879), 
the  son  of  Gottlieb  Fichte,  exerted  a  great  influence 
upon  the  thought  of  his  country  by  his  historical 
writings,  as  did  his  father's  philosophy.  Thor- 
oughly in  accord  with  the  philosophy  of  Luther, 
Schiller,  Goethe,  and  Clausewitz,  he  preached 
that  the  regeneration  of  Christianity  was  only  to 
be  accomplished  by  making  it  the  vital  organizing 
power  in  the  state,  instead  of  leaving  it  solely 
occupied,  as  in  the  past,  with  the  salvation  of 
individuals.  And  so,  to  the  patriotic  fervour  of 
his  predecessors,  he  added  an  uplifting  spirituality 


294  Empire  and  Armament 

which  found  expression  upon  every  page  of  German 
history  that  he  wrote. 

To  Karl  Hegel  (i 8 1 3-1 901)  it  remained  to  inject 
into  German  history  a  finalism  derived  from  the 
philosophy  of  the  great  trio  of  English  evolution- 
ists, so  readily  seized  upon  and  extended  by  Ernst 
Haeckel  in  Germany.  With  Hegel,  force  is  but 
the  index  or  measure  of  fitness;  as  the  strongest, 
the  most  resourceful,  survive,  these  must  be  the 
true  agents  of  civilization — through  them  the 
human  spirit  realizes  itself.  From  the  Egyptian 
to  the  Greek,  from  the  Greek  to  the  Roman,  the 
torch  of  civilization  was  passed  along  to  be  grasped 
at  last  by  the  hand  of  the  vigorous  Germanic 
races.  To  Hegel,  it  is  the  Prussian  state  which 
is  the  ultimate  representative  of  civilization. 

Now  it  is  at  about  this  stage  of  its  evolution  that 
the  German  philosophy  begins  to  show  a  definite 
development  along  false  lines.  Bismarck's  "blood 
and  iron"  policy  becomes  Weltpolitik,  which  in 
turn  becomes  "world-dominion"  as  a  matter  of 
right  by  reason  of  assumed  social  superiority. 
To  bring  about  this  development  the  theory  of 
evolution  was  skilfully  perverted  and  in  its  vitiated 
form  drilled  into  a  nation  by  every  available 
means.  The  principle  of  "fitness"  as  applied  to 
the  evolution  of  man  and  society  by  Bagehot, 
Darwin,  Spencer,  and  Huxley  was  misapplied  to 
national  politics  by  Hegel,  Nietzsche,  Treitschke, 
and  Haeckel  to  the  infinite  satisfaction  of  a  power- 
mad   Kaiser   and   his    Prussian    militarists.     No- 


The  False  Philosophy  of  War    295 

where  in  their  philosophy  do  we  find  a  suggestion 
of  the  real  meaning  of  Huxley,  who  himself  de- 
clared that  while  ' '  men  in  society  are  undoubtedly 
subject  to  the  cosmic  process,"  yet  that 

social  progress  means  a  checking  of  the  cosmic  process 
at  every  step  and  the  substitution  for  it  of  another, 
which  may  be  called  the  ethical  process;  the  end  of 
which  is  not  the  survival  of  those  who  happen  to  be 
the  fittest,  in  respect  of  the  whole  conditions  which 
obtain,  but  of  those  who  are  ethically  the  best. 

Contemporaneously,  but  not  always  in  accord 
as  to  details,  and  with  little  tolerance  of  each  other, 
worked  the  two  men  who  did  more  than  any  others 
have  done  to  poison  the  intellect  of  Germany  by 
foisting  upon  the  nation  a  false  philosophy,  Hein- 
rich  Gotthard  von  Treitschke  (1834-1896)  and 
Friedrich  Wilhelm  Nietzsche  (1 844-1 900). 

Exponent  of  "Weltpolitik"  and  the  Mailed 
Fist,  Treitschke  taught  that  no  state  could  bind 
itself  over  into  the  future  by  a  treaty,  and  that 
all  treaties  were  made  with  the  silent  stipulation 
— rebus  sic  stantibus.  In  other  words,  that  when 
conditions  change  a  treaty  becomes  a  "scrap  of 
paper."  He  held  that  a  state  found  its  highest 
duty  in  war,  and  that  the  people  were  created  for 
the  state  and  not  the  state  to  serve  the  people. 
As  to  the  British  Empire  he  taught  that  its  ' '  setting 
sun  is  our  aurora."  Eloquent  beyond  words  to 
describe,  fired  with  a  spirit  of  patriotism,  unex- 
celled, was  Treitschke.     His  name  is  today  revered 


296  Empire  and  Armament 

in  Germany  as  that  of  the  greatest  historian  and 
the  soundest,  most  astute  political  philosopher 
of  his  nation. 

Nietzsche,  far  less  beloved  and  popular  than 
Treitschke,  exerted  an  influence  upon  his  country- 
second  only  to  that  of  Treitschke.  Real  happi- 
ness, according  to  his  philosophy,  was  to  be  found 
only  in  strife  and  the  knowledge  of  power — increas- 
ing power.  He  taught  not  only  that  a  good  cause 
would  hallow  any  war,  but  that  a  good  war  would 
hallow  any  cause;  that  weakness  was  loathsome; 
and  that  weak  states  were  the  just  prey  of  stronger 
ones ;  that  it  was  the  duty  of  the  strong  to  conquer, 
conquer,  conquer,  and  extend  their  culture  for  the 
benefit  of  mankind. 

Ye  shall  love  peace  as  a  means  to  new  wars,  and 
the  short  peace  better  than  the  long. 

Man  shall  be  trained  for  war,  and  woman  for  the 
solace  of  the  warrior.     All  else  is  folly. 

I  do  not  counsel  you  to  work,  but  to  fight.  I  do 
not  counsel  you  to  peace,  but  to  conquest.  Let  your 
work  be  a  battle,  your  peace  a  victory. 

These  are  but  typical  examples  of  the  principles 
making  up  the  mad  philosophy  of  Nietzsche,  the 
insane  worshipper  of  the  "great  blond  beast" 
whose  divine  mission  and  whose  right  by  virtue 
of  physical  fitness  it  is  to  rule  the  world  according 
to  that  same  philosophy. 

It  seems  beyond  the  possible  that  a  race  of  men, 
noted  for  the  intellectuality  of  its  scholars,  could 


The  False  Philosophy  of  War    297 

have  swallowed  whole  the  philosophy  of  one  whom 
even  Treitschke  characterized  as  a  madman,  with 
all  its  egoism,  its  egotism,  its  inhumanity,  and 
its  obvious  falseness.  But  it  was  done,  however 
incredible  the  miracle  may  seem,  as  proved  by  the 
writings  of  those  who  have  followed  Nietzsche. 

In  this  brief  study  of  the  evolution  of  the  Ger- 
man philosophy  of  war,  in  this  hasty  survey  of  the 
path  of  German  imperialism,  only  the  towering 
hilltops  have  been  examined,  but  all  through  the 
German  historical  and  philosophic  literature  of 
the  past  century  are  lesser  landmarks.  Thus  we 
find  in  Schlegel : ' '  War  is  as  necessary  as  the  struggle 
of  the  elements  in  Nature,"  which  is  but  a  virtual 
repetition  of  Luther.  And  in  Clauss  Wagner  we 
read: 

The  natural  law,  to  which  all  laws  of  Nature  can 
be  reduced,  is  the  law  of  struggle.  All  intrasocial 
property,  all  thoughts,  inventions,  and  institutions,  as, 
indeed,  the  social  system  itself,  are  a  result  of  intra- 
social struggle,  in  which  one  survives  and  another 
is  cast  out.  The  extra  social,  the  supersocial  struggle 
which  guides  the  external  development  of  societies, 
nations,  and  races  is  war.  The  internal  development, 
the  intrasocial  struggle,  is  man's  daily  work — struggle 
of  thoughts,  feelings,  wishes,  sciences,  activities. 
The  outward  development,  the  supersocial  struggle, 
is  the  sanguinary  struggle  of  nations — war.  In 
growth  and  decay,  in  the  victory  of  one  factor  and 
in  the  defeat  of  the  other !  This  struggle  is  a  creator, 
since  it  eliminates. 


298  Empire  and  Armament 

The  anthropologist  Woltman  said  that  "the 
German  is  the  superior  type  of  the  species  homo 
sapiens,  from  the  physical  as  well  as  from  the  in- 
tellectual point  of  view."  To  Germany,  Wirth 
gave  the  whole  credit  for  the  civilization  of  the 
world  and  asserted  that  the  time  was  near  when 
Germany  must  inevitably  conquer  the  whole 
world.  Paulsen  declared  that  humanity  was 
aware  of  and  admires  the  German  omnipresence, 
while  Hartmann  taught  that  the  European  family 
is  divided  into  two  races,  male  and  female,  the 
first  being  exclusively  Germans,  and  the  second 
including  Latins,  Celts,  and  Slavs.  In  a  work  by 
Hummel,  which  is  in  general  use  in  German  pri- 
mary schools,  it  is  said  that  the  French  are  monkeys 
and  the  Russians  slaves.  It  was  but  recently 
that  Adolf  Lasson,  a  distinguished  professor  of 
philosophy  in  the  University  of  Berlin,  said:  "A 
man  who  is  not  German  knows  nothing  of  Ger- 
many. We  are  morally  and  intellectually  superior 
to  all,  without  peers.  ...  In  a  world  of  wicked- 
ness we  represent  love,  and  God  is  with  us."  The 
foregoing  passages  are  not  extracted  from  the  ir- 
responsible literature  of  the  Germans  but,  as  the 
name  of  the  author  in  each  case  shows,  from 
the  most  serious  works  of  the  age,  all  of  which 
are  saturated  with  the  poison  of  the  Nietzschean 
philosophy. 

And  now  we  come  to  Frederick  von  Bernhardi, 
the  Prussian  Cavalry  General,  who  seems  to  have 
set  America  agog  of  late  with  his  book — Germany 


The  False  Philosophy  of  War    299 

and  the  Next  War,  appearing  in  revised  form  under 
the  title,  England  Germany's  Vassal.  Ministers 
in  their  pulpits,  professors  in  their  lyceums,  and 
statesmen  from  their  rostrums  are  all  engaged  in 
bitterly  assailing  poor  Bernhardt  Is  this  not 
passing  strange?  For  the  object  of  all  this  vitu- 
peration is  not,  as  we  have  seen,  the  prophet  but 
only  one  of  the  many  disciples  of  the  doctrine — 
Durch  Nacht  und  Blut  zur  Licht. 

The  explanation  of  the  remarkable  reception  of 
Bernhardi's  book  is  a  psychological  one.  It  is 
only  now  that  in  our  ignorance,  self-confidence, 
or  what  you  please  to  call  it,  our  mental  attitude 
has  become  such  as  to  cause  our  minds  to  focus 
upon  the  propaganda  of  the  German  national  im- 
perialists. For  nearly  a  century  it  has  been  going 
on  beneath  our  very  eyes.  Writers  innumerable 
have  preceded  Bernhardi.  Von  der  Goltz  wrote 
his  Nation  in  Arms  a  full  decade  ago.  But,  like 
the  British,  lulled  into  a  dangerous  lethargy  of  mind 
by  the  pacifists,  we  have  refused  to  believe  that  the 
tree  of  war  would  again  put  forth  its  noxious  bloom. 

The  reason  why  Cramb  and  Usher  so  well  un- 
derstood the  German  people  of  today,  the  motives 
which  inspired  them,  the  ambitions  which  first 
tempted,  then  lured  them  into  the  present  struggle 
for  world-supremacy,  was  because  they  had  eyes 
unblinded  by  prejudice,  and  ears  undulled  by  the 
vapourings  of  perpetual  peace  advocates.  They 
perceived  that  the  philosophic  tree  which  had  been 
so  carefully  nurtured  by  the  German  nation  had 


300  Empire  and  Armament 

matured,  and  would  soon  bear  fruit.  They  knew, 
as  the  world  might  have  known  had  it  harkened 
to  the  soulful  cry  of  the  German  people,  that  the 
perverted  evolutionary  theory  of  war  had  become 
a  creed-doctrine  of  the  German  nation,  a  creed- 
doctrine  embodied  in  the  very  colours  of  the  im- 
perial banner,  representing  as  it  does  a  national 
determination  to  dispel  darkness  with  sunlight, 
and  to  seek  national  supremacy  by  means  of  arms 
and  blood,  thus  fulfilling  the  destiny  which  nature 
seemed  to  promise  them  for  their  race. 

And  Bernhardi?  What  has  been  his  humble 
part  in  the  reaching  out  of  Germany  towards  the 
goal  which  has  been  set  before  the  Empire  by  its 
poets,  its  historians,  its  scholars,  its  statesmen,  and 
its  soldiers?  Not  to  propound  novel  theories,  as 
the  world  seems  to  think,  but  merely  to  place 
before  the  world,  without  apology,  a  cleverly  dis- 
torted doctrine,  which,  seemingly,  all  races  had 
sustained,  and  to  put  before  the  Teutonic  race  in 
popular  and  untechnical  form,  the  doctrine  which 
has  inspired  German  statecraft  since  first  the 
German  Empire  was  erected  on  the  field  of  battle. 
His  part  has  been,  as  the  semi-official  spokesman 
of  the  empire  builders  of  Prussia,  to  place  their 
vicious  creed  before  Pan-Germany  in  order  that 
the  Teutonic  people  might  become  indoctrinated 
with  the  false  philosophy  and  thereby  be  rendered 
a  nation  in  arms  to  the  last  man,  homogeneous  in 
thought  and  purpose,  and  united  in  action  for  the 
achievement  of  the  racial  destiny. 


The  False  Philosophy  of  War    301 

Truly,  may  we  say,  he  who  ran  might  have  seen, 
and  yet  the  world,  the  stupid,  over-intelligent, 
over-trustful  world,  busy  with  the  boiling  of  its 
industrial  and  commercial  fat,  at  last  bestirs  itself 
and  cries  out  against  Bernhardi  for  the  exposition 
of  a  cold,  material,  sordid,  cruel,  and  inhuman 
philosophy,  the  tenets  of  which  it  professes  never 
to  have  heard  before !  Indeed  the  world  now,  but 
all  too  late,  stands  aghast  at  the  natural  spectacle 
of  a  virile,  ambitious,  martial,  struggling  race, 
loyal  to  the  principles  embodied  in  the  very  na- 
tional standard  it  has  borne  for  half  a  century 
while  the  German  bard  has  sung — 

Dream  ye  of  peaceful  sway? 
Dream  on,  who  dream  it  may. 
War  still  is  Empire's  word! 
Peace?     By  the  victor's  sword! 

And  yet  we  say  the  world  is  wise  and  that  with 
knowledge  peace  will  come ! 

One  may  now  enquire,  even  if  it  be  granted  that 
the  great  thinkers  and  the  universities  of  Germany 
have  expounded  the  philosophy  we  have  outlined, 
wherein  lies  the  real  difference  between  that  philo- 
sophy and  the  teachings  common  to  the  ancient, 
mediaeval,  and  the  modern  philosophers  of  other 
countries?  The  answer  to  this  question  is,  as 
already  suggested,  that  while  the  philosophers  of 
all  countries  seem  to  agree  that  group  struggle  or 
war  is  inevitable  and  necessary  to  social  progress, 
or  that  it  is  an  essential  element  of  the  cosmic 


302  Empire  and  Armament 

process,  yet  it  is  only  the  Germans  that  have 
undertaken  to  deny  the  function  of  the  ethical 
process  in  mitigation  of  the  cosmic  process,  and  it 
is  only  the  Germans  that  have  undertaken  to 
direct  the  operation  of  nature  in  their  own  exclusive 
interest. 

Again,  it  may  be  asked,  in  what  lies  the  proof 
that  the  philosophy  of  the  Germans  has  proved 
the  pole  star  of  their  course  and  guided  their 
conduct  with  respect  to  other  nations  in  any 
material  sense  ?  The  answer  to  this  question  is  to 
be  found  in  history.  Everyone  knows  that  the 
history  of  the  German  Empire  as  it  exists  today 
is  the  history  of  war  and  militarism.  Beginning 
with  Frederick  the  Great,  and  continuing  through- 
out the  Napoleonic  period,  the  Prussians  strove 
to  assert  their  independence.  However  unjusti- 
fiable the  policy  of  Frederick,  the  aim  of  his  people 
was  a  worthy  one — liberty  and  independence. 
Nor  are  Stein  and  Hardenberg  to  be  censured  for 
their  patriotic  labour  to  erect  a  German  state. 
It  is  only  when  Bismarck  enters  upon  the  scene 
that  we  find  the  laudable  patriotism  of  a  free 
people  giving  way  to  motives  of  selfish  national 
aggrandizement.  The  German  wars  then  became 
not  struggles  for  liberty,  but  for  excessive  Imperial 
power  in  order  that  Germany  might  extend  her 
sway  over  those  whose  rule  she  herself  had  spurned. 
The  unrighteous  war  with  Denmark  in  which  a 
helpless  state  was  despoiled  of  its  territory,  the 
coolly  calculated  war  with  Austria  in  which  Prus- 


The  False  Philosophy  of  War    303 

sian  hegemony  was  the  sole  stake,  and  the  war 
with  France  induced  by  jealousy,  greed  of  power, 
and  falsehood,  cannot  be  called  justifiable  in  the 
ethical  sense,  however  expedient  and  advantageous 
they  may  have  been  in  a  political  sense.  Bismarck 
was  only  the  pupil  of  Frederick ;  the  blood  and  iron 
maxim  of  the  latter  was  his  guiding  principle. 
And  so,  William  is  only  the  pupil  of  Frederick 
and  Bismarck,  seeking  as  he  does  to  justify  their 
policy  by  substituting  for  their  self-confessed 
chicanery  and  immorality,  a  self -professed  con- 
viction in  a  divine  mission.  Frederick  and  Bis- 
marck frankly  tell  us  that  they  were  inspired  by 
expediency  and  power-lust;  William  that  he  is 
inspired  by  God.  Their  acts  are  evidence  of  a 
common  policy.  Truly  may  one  say  of  William: 
"He  is  come  to  open  the  purple  testament  of 
bleeding  war,"  his  soul  harkening  to  "ancestral 
voices  prophesying  war." 

We  have  seen  that  Frederick  the  Great  did  not 
hesitate  to  violate  the  neutrality  of  the  Austrian 
dominions  notwithstanding  an  international  guar- 
antee of  the  integrity  of  Silesia.  Frederick,  as  we 
have  said,  was  at  least  honest  in  declaring  himself 
to  be  guided  by  expediency.  He  did  not  appeal 
to  God  for  justification,  nor  proclaim  himself  the 
chosen  agent  of  the  Almighty  in  this  seizure  of 
Austrian  territory.  "As  to  war,  it  is  a  trade,  in 
which  the  least  scruple  would  spoil  everything, 
and,  indeed,  what  man  of  honour  would  ever  make 
war  if  he  had  not  the  right  to  make  rules  that 


304  Empire  and  Armament 

should  authorize  plunder,  fire,  and  carnage?" 
So  wrote  the  great  Prussian  to  his  nephew. 

Some  of  Frederick's  general  ideas  on  the  man- 
aging of  a  state,  expressed  with  the  "ruthless  Ger- 
man directness"  spoken  of  by  Treitschke,  seem  to 
have  some  application  to  the  policies  of  his  coun- 
try today.     Frederick  wrote : 

.  .  .  never  be  ashamed  of  making  alliances,  and 
of  being  yourself  the  only  party  that  draws  advantage 
from  them.  Do  not  commit  that  stupid  fault  of  not 
abandoning  them  whenever  it  is  to  your  interest  so  to 
do;  and  especially  maintain  vigorously  this  maxim, 
that  stripping  your  neighbours  is  only  to  take  away 
from  them  the  means  of  doing  you  a  mischief.  .  .  . 
These  policies  may  be  reduced  to  three  heads,  or 
principles.  The  first,  self-preservation  and  aggran- 
dizement, according  to  circumstances.  Second,  alli- 
ances never  to  be  made  but  for  one's  own  advantage. 
And  the  third,  to  make  one's  self  respected  and 
feared  in  the  most  difficult  times.  .  .  . 

When  Prussia,  dear  nephew,  shall  have  made  her 
fortune,  it  will  be  time  enough  for  her  to  give  herself 
an  air  of  fidelity  to  engagements  and  of  constancy. 
...  I  have  already  told  you,  dear  nephew,  that 
politics  and  villainy  are  almost  synonymous  terms 
and  I  told  you  the  truth.  .  .  .  Should  it  be  necessary 
to  make  a  treaty  with  other  Powers,  if  we  remember 
that  we  are  Christians,  we  are  undone. 

William's  belief  in  the  doctrines  of  Frederick 
may  be  seen  in  the  war  of  today,  especially  in  the 


The  False  Philosophy  of  War    305 

violation  of  Belgium's  neutrality,  however  much 
he  may  seek  to  cover  up  his  real  convictions  by 
frequent  and  specious  references  to  his  divine 
mission.  Other  rulers  may  have  been  influenced 
by  the  law  of  nations  which  has  been  formulated 
at  the  cost  of  so  much  blood  and  suffering,  but 
not  William.  With  him  war  in  the  twentieth 
century  is  the  same  ruthless,  barbaric  struggle 
it  was  conceived  to  be  by  his  illustrious  ancestor 
in  the  eighteenth  century.  The  ethical  process 
enters  not  into  his  calculations.  The  obsolete 
conception  of  the  law  of  unmitigated  struggle  is 
his,  and  turning  to  Browning,  he  reads  and  mis- 
construes the  words:  "Progress  is  the  law  of  life: 
man  is  not  Man  as  yet,"  while  in  one  breath  his 
Chancellor  declares  that  "necessity  knows  no 
law,"  and  in  the  next  gives  himself  and  his  master 
the  lie  by  acknowledging  responsibility  for  the 
wrong  being  done  to  Belgium.  Said  he:  "The 
wrong  that  we  are  committing  we  will  endeavour 
to  repair  as  soon  as  our  military  goal  has  been 
reached." 

One  only  need  read  the  proclamations  posted 
in  Belgium  by  German  military  commanders  to 
thoroughly  understand  the  influence  which  the 
German  philosophy  of  war  has  had  upon  the  na- 
tion. Truly  were  those  proclamations  inspired 
by  the  spirit  of  Nietzsche's  great  "blond  beast," 
the  gory  wolf -man. 

In  bidding  farewell  to  his  troops  bound  for 
China,  in  1900,  William  used  this  language: 


306  Empire  and  Armament 

Preserve  the  old  Prussian  thoroughness.  You 
know  very  well  you  are  to  fight  against  a  cunning, 
brave,  well-armed,  and  terrible  enemy.  If  you  come 
to  grips  with  him  be  assured  quarter  will  not  be  given, 
no  prisoners  will  be  taken.  Use  your  weapons  in  such 
a  way  that  for  a  thousand  years  no  Chinese  shall  dare 
to  look  upon  a  German  askance.  Show  your  man- 
liness. .  .  .  Open  the  way  for  culture  once  for  all. 

The  Germans  today  resent  the  characteriza- 
tion of  Hun  as  applied  to  them,  but  it  was  their 
own  Emperor  who  claimed  the  proud  title  for  his 
troops  when  they  were  leaving  for  China.  He  is 
reported  to  have  said  in  one  of  his  five  speeches 
on  this  occasion : 

When  you  encounter  the  enemy  you  will  defeat 
him;  no  quarter  shall  be  given,  no  prisoners  shall  be 
taken.  Let  all  who  fall  into  your  hands  be  at  your 
mercy.  Just  as  the  Huns  one  thousand  years  ago, 
under  the  leadership  of  Attila,  gained  a  reputation 
in  virtue  of  which  they  still  live  in  historical  tradition, 
so  may  the  name  of  Germany  become  known  in  such 
a  manner  in  China  that  no  Chinaman  will  ever  again 
dare  to  look  askance  at  a  German. 

We  are  not  informed  that  William  thus  addressed 
the  Huns  that  ravaged  Belgium,  but  it  is  not 
strange  that  the  former  admonitions  of  the  War 
Lord  were  borne  in  mind  by  them.  And  so  we 
see  that  the  world  has  been  unduly  harsh  in  its 
judgment  of  the  German  soldier,  who  has  only 
done  that  which  he  was  taught  by  his  rulers  and 


The  False  Philosophy  of  War    307 

his  preceptors  to  do.  The  fundamental  principles 
of  international  law  seem  to  have  been  omitted 
in  his  education.  It  is  Frederick,  and  Bismarck, 
and  William  that  must  answer  at  the  bar  of  human- 
ity for  the  crimes  committed  in  the  name  of  Ger- 
many, whose  "Kultur"  is  not  apt  to  be  well 
received  by  the  world,  now  that  a  practical  example 
of  it  has  been  given. 

It  is  a  very  common  error  to  assume  that  the 
German  people  are  only  misguided  by  their  states- 
men and  political  leaders,  and  that  sooner  or  later 
will  their  eyes  open  to  the  truth.  When  the  Mus- 
sulman abjures  Mahomet,  when  the  Catholic 
denies  the  virginity  of  Mary,  when  the  Puritan 
adopts  the  confessional,  then  may  we  hope  that 
the  German  race  will  voluntarily  cast  aside  as 
false  the  philosophy  with  which  it  has  been  nur- 
tured for  a  century.  Whether  sound  or  false, 
that  philosophy  has  long  since  been  elevated  in 
the  national  mind  above  the  plane  of  mere  political 
or  diplomatic  policy.  It  is  no  longer  a  philosophy 
of  mere  academic  interest.  It  has  become  a  burn- 
ing conviction  inseparable  in  the  national  mind 
from  religion  and  patriotism,  embodying  as  it  does 
the  duty  of  every  loyal  Teuton  to  his  God  and  his 
fatherland.  For  us  to  condemn  the  German  citizen 
of  today,  be  he  high  or  low,  for  the  political  doc- 
trine he  adheres  to,  is  equivalent  to  blaming  the 
Hindoo  because  he  is  a  Brahmin,  or  the  Chinaman 
for  accepting  the  philosophy  of  Confucius.  The 
pacifist   can   never  eradicate   the   German  philo- 


308  Empire  and  Armament 

sophy  of  war  by  disarming  the  Imperial  army;  it 
would  not  help  the  cause  of  peace  to  do  so,  for 
armament  is  at  most  only  the  proximate  cause  of 
war.  To  remove  the  ultimate  cause  the  German 
people  must  be  converted  by  reason  just  as  is  the 
pagan  from  a  false  theology.  The  condemnation 
of  war,  which  in  the  abstract  is  abhorred  by  the 
Germans  as  well  as  by  the  Americans,  will  not 
convert  the  former.  They  do  not  relish  war  for 
its  own  sake  any  more  than  we  do,  but  they  do 
cherish  war  as  the  sole  means  of  achieving  a  glori- 
ous destiny.  The  task  of  the  pacifist,  then,  is 
to  convince  the  German  people  that  even  if  their 
doctrine  of  racial  evolution  be  correct,  the  falli- 
bility of  human  judgment  is  such  that  no  man  or 
race  of  men  should  assume  the  burden  of  deter- 
mining what  race  or  nation  is  fittest  to  survive. 
Such  a  decision  is  God's  province  and  not  that  of 
political  ministers,  however  wise  they  may  be. 
How  sad  a  world  would  be  this  had  those  of  God's 
creatures  with  the  most  brawn  and  sharpest  claws 
been  the  sole  arbiters  of  fitness!  Just  as  hunger 
among  brutes  is  dangerous,  so  it  is  with  national 
imperialists.  It  is  a  sociological  fact,  which 
disarmamentists  ignore,  that  man  is  selfish,  pre- 
datory, and  a  fighter.  It  is  natural,  therefore, 
that  a  race  of  men,  when  territorially  or  politically 
hungry,  is  not  apt  to  perceive  the  finer  qualities 
of  a  people  physically  weaker  than  itself.  It  is 
far  too  human  for  the  weakness  of  a  state  to  be 
regarded  as  the  measure  of  the  unfitness  of  the 


The  False  Philosophy  of  War    309 

individuals  composing  it,  to  permit  men  to  usurp 
the  function  of  the  Almighty  in  determining  fitness. 
Let  it  be  repeated,  that  if  every  state  in  the  world 
beat  its  swords  into  ploughshares,  disarmament 
would  only  have  begun,  for  under  such  conditions 
a  people  imbued  with  the  evolutionary  philosophy 
in  its  perverted  form,  with  the  belief  that  they 
themselves  were  endowed  with  the  divine  right 
to  determine  fitness  to  survive,  would  be  relatively 
better  armed  against  their  rivals,  and  a  graver 
threat  to  peace  and  civilization,  than  was  the 
Imperial  army  of  Germany  in  1914.  Before  uni- 
versal peace  can  be  established,  must  go  the  spiri- 
tual conviction  that  countenances  and  encourages 
the  practice  of  destroying  the  physically  and 
politically  weak,  for  even  though  pruning-hooks 
take  the  place  of  spears  they  may  be  employed 
in  the  attempt  to  establish  social  as  well  as  political 
hegemony.  So  long  as  a  single  race  of  men  remains 
convinced  that  it  is  the  chosen  of  God  and 
impressed  with  the  divine  mission  of  elevating 
its  type  over,  and  enforcing  its  culture  upon, 
all  mankind,  peace,  as  said  by  Plato,  will  be  no 
more  than  a  word,  whether  battle-ships  or  harvest- 
ing machinery  be  employed  in  the  struggle  for 
supremacy.  This  is  the  idea  Nicholas  Murray 
Butler  had  in  mind  when  he  wrote : 

Disarmament  will  never  come  by  pressure  from 
within.  If  justice  is  established  between  nations, 
peace  will  follow  as  a  matter  of  course.     The  reign  of 


310  Empire  and  Armament 

peace  will  cause  armaments  to  atrophy  from  disuse. 
Disarmament  will  follow  peace  as  an  effect,  not 
precede  it  as  a  cause. 

It  was  not  the  overdevelopment  of  armament,  as 
thought  by  some,  that  is  responsible  for  bringing 
the  German  Empire  into  the  thraldom  of  militar- 
ism. On  the  contrary,  it  was  the  German  univer- 
sities, as  we  have  seen,  subsidized  by  the  Prussian 
kings  and  committed  to  Machiavellism,  that 
brought  about  excessive  armament.  It  was  not 
the  Prussian  army  that  gave  Germany  her  most 
untiring  apostles  of  militarism.  Germany,  it 
must  be  remembered,  has  had  a  Fichte,  a  Hegel, 
a  Nietszche,  a  Treitschke,  and  a  Haeckel,  ex- 
pounding the  philosophy  of  militarism  in  the 
universities  of  the  people.  Reverting  to  Machia- 
vellism they  taught  that  only  the  state  was  good; 
that  whatever  ills  the  people  suffered  from,  the 
best  way  to  escape  them  was  to  make  strong  the 
state.  A  splendid  theory  is  this,  viewed  from 
the  standpoint  of  emperors.  Can  we  wonder  that 
kings  on  their  tottering  thrones  seized  upon  it  as 
a  means  of  damming  back  the  swelling  flood  of 
Democracy  ? 

Militarism,  then,  is  not  the  outgrowth  of  arma- 
ment, not  even  of  excessive  armament,  but  of  a 
perverted  philosophy,  expounded  in  the  national 
universities  of  Germany  for  the  benefit  of  ambi- 
tious rulers,  and  seized  upon  with  avidity  by  a 
martial  and  aspiring  race.     It  was  not  the  army 


The  False  Philosophy  of  War    311 

but  the  intellectuals  of  Germany  that  perverted 
the  evolutionary  theory  of  survival  of  the  fittest, 
to  be  in  practice  the  equivalent  of  "Devil  take 
the  hindmost."  The  fallacy  of  the  German 
doctrine  of  war  lies  not  in  the  theory  of  racial 
evolution,  but  in  its  mis-interpretation  and  mis- 
application. 


CHAPTER  XVIII 

WHAT  IS  ADEQUATE  NATIONAL  DEFENCE? 

WE  have  seen  that  true  pacifism  embraces 
both  ethical  effort  and  adequate  defence; 
the  first  to  make  possible  a  gradual  reduction  of 
armament,  the  second  to  protect  the  ethical  work- 
ers while  combating  the  cosmic  process,  or  the 
mere  gladiatorial  contest  for  survival  and  supre- 
macy. Having  considered  the  scope  of  practical 
pacifism,  and  seen  the  necessity  of  destroying 
the  power  of  the  false  philosophy  of  militarism, 
the  question  naturally  arises — how  shall  the  people 
of  the  United  States  proceed  in  an  economic  way, 
to  provide  the  essentials  of  an  adequate  national 
defence.  The  problem  is  both  social  and  econo- 
mic, social  in  its  political  and  economic  in  its  mate- 
rial aspect.  Such  proposals  as  may  be  made 
should,  therefore,  take  into  consideration  both 
these  aspects,  in  as  much  as  the  two  are  insepar- 
ably involved  in  the  solution  of  the  problem. 

It  is  a  mistake  to  assume  that  the  power  of  a 
state  depends  beyond  a  certain  point  on  its  actu- 
ally developed  military  power.  Militarism  errs  in 
evaluating  too  highly  the  factor  of  developed 
power;  disarmamentists  in  ignoring  that   factor. 

312 


What  Is  Adequate  Defence  ?      313 

The  problem  of  adequate  armament  may  be 
reduced  to  figures.  Let  Pa  and  Pb  represent  the 
ultimate  physical  power  of  two  states;  Aa  and  Ab 
the  developed  physical  power  in  the  form  of  arma- 
ment, and  Ra  and  Rb  the  reserve  power  which 
may  be  transformed  from  its  latent  form  to  the 
form  of  developed  power.     Then, 

Pa  =  Aa+Ra        and        Pb  =  Ab+Rb 

To  determine  whether  Pa  is  greater  than  Pb,  we 
must  not  merely  consider  the  variable  factor  A 
but  the  factor  R  as  well.  Even  though  Aa  may 
be  vastly  greater  than  Ab,  Pa  may  be  equal  to  or 
smaller  than  Pb  if  conditions  are  such  that  Rb  may 
be  developed  so  as  to  satisfy  the  equations 

Aa+Ra  =  Ab+Rb 
Aa+Ra<Ab+Rb 

The  real  problem  before  a  state  today  is  to 
provide  adequate  armament.  To  determine  what 
is  adequate  armament  it  can  substitute  in  the 
formula 

Pb  =  Ab+Rb 

representing  the  physical  power  of  a  possible  enemy, 
the  known  values  of  Ab  and  Rb,  which  gives  the 
physical  power  of  that  enemy ;  then  it  must  satisfy 
the  formula 

Aa+Ra  =  Pb. 


314  Empire  and  Armament 

The  relative  values  of  Aa  and  Ra  depend  largely 
upon  such  elements  as  the  military  education, 
training,  strategic  position,  character  of  the  people, 
and  the  time  element.  If  the  people  possess 
physical  aptitude  for  war,  if  a  sufficient  number 
of  them  are  educated  and  trained  to  command,  if 
the  nation  is  imbued  with  patriotic  spirit,  and  the 
strategic  situation  is  such  that  time  would  afford 
opportunity  to  develop  Ra,  then  the  value  of  Aa 
may  be  relatively  small,  but  it  is  not  an  absolute 
function,  as  thought  by  some  people,  of  Ra  in 
the  equation 

A3+Ra  =  Pb. 

Aa  is  also  a  function  of  Ab,  its  minimum  value 
being  fixed  by  that  fraction  of  Ab  which  the  enemy 
could  immediately  employ,  so  that  if  we  assume 
that  fraction  to  be  F,  then  adequate  defence 
requires  that 

Aa  =  F,     and  not  merely  that 
Aa+Ra  =  Pb. 

The  whole  problem  may  be  illustrated  as  follows : 
Suppose  nation  B,  possess  a  standing  army  of 
800,000  men,  and  the  ability  to  place  2,000,000 
additional  men  in  the  field  against  nation  A  in 
six  months,  but  that  the  strategic  circumstances 
are  such  that  nation  B  can  hurl  only  200,000  men 
against  nation  A  upon  the  immediate  outbreak  of 


What  Is  Adequate  Defence?      315 

hostilities  between  them.  What  would  be  ade- 
quate defensive  armament  in  point  of  numbers  for 
nation  A,  assuming  training  and  arms  to  be  equal 
in  value,  as  between  the  two  nations  ? 

Pb  =  Ab+Rb 

Pb  =  800,000+2,000,000  =  2,800,000 
But         F  =  200,000 
Aa  =  F 

Aa  =  200,000 

Pa  =  Pb 
Pa  =  Aa  +  Ra  Pb  =  Ab  +  Rb 

Aa+Ra  =  Ab+Rb 
F+Ra  =  Ab+Rb 

200,000 +  Ra  =  800,000  +  2,000,000 

.".  Ra  =  2,600,000 

Nation  A  would,  therefore,  be  compelled,  in 
order  to  provide  an  adequate  defence  against 
nation  B,  to  maintain  a  standing  army  of  200,000 
men,  as  a  minimum,  and  possess  means  of  creating 
a  reserve  army  of  2,600,000  men  before  the  end 
of  six  months,  some  of  whom  would  have  to  be 
almost  immediately  available  in  order  to  reinforce 
the  standing  army  against  (Ab  — F)  or  the  600,000 
men,  who  were  not  employed  by  nation  B  in  the 
first  attack,  the  number  depending  on  circum- 
stances. 

It  is  a  fact,  if  military  experts  are  to  be  relied 
upon,  that  an  enemy  could  within  a  few  weeks' 
time  land  150,000  troops  on  the  seacoast  of  the 
United  States.     The  problem  of  adequate  defence 


3i 6  Empire  and  Armament 

for  the  United  States  involves,  then,  a  naval  de- 
velopment that  would  in  all  probability  make  the 
landing  of  that  force  impossible,  and  second,  the 
provision  of  a  standing  army  capable  of  contend- 
ing successfully  with  such  a  force  if  the  first  line 
of  defence  failed.  Adequate  national  defence, 
while  it  does  not  impose  upon  the  United  States 
the  burden  of  maintaining  a  standing  army  equal 
in  size  to  that  of  a  possible  enemy,  does  impose 
the  burden  of  some  plan  for  the  development  of 
its  latent  military  power,  so  that  its  power  of 
resistance  can  at  all  times  be  made  equal,  if  not 
superior  to,  the  force  which  an  enemy  can  exert 
against  it.  The  whole  question  is  simply  a  prob- 
lem in  mathematics  and  the  factors  of  sentiment 
and  prejudice  will  not  solve  the  equations  of  that 
problem.  What  the  ideal  condition  would  be, 
how  near  that  condition  a  nation  would  like  to 
approach,  are  matters  beside  the  question.  Ade- 
quate armament  is  a  fixed  and  determinable 
factor  in  the  problem  of  national  defence  and  is 
equal  to  F,  the  force  which  an  enemy  may  in  his 
discretion  suddenly  hurl  against  the  state  upon 
which  the  burden  of  defence  rests,  and  which, 
if  unsuccessfully  resisted,  would  destroy  the 
ability  of  that  state  to  develop  its  latent  power  of 
defence. 

A  study  of  conditions  in  the  United  States  leads 
one  to  the  belief  that  the  present  regular  military 
establishment  is  too  small  to  form  either  the 
requisite  emergency  defence  by  itself,  or  a  nucleus 


What  Is  Adequate  Defence?      317 

about  which  to  build  up  a  larger  force  in  time  of 
stress.  Its  size  as  well  as  its  expansive  ability, 
in  as  much  as  there  is  no  organized  reserve,  is  too 
small.  One  also  finds  that  were  the  formation  of 
a  reserve  attempted,  the  lack  of  even  partially 
trained  officers  would  make  the  reserve  ineffective. 
Again  it  appears  that  the  methods  of  peace  train- 
ing now  in  vogue  are  such  that  were  the  regular 
establishment  largely  increased  and  a  reserve  pro- 
vided, no  adequate  practical  training  in  the  com- 
mand of  large  units  could  be  given  officers  above 
the  grade  of  the  field  officers ;  this  due  to  the  system 
of  scattering  the  troops  in  small  bodies  all  over 
the  country  by  assigning  them  to  small,  useless, 
and  expensive  garrisons  for  political  reasons. 
With  respect  to  the  navy  one  finds  that  Congress 
is  free  not  only  to  reduce  the  naval  budget,  but 
to  alter  the  program  of  construction  recommended 
by  the  naval  authorities,  and  that  the  system  of 
building  useless  naval  stations  and  yards  for  pur- 
poses of  political  patronage  consumes  much  of  the 
remaining  budget  with  the  same  effect  that  Con- 
gressional control  over  army  appropriations  pro- 
duces. Finally,  that  the  Organized  Militia,  in 
which  so  much  reliance  under  the  existing  system  is 
necessarily  reposed,  is  ineffective  for  the  reasons 
that  trained  officers  for  it  are  lacking ;  it  is  practi- 
cally impossible  by  reason  of  the  increasing  demand 
upon  the  time  of  the  militiaman  to  maintain  it  at 
effective  strength,  and  the  control  of  the  central 
Government  over  this  force  is  insufficient  to  enable 


318  Empire  and  Armament 

it  to  be  freely  employed  in  conjunction  with  the 
regular  establishment,  or  its  use  to  be  relied  upon 
with  certainty  in  the  formulation  of  a  definite 
plan  of  defence. 

It  is  suggested  that  before  any  further  effort 
is  made  to  secure  an  increase  of  the  regular  mili- 
tary and  naval  establishments,  an  amendment  to 
the  Constitution  providing  for  a  competent,  non- 
partisan Council  of  National  Defence  be  secured. 
This  amendment  should  provide  that  no  appropri- 
ation of  money  for  the  army  or  navy  could  be  made 
by  a  mere  majority  of  Congress  unless  the  measure 
be  approved  by  the  Council  of  National  Defence 
and  be  recommended  to  Congress  by  the  President, 
but  that  Congress  by  a  two-thirds  vote  might  pass 
such  a  measure  notwithstanding  the  disapproval  of 
the  Council  and  the  President.  Such  an  amend- 
ment would  expose  all  military  appropriations  to 
the  careful  scrutiny  of  experts  and  the  public,  ren- 
der political  log-rolling  for  individual  ends  imprac- 
ticable, concentrate  the  responsibility  for  all 
military  expenditures  upon  the  President,  and 
effect  tremendous  economies  in  the  matter  of  na- 
tional defence,  at  the  same  time  retaining  for  Con- 
gress the  ultimate  control  over  the  military  and 
naval  establishments,  for  bills  carrying  military 
appropriations  would  still  originate  in  the  lower 
House.  The  great  advantage  of  such  a  system 
would  obviously  be  that  the  President  would  be  in 
part  relieved  from  that  political  pressure  which 
often  compels  him   to  approve  measures  in  the 


What  Is  Adequate  Defence?      3J9 

narrow  interest  of  his  party.  He  would  find  re- 
fuge behind  the  requirement  of  the  Council's  ap- 
proval without  which  his  recommendation  would 
be  out  of  order  and  in  spite  of  which  his  veto  power 
would  remain  intact. 

The  next  step  in  our  program  would  be  the  in- 
crease of  the  regular  military  establishment  to  the 
requisite  size  for  adequate  defence  which  the  expert 
judgment  of  military  men  places  at  200,000  men. 
This  figure  contemplates  the  actual  presence  in 
continental  United  States  at  all  times  of  but  about 
150,000  available  men,  the  remaining  50,000  being 
absorbed  by  the  Canal  Zone,  Alaska,  the  Hawaiian 
Islands,  Porto  Rico,  the  colonial  possessions,  and 
the  ineffective  list  including  shortages  in  recruit- 
ment in  times  of  prosperity.  The  increase  of  the 
regular  establishment  should  include  a  sufficient 
number  of  surplus  officers  to  provide  for  the  many 
details  which  now  deprive  the  troops  in  training 
of  their  full  quota  of  officers. 

To  maintain  these  150,000  men  in  a  high  state 
of  efficiency  in  time  of  peace,  it  would  next  be 
necessary  to  legally  abandon  the  expensive  and 
strategically  unnecessary  army  posts  scattered 
broadcast  over  the  country.  Except  in  cases  of 
peculiar  necessity,  the  troops  should  be  concen- 
trated in  brigade  or  division  posts,  not  only  for 
the  purpose  of  training  the  superior  commanders 
in  the  handling  of  the  large  bodies  of  men  compris- 
ing their  appropriate  units,  and  the  supply  service, 
but   for  reasons  of  economy.      The  saving  that 


320  Empire  and  Armament 

would  result  from  such  a  system  would  be  enormous 
and  would  contribute  no  inconsiderable  amount 
toward  the  increased  cost  of  the  regular  establish- 
ment due  to  its  enlargement.  For  the  most  part 
the  army  posts,  in  so  far  as  strategic  considerations 
would  permit,  should  be  located  with  respect  to 
a  climate  permitting  the  maximum  period  of  prac- 
tical training.  There  should  be  no  regimental 
cavalry  posts  in  the  frozen  regions  of  the  North 
where  man  and  beast  are  compelled  to  hibernate 
from  mid-November  until  late  spring.  The 
cavalry  and  field  artillery  should  go  to  the  open 
country  of  the  South  and  Southwest  in  so  far  as 
possible;  the  infantry  only  to  the  populous  sec- 
tions when  large  cities  and  the  danger  of  internal 
disorders  require  the  presence  of  troops  there. 
Congressmen  would  be  deprived  of  the  final  terri- 
torial disposition  of  the  army  by  the  Council  of 
National  Defence  and  Senators  would  no  longer 
be  able  to  provide  army  posts  and  navy  yards  for 
their  constituents,  which  fact  would  be  eminently 
gratifying  to  most  of  them  for  the  reason  that 
they  would  be  relieved  of  the  burden  of  the  present 
scramble  for  military  patronage  because  they 
would  not  be  held  responsible  by  their  constituents 
for  failing  to  "bring  home  the  bacon."  The  mili- 
tary "pork  barrel"  would  be  empty  for  all,  how- 
ever energetic  and  influential  the  seekers,  and  our 
Congressmen  would  no  longer  be  the  victims  of  a 
system  against  which  they  are  powerless  to  struggle 
under  the  existing  order. 


What  Is  Adequate  Defence?      321 

Nor  would  it  be  possible  under  such  a  system  for 
Congress  to  cast  aside  the  administration  program 
of  naval  construction  and  at  the  same  time  dictate 
a  program  of  its  own.  True,  it  might  refuse  to  pro- 
vide the  necessary  money  for  the  execution  of  the 
administration  program  but  its  refusal  would  react 
upon  the  administration,  and  no  unwise  program 
which  it  might  substitute  would  be  apt  to  receive 
the  approval  of  the  Council  of  National  Defence. 

Along  with  the  increase  of  the  regular  establish- 
ment should  be  created  an  army  reserve,  in  order 
to  give  the  army  the  sudden  expansive  power 
which  a  serious  emergency  would  require.  A  re- 
serve is  not  only  the  most  satisfactory  means  of 
providing  such  expansive  power  but  the  most 
economical  means,  as  it  saves  to  the  nation  for 
immediate  use  the  men  who  have  been  trained 
with  the  colours  at  great  expense.  With  an  ade- 
quate reserve  available,  length  of  service  with  the 
colours  could  be  reduced.  A  system  of  manoeuvres 
requiring  the  occasional  presence  of  the  reservists 
with  the  colours  would  not  only  render  the  manoeu- 
vres more  valuable  to  the  army  as  a  whole,  but 
would  maintain  touch  between  the  War  Depart- 
ment and  the  reservists,  and  prove  a  constant 
test  of  the  efficiency  of  the  reserve.  The  burden 
imposed  upon  a  reservist  by  requiring  him  to  report 
to  the  division  of  his  department,  at  least  once 
during  the  period  of  his  brief  reserve  service,  would 
not  be  as  great  as  that  now  imposed  upon  mem- 
bers of  the  Organized  Militia. 


322  Empire  and  Armament 

With  an  adequate  reserve  available,  there  would 
be  no  need  of  securing  to  the  Federal  Govern- 
ment more  control  over  the  Organized  Militia 
than  it  now  has.  Thus,  one  cause  of  contention 
between  the  Federal  and  state  governments  would 
be  removed.  If  the  active  army,  colours  and 
reserve  combined,  were  not  large  enough  to  meet 
an  emergency,  United  States  volunteers  could 
be  mustered  into  service  and  such  units  of  the 
Organized  Militia  as  might  tender  their  services 
incorporated  as  part  of  the  volunteer  army.  The 
Federal  Government  should,  however,  retain 
the  right  to  refuse  to  accept  the  services  of  all 
militia  officers  above  the  grade  of  captain  who 
could  not  meet  the  requirements  of  volunteer 
officers  of  their  own  grade.  The  enlisted  men  of 
the  Organized  Militia  should  be  regularly  paid 
in  time  of  peace  by  the  Federal  Government, 
whether  in  service  or  not,  and  all  militia  officers 
up  to  and  including  the  grade  of  colonel,  provided 
their  commands  are  recruited  to  within  eighty- 
five  per  cent,  of  the  established  peace  minimum; 
but  no  officer  of  the  militia  should  receive  any 
pay  who  does  not  exercise  actual  command  over  a 
unit  appropriate  to  his  rank.  General  officers  and 
surplus  officers  in  the  Organized  Militia,  should 
be  paid,  if  at  all,  by  their  respective  states. 

To  provide  officers  for  the  reserve  and  the 
volunteers,  a  well-organized  system  of  military 
education  would  have  to  be  established.  Such 
a  system  to  be  effective  would  have  to  be  made 


What  Is  Adequate  Defence?      323 

popular  by  imposing  the  minimum  demands  upon 
the  officers  consistent  with  adequacy.  The  recent 
McKeller  bill,  which  succeeded  in  passing  the 
Military  Committee  of  the  House,  provided  for 
the  designation  in  each  state  of  the  Union  of  one 
institution  of  learning  from  which  reserve  officers 
might  be  drawn.  These  institutions  were  re- 
quired to  possess  a  minimum  enrolment  of  three 
hundred  students,  to  be  appointed  pro  rata  from 
the  counties  of  their  respective  states,  and  to 
each  of  these  institutions  the  sum  of  $80,000  was 
to  be  paid  annually.  The  Federal  Government 
was  to  have  absolute  control  over  the  military 
training  of  the  student  body,  which  meant,  of 
course,  absolute  control  over  the  institution; 
a  minimum  academic  standard  was  provided,  and 
in  return  for  the  free  education  he  received  the 
graduate  appointee  was  required  to  obligate  him- 
self to  serve  seven  years  as  a  reserve  officer,  sub- 
ject to  actual  service  upon  call,  and  peace  service 
during  the  summer  months  for  purposes  of  train- 
ing with  troops.  Such  institutions  as  might  re- 
ceive the  designation  under  this  measure,  were 
required  to  turn  over  their  plants  to  the  virtual 
ownership  of  the  Federal  Government  in  return 
for  the  insignificant  sum  of  $266  per  capita 
per  year  for  three  hundred  students,  a  sum  less 
than  that  for  which  a  really  good  institution  of 
learning  can  maintain  a  student.  Nothing  in 
addition  was  to  be  paid  for  the  plant. 

The  bill  possessed  many  serious  defects.     In 


324  Empire  and  Armament 

the  first  place  there  was  under  it  no  guaranty  that 
the  most  suitable  institution  in  any  particular 
state  would  receive  the  designation,  as  that  was 
left  to  the  state  Legislature  where  petty  politics 
would  control.  In  the  second  place  a  military 
institution  with  a  record  of  high  service  and  splen- 
did traditions  would  be  practically  destroyed  if 
not  so  designated,  for  it  would  be  unable  to  com- 
pete with  the  Governmental  school  in  as  much  as 
only  the  graduates  of  the  latter  were  eligible  for 
appointment  in  the  reserve;  it  would  therefore  be 
compelled  to  draw  exclusively  from  that  negligibly 
small  class  of  young  men  desiring  a  military 
education  and  yet  unwilling  to  become  officers. 
Whatever  the  character  of  a  military  school  at  the 
time  of  the  enactment  of  such  a  bill  as  that  intro- 
duced by  Mr.  McKeller,  there  could  be  but  one 
with  prestige  in  a  state  after  the  law  was  put  into 
effect.  Thus,  to  create  military  schools  where 
they  did  not  exist,  valuable  existing  ones  might 
be  destroyed. 

But  the  general  idea  of  the  McKeller  bill  was 
a  good  one,  and  by  keeping  the  end  it  desired  to 
accomplish  in  view,  and  by  radically  altering  the 
practical  features  of  the  system,  by  the  end  of 
seven  years  upwards  of  25,000  uniformly  educated 
reserve  officers  could  be  secured. 

The  radical  alteration  which  suggests  itself  is  that 
instead  of  leaving  the  selection  of  the  preferred 
institution  to  the  state,  the  Federal  Government 
itself  should  offer  a  contract  to  existing  institu- 


What  Is  Adequate  Defence  ?      325 

tions  willing  to  meet  the  established  requirements 
of  a  school  for  reserve  officers,  under  which 
these  institutions  shall  be  entitled  to  $825  or 
$1000  per  capita  for  every  graduate,  according 
as  he  may  have  been  in  the  institution  three  or 
four  years,  who  obligates  himself  to  serve  seven 
years  in  the  reserve,  and  provided  that  no  insti- 
tution should  be  entitled  to  such  an  allowance  that 
did  not  furnish  a  specified  minimum  number  of 
reserve  officers  and  measure  up  to  the  require- 
ments of  the  law  for  any  given  year.  Under  such 
a  plan  the  War  Department  could  continue  to 
detail  army  officers  to  the  military  schools  of  the 
country  as  it  does  at  present,  the  Federal  Govern- 
ment would  be  required  to  pay  for  nothing  that  it 
did  not  get,  as  it  now  does  in  many  cases  under  the 
Morrill  Acts  which  appropriated  vast  sums  to  the 
establishment  of  agricultural  and  mechanical 
colleges  where  military  training  was  to  be  given; 
the  institutions  qualifying  under  the  law  would 
not  be  required  to  sacrifice  their  individuality  and 
their  past  in  any  way,  and  more  than  one  insti- 
tution in  the  same  state  would  be  able  to  survive 
the  enactment  of  the  proposed  Federal  law.  The 
practical  details  of  such  a  law  cannot  here  be 
gone  into,  but  it  is  essential  that  some  measure 
of  the  kind,  without  the  objectionable  features  of 
the  McKeller  bill,  be  introduced  in  Congress  and 
enacted  into  law  if  an  adequate  number  of  reserve 
officers  is  to  be  secured.  Some  provision  should 
also  be  included  for  the  voluntary  transfer  of 


326  Empire  and  Armament 

reserve  officers  to  the  army  when  the  number  of 
graduates  of  the  United  States  Military  Academy 
for  any  one  year  is  insufficient  to  fill  vacancies. 
This  provision  should  contemplate  the  assign- 
ment of  reserve  officers  according  to  the  deficiency 
in  the  representation  of  the  several  states  in  the 
Corps  of  Cadets  of  the  National  Academy.  Thus, 
if,  in  1920,  there  were  ten  cadets  from  Virginia 
and  twenty  from  New  York  in  the  Academy,  and 
Virginia  was  entitled  to  fifteen  and  New  York  to 
thirty,  these  states  would  be  entitled  to  the  same 
number  of  transfers  from  the  list  of  reserve  officers 
to  the  army  for  that  year,  provided  vacancies 
existed  in  the  active  list.  A  provision  of  this  kind 
would  encourage  many  young  men  who  could  not 
secure  appointment  to  West  Point  to  enter  an 
accepted  state  military  school. 

For  the  benefit  of  those  who  fear  the  growth  of 
militarism  under  such  a  general  system  of  military 
education,  it  may  be  pointed  out  that  in  as  much 
as  the  reserve  contemplated  for  the  army  would 
always  be  larger  than  the  active  army,  and  the 
officers  of  that  reserve  would  be  men  educated  and 
trained  in  the  several  states,  and  not  only  citizens 
in  the  highest  sense  of  the  word  but  state  citizens 
at  that,  loyal  and  devoted  to  their  local  political 
institutions,  it  would  be  impossible  for  the  Federal 
Government  to  exercise  that  excessive  centralized 
power  through  the  medium  of  the  army  which 
is  so  essential,  as  we  have  seen,  to  the  reign  of 
militarism. 


What  Is  Adequate  Defence  ?      327 

At  the  close  of  this  study  let  us  now  summarize 
briefly  the  conclusions  which  we  are  justified  in 
drawing  from  American  history : 

1.  The  United  States  is  not  a  self-centred 
and  isolated  continental  state,  but  an  empire 
made  up  of  widely  separated  territories  and  pos- 
sessing world-wide  interests. 

2.  The  imperial  interests  of  the  United  States 
bring  it  into  close  contact  with  the  other  nations 
of  the  world,  and  into  the  most  complex  relations 
with  many  of  those  nations. 

3.  The  existing  American  policy  of  national 
imperialism  constantly  generates  new  political 
problems,  which  increase  in  importance  and  com- 
plexity in  direct  proportion  to  the  intimacy  of 
contact  between  the  United  States  and  other 
states. 

4.  As  foreign  relations  increase  in  importance 
and  complexity,  the  danger  of  international  fric- 
tion also  increases. 

5.  With  the  increasing  danger  of  friction 
between  the  United  States  and  other  States, 
means  of  adequate  national  defence  become  more 
essential. 

6.  An  ancient  and  inherited,  but  unreasoning 
prejudice  against  a  standing  army,  exists  among 
the  American  people. 

7.  Coupled  with  this  prejudice  is  the  erroneous 
belief  that  adequate  armament  is  not  only  uneco- 
nomic, but  that  such  an  armament  necessarily 
increases  the  chances  of  war. 


328  Empire  and  Armament 

8.  The  belief  is  also  widely  prevalent  that  not 
only  war,  but  armament  is  unnecessary;  war  and 
armament  are  as  a  rule  confounded  in  their  various 
aspects. 

9.  The  old  jealousy  of  the  power  of  a  standing 
army,  lest  it  usurp  the  reins  of  government  in  the 
interest  of  a  military  dictator  or  an  autocrat,  has 
given  way  to  the  fear  that  an  enlarged  regular 
army  would  engender  the  spirit  of  militarism 
among  the  people  themselves. 

10.  Militarism  is  neither  the  offspring  of  arma- 
ment— not  even  of  excessive  armament — nor  of 
national  imperialism,  but  is  the  outgrowth  of  that 
excess  of  centralized  political  power  which  cannot 
exist  in  the  United  States  under  its  present  form 
of  government;  therefore  the  provision  of  ade- 
quate armament,  political  forms  remaining  un- 
changed, could  not  establish  militarism. 

11.  The  creation  of  an  adequate  system  of 
national  defence  is  not  a  difficult  matter  if  ap- 
proached without  prejudice,  with  a  proper  con- 
ception of  the  function  of  military  education, 
training,  and  armament,  and  with  a  determination 
to  establish  the  system  upon  a  non-political  basis 
so  far  as  petty  politics  is  concerned. 

12.  The  time  has  come  when  the  people  of  the 
United  States,  in  justice  to  themselves,  and  the 
country  they  inherited  from  their  forefathers, 
must  act,  or  else,  will  be  heard,  sooner  or  later, 
from  the  lips  of  the  so-called  pacific  statesmen, 
who  now  inveigh  against  adequate  armament  for 


What  Is  Adequate  Defence?      329 

national  defence,  the  belated  and  paraphrased 
appeal  of  Demosthenes,  as  it  has  been  heard  in 
England : 

Yet,  O  Americans,  yet  is  there  time !  And  there  is 
one  manner  in  which  you  can  recover  your  greatness, 
or  dying,  fall  worthy  of  your  past  at  Yorktown  and 
New  Orleans.  .  .  .  Go  yourselves,  every  man  of  you, 
and  stand  in  the  ranks;  and  either  a  victory  beyond 
all  victories  in  its  glory  awaits  you,  or  falling,  you  shall 
fall  greatly  and  worthy  of  your  past ! 

And  then  too,  as  if  an  echo  of  the  mingled  voices 
of  Jefferson  and  Monroe  and  Polk  and  Pierce  and 
the  other  American  imperialists,  all  too  late  as  a 
warning,  the  mocking  choir  of  Fate  will  chant  the 
words: 

"Dream  ye  of  peaceful  sway? 
Dream  on,  who  dream  it  may. 
War  still  is  Empire's  word ! 
Peace ?  By  the  victor's  sword !" 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 

The  manuscript  of  this  work  was  completed  in 
November,  1914.  It  was  not,  therefore,  until  after 
this  that  the  author  was  able  to  examine  Roland  G. 
Usher's  remarkable  work,  Pan-Americanism,  which 
appeared  in  March,  19 15,  a  work  which,  in  the  author's 
opinion,  is  of  most  vital  interest  to  Americans.  No- 
thing was  found  in  that  work  requiring  the  author  to 
alter  his  views,  and  he  believes  that  Empire  and  Arma- 
ment should  be  read  in  connection  with  it,  as  well 
as  in  connection  with  Norman  Angell's  The  Great 
Illusion,  which  sustains  its  main  thesis — a  plea  for 
peace. 

Since  the  writing  of  this  work,  the  author  has  found 
opportunity  to  examine  a  number  of  authorities  to 
which  his  attention  has  been  called,  but,  with  the 
exception  of  the  insertion  of  a  quotation  from  F. 
Garcia  Calderon's  scholarly  treatise,  Latin  America; 
Its  Rise  and  Progress,  which  quotation  briefly  sets 
forth  the  South  American  view  of  our  imperialism, 
no  material  addition  to  the  text  has  been  made.  In- 
stead, therefore,  of  apologizing  for  the  citation  in  this 
bibliography  of  authorities  which  had  not  been  con- 
sulted in  the  writing  of  the  book,  the  author  deems 
it  highly  gratifying  that  he  may  refer  to  them  with 
assurance  that  they  will  support  his  arguments. 

33  * 


332  Empire  and  Armament 

In  the  March,  1915,  number  of  the  Harvard  Illus- 
trated, President  Lowell  of  Harvard  wrote: 

"The  need  of  preparation  for  war  is  real.  The  war 
in  Europe  has  taught  us  many  things,  and  we  should 
be  indeed  dull  if  we  learned  nothing  from  such  a 
cataclysm  in  the  history  of  civilization. 

"We  have  learned,  first,  that  war  is  inevitable  even 
for  a  nation  that  does  not  seek  it.  We  have  learned 
also  that  modern  warfare  marches  so  rapidly  that 
there  is  no  time  to  organize  a  defensive  force  after  it 
begins.  We  have  learned,  in  the  third  place,  that  the 
greatest  need  of  a  country  with  a  small  standing  army 
is  a  body  of  trained  officers.  With  them  armies  can 
be  recruited  and  drilled  in  a  comparatively  short  time. 
Without  them  the  creation  of  an  efficient  defensive 
force  is  almost  impossible." 

"Sensible  men  insure  their  houses  and  a  sensible 
people  will  prepare  to  defend  their  soil,"  he  added. 

It  is  unfortunate  that  there  are  not  more  influen- 
tial scholars  of  the  type  of  President  Lowell  and  Pro- 
fessor Ely  to  assist  in  enlightening  the  American  people. 

One  who  wishes  to  study  the  arguments  on  both 
sides  of  the  question  of  adequate  armament  and 
national  defence  would  do  well  to  consult  the  works 
included  in  this  bibliography.  The  author  particu- 
larly recommends  a  series  of  brilliant  articles  which 
have  recently  appeared  in  the  Scientific  American, 
and  to  which  his  own  attention  was  directed  by 
Major-General  Leonard  Wood. 

In  the  extended  search  of  authorities  incident  to 
the  writing  of  this  book,  the  members  of  the  author's 
class  in  Political  Science  rendered  invaluable  aid, 
especially  in  connection  with  the  writings  and  papers 
of  early  American  statesmen. 


Bibliography  333 


Adams.     Essays  Military  and  Diplomatic. 

Adams,  John.     Works  of. 

American  State  Papers. 

Angell.     The  Great  Illusion. 

Annals  of  American  Academy  of  Political  and  Social  Science. 

Arnold.     German  Ambitions  as  they  Affect  the  United  States. 


Bacon's  Essays. 
Bagehot.     Physics  and  Politics. 
Bancroft.     History  of  United  States. 
Barker.     Nietzsche  and  Treitschke. 
Beard.     American  Government  and  Politics. 

Economic  Interpretation  of  the  United  States  Constitution. 

Contemporary  American  History. 

Benton.     Thirty  Years'  View. 

Bergson,     Creative  Evolution. 

Bernhardi.     Germany  and  the  Next  War. 

Bingham.     The  Monroe  Doctrine,  an  Obsolete  Shibboleth. 

Block.     Is  War  now  Impossible  ? 

Bryan,  William  J.     Speeches  and  Utterances  of. 

Burgess.     Political  Science  and  Constitutional  Law. 

Butler.     The  International  Mind. 


Calderon.     Latin  A  merica;  Its  Rise  and  Progress. 

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Clausewitz.     War. 

Clemenceau.     South  America  Today. 

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Conway.     Life  of  Edmund  Randolph. 

Cooley.     Constitutional  Law. 

Coolidge.     The  United  States  as  a  World  Power. 

Cramb.     England  and  Germany. 

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Darwin.     Descent  of  Man. 

Origin  of  Species. 

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334  Empire  and  Armament 

De  Vries.     Die  Mutationstheorie. 

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Federalist. 

Fiske.     Essays  Historical  and  Literary. 

Fite.     Social  and  Industrial  Conditions  in  the  North  during  the 

Civil  War. 
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"Report  as  Secretary  of  War  for  1914." 
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the  Pacific  Ocean. 

Hamilton.     History  of  the  Republic  of  the  United  States  as  Traced 
in  the  Writings  of  Alexander  Hamilton  and  his  Contemporaries. 

The  Writings  of  James  Monroe. 

Harrison,  Benjamin.     This  Country  of  Ours. 

Hausrath.     Life  of  Treitschke. 

Henderson.     American  Diplomatic  Questions. 

Hershey.     Essentials  of  International  Public  Law. 

Huxley.     Evolution  and  Ethics. 

Method  and  Results. 

Jameson.     Calhoun's  Correspondence. 
Jefferson's  Correspondence. 

Kant.     Perpetual  Peace. 


Bibliography  335 

Latane.     Diplomatic  Relations  of  the  United  States  and  Spanish 

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International  Law. 
Lea.     The  Valour  of  Ignorance. 

The  Day  of  the  Saxon. 

Lodge.     Hamilton's  Works. 

Machiavelli.     The  Prince. 

Madison  Papers. 

Mahan.     The  Interest  of  America  in  International  Conditions. 

Some  Neglected  Aspects  of  War. 

The  Interest  of  America  in  Sea  Power,  Present  and  Future. 

Armaments  and  Arbitration. 

Mallory.     Life  and  Speeches  of  Henry  Clay. 

Marshall.     Life  of  Washington. 

Minor.     Notes  on  Government  and  States'  Rights. 

Molinari.     Grandeur  et  decadence  de  la  guerre. 

Montesquieu.     Spirit  of  Laws. 

Moore.     American  Diplomacy. 

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Four  Phases  of  American  Development. 

History  and  Digest  of  International  Arbitration. 

Morse.     John  Quincy  Adams. 

Neeser.     Our  Navy  and  the  Next  War. 
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Rowland.     Life  of  George  Mason. 
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Schultz.     Race  or  Mongrel. 
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Sombart.     Krieg  und  Kapitalismus. 
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Stimson.     State  Constitutions. 
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Popular  Government. 

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Essays. 

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Villard.     Germany  Embattled. 
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Wirt.     Life  of  Patrick  Henry. 


INDEX 


ABC  Powers,  Mr.  Taft's 
view  of,  222 

Adams,  John,  on  national  de- 
fence, 33,  64;  urges  protec- 
tion of  commerce,  64,  65; 
letter  to  James  McHenry, 
65;  letter  to  Stoddert,  66; 
urges  plan  of  national  de- 
fence, 72,  73;  his  letter  on 
peace  and  war,  229,  289 

Adams,  John  Quincy,  urges 
exclusive  policy  upon  Mon- 
roe, 125;  his  views  of  Mon- 
roe Doctrine,  131,  178,  212; 
his  attitude  on  Florida  in- 
vasion, 140;  mentioned,  145 

Alaska,  acquisition  of,  207 

Alexander  the  Great  men- 
tioned, 284 

Algiers,  trouble  with,  in  1794, 
59;  British  encourage  depre- 
dations by,  82;  punished  by 
United  States,  121 

Alliances,  Washington  warns 
against  European,  62 

Amendment  of  United  States 
Constitution  proposed,  318 

"American  Spirit,"  example 
of,  200 

Americanism  of  the  West 
produces  Jackson,  151 

"Americanization,"  Pierce's 
policy  of,  187 

Angell,  Norman,  styles  war  an 
illusion,  233,  237;  aptly 
quotes  Bacon  on  man's  love 
of  strife,  247;  mentioned  as 
a  pacifist,  2S6 

Arbitration,  scope  of,  79 


Archimedes  referred  to,  239 

Aristotle,  his  ideal  state,  284 

Arizona,  United  States  ac- 
quires, 167 

Armament,  discussion  of,  226; 
distinguished  from  militar- 
ism, 246;  adequate,  con- 
founded with  militarism  ,250; 
cost  of,  for  Great  Powers, 
251,  252,  253;  economics  of, 
discussed,  255  et  seq.;  oppo- 
sition to,  based  on  error  in 
economics,  266;  Taft  on, 
267;  answer  to  arguments 
against,  267;  cost  of,  is  but 
money  in  circulation,  275; 
functions  of,  highly  economic, 
276;  not  responsible  for 
militarism,  310;  how  ade- 
quate, is  determined,  313 

Armies,  use  and  growth  of 
standing,  3;  size  of,  imma- 
terial, 30 

Arms,  manufacture  of,  pro- 
vided for,  73 

Army,  first  proposal  to  create 
an  intercolonial,  12;  creation 
of  colonial,  15,  16,  17;  en- 
largement of  the,  18;  pre- 
judice against  a  standing,  21 ; 
Continental,  disbanded,  31; 
reason  for  creation  of,  39 ;  pro- 
visions concerning,  in  Fed- 
eral Constitution,  46,  47,  48; 
more  autocratic  than  navy, 
49 ;  used  to  suppress  Whiskey 
Rebellion  of  1794,  58;  created 
in  1795,  61;  provided  for 
war  with  France  in  1798,  65; 


337 


338 


Index 


Army — Continued 
Jefferson  reduces,  74;  Jeffer- 
son urges  formation  of,  97, 
98;  Clay  favours  creation  of, 
112;  Webster's  speech  con- 
cerning, 117;  Calhoun  op- 
poses reduction  of,  120;  size 
of,  in  1815,  120;  reduced  in 
1817,  123;  increased  in  1838, 
160;  Tocqueville's  views  on 
need  of,  in  United  States,  168; 
Tucker's  views  on,  171; 
views  of  Story,  Burgess,  and 
Curtis,  171;  Bryan  the  en- 
emy of  an  adequate,  171; 
Senator  Teller's  ancient  pre- 
judice against,  171;  Webster 
discusses  purposes  of,  203; 
Bryan  and  Teller  on  ability 
of  President  to  raise,  255, 
256;  President  Wilson's  views 
on,  259;  what  is  adequate 
size  of,  319 

Articles  of  Confederation,  weak 
military  provisions  of,  22 

Attila,  Kaiser  William's  ap- 
peal to  troops  to  imitate, 
306 

Austria,  influence  of,  on  Mon- 
roe's doctrine,  126;  offended 
by  United  States  over  Kos- 
suth incident,  182,  183; 
Prussian  war  forced  upon, 
302 

Bacon,  his  essay  on  war,  30; 
referred  to,  239 ;  aptly  quoted 
by  Angell  relative  to  war, 
247;  on  war,  284,  285 

Bagehot,  Walter,  his  theory  of 
war,  206;  his  theory  of 
group  struggle,  244;  on  war, 
282,  283 

Bancroft  quoted  on  Washing- 
ton, 75 

Barbary  States,  prey  on  Amer- 
ican commerce,  78;  British 
encourage,  82 

Barker,  Ernest,  quoted  on 
Kant  and  Hegel,  287 


Baton  Rouge,  Americans  help 
seize,  108 

Beard  quoted,  40,  41 

Belgium,  her  army  in  1914,  32 

Benton,  Mr.,  defeats  treaty  of 
annexation  of  Texas,  166 

Bergson,  Henri,  on  war,  283 

Bering  Sea,  dispute  over,  with 
Great  Britain,  195 

Bernhardi,  Frederick  von,  re- 
ferred to,  263;  his  influence, 
298,  299;  his  real  mission, 
300 

Bill  of  Rights,  complaints 
against  soldiery  in,  11 

Bingham,  Hiram,  his  view  of 
Monroe  Doctrine,  214 

Bismarck,  his  national  aspira- 
tion, 293,  302;  the  pupil  of 
Frederick,  303;  William  the 
pupil  of,  303 

"Blond  Beasts,"  philosophy  of 
the,  242 

Bliicher,  name  of,  revered  by 
Germans,  292 

Bowdoin,  Governor  of  Massa- 
chusetts in  Shay's  Rebellion, 

34  ,     . 

Brabazon  soldiers  used  in 
England,  8 

Brazil,  altercation  with,  in 
1893,  196 

British  seamen  search  United 
States  vessels,  63 

Browning  quoted,  305 

Bryan,  W.  J.,  foments  jealousy 
of  army,  171;  his  absurd 
statement  about  ability  of 
President  to  raise  troops, 
255;  referred  to,  263;  his 
superior  judgment  ques- 
tioned, 265 

Bryce,  James,  Bingham's  book 
on  Monroe  Doctrine  dedi- 
cated to,  214 

Buchanan,  James,  preserves 
peace  with  Great  Britain, 
176 

Bunker  Hill,  Webster  s  ad- 
dress at,  161 


Index 


339 


Burr's  conspiracy,  imperialistic 
in  design,  108;  originated  in 
desire  for  expansion,  184 

Burroughs,  John,  on  group 
struggle,  244 

Butler,  Nicholas  Murray,  on 
disarmament,  243 

Cade,  Jack,  suppressed  by 
Brabazon  mercenaries,  8 

Calhoun,  John  C,  mentioned, 
no;  efforts  on  behalf  of 
national  defence,  113,  114, 
urges  continuance  of  war  in 
1812,  115;  his  doctrine: 
"Government  is  Protec- 
tion," no,  116,  149;  on  war, 
116;  opposes  reduction  of 
army,  120;  influence  of,  for 
national  defence,  122;  in- 
fluence of,  upon  Monroe's 
doctrine,  125;  mentioned, 
139,  146;  "Liberty,  dearer 
than  the  Union!"  147;  his 
counsel  to  South  Carolina, 
149,  150;  estranged  by  Jack- 
son, 162;  accepts  State  port- 
folio, 165;  tacitly  accepts 
doctrine  of  coercion,  165; 
favours  annexation  of  Texas, 
165;  favours  acquisition  of 
new  territory,  165;  his  in- 
consistencies as  to  Mexican 
War,  172;  guilt  of  Mexican 
War  rests  upon,  173;  his 
view  of  Yucatan  case,  178, 
212 

Canada,  trouble  over  bound- 
ary of,  160,  164 

Canadian  Revolution  of  1837, 
Americans  active  in,  158 

Carnegie,  Andrew,  pacifist,  286 

Central  America,  lust  of  Amer- 
icans for,  185;  Walker's  in- 
roads upon,  185;  the  natural 
lack  of  faith  of,  in  United 
States,  188 

Cherokee  Indians,  145 

Cheves,  Mr., of  South  Carolina, 
mentioned,  no 


Chile,  altercation  with,  in  1892, 
196 

China,  Kaiser  William's  ex- 
hortation to  his  troops  con- 
cerning their  conduct  in,  306 

Christ,  saying  of,  as  to  peace 
and  war,  234;  kingdom  of, 
not  yet  come,  248 

Clausewitz,  on  war,  206;  his 
influence,  292 

Clay,  Henry,  mentioned,  no; 
elected  Speaker  United  States 
House  of  Representatives, 
in;  assists  Madison  pre- 
pare for  defence,  1 1 1 ;  favours 
and  has  no  fear  of  an  army, 
112;  his  splendid  efforts  for 
national  defence,  114;  his 
views  on  standing  armies, 
116;  influence  of,  122;  solves 
nullification  difficulty,  150; 
utilizes  Jingoes,  162;  refuses 
State  portfolio,  164;  defeats 
treaty  of  annexation  of 
Texas,  166;  mentioned,  280 

Clay-Calhoun  Doctrine,  106 

Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty,  de- 
fined, 179;  fatal  to  Monroe 
Doctrine,  180 

Cleveland,  President  Grover, 
his  remarkable  message  to 
Congress  on  the  Venezuelan 
case,  198 

Coercion,  Federal,  Doctrine  of, 
estranges  Clay  and  Calhoun, 
162;  tacitly  adopted  by  Cal- 
houn, 165 

Colonies,  real  condition  of,  in 
1776,  20 

Colorado,  United  States  ac- 
quires, 167 

Commerce,  Hamilton's  aggres- 
sive policy  concerning,  39; 
as  cause  of  war,  41;  Adams 
urges  protection  of  United 
States,  64,66;  Barbary  States 
prey  on,  78;  restrained  by 
Great  Britain,  82;  Webster 
urges  protection  of,  no,  117, 
118;  Algerians  punished  for 


340 


Index 


Commerce —  Continued 

inroads  upon  United  States, 
122 ;  influences  Monroe's  doc- 
trine, 127,  128;  discussed  by 
Webster,  204 

Commercial  aggression,  doc- 
trine of,  39,  74 

Committee  of  Safety,  military 
measures  of,  15 

Compulsory  military  service 
proposed  and  assailed,  118 

Conclusions  concerning  mili- 
tary and  political  situation 
of  United.  States,  327 

Congress,  First  and  Second 
Continental,  military  meas- 
ures of,  15,  16,  17;  should  de- 
fine Latin-American  policy, 
223 

Connecticut,  threats  of  nulli- 
fication and  secession  in,  83 

Constitution,  Federal,  military 
provisions  in,  46,  47;  Jeffer- 
son opposes  ratification  of,  5 1 

Constitutional  Convention, 
1787,  influence  exerted  upon, 
35;  character  of  members  of, 
35;  evidence  found  in  re- 
cords of,  39;  diplomacy  of, 
with   respect   to   the  army, 

46,  47 

Continental    troops,    splendid 

service  of,  29;  their  record 

emphasizes  certain  facts,  29; 

discharged,  31 
Coruna,     Don     Valentin     De 

Toronda,    Jefferson's    letter 

to,  94 
Cosmic  Process,  embraces  war, 

230;  Huxley  on,  231 
Cosmism,  nature  of,  245,  246 
Costa   Rica,   Walker  invades, 

186 
Council   of   National   Defence 

proposed,  318 
Cramb,  his  treatise  on  England 

and  Germany,  299 
Creek  Indians,  143,  144 
Croesus,  Solon's  remark  to,  on 

war,  31 


Crusades  developed  standing 
armies,  5 

Cuba,  filibustering  in,  189; 
attempts  to  neutralize,  by 
Great  Britain  and  France, 
189;  Soule  favours  seizure 
of,  190;  European  attitude 
towards,  189,  190;  interven- 
tion of  United  States  in,  on 
moral  grounds,  235 

Curtis  quoted  on  Shay's  Re- 
bellion, 34 

Danish  West  Indies,  United 
States  wishes  to  buy,  208 

Darwin,  his  views  on  strife,  76; 
his  theory  of  evolution,  206; 
on  war,  283 

Decatur,  Commodore,  defeats 
Algerians,  121 

Declaration  of  Independence, 
complaints  against  the  mili- 
tary in,  19 

Defence,  national,  Madison's 
message  concerning,  1 1 1 ; 
Clay's  speech  on  behalf  of, 
112;  Webster's  speech  on, 
117;  Wilson  on,  280 

Demosthenes,  appeal  of,  para- 
phrased, 329 

Denmark,  Prussia's  unright- 
eous war  with,  302 

Dionysius  on  war,  88,  230, 
281 

Diplomacy  employed  by  Con- 
stitutional Convention,  47 

Disarmament,  Jefferson's  the- 
ory of,  76,  77,  78;  policy 
angers  people,  84;  error  and 
evils  of,  240  el  scq. ;  Nicholas 
Murray  Butler  on,  243,  309; 
in  no  sense  equivalent  of 
pacifism,  247;  Taft  on,  267; 
Treitschke  on,  267;  answer  to 
arguments  in  favour  of,  267; 
futility  of,  309 

Dorr's  Rebellion,  doctrine  of 
coercion  applied  in,  165 

Dryden,  John,  his  poem  on 
militia,  56 


Index 


34i 


Duane,  Gen.,  Jefferson's  letter 
to,  91 

Economics,  of  war  and  arma- 
ment, 255;  of  war  and  arma- 
ment misunderstood,  266; 
fallacies  concerning  arma- 
ment, 267  et  seq. 

Ely,  Professor  Richard  T., 
referred  to,  332 

Emery,  Professor,  quoted  on 
relative  cost  of  German  arm- 
ament, 270 

Empire,  growth  of  the  Amer- 
ican, 159,  167,  193,  200; 
Calderon's  summary  of  the 
American,  208;  price  of,  301 

England,  development  of  stand- 
ing army  in,  7;  prejudice  of 
people  in,  against  armies,  9; 
her  colonial  military  policy, 
14;  reasons  for  her  failure  in 
Revolution,  28 

Entanglements  of  United  States 
with  Europe,  44,  45,  62,  63; 
with  foreign  States,  108,  154, 
158,  159,  195,  206 

Erasmus,  influence  of,  286, 
290 

Ethical  duty,  of  man,  as  to 
war,  231 

Ethical    Process,    Huxley    on, 

231 

Europe,  United  States  as  ar- 
biter of,  in  America,  44; 
views  of,  on  United  States 
policy,  44;  early  entangle- 
ments of  United  States  with, 
45;  Washington  calls  atten- 
tion to  danger  from,  62; 
warns  against  entangling 
alliances  with,  62 

European  treaties  of  United 
States,  disputes  over,  63 

European  views  of  United 
States  designs  on  Cuba,  190 

Evolution,  theory  of,  embraces 
war,  230  et  seq.;  theory  of, 
presented  by  Germans,  294, 
301 


Expansion,  policy  of,  in  United 
States,  107,  108 

Federal  Government,  resist- 
ance of,  by  States,  144,  145 

Federalist  referred  to  and 
quoted,  39 

Federalist  Party,  death  of,  122 

Fenelon,  influence  of,  286,  290 

Fichte,  Gottlieb,  206,  293 

Fichte,  Immanuel  Hermann 
von,  mentioned,  206;  his  in- 
fluence in  Germany,  293 

Filibustering,  American,  un- 
restrained, 184;  Walker's 
career  of,  185 

Fillmore's  Administration,  con- 
ditions in,  182;  origin  of 
spirit  of,  185 

"Fire-eaters"  of  South  Caro- 
lina, 149 

Florida,  Hamilton  suggests 
seizure  of,  70;  Jackson's  in- 
vasion of,  122,  140;  Indian 
troubles  in,  160 

Fortifications,  Webster  dis- 
cusses, 204 

Foster,  John  W.,  his  view  of 
Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty  and 
Monroe  Doctrine,  180 

France,  dispute  with,  over 
treaty  of  1778,  63;  Louis- 
iana purchased  from,  81; 
trouble  with,  over  Spanish 
treaty,  98,  106;  Jackson's 
wrath  against,  138;  threat- 
ened by  Jackson,  154;  at- 
tempts to  protect  Cuba 
from  United  States,  189; 
military  expenditures  of ,  251, 
252,  253;  Heine  forecasts 
conquest  of,  291 

Franklin,  Benjamin,  proposals 
of,  12 

Frederick  the  Great,  seizes 
Silesia,  288;  violates  neutral- 
ity of  Silesia,  288,  303;  fore- 
most in  German  mind,  292; 
father  of  German  militarism, 
302;  on  war,  303,  304 


342 


Index 


Galileo  referred  to,  239 

Garrison,  Mr.,  Secretary  of 
War,  at  variance  with  Presi- 
dent, 263 

Georgia  nullifies  Federal  law, 
144,  146 

German  philosophy  of  war, 
280,  285;  obsolete  and  vici- 
ous, 242 ;  danger  of,  248 ;  re- 
sponsible for  the  great  war, 
310 

German  policy  of  mailed  fist, 
42 

German  political  thought,  288 

Germans,  self -assumed  superi- 
ority of,  298 

Germany,  military  expendi- 
tures, 251,  252,  253;  philoso- 
phy of,  290  et  seg.;  aspira- 
tions of,  292 ;  her  national  flag 
interpreted,  292,  293;  her 
destiny,  301;  her  obsolete 
and  ruthless  conception  of 
war,  304,  305;  inconsistent 
attitude  of,  305;  people  of, 
not  to  blame,  307 

Goethe  quoted  on  war,  290, 
301 

Goltz,  Von  der,  his  Nation  in 
Arms,  299 

Gospel  quoted  from  on  war, 
234,  241,  248 

"Government  is  Protection," 
Calhoun's  doctrine,  no,  116, 

J49        .     . 

Great  Britain,  disputes  with, 
over  North -West  Territory, 
63;  war  with,  threatened  in 
1807,  82;  thwarted  in  sale  of 
Louisiana  to  United  States, 
107;  sentiment  against  re- 
sisting ,  in  United  States,  1 09 ; 
influence  of,  upon  Monroe's 
declaration,  125;  proposes 
opposition  to  Holy  Alliance 
by  United  States,  127;  Jack- 
son's wrath  against,  138; 
Americans  engage  in  Can- 
adian insurrection  against, 
158;     trouble     with,     over 


Maine  boundary,  160,  164; 
involved  with  United  States 
over  Oregon,  175;  Buchanan 
preserves  peace  with,  176; 
Mosquito  Coast  troubles  of, 
with  United  States,  177; 
attempts  to  protect  Cuba 
against  the  United  States, 
189;  dispute  with,  over  Ber- 
ing Sea,  195;  Venezuelan 
incident,  196;  military  ex- 
penditures of,  251,  252,  253 
Grotius,  influence  of,  286 
Guam     acquired     by    United 

States,  208 
Guatemala,  effect  of  loans  to, 
209 

Haeckel,  mentioned,  206;  phi- 
losophic influence  of,  294 

Hamilton,  Alexander,  views  of, 
on  national  defence,  36,  45; 
his  national  doctrine,  38;  on 
commerce  as  cause  of  war, 
41,  42,  44;  military  policy 
of,  45;  assists  Washington 
with  farewell  address,  62; 
services  in  Whiskey  Rebel- 
lion, 67;  his  aggressive  mili- 
tary policy  in  1798,  68;  sug- 
gests seizure  of  Louisiana, 
Florida,  and  South  America, 
70;  his  plan  of  national 
defence,  70,  71 

Hardenburg,  the  German  pa- 
triot, 302 

Harrison,  William  Henry, 
choice  of  Jingoes,  163 

Hartford  Convention,  144 

Hartmann  classifies  Euro- 
peans, 298 

Hawaiian  Islands,  annexation 
of,  planned,  201;  acquired 
by  United  States,  208 

Hegel,  Karl,  referred  to,  206, 
263;  his  historical  finalism, 
294 

Hegel,  Wilhelm  Friedrich,  his 
influence,  287;  annuls  ideal- 
ism of  Kant,  289 


Index 


343 


Heine  on  German  national 
ambition,  291 

Heraclitus  on  war,  88,  281 

Hobbes,  Thomas,  on  war,  285 

Holt,  Hamilton,  refers  to  Taft 
as  pacifist,  220 

Holy  Alliance,  influence  of, 
upon  Monroe's  doctrine,  126 

Honduras,  Walker  invades, 
187;  effect  of  loans  to,  209 

Horace  on  war  and  peace,  282 

Hummel  declares  French  are 
monkeys  and  Russians 
slaves,  298 

Hungary,  United  States  inter- 
meddles in  affairs  of,  181; 
revolution  in,  182,  183,  184 

Huxley,  his  views  on  human 
strife,  76;  his  theory  of  evo- 
lution, 206;  on  ethical  duty 
of  man,  231;  on  war,  283; 
his  real  meaning,  295 

Idealism  of  Kant  annulled  by 
Hegel,  289 

Imperialism,  Hamilton's  policy 
of,  70;  birth  of,  106,  107, 
108;  Polk's  doctrine  of,  156 
et  seq.;  grows  out  of  nation- 
alism, 156;  origin  of  Ameri- 
can, 157;  history  of  begin- 
nings of,  156  et  seq.;  a  fact, 
its  dangers,  193  et  seq.;  re- 
sults of,  200;  bears  no  es- 
sential relation  to  militarism, 
202;  Calderon's  views  on 
United  States,  208;  course 
of,  traced,  207,  208,  209; 
dangers  of,  209,  210;  imper- 
tinence of  our,  210;  German 
policy  of,  297,  301 

Indians,  troubles  with  Georgia, 
143  et  seq. 

Industry,  value  of  military 
training  to,  273 

Ingraham,  Captain,  offends 
Austria,  183 

Insults  to  United  States  flag 
in  1808,  84 

Insurance,    lack    of    national, 


237.  238;  economic  function 
of  armament,  278 
Intercolonial     Conference     of 
1754,  failure  of,  12 

Jackson,  Andrew,  mentioned, 
122;  his  doctrine,  135  et  seq.; 
his  opposition  to  Washing- 
ton, 137;  his  victory  over  the 
British,  138;  people  fearful 
of,  138;  his  altercation  with 
General  Scott,  139;  arouses 
spirit  of  nationalism  in  the 
West,  141;  his  presidential 
campaigns,  141  et  seq.;  his 
attitude  on  nullification,  143 
et  seq.;  his  treatment  of 
Georgia  Indians,  145;  "Our 
Federal  Union:  it  must  be 
preserved,"  147;  attitude 
toward  South  Carolina,  147, 
148;  country's  support  of, 
151;  produced  by  Western 
Americanism,  151;  his  doc- 
trine compared  with  former 
ones,  152;  compels  France 
to  pay  her  debt,  154;  estab- 
lishes United  States  as  a 
world-power,  155;  his  doc- 
trine of  Federal  coercion, 
162 

Jacksonian  Doctrine,  135  et 
seq.;  nature  of ,  148,  152,  153 

Janizaries,  Turkish,  use  of,  5 

Japan  "gently  coerced"  by 
Perry,  192 

Jay,  John,  his  commercial 
policy,  39,  42;  on  war  and 
human  nature,  42;  his  mili- 
tary policy,  43,  45 

Jay  Treaty  results  from  dis- 
putes with  Great  Britain,  63 

Jealousy  of  the  military  power, 
9,    IO,  16,  18,  21,  24,  25,  28, 

36,  46,  49,  51,  81;  as  shown 
in  State  constitutions,  51, 
52;  manifested  by  people, 
57,  59;  instances  of,  no,  119, 
138,  140,  167,  169,  170,  171, 
!93»    J94f    28°;     Clay     de- 


344 


Index 


Jealousy —  Continued 

nounces  it  as  foolish,  112; 
aroused  by  Jackson's  inva- 
sion of  Florida,  122 

Jefferson,  Thomas,  socialistic 
character  of,  36,  77;  opposes 
ratification  of  Constitution, 
5 1 ;  comes  into  power  and 
reduces  army,  74;  his  policy 
compared  with  Washing- 
ton's, 74;  his  professions  on 
peace,  75 ;  his  military  policy, 
76;  his  theory  of  disarma- 
ment, 76,  77,  78,  80;  plan 
to  secure  peace,  77;  urges 
employment  of  militia  in 
1803,  78;  perceives  advan- 
tages of  standing  army, 
8 1 ;  retaliatory  measures  of, 
82;  his  policy  destroys  mer- 
chant marine,  82;  his  in- 
consistent policies,  84;  his 
influence  for  peace,  86;  com- 
pared with  Kant  and  St.- 
Pierre,  87;  on  peace  and 
war,  88;  apostle  of  pacifists, 
89;  his  mixed  philosophy, 
89;  his  letter  on  peace  to 
General  Duane,  91;  on  mil- 
itia and  liberty,  92;  as 
Governor  of  Virginia,  92 ;  his 
feeble  military  policy,  93; 
his  inconsistencies,  93;  his 
remarks  on  officers,  94,  95; 
his  inhumane  plan  to  burn 
London,  96;  his  views  on 
privateers,  96;  regrets  Bona- 
parte's downfall,  97;  laments 
lack  of  standing  army,  97, 98 ; 
remarks  on  peace,  99;  threat- 
ens existence  of  London,  99 ; 
his  doctrine  analyzed,  105; 
was  not  a  pacifist,  105; 
threatens  France,  106;  his 
dream  of  empire,  107;  re- 
duces country  to  defenceless 
state,  109;  opposed  by  Madi- 
son, in;  his  policy  referred 
to,  120;  urges  Monroe  to 
declare  exclusive  policy,  124; 


not  a  real  pacifist,  286,  287; 
evades  expression  on  war, 
289 

Jeffersonian  doctrine,  analyzed, 
105;  destroyed  by  Clay  and 
Calhoun,  116 

Jingoism,  engendered  by  ex- 
cessive nationalism,  158; 
rampant  over  Texas,  159; 
over  Maine-Canada  ques- 
tion, 164;  over  Oregon 
trouble,  176;  period  of  un- 
restrained, 178;  of  Webster 
in  Hungarian  matter,  181; 
fosters  filibustering,  184; 
Quitman  and  Lopez,  188; 
Mexico  in  1866  and  Bering 
Sea  in  1892,  195,  219;  Chile, 
Brazilian,  and  Venezuelan 
incidents,  196,  219;  in  Span- 
ish-American War,  200; 
cause  of  future  wars,  219 

Kant,  his  philosophy,  87,  88 ; 
influence  on  Jefferson,  87; 
his  influence,  286,  287;  his 
idealism  annulled  by  Hegel, 
289;  his  lack  of  influence, 
290 

Kosciusko,  Jefferson's  letter 
to,  on  disarmament,  77; 
Jefferson's  letter  to,  in  181 1, 
84,  90,  91 

Kossuth,  and  his  revolution- 
ists abetted  by  United  States, 
181;  brought  to  United  States 
by  Congress,  182;  activities 
of,  in  United  States,  182 

Koszta,  Martin,  affair  of,  183 

Lasson,  Adolf,  on  superiority 
of  Germans,  298 

Latin  America,  view  of  United 
States'  designs  on  Cuba,  190; 
United  States  policy  con- 
cerning, 216;  Taft's  views 
concerning,  221 

Lincoln,  General,  in  Shay's 
Rebellion,  34 


Index 


345 


London,  Jefferson's  inhumane 
plan  to  burn,  96 

Lopez,  General,  his  Cuban 
revolutions,  188;  executed, 
189 

Louisiana,  Hamilton  suggests 
seizure  of,  70;  secret  treaty 
concerning,  between  Napo- 
leon and  Spain,  78;  purchased 
by  Jefferson,  81;  Spanish 
treaty  concerning,  106 

Lowell,  President,  of  Harvard 
University,  quoted,  332 

Lowndes,  Mr.,  of  South  Car- 
olina, mentioned,  no 

Luther,  mentioned,  230;  his 
views  on  peace  and  war, 
285,  290 

Machiavelli,  his  views  on  the 
State,  202 ;  his  views  on  war, 
284 

Madison,  James,  views  of,  on 
national  defence,  36;  be- 
comes President  in  1809,  83; 
sorry  condition  of  country 
under,  84;  peace  sentiment 
in  his  administration,  109; 
assisted  in  preparing  defence 
by  Clay,  in;  urges  vindica- 
tion of  national  dignity,  in; 
successes  of  his  administra- 
tion, 121 

Mailed  Fist,  Doctrine  of  the, 

,  295  _ 

Maine,  threatens  nullification, 
145,  146;  trouble  over  Can- 
adian boundary  of,  160, 
164 

Manoeuvres,  need  of  system 
of,  321 

Mars,  the  Goliath  of  our  day, 
242,  243 

Marshall,  John,  Jackson's  hos- 
tility to,  146 

Massachusetts,  Bill  of  Rights 
of,  military  provisions  of, 
25;  threats  of  nullification 
and  secession  in,  83;  threat- 
ens nullification,  146 


Maude,  Colonel  F.  N.,  quoted, 

293 

McHenry,  James,  Secretary  of 
War,  Adams'  letter  to,  on 
plan  of  defence,  65;  Hamil- 
ton's letter  to,  in  1798,  69 

McKeller  Bill,  the  recent,  323; 
necessary    amendments    of, 

325 

Mercenaries,  use  of,  6,  8 

Merchant  marine  destroyed 
by  Jefferson's  policy,  82 

Mctternich,  Austrian  Coun- 
sellor of  State,  interprets 
Monroe  Doctrine,  132,  134 

Mexico,  Burr  plots  to  over- 
throw and  seize,  108;  trouble 
with,  159;  protests  against 
annexation  of  Texas,  165; 
Calhoun's  attitude  toward, 
166,  172,  173;  war  with,  167; 
cedes  New  Mexico  and  Up- 
per California,  167;  Texas 
affairs  of,  175;  natural  lack 
of  faith  of,  in  United  States, 
188;  excitement  over  French 
occupation  of,  195,  219; 
ethical  duty  of  United  States 
as  to,  234 

Militarism,  prejudice  against, 
in  United  States,  194;  bears 
no  essential  relation  to  im- 
perialism, 202,  207;  no  dan- 
ger of,  210;  armament  dis- 
tinguished from,  246,  250; 
defined,  250,  251;  how  evi- 
denced, 251;  errors  concern- 
ing evidence  of ,  251, 252; rat- 
ing of  nations  in  scale  of,  251, 
252,  253,  254;  distinguished 
from  militancy,  254;  gener- 
ally misunderstood,  256; 
present  fear  of,  280;  evolu- 
tion and  nature  of,  280; 
Frederick  the  father  of,  302 ; 
origin  of,  310;  error  of,  312 

Military  Academy,  proposed 
by  Hamilton,  71;  advocates 
of,  82 ;  function  of  United 
States,  326 


346 


Index 


Military  burden  of  States  and 
individuals,  251,  252,  253; 
meaning  of,  269 

Military  character  misunder- 
stood by  people,  163 

Military  classification  of  na- 
tions, 254 

Military  expenditures  of  Great 
Powers,  251,  252,  253 

Military  policy,  Upton's  book 
on,  17;  adherence  to  original, 
22 ;  under  Articles  of  Confed- 
eration, 23;  inadequacy  of, 
in  1786,  33;  following  adop- 
tion of  constitution,  57,  59; 
in  1798,  67,  68;  Jefferson's, 
74,  76;  of  United  States 
reviewed  by  Webster,  202; 
never  revised,  206 

Military    power,   jealousy  of, 

9,   IO,   16,   18,  21,  49,  51,  8l; 

under  Articles  of  Confeder- 
ation, 22;  as  a  means  of 
defence,  41;  conferred  on 
Federal  Government,  48 ; 
Tucker's  and  Reinsch's  ob- 
servations on,  49;  popular 
fear  of,  57,  59 

Military  situation,  of  United 
States,  316;  conclusions  con- 
cerning, 327 

Military  training,  value  of,  to 
industry,  273 

Militia,  early  American,  II ; 
colonial,  created,  15;  prefer- 
ence of  recruits  for,  in  1776, 
18;  safe  defence  of  a  free 
people,  18,  25,  51;  Wash- 
ington's views  on,  21,  29; 
constitutional  provisions  con- 
cerning, 46,  47,  48,  49,  51; 
State  constitutional  provi- 
sions concerning,  52;  Dry- 
den's  poem  on  weakness  of, 
56 ;  used  in  Whiskey  Rebellion 
of  1794,  58;  Adams  urges 
training  of,  64;  Jefferson's  re- 
liance on,  74,  78;  advantages 
of  standing  army  over,  81; 
Jefferson's   remarks  on,  92; 


poor  showing  of,  in  18 12, 
92;  Clay's  references  to,  112; 
Webster's  views  on,  119; 
President  authorized  to  call 
out  in  1839,  160;  proposal  to 
train  by  Federal  authority, 
161;  Webster's  protest 
against  Federal  control  of, 
t6i  ;  Poinsett's  plan  for 
training  of,  1 62;  volunteers 
substituted  for,  in  Mexican 
War,  168;  Webster  praises 
and  favours,  170;  Wilson's 
reliance  on,  259;  Treitschke's 
condemnation  of,  263 

Mill,  John  Stuart,  on  value  of 
military  training,  273 

Minute  Men  of  the  colonies, 

?5. 

Mississippi  River,  dispute  with 
Spain    over    navigation    of, 

63 

Monroe,  James,  Jefferson's  let- 
ter to,  on  peace,  85;  con- 
ditions when  he  became 
President,  121;  his  views  on 
defence,  122;  his  broad  for- 
eign policy,  124 

Monroe  Doctrine,  referred  to, 
44;  origin  of,  121  et  seq.; 
real  purpose  of,  128;  text 
of  passages  in  message  to 
Congress,  129;  conflicting 
interpretations  of,  130  et  seq.; 
significance  of,  as  perceived 
in  Europe,  132;  separated 
America  from  Europe,  132; 
influence  of,  upon  other 
countries,  133,  135;  Polk's 
extension  of,  176,  177,  212; 
Calhoun's  interpretation  of, 
178,  212;  Adams'  interpre- 
tation of,  178,  212;  aban- 
doned by  Taylor,  179;  John 
W.  Foster's  discussion  of, 
180;  Japanese  policy  out  of 
accord  with,  192;  extension 
of,  by  Cleveland  and  Olney, 
197,  198;  misinterpreted, 
207;  most  recent  perversion 


Index 


347 


Monroe  Doctrine —  Continued 
of,  by  United  States  Senate, 
210;  never  understood,  212; 
an  obsolete  shibboleth,  214; 
evils  and  benefits  of,  214, 
215;  a  cause  of  future  wars, 
217;  a  national  fetish,  216, 
217, 222 ;  Taft's  peculiar  view 
of,  220;  necessity  of  defining, 
223 

Monroeism,  133,  135;  nature  of 
present,  210;  ultimate  cause 
of  future  wars,  223 

Moore,  John  Bassett,  his  re- 
mark on  American  pugna- 
city, 196 

More,  Sir  Thomas,  his  Utopia, 
284 

Morrill  Acts,  abuse  and  failure 
of,  325 

Napoleon,  his  secret  treaty 
with  Spain,  78;  Jefferson's 
regrets  over  his  downfall, 
97 ;  disregards  Jefferson,  107; 
sells  Louisiana  to  United 
States,  107 

National  defence,  Washington 
on,  29,  35,  61 ;  John  Adams 
on,  33,  64;  Hamilton  on,  36, 
41;  Pinckneys  on,  36;  Ran- 
dolph on,  36 ;  Madison  on,  36 ; 
Jay  on,  42;  means  of  secur- 
ing, 45;  provisions  for,  in 
Federal  Constitution,  46, 
47;  State  constitutional  pro- 
visions for,  51;  Adams  urges 
plan  of,  65,  66;  Hamilton's 
plans  for,  in  1798,  68, 69,  70; 
Adams  again  urges  plan  of, 
72,  73;  efforts  of  statesmen 
to  educate  people  concerning, 
73;  Polk's  views  on  means 
of,  169;  Bryan's  and  Teller's 
views  on,  171;  Webster's 
review  of  the  policy  of,  202 ; 
traditional  policy  of,  per- 
sistently adhered  to,  206; 
adequate,  226;  indispensable 
to  pacifism,  227;   fatuity  of 


American  people  concerning, 
238;  cost  of,  for  Great 
Powers,  251,  252,  253;  Presi- 
dent Wilson's  message  con- 
cerning, 256;  Taft's  views 
on,  267;  adequate,  what  it  is, 
312;  how  adequate,  is  deter- 
mined, 313 

National  Guard,  President 
Wilson's  views  on,  259; 
Treitschke  on,  263 

Nationalism,  influenced  by  the 
Congress  of  Vienna,  135; 
growth  of,  in  United  States, 
136;  spirit  of,  aroused  by 
Jackson,  141 ;  excessive,  gen- 
erates imperialism,  156;  en- 
gendered Jingoism,  158;  ag- 
gressive, distinguished  from 
militarism,  194 

Nations,  classification  of,  with 
respect  to  peaceableness,  254 

Naval  defence,  plan  of,  urged 
by  Adams,  64 

Naval  power,  United  States  to 
hold  balance  of,  44;  con- 
ferred on  Federal  Govern- 
ment, 47 

Navy,  Jay  on  value  of,  43; 
provisions  concerning,  in 
Federal  Constitution,  46,  47, 
48;  more  democratic  than 
army,  49;  creation  of,  urged 
in  1794,  59;  absurd  argu- 
ments against  building  of 
ships,  59,  60;  Adams  urges 
enlargement  of,  64;  criticizes, 
66 ;  natural  defence  of  United 
States,  67;  dismantled  by 
Jefferson,  82 ;  non-existent 
in  1808,  84;  Webster  urges 
upbuilding  of,  109,  113,  117; 
rehabilitated,  113;  influence 
of  Clay,  Calhoun,  Cheves, 
Lowndes,  upon,  113;  reduced 
in  1817,  123;  Webster  dis- 
cusses purposes  of,  203 ;  Wil- 
son's  views  on,  260 

Nelson,  Thomas,  Jr.,  letter  of, 
27 


348 


Index 


Neutrality,  advantages  of,  to 
United  States,  45;  when 
respected,  45;  Van  Buren 
unpopular  because  of  his, 
158;  violations  of  laws  of, 
by  United  States,  189 

New  Grenada,  or  Colombia, 
treaty  with,  177;  treaty  with, 
violated  by  Walker,  186 

New  Mexico,  territory  of,  ac- 
quired by  United  States,  167 

New  Orleans  placed  under 
martial  law  by  Jackson,  139 

Nicaragua,     Walker    invades, 

l87  ,        , 

Nietzsche,    referred    to,    206; 

quoted,  242,  263;  his  vicious 
philosophy,  243;  evil  influ- 
ence of,  293,  295,  296 

North -West  Territory,  dispute 
over,  63 

Nullification,  doctrine  of,  in 
Connecticut  and  Massachu- 
setts, 83;  Webster  proposes, 
119;  instances  of,  143,  144, 
145,  146 

Nullifiers,  of  South  Carolina, 
149 

Officers,  lack  of  experienced, 
94,  95;  how  to  provide 
reserve,  322 

Olney,  Richard,  his  amazing 
attitude  toward  Great  Brit- 
ain, 197 

Optimism  of  Rousseau,  289 

Oratory,  effect  of  cheap  and 
senseless,  239 

Oregon,  annexation  of,  cam- 
paign issue,  167;  trouble  with 
Great  Britain  over,  175 

Organized  militia,  why  in- 
effective, 317;  should  be 
paid,  322 

"Ostend  Manifesto,"  amazing 
incident  of,  190 

Pacifism,  Jefferson's  belief  in, 
81;  American  example  of, 
2Co;  Taft's  contribution  to, 


220;  defined,  227;  how  jus- 
tified, 233;  practical  con- 
sideration of,  237;  what  it 
should  include,  241;  error 
of  so-called,  247;  does  not 
properly  embrace  disarma- 
ment, 247;  origin  of,  286, 
289;  real  nature  and  task  of, 
308 

Panama  Canal  Zone,  United 
States  control  of,  207 

Panama,  Congress  of,  1826, 
United  States  sends  dele- 
gates to,  131,  213 

Panama,  Isthmus  of,  United 
States  guarantees  neutrality 
of,  177 

Pandora's  Box,  of  national 
doctrines,  133 

Paulsen  on  superiority  of 
Germans,  298 

Peace,  Washington  on  how  to 
secure,  35;  Jefferson's  letter 
to  Washington  on,  74 ;  Wash- 
ington's remarks  on,  75; 
socialistic  view  on,  77;  Jeffer- 
son's theories  on,  79,  82; 
impotence  of  conferences  on, 
80;  Jefferson's  professed  pol- 
icy in  181 1,  84;  Jefferson's 
letter  to  Monroe  on,  85;  ex- 
tent of  Jefferson's  influence 
for,  86;  Kant's  philosophy 
respecting,  87;  Jefferson  on, 
89,  91,  99,  100,  101,  102; 
John  Adams'  letter  con- 
cerning, 229;  Christ's  saying 
concerning,  234;  delusions 
concerning  universal,  237; 
hymn  concerning,  248;  Ten- 
nyson's poem  concerning, 
249;  President  Wilson  on, 
258;  Taft's  views  on  inter- 
national, 267;  dream  of 
perpetual,  289;  universal,  re- 
mote as  yet,  309;  prere- 
quisites of,  309;  by  victor's 
sword,  329 

Pensacola  seized  by  Jackson, 
122,  140 


Index 


349 


Perry,    Commodore,     "gently 

coerces"  Japan,  191,  192 
Persians  at  Arbela,  great  army 

of,  30 
Petition  of  Rights,  complaint 

against  soldiery  in,  10 
Philadelphia,  national  capital, 

captured,  92 
Philippines  acquired  by  United 

States,  208 
Philosophy,     false,     cause     of 

war,  246;  the  German  war, 

290  et  seq.;  evil  of  German, 

310  . 

Pierce,  President,  his  admin- 
istration, 184,  185,  186,  187; 
encourages  Walker,  187;  ad- 
vocate of  "Americaniza- 
tion," 187 

Pierce's  administration,  "Hey- 
day of  the  Filibuster,"  184; 
origin  of  spirit  of,  185 

Pinckneys,  the  (Charles  and 
C.  C),  views  of,  on  national 
defence,  36 

Plato  on  war,  88,  230,  282 

Poinsett,  Mr.,  wise  plan  of,  for 
training  militia,  162 

Police  protection,  economic 
function  of  armament,  276 

Polk,  President,  his  imperial- 
istic doctrine,  156;  nom- 
inated on  imperialistic  ticket, 
167;  conducts  war  with 
Mexico,  167;  lauds  volun- 
teers, 169;  his  erroneous 
views,  170;  imperialistic  pol- 
icy of,  172;  frankness  of, 
174;  his  extension  of  Mon- 
roe Doctrine  in  1845,  176, 
177;  advocates  occupation 
of  Yucatan,  178,  212 

"  Pork  barrel, "  how  to  destroy, 
320 

Porto  Rico,  United  States 
acquires,  207,  208 

Press,  unpacinc  temper  of 
United  States,  199,  200 

Prestige,  economic  function  of 
armament,  276 


Privateers,  Jefferson's  views  as 
to  use  of,  96 

Progress  the  law  of  life,  305 

"Protection,  Government  is," 
the  doctrine  of  Calhoun, 
no,  116,  149 

Prussia,  influence  of,  on  Mon- 
roe's doctrine,  126,  127; 
history  of,  interwoven  with 
war,  302  et  seq. 

Quitman,  John  Anthony,  Jingo 
imperialist,  188;  his  career, 
188 

Randolph,  Edmund,  views  of, 
on  national  defence,  36;  his 
commercial  policy,  39 

Randolph,  John,  of  Roanoke, 
opposes  War  of  1812,  no; 
his  erratic  views,  in;  op- 
position to  army,  122 

Regular    army,  adequate  size 

of,  319 

Reinsch,  Professor,  distin- 
guishes between  armies  and 
navies,  49;  quoted,  287 

Reserve,  lack  of,  in  United 
States,  317,  321 

Revolution,  the  American, 
reasons  for  England's  failure 
in,  28;  sad  record  of  Amer- 
ican soldiers  in,  28 

Revolution  of  18 10,  Spanish, 
in  Louisiana,  108 

Revolutionary  period,  mili- 
tary policy  of,  14 

Rhode  Island,  Dorr's  Rebel- 
lion in,  165 

Richmond,  capital  of  Virginia, 
captured,  92;  Webster's  ad- 
dress in,  161 

Root,  Elihu,  on  Monroe  Doc- 
trine, 129 

Rousseau,  his  influence  on 
Jefferson,  88;  his  influence 
for  peace,  286 

Ruskin  on  war,  281,  283 

Russia,    influenced     Monroe's 


350 


Index 


Russia — Continued 

doctrine,    125;   military   ex- 
penditures of,  251,  252,  253 

Salisbury,  Lord,  his  fine  con- 
duct in  the  Venezuelan  in- 
cident,   198,    199 

Samoan  Islands,  protectorate 
over,  200;  part  of,  acquired 
by  United  States,  207,  208 

San  Domingo,  United  States 
interest  in,  208 

Scharnhorst,  name  of,  revered 
in  Germany,  292 

Schiller  on  war,  290,  291 

Schlegel  on  war,  297 

Schools,     military,     requisite, 

323 

Scott,  General  Winfield,  men- 
tioned, 139 

Secession,  threatened  by  Mas- 
sachusetts, Rhode  Island, 
and  Connecticut,  83,  121; 
threats  of,  143 

Shay's  Rebellion,  effect  of,  34, 

35 

Silesia  seized  by  Frederick  the 

Great,  288 
Socialism  opposed  to  military 

power;  why?,  273 
Socialists,  views  of,  on  peace, 

77 
Solon,  his    remark  to  Croesus 

on  war,  31 
Soule,  Pierre,  his  remarkable 

career,  190;  issues  "Ostend 

Manifesto,"  190 
South     America,     Hamilton's 

suggestion  to  seize  parts  of, 

70;     influence     of     Monroe 

Doctrine  on,  125;  future  war 

involving,  223 
South    Carolina,    nullification 

doctrine     of,     143     et    seq.\ 

nullifies    Federal    law,    146, 

J47 

South  Carolinians,  galaxy  of 
brilliant,  and  their  attitude 
toward  national  defence,  113 

Spain,      dispute      of      United 


States  with,  over  treaty  of 
I795.  63;  secret  treaty  of 
Napoleon  with,  78;  threat- 
ened war  with,  78;  secret 
treaty  of  France  with,  106; 
United  States  violates  rights 
of,  in  18 10,  108;  Florida  pur- 
chased from,  140;  trouble 
with,  caused  by  Jackson,  140; 
her  natural  distrust  of  United 
States,  188;  United  States 
violates  rights  of,  189;  con- 
sulate of,  in  New  Orleans  de- 
stroyed, 189 

Spanish-American  War,  200 

Spencer,  Herbert,  his  views  on 
human  strife,  76;  his  theory 
of  evolution,  206;  his  views 
of  war,  283 

St.  Marks  seized  by  Jackson, 
122,  140 

St. -Pierre,  Abb£  de,  his  influ- 
ence for  peace,  87,  286 

Standing  armies,  distinction 
between,  and  mercenary 
force,  24;  Washington  on 
value  of,  29;  Bacon's  views 
on,  30;  Jefferson's  prejudice 
against,  36;  Hamilton's 
views  on  value  of,  41 ;  in- 
struments of  autocracy,  49; 
Jefferson  advocates,  97; 
Tocqueville  on  danger  of, 
168 

State  constitutions,  military 
provisions  of,  analyzed,  51 

State's  Rights,  doctrine  of, 
announced  by  Webster,  119 

Stein,  German  patriot,  302 

Steinmetz  on  war,  283 

Stoddert,  Adams'  letter  to,  on 
navy,  66 

Struggle,  cosmic  law  of,  231; 
Bagehot  on  group,  244;  Bur- 
roughs on  group,  245;  Bacon 
on   man's    predilection   for, 

247. 

Submissionists,  of  South  Car- 
olina, 149 

Swiss  mercenaries,  6 


Index 


35i 


Switzerland  armed  but  not 
militaristic,  246,  251 

Taft,  William  H.,  his  peculiar 
view  of  Monroe  Doctrine, 
220;  contributes  nothing  to 
peace,  221 ;  on  disarmament, 
267 
"Tariff  of  abominations,"  146 
Taylor,  Zachary,  becomes  Pre- 
sident, 179,  193;  abandons 
Monroe  Doctrine,  180;  inter- 
meddles with  Hungary,  180; 
elected  by  Jingo  influence, 

193 

Teller,  Senator,  error  of,  as  to 
danger  of  an  army,  171, 
256;  his  lack  of  experience, 
265 

Tennyson,  his  poem  on  uni- 
versal peace,  249 

Texas,  annexation  of,  159; 
annexation  of,  opposed  by 
Webster,  Benton,  and  Clay, 
166;  annexed  in  1845,  167; 
duplicity  of,  175 

Tigranes,  the  Armenian,  Vir- 
gil's reference  to,  30 

Tocqueville  quoted  on  war 
and  armies,  37,   168 

Tolstoi,  Count  Lyoff,  286 

Trade,  Hamilton's  aggressive 
policy  respecting,  38;  as 
cause  of  war,  41 ;  Adams 
urges  protection  of  United 
States,  64 

Training,  military,  lack  of,  in 
United  States,  317;  how  to 
provide  for,  321;  schools  for 
reserve  officers,  323 

Treaty,  Treitschke's  rule  for 
the  interpretation  of  a,  295 

Treaty  of  1778,  dispute  over, 
with  France,  63 

Treaty  of  1795,  dispute  with 
Spain  over,  63 

Treitschke,  referred  to,  206, 
263;  his  correct  views  as  to 
militia,  263;  in  accord  with 
George     Washington,     265; 


on  disarmament,  267;  evil 
influence  of,  295,  296 

Troops,  British  and  American, 
in  War  of  1812,  92 

Truxton,  Commodore,  wins 
naval  fight  with  French  in 
1799,  72 

Tucker,  John  Randolph,  his 
distinction  between  armies 
and  navies,  49;  remarks  of, 
on  military  power,  171 

Tutuila,  acquisition  of,  207 

Tyler,  John,  solves  Maine- 
Canada  problem,  164 

Unionists  of  South  Carolina, 
149 

United  States,  military  ex- 
penditures of,  251,  252,  253; 
what  is  adequate  armament 
for,  312;  military  situation 
of,  316 

Upton 's  great  book  on  military 
policy  of  the  United  States, 

17 
Usher,  Roland  G.,  referred  to, 

299.  331 

Van  Buren,  his  doctrine,  157; 
discourages  Texans,  1 59 ; 
army  increased  by,  160; 
defeated  by  efforts  of  Clay 
and  Calhoun,  162 

Vegetius  on  war  and  peace, 
282 

Venetians  on  peace  and  war, 
282 

Venezuela,  altercation  over, 
in  1895,  197,  208,  219 

Verona,  Congress  of,  127 

Vienna,  Congress  of,  its  influ- 
ence for  nationalism,  135 

Virgil,  his  observations  on 
armies  and  war,  30 

Virginia  Bill  of  Rights,  mili- 
tary provision  in,  18;  cir- 
cumstances connected  with, 
27;  Thomas  Nelson,  Jr.'s, 
letter  on,  27 


352 


Index 


Volunteers,  reliance  on,  in 
United  States,  74;  compara- 
tive number  of,  employed 
in  1846,  168 

Vries,  Hugo  de,  his  theory  of 
war,  206,  283 

Wagner,  Clauss,  on  war,  297 
Walker,  William,  his  remark- 
able career  as  a   filibuster, 

185 
War,  Virgil's  observations  on, 
30;  Solon's  observations  on, 
31 ;  Tocqueville  on,  37;  Ham- 
ilton on  commerce  as  cause 
of,  41,  45;  Jay  on  human 
nature  and,  42;  Adams  on 
commercial,  66;  Adams  on 
probability  of  future,  72; 
ultimate  causes  of,  unknown 
except  in  retrospect,  79; 
Jefferson  on,  88;  Kant  and 
St. -Pierre  on,  88;  Dionysius, 
Plato,  and  Heraclitus  on,  88 ; 
German  doctrine  of,  88; 
Washington's  views  on,  88; 
Jefferson's  views  on,  99,  1 00, 
101,  105;  Calhoun's  doc- 
trine of,  116;  Webster's 
remarks  on,  117;  Tocque- 
ville's  views  on,  168;  guilt 
for  Mexican,  173;  American 
readiness  to  provoke,  194; 
Monroe  Doctrine  cause  of 
future,  219,  222;  causes  of, 
in  United  States,  223;  John 
Adams  on,  229;  inevitable, 
230;  part  of  cosmic  process, 
231;  Angell  styles  it  an 
illusion,  233,  237;  vicious 
Nietzschean  philosophy  of, 
242 ;  will  continue  as  cosmic 
agency,  243,  244;  false  phi- 
losophy of  militarism  cause 
of,  246;  economics  of,  dis- 
cussed, 255  et  seq.;  distin- 
guished from  armament, 
279;  the  German  philosophy 
of,  280,  285;  evolution  of  the 
false    philosophy    of,    281; 


Heraclitus  and  Dionysius  on, 
281;  Ruskin  on,  281;  Plato 
on,  282;  Vegetius  on,  282; 
Horace  on,  282;  Washington 
on,  282;  Venetians  on,  282; 
Bagehot  on,  282;  Darwin, 
Huxley,  and  Spencer  on,  283 ; 
Ward  on,  283;  de  Vries  on, 
283;  Bergson  and  Steinmetz 
on,  283;  Aristotle  on,  284; 
Machiavelli  on,  284;  Bacon 
on,  284;  Hobbes  on,  285; 
Luther  on,  285;  John  Adams 
on,  289;  Goethe  and  Schiller 
on,  290,  291;  Clausewitz's 
theory  of,  292;  Treitschke 
on,  295;  Nietzsche  on,  296; 
Schlegel  and  Wagner  on, 
297;  Goethe  on  empire  and 
strife,  301;  Frederick  the 
Great  on,  303;  Kaiser  Wil- 
liam's conception  of,  305; 
due  to  German  philosophy, 
310 
War  of  1 8 12,  troops  engaged 
in,  92;  forced  on  Congress, 

113 

War  with  France,  1799,  71,  72 
Ward,  Lester  Frank,  on  war, 

283 
Washington     City,     effect    of 

burning  of,  on  the  country, 

93,  95 

Washington,  George,  his  views 
on  the  army,  15,  16;  on  the 
militia,  21;  on  jealousy  of 
army,  21,  24;  as  military 
dictator,  22;  on  regular 
troops  and  militia,  29;  on 
peace  and  national  defence, 
35;  urges  measures  for  na- 
tional defence,  61;  his  warn- 
ing in  farewell  address,  62; 
nature  of  his  national  doc- 
trine, 63 ;  becomes  command- 
er-in-chief in  1798,  65;  his 
policy  compared  with  Jef- 
ferson's, 74;  Bancroft  quoted 
on,  75;  his  desire  for  peace, 
75;  his  advice  disregarded, 


Index 


353 


Washington — Continued 

240,  241 ;  on  war  and  peace, 
282 

Washingtonian  Doctrine,  57, 
62,  63,  74 

Webster,  Daniel,  upholds  navy 
in  his  youth,  109;  urges  pro- 
tection of  United  States 
commerce,  no;  advocates 
creation  of  a  strong  navy, 
113;  his  influence  in  New 
England,  116;  assails  com- 
pulsory military  service,  118; 
proposes  nullification  as  duty 
of  a  State,  119,  144;  protests 
against  Federal  control  of 
militia,  161;  accepts  State 
portfolio,  164;  opposes  an- 
nexation of  Texas,  166;  er- 
roneous views  as  to  militia 
and  volunteers,  170;  his 
views  as  to  Cuba,  174; 
blatant  Jingoism  of,  181; 
his  military  conceptions, 
202;  evils  of  his  teachings, 
205;  his  remark  concerning 
British  Empire  applied  to 
United  States,  260 

Weltpolitik,     origin     of,     294, 

295 

West  Point,  function  of,  326 
Western  Democracy,  origin  of, 

136;  favours  exclusive  policy, 

136;  rise  of,  141,  142 
Whiskey  Rebellion  of  1794,  sup- 


pressed by  force,  58;  influ- 
ences creation  of  an  army,  6 1 

William,  Kaiser,  pupil  of  Bis- 
marck, 303;  his  lust  for 
war,  303;  justifies  actions 
by  appeals  to  God,  303;  his 
belief  in  Frederick,  303,  304; 
his  principles  concerning  war, 
304;  his  barbarism,  305,  306; 
must  answer  at  bar  of 
humanity,  307 

Wilson,  President,  his  cabinet 
compared  to  Jackson's,  142; 
his  message  of  1914  on 
national  defence,  256;  his 
erroneous  views,  261;  his 
views  at  variance  with  those 
of  the  Secretary  of  War,  263 ; 
his  lack  of  experience,  265; 
his  "clear  policy,  "  265;  fears 
militarism,  280 

Wirth  on  superiority  of  Ger- 
mans, 298 

Woltman  on  superiority  of 
Germans,  298 

Wood,  Major-General  Leonard, 
referred  to,  332 

Wyoming,  United  States  ac- 
quires, 167 

"Young  America,"  spirit  of, 
184 

Yucatan,  occupation  of,  advo- 
cated by  Polk,  178,  212; 
opposed  by  Calhoun,  178 


23 


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